

What does it mean to live in democracy around the world?

Simeon Mitropolitski

simeon.mitropolitski@gmail.com

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People around the world overwhelmingly support democracy and also in quite large numbers equate this political regime with the right to elect politicians in free elections, suggests the data from the most recent wave of World Values Survey (WVS). Beyond this universally accepted procedural definition of democracy, do people around the world interpret democracy in the same way? Is political culture providing additional signifiers that pluralize democracy to the point of blending different political regimes under the same semantic umbrella?

This study gives affirmative answer to pluralistic understanding of democracy. It makes secondary analysis of WVS of all countries that provide data from the most recent 6th wave of survey (2010-2014). Its results suggest that regional clusters of states may relate democracy to regimes that favor strong authoritarian leaders, army rulers, expert rulers and religious authorities with a final say in interpreting the laws. Clusters of countries may also relate democracy to centralized wealth redistribution and centralized security arrangements that respect local traditional authorities. Finally, democracy may refer to political system without autonomy vis-à-vis local community.

Research question, methodology

“Having a democratic political system” as a norm has already won the hearts and minds of people around the world. According to the most recent 6th wave of World Values Survey (WVS), an average of 88% of the population in 59 countries (all countries for which relevant data is available) consider having democratic political system as something “very good” and “fairly good”. The range of approval for democracy, of course, varies from country to country, but in no country it falls below still overwhelming 71.9% (Kyrgyzstan). Likewise, people around the world value the “importance of democracy”. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 means “absolutely important”, they answer this question with an average of 8.3, with the lowest score in Bahrain (7.22), again well above the scale's middle point. Furthermore, most people around the world are well informed about the key characteristic of democratic political system, that “people choose their leaders in free elections”. Again, on a scale between 1 and 10, their global average reaches 8.79, with only one country showing a mean score below 5 (Bahrain, 4.96). Not surprisingly, the results of these three variables taken from the WVS: the preference for a democratic political system (v1), the opinion on importance of democracy (v2), and the knowledge about its main feature (v3) are positively correlated. The correlation coefficient between v1 and v2, and between v2 and v3 is 0.66; between v1 and v3 is 0.6. Less enthusiastic but still overall positive is the global opinion about the current national political situation (v4). The answers almost reach an average of 6 on scale between 1 and 10, with the minimum never falling below 3.8 (Armenia) and only in 11 cases (out of 59) falling below 5. On the other side, the maximum never exceeds 7.68 (Uruguay) and only in 9 cases it exceeds 7. In other words, people in no country are completely satisfied with the state of democracy at home, but nonetheless none of the countries falls into the

extreme opposite, as if the entire world on this question falls within some intermediate shades of lightness/darkness. Being part of different levels of perception of democracy, more normative (v1, v2 and v3) and more descriptive (v4), it is of no surprise that v4 does not make high positive correlations with the other three more normative variables. In other words, the fact that people highly appreciate democratic system and identify free elections as its essential feature does not automatically lead to high appreciation of the state of democracy at home. In fact, the correlation coefficient between v1 and v4 is barely 0.02, which means that people at quite different levels of preference for democracy may be equally critical toward their national state of democracy; it also means that people at quite different levels of assessment for their national state of democracy may have quite similar attitudes toward democratic system taken as a norm. Slightly less intuitive is the moderate positive correlation coefficient between v2 and v4 (0.25). This result suggests that the relation between the two is less arbitrary than that between v1 and v4; it also suggests that despite the strong correlation between v1 and v2, they are not semantic identical twins. In other words, significant number of people make difference between having positive attitudes toward democracy as political system and considering democracy as important. Despite strong positive correlations with either v1 or v2, v3 actually shows some although not very strong negative correlation with v4 (-0.14). Possible understanding of this paradox would be to consider those who put free elections at the center of democratic experience very sensitive as far as any breach of this norm is observed at home.

