TALKING ACROSS DIVERSITY: DELIBERATIVE CAPITAL AND FACILITATING DISCOURSE QUALITY

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INTRODUCTION

How do successful deliberations unfold? What happens when deliberations unravel? In the former case, I argue, what we see is participants making a series of investments by engaging in desired deliberative behaviours. In the latter, participants are unwilling or unable to make these investments and instead make divestments. This paper has three aims. First, I will draw on the literature on deliberative democratic theory as well as social capital and outline a theory of deliberative capital. I posit investments as instances of engagement in positive deliberative behaviour and reframe engagement in negative deliberative behaviour as instances of divestments. I will give an account of the indicators of investments and divestments that we might expect to see in a deliberative engagement.

Second, I will briefly outline two innovative facilitative treatments that can be utilized at the beginning or during a deliberative process to incentivize investments and discourage divestments. They are simulated representation (getting participants to switch places literally by learning, presenting, defending each other’s views for a portion of deliberation) and deliberative worth exercises (getting participants to rate each other based their investments/divestments choosing the best deliberators of each round). Third, in order to examine the efficacy of these treatments, I will look at coded transcriptions as well as pre- and post-deliberation questionnaires from deliberative experiments involving 40 students on the topic of permitting religious arbitration for the resolution of civil cases in British Columbia.

The framework of deliberative capital, I argue, both complements and addresses some of the gaps in the increasingly utilized Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen, et al. 2003) and Deliberative Transformative Moments (Jaramillo and Steiner 2014). First, it emphasizes the fact that investments or engagement in positive deliberative behaviours by participants are made with
the expectation of future returns and, when made, are reciprocated by others. Second, it also pays attention the other side of the same coin: when participants make divestments (i.e. interrupt others or make negative statements about them), they reduce the deliberative capital. Just as investments are reciprocated, so are divestments. Therefore, these divestments do more than just not contribute to quality of discourse. They reduce it and they can have a snowballing effect on others’ behaviour and quality of deliberation as a whole.

The results from the deliberative experiments demonstrate that when participants deliberate under control conditions, women and visible minorities are more likely than men and non-minorities to engage in positive deliberative behaviours such as respecting fellow participants, taking into account what has been said, and offering compromises or mediating proposals. Meanwhile, men and non-minorities are much more likely to engage in negative deliberative behaviour by disrespecting fellow participants, ignoring what others are saying, or not responding to challenging arguments. Both results indicate that power relations affect interactions within deliberation. However, when two innovative facilitative treatments were used, the gender difference and the difference between minorities and non-minorities all but disappears.

**DELIBERATIVE CAPITAL**

Deliberative capital is the by-product of the investments made by participants during the course of the deliberative process. These investments (explaining one’s reasons, waiting for one’s turn, taking an extra step to understand others, among others) increase deliberative capital which in turn facilitates a better and easier dialogue process for all participants. Deliberative capital is

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1 Similarly, deliberative capital also responds to and complements the work done by Jennifer Stromer-Galley and her colleagues on analyzing disagreement within deliberation—mainly how it is initiated, what its nature is and how long it lasts (Stromer-Galley, et al. 2015, 4). Their analysis is guided by “prior research on expressions of disagreement from Kuo 1994, Pomerantz 1984, and Rendle-Short 2007” (6). Once again, the reciprocal nature of (poorly expressed) disagreement is not highlighted.
threatened when these investments are replaced by divestments (marginalizing comments, ignoring what others are saying, among others). Deliberative capital is defined and identified by its productive function: producing better and easier conversations. It is valuable precisely because it is a means to an end. Without a sufficient degree of deliberative capital, good deliberation—one that is open, respectful, and constructive—will not come about. I use the word capital\(^2\), with its connotations, to highlight the process of investing with expectation of future returns (i.e. I wait my own turn for speaking with the expectation that others will do the same when I am talking) that occurs during a deliberation.

I have to emphasize that the concept of deliberative capital is an original contribution\(^3\). I rely on the literature on deliberative democracy to identify the particular investments and divestments which are often listed, disconnected from one another, as deliberative standards/norms and solecisms respectively. It is in the framing of these as investments and divestments that my contribution lies. I argue that such a framing is important because it allows us to see a deliberative

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\(^2\) The term ‘capital’ has a long history and many uses. In its traditional usage in economics, capital is an already produced good that can be used in the production of more goods and services and is, thus, one of the factors of production alongside of land, labor, and entrepreneurship. (Hicks 1971, 272). This is a holdings view of capital. However, used more broadly, the term ‘capital’ encompasses other forms of investments and assets including human, academic, social, cultural, public, and spiritual forms of capital. For example, human capital refers to the various skills, knowledge, experiences, and competences of individual(s) as they contribute to the overall productivity of a certain organization or country. The kind that I am interested in is a relational capital - one that exists in the bonds between individuals. Both social and deliberative capital are relational.