Are these low levels of correlation, both positive and negative, between v4, on the one side, and v1, v2 and v3, on the other side, too low or too high? In other words, are people too critical or too tolerant in assessing the state of democracy at home? To answer these questions, it would be appropriate to put into equation another descriptive variable measuring democratic performance. This additional variable may be the Freedom House (FH) rating of political rights and civil liberties. As expected, there is significant correlation between FH and v4 (-0.36); the negative sign of this correlation is due to the fact that FH rates best performing countries with the lowest marks. The correlations between FH, on the one hand, and v2 and v3, on the other hand, are even higher (-0.43 and -0.45). The quite significant difference between these negative correlations and the difference between the normative variables: v1, v2 and v3, and descriptive variable v4 (-0.14) within WVS suggests that people are not equating democracy with free elections only. They may consider other attribute(s) of democracy as essential for its good functioning. **Finding this or these attributes represents the main goal of this paper.**

I start from the assumption that there is at least one attribute in addition to free elections that influences positively the people's perceptions of the state of democracy at home. In other words, people tend to assess the state of democracy rosier not because they close eyes on problems related to free election practices, but because, notwithstanding these problems, they still find enough independent factors that make up for the deficiency of these practices, measured by v3.

Where to look for possible clues for these missing additional attributes of democracy and how to make sure we have found the correct ones? This paper will analyze available data from the 6th wave of WVS as far as people's assessment of democratic attributes is concerned. A series of questions within this survey have asked people to assess different statements on democracy and its attributes, therefore our analysis will have to choose among them. To be considered as satisfying our curiosity, the new unorthodox attributes for democracy must meet the following conditions: 1. They should have good positive correlation with normative vision of democracy, presented by either v1 and v2; 2. They should have significant negative correlation with FH index (negative because FH rates best performing democracies with lowest marks); 3. They should have little or no correlation with v3, thus suggesting that these democratic attributes are indeed different within particular political culture. To note that condition #2 is less important than #1 and #3 because this data is not part of the WVS. The results from #2 however may act as a reinforcing argument if the other conditions (#1 and #3) are met.

Findings

Democracy among other political regimes

To begin with, some intuitively alternative forms of political system are tested within WVS: 1. Having a strong leader not having to bother with parliament and election (V127); 2. Having experts, not government, make decisions (V128); and 3. Having the army rule (V129). People who find “very good” and “fairly good” these political systems are 45.6% (V127), 59.6% (V128), and 24.9% (V129). What are the correlations of these supposedly alternative political systems with the data representing normative visions of democracy (v1 and v2), with the self-assessment of democratic governance (v4), and with the external assessment of the democratic performance (FH index)? Regarding the first condition, the good *positive* correlation with either v1 and v2, all supposedly alternative political systems show small to significant *negative* correlations, ranging from -0.11 to -0.44. To note here that intuitively, if these political systems were truly alternative to one another, the expectations for negative correlations among them would be much higher than observed. The government of experts (V128) for both v1 and v2 shows very moderate *negative* correlation, ranging from -0.11 to -0.15, suggesting that many people do not see it as a comprehensive alternative but rather as an add-on to democratic system.

As far as the second condition is concerned, having significant *negative* correlation with FH index, the results again, are rather opposite. Thus, some *positive* correlations are suggested between FH index and all supposedly alternative political systems, ranging from quite insignificant with the rule of experts (0.05) to quite significant with the army rule (0.42). Again, as in the previous paragraph, the expert rule is more like an add-on to the democratic system than a comprehensive systemic alternative.

Finally, regarding the third condition, having little or no correlation with v3, presenting the minimalist electoral vision of democracy, the results show such insignificant correlation (0.02) only with V128 (expert rule); with the other two systems the negative correlation being significant (-0.26 for the “army rule” and -0.53 for “strong leader”).

It is impossible at this stage to find comprehensive solution to the research question for the entire world population. We can however try to look for clues by dividing the world into geographic cultural clusters of countries. The entire population of 59 countries thus will be divided into 5 clusters, each of which with sufficient number of cases to allow for bivariate analysis: Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East/North Africa, Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States, and the rest of Africa.

As far as Latin America and Caribbean are concerned (9 countries), regarding the first condition, the good *positive* correlation with either v1 and v2, all supposedly alternative political systems show significant *negative* correlations, ranging from -0.39 to -0.73. As far as the second condition is concerned, having significant *negative* correlation with FH index, the results again, are quite the opposite. Within this cluster of countries, though, even the expert rule has strong positive correlation with FH index (0.43). For the other two political regimes, the correlation goes up to 0.59 and 0.66. Finally, regarding the third condition, having little or no correlation with v3, presenting the electoralist vision of democracy, the results show no such insignificant correlation with any alternative political regime, the scores ranging between -0.44 and -0.76. The region of Latin America and Caribbean does not provide any valuable clue as for the extended meaning of democracy. People there make quite clear distinction between democratic, military, autocratic and expert rule.