\(^3\) The only other utilization of the concept of deliberative capital by Markus Holdo in a 2015 Critical Policy Studies article (Holdo 2015). While both Holdo and I are concerned with deliberative democratic practices in organized structures (i.e. small-scale deliberative engagements), our approach to the concept is different. For Holdo, deliberative capital is essentially different from competence, capacity, and skill. It is the “source of social recognition” particularly recognition outside the deliberative field as a result of the participation within it. However, I see deliberative capital as product of investments. Deliberative capital is created and maintained when participants demonstrate themselves as capable—having the capacity—of making those investments. In addition, while I depend on the concept of deliberative capital to critically and analytically understand the moments of success and failure of speech within an organized dialogue, Holdo uses the concept to understand and explain the ways in which the voices of the marginalized, those without access to common forms of capital, can gain empowerment through engagement in a small-scale deliberative engagement.
engagement as an organic whole which is affected by the particular actions of the participants—whether good or bad.

While the concept of deliberative capital is original, it is built on and responds to work already done in deliberative democratic theory looking at processes of deliberation in small-scale deliberative engagements as well as the literature on social capital. Social capital has come to be seen as the by-product of the relationships between individuals in a social structure which, in turn, makes actions within that social structure easier, more cooperative, and trusting. Similarly, deliberative capital is the product of the investments made by participants during the course of deliberation and reduced when divestments replace those investments. Just as social capital is increased through investments in trust and eased (for an individual) by a general assumption that others have a goodwill towards us, deliberation goes forward if and when there is a certain amount of trust and willingness on the part of the participants to make these investments. Social capital depends on the general social norms enforcing (or making desirable) reciprocity.

Deliberative capital comes about through a similar process of self-interest guiding investments which in turn fulfills the expectations of others and creates and obligation on their part to do the same. Their reciprocal investment, then, creates and strengthens deliberative norms. These deliberative norms, then, incentivize further investments—one’s self-interest will not be fulfilled by straying far from the deliberative norms that others adhere to and risk being penalized by other participants.

The concept of deliberative capital has, in part, been developed as a response to this problem of pre-commitment within deliberative democratic theory and practice. Theoretically,

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4 Social capital, briefly, “refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, 67).

5 In other words, social and now deliberative capital arguments are linked to the theory of repeated games.
deliberation requires participants to show up to the table with, at least, a degree of pre-commitment to the desired norms of deliberation. In other words, deliberative democracy requires participants to come to the table willing to explain their positions, respect each other, listen to one another, and to take in and respond to one another. However, these are also behaviours that participants learn and internalize through the course of deliberation.

So why do deliberative processes often proceed and conclude successfully? I argue that this can be explained by the fact that during deliberation participants make a series of investments with the expectation of reciprocity. This means that early-on, these investments are self-interested. Participants are likely motivated by the desire to have others treat them with an open, explanatory, respectful, and constructive attitude. As Mark Warren argues, “good manners do not even rely on altruism, since individuals rarely get their way through rudeness, while they do well through cooperation” (Warren 2006, 175). This also means that for good deliberation to occur, we do not necessarily need to rely on participants being pre-committed. We do not need ideal deliberative citizens, only good ones.

Investments, when reciprocated, increase the deliberative capital within a deliberation. The more participants invest, the more it becomes a norm and an expectation that they will do so. In other words, self-interest transforms into a norm of reciprocity. The concept of capital—with it connotations—is extremely apt at explaining this process of investments with expectation of future returns (i.e. I wait my own turn for speaking with the expectation that others will do the same when I am talking). Facilitators and conveners of small-scale deliberative engagements ease this process by, first, ensuring basic desired structural conditions such as inclusivity, openness, representativeness, and equality; and, second, and more importantly, by creating a sense of trust
in the participants that there is something of value for them in the next hour, or weeks, or months to come.

INVESTMENTS IN AND DIVESTMENTS FROM DELIBERATIVE CAPITAL

What does it mean to invest or to engage in positive and negative deliberative behavior within a deliberation? Investments refer to instances of adherence to particular deliberative standards or norms of reason giving\(^6\), respect\(^7\), reflection on and incorporation of the views of others\(^8\), sincerity\(^9\), empathy\(^10\), and productive dialogue\(^11\). These particular norms are not original contributions. They have been identified by the literature on deliberative democracy as standards that contribute to better quality deliberation. Instead of providing a normative argument or an ethical rationale for why each of these contribute to discourse quality, this article, for the most part, takes them as established cornerstones of deliberative democratic scholarship. However, this article provides a guideline for the particular indicators of these investments. These standards and their indicators are summarized in Table 1.

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\(^9\) For a more complete account of the way sincerity has been discussed within the literature see Fishkin 2011, Lenard 2008, Ratner 2008, van Gelder 2012, and Warren 2006, to name a few.

\(^10\) For ways that scholars have incorporated the concept of empathy in their discussion of deliberative democratic theory and practices see Dryzek 2009, Fearon 1998, Mansbridge 1980, Morrell 2007, 2010, and Williamson and Fung 2005, to name a few.

\(^11\) This refers to offering mediating proposals or accepts compromises. See Steenbergen, et al. 2003.
**Table 1  Indicators of investments in a deliberation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason-giving</th>
<th>Respect</th>
<th>Reflection and incorporation</th>
<th>Sincerity</th>
<th>Empathy</th>
<th>Productive dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Absence of negative statements in expressing disagreement</td>
<td>Expressing change or amending of one’s view</td>
<td>Admittance of ignorance or lack of knowledge</td>
<td>Identifying one’s own emotions</td>
<td>Offering concessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation to make the meaning more intelligible</td>
<td>Absence of interruptions in longer speech acts</td>
<td>Connect one’s point to general ideas</td>
<td>Consistency in reasons given</td>
<td>Acknowledging/communicating the feelings of others</td>
<td>Offering mediating proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asking others what they think</td>
<td>Connect one’s point to others’ ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Connecting one’s own feelings to others’ emotion (Can be an example)</td>
<td>Separating personal feelings from positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rephrasing/repeating what someone else has said</td>
<td>Asking clarifying questions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apologizing for a divestment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Using “we” or “our”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Divestments or negative deliberative behaviours refer to instances where participants do not offer a justification for their positions, when they share or process information in a biased manner, or when they engage in cognitive apartheid\(^\text{12}\), disrespect, hermeneutical exclusion\(^\text{13}\), and rhetorical action\(^\text{14}\), and unproductive dialogue. **Table 2** details the indicators for each of them—what one needs to look for in a deliberation to see if negative deliberative behaviors are taking

\(^{12}\) Cognitive apartheid refers to a “[failure] to engage with one’s interlocutor as a person of intelligence” by “[reconsidering] her views on basis of reasons” (Bohman and Richardson 2009, 270).

\(^{13}\) When hermeneutical exclusion happens, “[arguments] are not extended because they go past each other by using incommensurate terms and meanings […]. Key terms for one side are passed over as unimportant by the other or are defined and used differently” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997, 72).

\(^{14}\) Rhetorical action refers to engaging in deliberation in order to simply “justify [one’s] own standpoint” (Bächtiger, et al. 2010, 51) instead of engaging in a real back-and-forth with others. Also see Schimmelfennig 2001.
place. Once again, the literature has, for the most part, noted these undesired behaviours—often in disjointed and separate works.

*Table 2  Indicators of divestments in a deliberation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unsupported claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No attempts to make a point more intelligible</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biased information sharing &amp; processing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pushing for false consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting or being swayed by arguments evoking fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical fallacy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognitive apartheid</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignoring what others are saying—changing the flow drastically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not taking into account any of the others’ real concern</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disrespect</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ad hominem attacks or hypocrisy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting others off</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hermeneutical exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Using the same term to mean different things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misunderstandings without resolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominating speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overconfidence in one’s view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetition of the same idea in the face of challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silencing of speech acts opposed to one’s view</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unproductive dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of mediating proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of concessions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We know that divestments occur in deliberations. Are there ways that we can encourage investments and decrease the instances of divestments within deliberations? One key advantage of using the framework of deliberative capital is that it better equips us to envision and devise strategies directed at incentivizing investments and discouraging divestments. In the next section, I will briefly outline and describe two strategies aimed at doing exactly this.
FACILITATIVE TREATMENTS

Facilitative treatments are mechanisms or exercises that can be utilized either at the start of the deliberation or during the course of the deliberation to change the conditions under which the deliberation takes place in order to facilitate participants’ investment in deliberative capital. “In structured deliberation[s], face-to-face disagreement is often mediated through moderators, facilitators, debating rules, civility codes, turn taking, shared information, and many other mechanisms designed to manage disagreement” (Chambers 2013, 205). However, simple mediation is often not enough to eradicate divestments arising from unequal power relationships, such as those between genders and minorities and non-minorities, within deliberation. Facilitative treatments are tools in the box of strategies and innovative designed aimed at making deliberation more democratic and equal. They are an extension of an already-existing intervention within the dialogue: facilitation and/or mediation\(^\text{15}\). I will expand on two treatments of simulated representation and deliberative worth exercises.

Simulated representation

The facilitative treatment of simulated representation is based on the insights of scholars of both psychology and education. Within psychology literature, perspective-taking and imagined contact has proven to be good technique in changing the stances and cognitive outlooks of people in a more positive way (Ku, et al. 2010, Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000, Galinsky, et al. 2008, Shih, et al. 2009, Wang, et al. 2014, and West, et al. 2015). Role-playing in classrooms as a way to teach students the ability to understand one another as well as the motivations of different historical, fictional, and imagined characters is widely practiced at different levels of education (Jarvis, et al. 2002, Sumler-Edmond 2013, Kodotchigova 2002, Douglas and Coburn 2009, Wender 2014). The

\(^{15}\text{See Pearce and Littlejohn 1997.}\)
purpose behind this facilitative treatment is, as the name may suggest, to get participants in a deliberation to try to better understand each other and the ways in which they may be defining certain key terms and then to represent those views as if the views were their own\textsuperscript{16}.

It works as: after one round of deliberation, participants are paired up or put in groups of three. An interview process will follow with the participants asking each other about their positions and reasons for them; as well their motivations and feelings. After this interview process, deliberation will resume but for the next round, instead of each participant presenting and defending their own viewpoints, they will be asked to present and defend views and opinions of the other. For example, Participant A will be asked to present and argue for the positions, reasons, and feeling of Participant B as if they were her own and vice versa\textsuperscript{17}. After this, deliberation resumes in a normal fashion.

This facilitative treatment works in two parts. First, it can force us to move beyond simply defending our positions and values to teaching them to others. Teaching is a dialogical process and forces us to remain responsive to the other side to ensure that our efforts have been worthwhile. Second, it can force us to move simply beyond listening to others to really hearing them in order to articulate and defend them in the next round. Put simply, such a treatment is designed to, hopefully, bring about a degree of “cognitive empathy” (Spencer 1995) in the participants.