As far as the region of the Middle East and North Africa is concerned (14 countries), regarding the first condition, the good *positive* correlation with either v1 and v2, two regimes – unrestricted leader and experts, enjoy such positive correlation, ranging from small 0.05 (v1:strong leader) to significant over 0.30 (v1:experts; v2:experts; v2:strong leader). The third regime, the army rule shows significant *negative* correlation. Peoples in this region do not see incompatibility between democracy and technocracy, and to some extent between democracy and autocracy. As far as the second condition

is concerned, having significant *negative* correlation with FH index, the results, again, eliminate the army rule (0.03) but retain to some extent the other two regimes, autocracy (-0.15) and technocracy (-0.08). Regarding the third condition, having little or no correlation with v3, the results run against the expectations. The correlation is negative with the army rule (-0.45) and with the authoritarianism (-0.12), and positive with technocracy (0.33). Despite the results that defy our expectations on 3rd condition, the region of Middle East and North Africa becomes an interesting location for uncovering an enlarged meaning of democracy, meaning that embraces elements of authoritarian and technocratic regimes.

As far as Europe is concerned (9 countries), regarding the first condition, the good *positive* correlation with either v1 and v2, none of the alternative regimes shows such positive correlation, although there are insignificant positive correlations in some cases, such as v1:strong leader and v2:army rule. The remaining correlations are negative, ranging from -0.14 to -0.87. It is interesting to note that people tend to oppose more democracy with technocracy than democracy with other two alternative regimes: military rule and autocracy. As far as the second condition is concerned, having significant *negative* correlation with FH index, the results, again, eliminate all expectations. All correlations are highly positive, ranging from 0.47 to 0.88. Regarding the third condition, having little or no correlation with v3, the only results that confirm this expectation concern the army rule (-0.02). The other two regimes, autocracy and technocracy, show significant negative correlations (-0.33 and -0.46). It is clear that Europe is not a good place to find multiple meanings for democracy, although some answers regarding military rule and autocracy may leave room for further elaboration.

As far as the CIS is concerned (9 countries), regarding the first condition, the good *positive* correlation with either v1 and v2, such correlation is present between v1 and v2, on the one hand, and the army rule (0.13 and 0.38). As for the other two political regimes – autocracy and technocracy, the correlation is negative, ranging from insignificant to quite significant (-0.46). As far as the second condition is concerned, having significant *negative* correlation with FH index, such correlation is present with autocracy (-0.34); the other two regimes – military rule and technocracy are positively correlated (0.17 and 0.54). Regarding the third condition, having little or no correlation with v3, all three regimes confirm the expectations, their correlations ranging from -0.01 (army rule) to quite modest 0.1 (autocracy). In general, the CIS countries show extended meaning of democracy that includes elements of army rule and autocracy, but no elements from technocracy.

Finally, as far as African countries (excluding North Africa) are concerned (5 countries), regarding the first condition, the good *positive* correlation with either v1 and v2, such correlation is nowhere observed; there is only a slight positive correlation between v2 and technocracy (0.08); the remaining correlations are negative. As far as the second condition is concerned, having significant *negative* correlation with FH index, such correlation is observed only in the case of autocracy (-0.23); the remaining two regimes show small positive correlation or no correlation at all. Regarding the third condition, having little or no correlation with v3, the only variable that confirms this expectation is technocracy (0.07); the remaining two regimes showing huge negative correlation (-0.79 and -0.99). The findings in Africa are weaker than in the Middle East and in the CIS, but nevertheless, some correlations may suggest of groups that have extended interpretation of democracy going beyond the free elections. Although some regions present interesting food for thought, comparing the attitudes toward different political regimes seems not convincing in explaining the paradox of not quite critical attitudes toward domestic state of democracy.

Democratic attributes

In addition to presenting democracy in its relation to other political regimes, the meaning of democracy may also be understood through its relation to some social and political attributes that have been presented for assessment, again, within the 6h wave of WVS. I am especially interested in

presenting democracy in relation to attributes that lie outside the liberal democratic theory, such as V131. Governments tax the rich and subsidizes the poor; V132. Religious authorities interpret the laws; and V135. The army takes over when government is incompetent. Again, we will check these new variables against the three expectations, the same we did with the alternative political regimes: 1. Whether they show strong *positive* correlation with either v1 or v2; 2. Whether they show strong *negative* correlation with FH index; and 3. Whether they have little or no correlation with v3. Again, we will proceed from the entire population toward geographically and cultural clusters.

The entire population does not confirm the first expectation. Only V131 has small positive correlation with both v1 and v2. Both V132 and V135 have moderate to strong negative correlations with both v1 and v2. The small positive correlation between taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor, although not part of orthodox liberal democratic theory, is hardly a surprise given the close link between being part of the majority and being poor. If such interpretation is correct, then we should expect that the positive correlation between V131 and both v1 and v2 will rise for the geographic regions with generally low purchasing power, such as Africa and possibly Latina America and Caribbean. On the issue of expected negative correlation with the FH index, the expectation is rejected for all attributes; they all show positive correlation. As for the third expectation, it is also rejected; the results show either positive correlation (with V131) or negative correlation (with V132 and V135) with v3, but never little or no correlation as expected.

As far as the region of Latin America and Caribbean is concerned, the expectations regarding the support for V131 is confirmed. The correlation between this variable and both v1 and v2 is strong and positive (0.25 and 0.55). Democracy and redistribution of wealth are not just coexisting; the redistribution is an essential attribute of democracy. As for the other two attributes, represented by V132 and V135, their correlation is negative, and the magnitude exceeds that within the general population. Not surprisingly too, only V131 shows strong negative correlation with the FH index (-0.34), the other two attributes showing even stronger but positive correlation (0.79 and 0.83). On the issue v3, all attributes show either positive or negative correlations, but none behaves as expected.

As far as the region of North Africa and the Middle East is concerned, all three attributes show positive, from moderate to strong correlations with both v1 and v2. The magnitude of correlation is lowest as far as the military coup is concerned (0.29 and 0.14), stronger as far as religious authorities are given right to interpret the laws (0.43 and 0.61), and reaches its highest when redistribution of wealth is taken into account (0.74 and 0.76). As far as the expectation for negative correlation with the FH index is concerned, only the question of the wealth redistribution behaves as expected; the other two attributes do not follow the direction of expectations. Finally, all three attributes show strong positive correlation with v3, thus rejecting this expectation too.

As far as Europe is concerned, the expectations regarding the support for V131 is partially confirmed. The correlation between this variable and v1 positive (0.26) but with v2 is negative (-0.18). As for the other two attributes, represented by V132 and V135, their correlation is negative, ranging from -0.23 to -0.65. Not surprisingly too, only V131 shows strong negative correlation with the FH index (-0.27), the other two attributes showing even stronger but positive correlation (0.45 and 0.83). On the issue v3, all attributes show either positive or negative correlations, but none behaves as expected.

As far as the CIS is concerned, in almost all cases all three attributes have positive correlations with both v1 and v2; the magnitude of correlation ranges from 0.21 to 0.29. The only exception is the correlation between the v2 and the redistribution of wealth (-0.10). On the second expectation, only the redistribution shows strong negative correlation with the FH index (-0.23); the other two correlations are positive. Quite interesting, two out of three attributes show quite low values in relation to v3 (0.03 and 0.10), thus meeting our expectations. The attributes in question are the role of the religious authorities and the possible military coup.

Finally, as far as Africa is concerned, none of the three possible democratic attributes shows

positive correlation with either v1 or v2; these correlations are negative and their magnitude is strong from -0.48 to -0.91. At first, it seems like people in these countries adhere to strict liberal understanding of democracy. This however is far from the truth because the same people reject linking democracy with free elections. The puzzle becomes even more interesting having in mind that people in Africa almost unanimously approve democracy as a political regime (0.98). To make the situation even more confusing, the expectations regarding the *negative* correlation with the FH index are partly confirmed; V131 and V132 show negative correlations ranging from -0.28 to -0.41. Why religion and material redistribution become important here but not as far as v1 and v2 are mentioned will be discussed later. Finally, all attributes shows important correlations with v3 thus defying our expectations.