Facilitative treatment of simulated representation can be used to discourage divestments such as cognitive apartheid, rhetorical action, biased information processing, and insufficient

\textsuperscript{16} Within deliberative democracy, Michael Morrell has also showed how empathy exercises can change the perspective of participants to be more inclusive and, yes, empathic (Morrell 2007, 2010).

\textsuperscript{17} I should perhaps emphasize here that under this facilitative treatment, facilitators will be present and tasked with keeping the conversation on track and ensuring that the basic deliberative standards. The logic behind this is simple: in the worst case scenario, facilitator would not require, say, racist views to be repeated and amplified.
attempts at understanding or recognition as well as to encourage investments such as justification, listening to others, reflection, empathy, and even attempts at a productive dialogue.

**Deliberative worth exercises**

Deliberative worth exercises are based on the need to keep and maintain reputation and are rooted in the scholarly works on “face-saving” from sociology which highlight the degree to which people generally try to maintain their image (Goffman 1967, 1972, 2003; also see Lim and Bowers 1991 and Ting-Toomey 2009). Face-saving can motivate people to act in a way that would protect their face and promote its continuation and acceptance by others as well as oneself. Within a deliberative setting—especially one with explicit ground rules regarding the positive deliberative behaviors—participants can be encouraged to engage in face-saving strategies based on the need “for others to acknowledge their friendliness and honesty” and to see them as “‘likeable’, ‘acceptable’, ‘friendly’, ‘agreeable’, ‘cooperative’, ‘alike’, and ‘affiliated’” (Huang 2014, 180).

They work as follows: at the end of each round of deliberation, participants will be asked to write down the name of a fellow participant they deem to have been best at engaging in positive deliberative behavior and refraining from engaging in negative deliberative behavior as well as a one sentence rationale for their choice. This is followed by the facilitator collecting the names and reasons, reading them to the group, and keeping a tally during the deliberative process. While this might seem to be a rather trivial practice, it operates by tapping into real cognitive, psychological, and emotional needs of people and reinforcing the cycle of investment in deliberation, not only for oneself but in the way one deliberates, others’ investments too.

The facilitative treatment of deliberative worth exercises can be utilized in order to discourage divestments such as insufficient attempts at respect, understanding, or recognition, cognitive apartheid, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action as well as to encourage
investments such as respect, empathy, listening to and incorporating the views of others, reflection, and even attempts at a productive dialogue. The particular problem that this facilitative treatment can address is the possibility—if not the tendency—of participants forgetting about the norms and rules of deliberation. Utilizing this facilitative treatment means that in addition to, and perhaps instead of, the constantly reminding them, participants become cognizant and internalize deliberative standards more quickly. They invest more readily and as investments rise, deliberative capital increases and deliberation becomes better, more considered, and more civil. With these two treatments in mind, I turn my attention to two experiments utilizing these two specific facilitative treatments.

**DELIBERATIVE EXPERIMENTS ON FACILITATIVE TREATMENTS**

In this section, I will look at the efficacy of these facilitative treatments in increasing investments and decreasing divestments in a deliberation conducted under conditions of cultural and religious diversity. The topic under deliberation was whether British Columbia should allow the resolution of some civil cases through religious arbitration. The analysis draws on both coded transcriptions as well as pre- and post-deliberation questionnaires. In particular, I am interested to see whether there are significant differences between men and women as well as visible minorities and non-minorities in their tendencies to engage in investments and divestments within a deliberation.

**Data and methods**

The data is original and was collected through deliberative experiments. The 40

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18 Within deliberative democracy, in particular, Burkhalter, et al. 2002 and Bächtiger et al. (2010) Bächtiger, et al. 2010 discuss the process of delaying actual deliberation—sequencing deliberation—by incorporating “alternative forms of communication [occurring] in earlier stages of communicative processes” (Bächtiger, et al. 2010, 59). A period of dialogue before deliberation can be seen as way to teach the participants about the norms and rules of deliberation and getting them to internalize those norms and values—similar to deliberative worth exercises.
participants were all students at the same university. The study was approved by Behavioural Research Ethics Board of the university prior to the recruitment of the participants. More information about the recruitment process as well as participants can be found in the appendix. The students were divided into three groups for three different sessions of deliberation on three separate days\(^{19}\). The first group of participants—14 students—constituted the control group. The second group, made up of 16 students, deliberated while the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth was utilized. The facilitative treatment of simulated representation was used with the third group of students made up of 10 students. A week before each of the deliberation days, participants were sent an information pamphlet on religious arbitration, a timetable for each day, as well as rules of deliberation. The three deliberative engagements were held at the university. All events started at 10 am and ended around 2:15 pm. Audio-recording devices were used at each table on all of the days as a way to record the conversation. All of the sessions were moderated by trained facilitators.

A preliminary round of coding was done on the transcription pages. Afterwards, the coder entered a series of “hypothesis codes” into the nVivo program—a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software. Three more rounds of coding, days apart, took place during which time both the identifying information of participants as well as previous coding was stripped from the document. This was done to reduce bias of coder and to check for accuracy of codes. Pre- and post-deliberation questionnaires were distributed and filled by participants before and after deliberation. The data are analyzed through graph/table comparisons as well as regression models.