Discussion

This section will discuss cases in which data confirms the presence of enlarged or modified meaning for the concept of democracy. It will also discuss other cases that defy explanation based on results from descriptive analysis. The cases to be discussed deal with the following phenomena:

1. The compatibility of democracy, on the one hand, and technocracy (epitomized by rule of experts) and autocracy (epitomized by rule of unrestricted strong leader), on the other hand, for the people living in North Africa and the Middle East.
2. The compatibility of some markers for democracy, on the one hand, and army rule and autocracy, for the people living in the CIS.
3. The compatibility of some markers for democracy, on the one hand, and technocracy, for the people living in Africa. Answering this question will also touch upon the paradox that people in Africa overwhelmingly support democracy while simultaneously reject the link between democracy and free elections.
4. The compatibility between the idea of democracy and the idea that governments should tax the rich and subsidizes the poor, expressed by the people living in Latin America and Caribbean, in North Africa and the Middle East, in the CIS, and partially in Europe.
5. The compatibility between the idea of democracy and the idea that the religious authorities should interpret the laws, and that the army should take over when government is incompetent, expressed by the people living in North Africa and the Middle East, and in the CIS.

Regarding the first question, the compatibility of democracy, on the one hand, and technocracy and autocracy, on the other hand, for the people living in North Africa and the Middle East, the first thing to mention here is the high level of correlation between technocracy and autocracy for the population in this region (0.44). They are simply not quite autonomous from one another, in addition to the fact that they do not negate the principle of democracy. Taking a few more questions from the WVS may elucidate to a degree the meaning of these two alternative forms of government and try to understand the reason why people in the region do not take them as real alternatives to democracy. The additional questions deal with the attitudes toward obedience, authority, technological development, competence and respect for seniors (over 70 year old people) and the general level of post-materialist values. The principle that we apply here is the search for highest level of correlation. Thus, we learn that people in the region are expecting higher respect for authority in the near future (V69), irrespectively from the shape this authority takes. This authority as a general principle, however, has nothing to do with blind obedience, something people will not teach their children (V21). It has more to do with respecting senior people (V163). This respect is not limited to youngsters only; nothing in the wording suggest that public authorities are kept outside the circle of people that are supposed to provide this respect. As a special glue, the role of (respected) seniors is to stick the different forms of government and make them responsible to the entire population, not always through the power of the ballot boxes but always through the symbolic power of the patriarchs. If this hypothesis is correct then

we should expect particularly high level of popular confidence within the family institution. The results suggest that we are right, the entire region has extremely high levels of belief in the importance of the family (91.3% very important + 6.7% rather important).

Regarding the second question, which is the compatibility of some markers for democracy, on the one hand, and the army rule and autocracy, on the other hand, for the people living in the CIS, the WVS suggests an interesting interpretation. The blind confidence in authority, in any authority, is only the first tentative step toward unlocking the world of significance. People from the region teach their children obedience and how to prevent self-expression. This trend becomes more important for those who suggest authoritarian political regime, military or civic. Although these two forms of authoritarian regimes look like twin brothers, people from the region fall into two different groups as far as their rationalization is concerned. The defenders of military authoritarianism adopt gender-based approach in politics, in which only men make good rulers. These also are people who may justify when men beat their women. The civic branch of authoritarianism is quite different in this respect. It rejects the notion that men make better rulers than women and shows no trend as far as question of men beating their women is concerned. These two branches of authoritarianism, whoever, embrace each other on one important point – in some cases the violence against other people is justifiable. If I have to identify the ideal type of personality that may stand with each of these two branches, I would say that “military” type evokes the image of alpha-male that cuts short the chain of decision implementation by imposing its will by force; the “civic” type, on the other hand, is a gender-neutral beta-type, who fears losing its comparative position in society and who is ready to sacrifice its rights in the name of a stronger Leviathan who will take care of weak people like him- or herself.

The third question concerns the compatibility of some markers for democracy, on the one hand, and technocracy, on the other hand, for the people living in Sub-Sahara Africa. In fact, a slight correlation is observed between democracy as a norm and as real a situation and technocracy as a political regime. The other peculiarities of our 5 African cases are the large predominance of democratic norms without linking these norms to liberal mechanisms such as free elections; also the predominant rejection of military and civilian authoritarian regimes. How to explain these paradoxes? What is the meaning of democracy and why technocracy moves close to it? To answer these questions I will use an approach based on the hypothesis that Sub-Sahara African nations are still very much influenced by traditional values and social structures. According to this vision, democratic values refer mainly to the collective rights covering their family and neighborhoods. Another hypothesis, this time in relation to the relative approval of technocracy, is that “expert” rule in these countries will have less to do with science than with traditional knowledge. In fact, WVS confirms these hypotheses. People who embrace democracy as preferred form of political system also predominantly see themselves as part of local community (0.78). It is interesting to note that both identifications, with the country and with the local community, are also almost completely overlapping (0.92). The only logical explanation for this overlapping is that national belonging symbolically passes through the belonging to local community (“I am part of this country because I am part of this local community”). This local community, however, has traditional foundations, which explains the high disapproval ratings for statements that “old people are burden to society” (65.3% “strongly disagree” and “disagree”). As far as the “expert” hypothesis is concerned, a moderate positive correlation is observed between democratic regime and dominance of religious knowledge over science (0.09). This correlation is consistent in direction and in magnitude with those that related to the rule of experts. To sum-up, in Sub-Sahara Africa people look at the political system as continuation of local links and influence. The democratic political regime, therefore, mainly refers to the power that expresses and protects the interests of local communities, in which the low autonomy people find sense of belonging and protection (Autonomy index for the region is -18.2; for comparison the world average is + 9.7; the number is calculated by subtracting the positive values representing “Determination, perseverance/Independence” and negative values representing “Obedience/Religious Faith”). The

mechanisms that link the local communities to the central authority are not so much elections as the older people and those with special non-scientific expertise, e.g. local religious authorities.

The fourth question deals with the compatibility between the positive attitude towards democracy and the idea that governments should tax the rich and subsidize the poor, expressed by the people living in Latin America and Caribbean countries (0.55), in North Africa and Middle East (0.74), in CIS (0.21), and also in Europe (0.26). In the light of the discussion above on Africa it becomes clearer why on this issue people in these countries will not make link between democracy and wealth redistribution by the government. Having no particular attachment to the nation-state, these nations will not make it instrumental in terms of wealth redistribution. Now, among four regions that express any positive correlation, this discussion will cover the countries from two regions where the correlation is particularly strong (Latin America and the Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East). Although both regions show similar trends regarding the link between democracy and wealth redistribution, they nevertheless represent two different cultural models, in which this relationship has different understanding. In North Africa and the Middle East, people with this understanding of democracy also consider the state as a collective good, which explains their willingness to fight for it if necessary (0.36). There is no such positive correlation in Latin America (-0.31). If the state there has some value, it is purely instrumental. In Latin America, however, what makes people attached to the state is its capacity of business manager (0.79). In contrast, in North Africa and the Middle East this correlation is insignificant (0.08). Not surprisingly, in Latin America people value positively caring about the neighbors (0.59). There is no such positive correlation in North Africa and the Middle East; in fact the correlation is strongly negative (-0.36). This important difference between the regions suggest that behind the common features, such as taking the state as income equalizer, the ideal political system that will guarantee this economic egalitarianism is quite different. In Latin America democratically-minded people want to integrate the state that symbolizes economic management, to fill positions that will help them make up for their original economic disadvantage. In North Africa and the Middle East, on the other hand, democratically-minded people want to integrate the state in its capacity of security provider.

Finally, the fifth question within the first group discusses the compatibility between the idea of democracy and the idea that the religious authorities should interpret the laws, and that the army should take over when government is incompetent. The regions where such ideas are mostly expressed are North Africa and the Middle East, and the CIS. As far as the first part of this question is concerned, we will test elements of hypothesis that attributes the meaning to the importance of religion in life and to the general prevalence of religious considerations over science. As for the second part of this question is concerned, I will test elements of hypothesis that attributes meaning to the importance of the army in social life. Regarding the place of religion, all four chosen indicators for North Africa and the Middle East suggest strong positive correlation (around 0.70) with the idea that democracy is compatible with religious authorities interpreting the law; as for the CIS countries, this correlation is negative with the exception of moderately positive correlation with the indicator of confidence toward religious institutions. Regarding the place of the armed forces, the countries from North Africa and the Middle East do not show positive correlation between the idea of military coup and the confidence in armed forces; the CIS countries, on the opposite, are making strong positive correlation between these two variables (0.43). The most interesting element of this analysis is the strong positive correlation between these two quite different forms of political regime, symbolizing the ultimate unfolding of theocracy and militarism. People who support these regimes and who at the same time consider them as compatible to democracy are quite often the same respondents. Unfortunately, the WVS data does not allow us making any suggestion regarding why this correlation is strongly positive. One possible explanation may be that the idea of allowing the army to take control over the government is somehow related to religious teaching in these two regions. Therefore the approval for military coup is conditioned upon the high confidence in religious authorities. Statistics confirm this suggestion but I will not jump into

fast conclusions without additional elaboration.