**Results and discussion**

There are a number of key findings that need to be highlighted in this section. I will first

\(^{19}\) The deliberations were held on November 1\(^{st}\), 2015; November 7\(^{th}\), 2015; and November 8\(^{th}\), 2015.
look at the overall effect of facilitative treatments on quality of deliberation as well as their effect on particular groups within deliberation. In the subsequent section, I will provide some examples from the transcripts of the deliberations highlighting notable investments and divestments. In the final section, I will examine the data gathered from pre-and post-deliberation questionnaires.

*Overall effect of facilitative treatments*

**Figure 1** gives an overall outlook of the deliberation process under control conditions as compared to the ones conducted under the facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation.

*Figure 1  Overall look at deliberation under different conditions*

A few conclusions can be drawn from this figure. The first is that, overall, in all of the deliberative settings, investments outnumber divestments. This means that for the most part, even without particularly designed facilitative treatments, participants follow the norms and rules of deliberation. The second conclusion that can be drawn from this figure is that both facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation are highly successful in encouraging investments and discouraging divestments\(^{20}\).

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\(^{20}\) Under control conditions, 56% of the speech acts coded were investments compared to 96% under deliberative worth conditions and 93% under simulated representation. Comparatively, control conditions produced 44% divestments compared to 4% and 7% under deliberative worth and simulated representation conditions respectively.
While Figure 1 is helpful at giving us an overall look at the deliberation dynamics, it does not allow us to get an idea of who is making the investments and divestments. In particular, it does not answer whether there any differences between men and women in their respective tendencies to invest or divest. Figure 2 summarizes the percentage of investments and divestments by gender under control conditions.

Figure 2  Gender difference in investments/divestments under control conditions

As it can be seen in the figure, there were significant gender differences in the percentage of investments and divestments under control conditions: 77% of all of the coded speech acts by women are investments compared to 40% for men. Correspondingly, 60% of speech acts made by males were coded as divestments compared to 23% by women. Two conclusions can be drawn from this finding. The first is that power dynamics affect interaction within deliberation. This finding is congruent with those of Mendelberg and her colleagues (Mendelberg, et al. 2014a, Mendelberg, et al. 2014b). In many ways, divestments made by men reduce women’s speaking time and confidence. This finding is also similar to a recent study on the interactions in the Supreme Court in the United States by Jacobi and Schweers who find that “judicial interactions at oral argument are highly gendered, with women being interrupted at disproportionate rates by their male colleagues” (Jacobi and Schweers 2017). The second conclusion is that women are much more willing and capable of engaging in the desired behaviors identified by deliberative democratic theorists. In other words, women are more deliberatively oriented.
Do facilitative treatments change this difference? Figure 3 summarizes the percentage of investments and divestments by gender under the facilitative treatments.

Figure 3  No gender difference in investments/divestments under facilitative treatments

This figure shows that the percentage of positive deliberative behaviors for all participants increased when either treatment was enacted. However, what is particularly of note here is that facilitative treatments are capable of wiping out the gender difference which characterized the deliberation under control conditions. Due to the small sample size, these results are somewhat exploratory. However, they clearly indicate that facilitative treatments are successful tools in democratizing deliberation by reducing the differences between the behavior of women and men.

Similar patterns are seen when looking at the difference between visible minorities and non-minorities within deliberation. Figure 4 summarizes the percentage of investments and divestments by one’s status as a visible minority under control conditions.

Figure 4  Minority difference in investments/divestments under control conditions
What we see is that, once again, visible minorities and non-visible minorities are completely different. Non-visible minorities engage in, at slightly higher rates, in behaviour coded as divestments. Meanwhile, visible minorities are more likely to invest in deliberative capital. Once again, this shows that, first, power impacts deliberation dynamics; and, second, visible minorities are more deliberatively oriented.

Do facilitative treatments change this difference? Figure 5 summarizes the percentage of investments/divestments by visible minority under the facilitative treatments. Once again, it is clear that facilitative treatments are capable of wiping out the difference between visible minorities and non-minorities which characterized the deliberation under control conditions.

**Figure 5**  No minority difference in investments/divestments under facilitative treatments

In the previous section, I offered a theoretical explanation as to why particular facilitative treatments of deliberative worth and simulated representation would encourage particular investments and discourage particular divestments. The appendix includes an account of the specific investments and divestments occurred in each session compared to the control group (See Figures 10 and 11; Tables 3 and 4). Instead of providing a detailed account of the effect of these treatments on the occurrence of each investment and divestment, I want to highlight a number of important examples from the qualitative data.
Deliberative worth exercises\textsuperscript{21}

Under deliberative worth treatment, there were ample instances of participants engaging in self-facilitation by encouraging other participants to participate by either asking others what they thought or attempting to rephrase or repeat what others had said for the group at large. An instance of this is illustrated in this example: at one of the tables, the participants were having a discussion regarding the possibility of instituting limitation of religious arbitration through the use of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One of the participants, S7P1, was particularly silent in the conversation. This prompted self-facilitation by one of the participants:

“\textbf{S7P3:} What do you think [S7P1]?
\textbf{S7P1:} I’m not too sure.
\textbf{S7P3:} You’re not sure? What do you, what’s, what’s the, what’s the worry that you have?”