Conclusion

The wrap-up the main conclusions, people around the world make interpretation of democracy that goes beyond the minimalist liberal view of free and fair elections. First, in many regions, except for the Sub-Sahara Africa, people see democracy as a way of more just redistribution of wealth, taking from the rich and giving to the poor. This understanding of democracy has two main regional varieties: 1) In Latin America people see the state mainly as a business manager, therefore a more democratic state will provide better access to its economic redistribution apparatus; 2) In North Africa and the Middle East people see the state as a security provider, therefore a more democratic state will provide better access to its security apparatus. Second, the people in North Africa and the Middle East see democracy much more as clannish participation within the government, safely secured by the degree by which the clannish elders are acknowledged by the central authorities. Third, in the CIS, two forms of non liberal democracy, military rule and autocracy, are viewed as somewhat compatible with democracy, projecting the political goals of two quite different social types: those who identify with the majority and look for facilitating the chain of command and control; and those who identify with different minorities and who need strong Leviathan to balance tyranny of the majority. Fourth, for the people in Sub-Sahara Africa, the meaning of democracy is closely related to the vision of politics as a bottom-up construction in which the central authority is but the ultimate level of organic development of local community, not a separate world of politics. A democratic state therefore means a system that protects the local way of life. Fifth, and final, additional element in understanding democracy for the people in North Africa and the Middle East is the role of religious authorities as law interpreters in defining the state as democratic. This role is not incompatible with the clannish view of democracy because the religious organization in these countries is much less hierarchical than in predominantly Catholic societies.

These meaning of democracy are result of analysis that was applied to the world by dividing the countries into geographic and cultural clusters. One possible way ahead for further analysis of the phenomenon may be to sub-divide these clusters into smaller groupings. Intuitively, I am skeptical that such approach will lead to new heuristic breakthroughs. Instead, I personally would elaborate further the question of different meaning of democracy by looking at earlier waves of WVS. The presence of data as early as 1981 may reveal whether and to what extent the present situation is entrenched in the political culture.

Addendum

Questions from WVS, 6th wave (2010-2014)

V4. How important it is in your life. Would you say it is: **Family**

V9. How important it is in your life. Would you say it is: **Religion**

V14. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?: **Feeling of responsibility**

V19. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?: **Religious faith**

V20. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?: **Unselfishness**

V21. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?: **Obedience**

V22. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?: **Self-expression**

V51. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?: **"On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do"**

V52. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?: **"A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl"**

V66. Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, **would you be willing to fight for your country?**

V68. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?: **"More emphasis on the development of technology"**

V69. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?: **"Greater respect for authority"**

V74B. Would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? : **"It is important to help people living nearby; to care for their needs"**

V79. Would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? : **"Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one's religion or family"**

V96. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. **"Incomes should be made more**

equal" vs. **"We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort"**

V97. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. **"Private ownership of business and industry should be increased" vs. "Government ownership of business and industry should be increased"**

V98. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. **"Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" vs. "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves"**

V102. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? **Your family**

V103. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? **Your neighborhood**

V108. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? **The churches / religious organizations / the Church**

V109. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? **The armed forces**

V127. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections**

V128. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country**

V129. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **Having the army rule**

V130. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **Having a democratic political system**

V131. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy": **Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor**

V132. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy": **Religious authorities interpret the laws**

V133. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means

it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”: **People choose their leaders in free elections**

V135. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”: **The army takes over when government is incompetent**

V140. **How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?**

V141. **How democratically is this country being governed today?**

V153. Please tell us if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements: **"Whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right"**

V162. How likely it is that most people in [country] view those over 70 ... **as competent?**

V163. How likely it is that most people in [country] view those over 70 ... **with respect?**

V167. Now could you tell me whether you agree, agree strongly, disagree or disagree strongly with each of the following statements? **Older people are a burden on society**

V201. Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: **Cheating on taxes if you have a chance**

V202. Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: **Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties**

V208. Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: **For a man to beat his wife**

V210. Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: **Violence against other people**

V212. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? **I see myself as a world citizen**

V213. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? **I see myself as part of my local community**

V214. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? **I see myself as part of the [country] nation**

Y002. Post-materialist index (4-item)

Y003. Autonomy Index