Moreover, were also many investments in reflection on and incorporation of the views of others including opinion change. For example, K7P1 who had previously made the argument that women should not be seen as minorities within their religious communities since they freely and consciously choose to be part of that religion, made the following comment in the second round of deliberation:

“\textbf{K7P1:} Yeah, but also, like, when it comes to civil, like, conflicts maybe it’s about, like, child being taken away from the mother. And even though it’s civil but it’s something really really [sentimental to like] the mother. So maybe, like, in these cases, like, arbitration might not be a good idea.
\textbf{K7P6:} Yeah.
\textbf{K7P1:} So even though it isn’t criminal thing, but still.”

\textsuperscript{21} Compared to the control group, there was a significantly higher percentage of investments in respect (19\% compared to 8\%), reason-giving (30\% compared to 17\%), and reflection on and incorporation of the views of others (31\% compared to 20\%) when participants deliberated with the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth in effect. There was also a slightly higher percentage of instances of sincerity (8\% compared to 6\%) and productive dialogue (4\% compared to 3\%).
In addition to the investments, there was a significantly lower percentage of divestments when deliberative worth exercises were used\(^\text{22}\). In particular, one of the more troubling divestments in the control condition was that of participant(s) pushing for false consensus. The problem with pushing for false consensus is that inherently it is a sign that participant(s) are not paying attention to the disagreements or points of contention. Indeed, they are processing the information in a way that is biased in favour of what they want to hear.

The following is an exchange between two participants, under control conditions, after one participant decides to call the other on forcing a consensus by constantly summarizing the conversation as if there was an agreement between all:

```
“S1P3: Ok. so we all agree.
S1P1: I don’t agree with that.
S1P3: What?
S1P1: [laughs] I think you’re trying to come to consensus too quickly.
S1P3: I thought you said, I thought you said...I mean, I’m just trying to find common...
S1P1:....Yeah, and I think that’s the problem...”
```

Deliberative worth exercises also helped in cutting back the instances of rhetorical action which, often, seek to silence others by saying something that signals that all other options or disagreements are effectively pointless. For example, consider the exchange below from control conditions:

```
“S1P3: To ensure that to a certain extent, a finite extent, I think we, do we all agree that we cannot please everyone? [...]to do so, in a multicultural society? Do we all agree on that? [pauses] I mean, it seems kinda reasonable.
S1P1: well...
S1P3: but I mean, so then....the question, then, that we should be considering is where we set the bar, how much arbitration can take place?”
```

\(^{22}\) In particular, there was a significant reduction of instances of in disrespect (0.6% compared to 18%), rhetorical action (1.3% compared to 10%), and cognitive apartheid (0.8% compared to 7%) as well as instances of biased information sharing and processing (0.32% compared to 4.2%) and hermeneutical exclusion (0.2% compared to 0.9%).
In this conversation, S1P3 is responding to the argument by S1P2 that there should be some limits to religious arbitration which may not please religious communities. S1P3 who is in favour of religious arbitration “asks” others if they agree that there is no way to please everyone. He, then, positions that view as the “reasonable” one. He does not wait for others, particularly S1P1, to assent to the fact that they all agree and moves on to say that, in effect, since everyone agree with that, they can move on to the next question.

*Simulated representation*\(^{23}\)

Under simulated representation, there were more than 2.5 times more instances of reason-giving either through offering a justification or making attempts to make what one had said before more intelligible than in the control group. This was perhaps incentivized because of the process of facilitative treatment which required participants to better and more fully explain their positions to, first, find points of agreement and disagreement; second, convey rationales to the person with whom they were paired; third, represent and fully expand on the positions of the other in role-reversal portion of deliberation; and, finally, to remind others of their original positions after role-reversal was over.

Furthermore, there were ample instances of participants amending or changing their minds throughout the course of deliberation. For example, in the following passage, S8P6—a strong supporter of religious arbitration—admits that he conceded a flaw in his opinion as a result of the deliberation and particularly as a result of being paired up with S8P1—an ardent opposer to religious arbitration. I have only included a fraction of his speech act:

“**S8P6:**...*but then, the only thing I’ll say is that I’ve been naive in the sense that I put in so much trust into the fairness of the religious arbitrators. Believing that they would try to the best of their*

\(^{23}\)Compared to the control group, there was a significantly higher percentage of investments in reason-giving (36% compared to 17%) and respect (21% compared to 8%) when participants deliberated with the facilitative treatment of simulated representation in effect. There was also a slightly higher percentage of instances of reflection on and incorporation of the views of others (28% compared to 20%) and productive dialogue (5% compared to 2%).
ability to be very, um, unbiased and fair to both parties. And deciding strictly based on, strictly based on what the rules are and what their opinions are.”

In addition to the investments, there were significantly fewer instances of divestments such as biased information processing, cognitive apartheid, disrespect, hermeneutical exclusion, and rhetorical action.

Outcomes of deliberation: pre and post deliberation questionnaires

In this section, I will briefly discuss a few of the results gathered from pre-and post-deliberation questionnaires focusing on: political efficacy, knowledge gains, and two indicators of look at the data gathered from pre and post deliberation questionnaires looking specifically at two indicators of participants’ evaluation of the process: willingness for future deliberation and view that only a few dominated the deliberation. The appendix includes regression results for each of these items (See Tables 5-8).

1. Political efficacy

The participants were gauged their opinion on the following statement both before and after the process of deliberation: “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.”

When divided by different groups, the largest increase was under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: an increase of 0.44 (from 0.12 to 0.56; p=0.03). The smallest effect was seen under control conditions (0.21 to 0.36; p=0.43). Finally, there were moderate gains (0.3 points) increase under simulated representation (p=0.28).

Figure 6 summarizes this effect. This means that there were larger increases in political efficacy under facilitative treatments and especially under deliberative worth exercises. This is perhaps caused by the fact that the congenial atmosphere under deliberative worth better enables

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24 The variable is coded from Strongly agree (-2) to Strongly disagree (+2). Overall, there was a statistically significantly mean increase of 0.3 points (from 0.1 to 0.4; p=0.012) in all groups.
participants to view contributions to political conversations and decision making as easy and manageable.

Figure 6  Effect of treatments on political efficacy

2. Knowledge gains

The participants were asked a series of questions checking their factual knowledge regarding the issue of religious arbitration as well as the legal factors surrounding the issue. When divided by different groups, the largest increase was in the control group: an increase of 0.24 (from 0.47 to 0.71; p=0.24). The smallest effect (+0.03) was seen under the facilitative treatment of deliberative worth: (0.58 to 0.61; p=0.88). Finally, there were small gains (+0.08 points) increase under simulated representation (from 0.56 to 0.64; p=0.77). Figure 7 summarizes these results.

Figure 7  Effect of treatments on knowledge gains

The results basically demonstrate that participants learned more and retained more information when they deliberated under control conditions as compared to the two treatments. This result
might, at first, appear surprising. However, there is ample research that shows that many learn better under more contentious as opposed to consensual circumstances. For instance, research on the effect of negative ad campaign show that individuals often seek more information in response to negative ads and retain information gained from negative ads for longer (See Brader 2005, Marks, et al. 2012, Morey 2017). Therefore, it is possible that the more contentious atmosphere under control conditions lead participants to learn and remember more.

3. A few dominated the deliberation

As it can be seen in Figure 8, there were significant differences between the evaluation that only a few participants dominated the discussion between the different conditions. It is perhaps not at all surprising that a very small group of participants deliberating under deliberative worth conditions believed that only a few dominated the discussion since the treatment encouraged the participants not to engage in such a behaviour. It is also unsurprising that a large majority deliberating under control conditions believed otherwise.

Figure 8  Effect of treatments on evaluation that "only a few dominated the conversation"

4. Willingness for future deliberation

Finally, when participants were asked if they would be open to participating in the future, participants who deliberated under simulated representation expressed much more willingness for
future participation than those deliberating under control conditions and slightly more than those deliberating under deliberative worth. This can be seen in Figure 9.

Figure 9  Effect of treatments on future willingness for deliberation

LIMITATIONS

There are a number of limitations with this study. First, the study has a relatively small sample size. Moreover, the sample includes only students which limits the variance in age of the participants as well as their education levels—and likely their political and social values and beliefs to an extent. Moreover, all the participants are, residents of Vancouver, BC or surrounding cities creating a geographical limitation to the study. The coder was female, which may spawn potential biases in interpretation. To forestall that, identifying information about participants (including gender/ethnic background) were stripped from the transcripts. The coder she read the transcripts three times, days apart, to ensure that coding is gender-neutral to the best of her ability.

An important consideration remains that university students may very well be trained to accept diversity and act respectfully in dialogue with others. As a result, this article recognizes and accepts that they would be more likely—even under control conditions—to engage in and demonstrate positive rather than negative deliberative behavior. However, the results indicate that they still engage in negative deliberative behavior and, therefore, the effect of the facilitative treatments on the behavior of participants signal their effectiveness. The results therefore are
applicable more broadly. In future research, however, it is advantageous to look at the public at large in order to look at the effectiveness of these treatments to produce positive deliberative behaviours.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper makes a number of important contributions to deliberative democracy, multiculturalism, and political theory. The concept of deliberative capital is very useful at explaining the success and breakdown of speech and demonstrating how virtuous and vicious cycles are both equally possible in a deliberation. Moreover, this work provides a list of indicators for particular investments and divestments within deliberation.

Furthermore, it develops two facilitative treatments or techniques tailored towards increasing investments and decreasing divestments within deliberation, particularly under conditions of cultural and religious diversity where both the diversity in the participants and the topic under deliberation can accentuate the unequal power dynamics, between men and women as well as visible minorities and non-minorities.

In many ways, this work responds to the scholarship by deliberative multiculturalists—such as Benhabib 2002, Deveaux 2003, 2006, Song 2005, 2007, and Valadez 2001, 2010—who emphasize deliberative democracy as the answer to the tensions between liberalism and multiculturalism in liberal multicultural democracies. They argue that we should talk; I show that we can talk. Moreover, I show that there are ways that we can improve the quality of talk; and, in doing so, I show how deliberation can further turn diversity into a benefit rather than a burden. Finally, this work also contributes to political theory by combining theoretical work with quantitative and experimental methodology to both ask and answer questions.

Most importantly, this work argues and shows that talking is better than fighting. When we
fail to talk, we fail to understand. This often times leads to marginalization, segregation, and violence. It is, therefore, crucial to expand this work to the larger public sphere and identifying the challenges to and incentives for investments and divestments within the larger public sphere. Deliberative engagements allow us the chance to create the right conditions for difficult conditions. However, they are limited in their scope, not only when it comes to their sample sizes but in their ability to affect the larger dialogue.

**WORKS CITED**


APPENDIX

Note about the decision to use students as participants: One of the reasons was ethical. The topic of the deliberative experiment requires of the participants to reflect on, present, and debate their cultural and religious values and practices. Debates over deeply-held values and interests, especially those that can challenge the ontological and emotional security of participants, can potentially be uncomfortable. Therefore, the logic behind using students was to reduce the risks associated with the study. Since the other participants with whom they will deliberate are fellow students, there is a lesser degree of hierarchies between students which could make some more vulnerable. Moreover, undergraduate and graduate students will be more familiar with various research endeavors at the university. They are often asked for their participation in surveys and experiments conducted either by fellow students, graduate students, or the university. This means that they are less likely to see their engagement in the experiment as something unknown and unfamiliar. Finally, students are used to these kinds of discussions as part of their high school and university education. This means that their level of discomfort when engaging in deliberation should be minimal. Another reason had to with financial constraints. The recruitment of participants from outside of the university would have taken posed undue financial burdens on the investigator.

Note about recruitment procedures for the experiment: Participants were recruited through a number of methods: 1) An invitation at the end of the online survey in the previous section of this study (not discussed in this paper); 2) Invitation posters around the campus; 3) Invitation email sent to students via department and course electronic mailing lists; 4) Invitation email sent to student members of different clubs and organizations on campus; 5) Invitation posters in department newsletters; and 6) Invitation posters in the social media sites/groups of the different student clubs and organizations. The last two methods of recruitment were used only when the researcher was asked to do so by departments or presidents of the clubs and organizations. Overall, 103 students expressed interest in participation. Sixty-one participants expressed secondary
interest in the process after more details were given. Fifty-four confirmed their participation and forty participants turned out for the deliberative engagements. Participants were thanked for their participation with $30 and reimbursed for additional costs.

Note about the demographic makeup of the participants in the experiment: The demographic makeup of the participants was as follows: gender: 25 female, 14 male, and 1 transgender; status as visible minority: 12 identify as a visible minority, 19 identify as not a visible minority, and 9 did not know; ethnic background: 17 participants identified as white, 13 as East Asian, 3 as South Asian, 2 as West Asian, 2 as Black, 2 as Latin American, 2 as Southeast Asian, and 4 as other; and religiosity: 7 attended religious services frequently, 3 often, 5 moderately, 11 rarely, and 13 noted that they never attended religious services.

- Control group: Gender (M=6; F=8) | Status as visible minority (Y=5; N=7; D/K=2) | Ethnic background (Black=1; White=5; East Asian=5; Hispanic=2; Burkinabé=1; Central Asian=1) | Religious attendance (Frequently=1; Often=1; Moderately=1; Rarely=5; Never=5)
- Deliberative worth: Gender (M=5; F=10; T=1) | Status as visible minority (Y=2; N=9; D/K=5) | Ethnic background: (White=8; West Asian=2; South Asian=2; East Asian=4; Southeast Asian=1; Karen=1; South African White=1) | Religious attendance (Frequently=4; Often=2; Moderately=3; Rarely=2; Never=5)
- Simulated representation: Gender (M=3; F=7) | Status as visible minority (Y=5; N=3; D/K=2) | Ethnic background: (Black=1; White=4; South Asian=1; East Asian=4; Southeast Asian=1) | Religious attendance (Frequently=2; Often=0; Moderately=1; Rarely=4; Never=3)

Note about coding simulated representation: I considered not including the coding of speech acts when participants were actually playing the new roles. However, after the second round of coding I decided against this. The main reason is as follows: participants continued making investments and divestments when they were in the role-playing mode. In particular, I wanted to take note of the instances where participants took extra steps to explain and expand on a position that was not expressly discussed between the two during the interview process. I also wanted to take note and include the instances where participants were glib or when they misrepresented what the other side has said. However, I did the analysis for this. However, I did the analysis without the role-playing portion. It did not show a meaningful difference.
Figure 10 (Appendix) Breakdown of investments under each treatment

Figure 11 (Appendix) Breakdown of divestments under each treatment
**Table 3 (Appendix)**  Deliberative worth versus Control conditions; notable investments and divestments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Control Conditions</th>
<th>Deliberative worth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-facilitation</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>“We”, “Us”, “Our”</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reflection/ incorporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Connecting one’s opinion to that of others</td>
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<td>120</td>
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<td>Mediating proposals</td>
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**Table 4 (Appendix)**  Simulated representation versus Control conditions; notable investments and divestments

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<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection/ incorporation</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>226</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amending/changing one’s view</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
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**Table 5 (Appendix)**  Regression results: effect of treatments on political efficacy compared to control conditions

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth</td>
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<td>0.28</td>
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<td>Simulated Representation</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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Table 6 (Appendix)  Regression results: effect of treatments on knowledge gains compared to control conditions

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<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth</td>
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<td>0.009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simulated Representation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.009</td>
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Table 7 (Appendix)  Regression results: effect of treatments on evaluation that “only a few dominated the deliberation” compared to control conditions

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<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberative worth</td>
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<td>Simulated Representation</td>
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Table 8 (Appendix)  Regression results: effect of treatments on future willingness for deliberation compared to control conditions

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