"Two Distinct Redistributive Policy Outlooks: Generalized Redistribution away from the Rich and Targeted Redistribution toward the Poor"

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Abstract

While preceding scholarship often treats citizens' redistributive policy issue positions as a single attitudinal dimension, this paper argues that two distinct dimensions can be identified: generalized redistribution away from the rich, and more targeted redistribution toward the poor. Using six waves of Canadian Election Study data from 1993 to 2011 and three waves of World Values Survey data from 1990 to 2005, this paper demonstrates that many of the most important factors that drive support for redistribution—including income, education, and economic beliefs—also have differential impacts on outlooks toward each of these two key redistributive policy types. It shows that a citizens' interests, level of economic security, dispositions toward the rich and poor, and economic beliefs all play a role differentiating between many citizens' redistributive policy preferences. And while income differences have more substantial effects on views about generalized redistribution away from the rich, economic beliefs play a more important role influencing their stances toward more targeted redistribution toward the poor.

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§ 1 Introduction

This paper emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between two general forms of policies that are designed to redistribute social resources from those who have more to those who have less. Or put more simply, two general forms of *egalitarian* redistribution. On the one hand, 'targeted' redistribution centers on the provision of a basic minimum level of well-being or security for the poor or unfortunate. For example, social assistance programs specifically focus on redirecting financial resources toward the poorest social members who are unable to independently secure a minimum level of economic well-being. On the other hand, 'generalized' redistribution concentrates on more broad-based social policies that are as interested in addressing inequalities at the top as they are at the bottom of the income distribution hierarchy. For example, progressive income taxes—particularly those with substantial marginal income tax rates for those in the highest tax brackets—as well as corporate and inheritance taxes are clear illustrations of public policies that intend to redistribute away from the more and toward the less wealthy and fortunate. The presented evidence demonstrates that a citizens' interests, level of economic security, affect for the rich and poor, and economic beliefs all play a role differentiating between views toward one of these redistributive policy types and the other. And while income differences have more substantial effects on views about generalized redistribution away from the rich, economic beliefs play a more important role influencing their stances toward more targeted redistribution toward the poor.

The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, the preceding literature that has investigated citizens' redistributive issue positions is considered, first with an eye to scholarship that examines Canadians' redistributive policy preferences, and then turning to discuss cross-national research that has endeavoured to compare between the effects of determinants of support for different redistributive policy types. The analysis then moves to outline the theory at the heart of the paper which explains why we may expect citizens' outlooks toward the two redistributive policy types to differ. Next, the data and statistical methods of the paper are described, and the findings of the empirical examinations are presented. Following a discussion of these results, the paper concludes with a brief summary of the key findings and proposals of possible avenues for further research.

§ 2 Preceding Research Assessing Citizen Support for Redistribution

§ 2.1 Preceding Canadian Analyses

Until recently, research examining Canadians' redistributive outlooks has been somewhat limited. That students of Canadian politics have chosen to focus their attention on areas other than citizens' redistributive policy issue positions may perhaps be unsurprising, particularly given not only Alford's observation some fifty years ago that "Canadian parties have been characterized for at least sixty years by a lack of both doctrine and a stable class base" (1963: 262) and oft-cited conclusion that region and religion tend to overshadow Canadian class cleavages, but also the frequency with which this central supposition has been referred to within the discourse of Canadian political analysis (Horowitz 1966: 170, 1968: 42; Engelmann and Schwartz 1967: 134; Simeon and Elkins 1974: 416; Ornstein *et al*. 1980: 236; Blais *et al*. 2002: 94; Kanji and Archer 2002: 170; Farney and Levine 2008; Anderson and Stephenson 2010: 15).

The lack of attention to public views toward redistribution might instead, however, have been a consequence of the breadth of coverage provided by one of the earliest studies of Canadians' redistributive attitudes. In considering Alford's thesis, Ornstein *et al*. (1980) investigate the relative magnitudes of 'regional' versus 'socioeconomic status' effects on a range of ideological attitudes, including 'social welfare' and 'redistribution of income' dimensions. Their results indicate that higher age is associated with lower support for social welfare, higher occupational status is associated with lower support for redistribution, and higher income and education are associated with lower support for both. Ornstein and Stevenson (1999) follow with a volume that largely echoes and builds upon these initial findings. These findings suggest that, if anything, women and Catholics are more likely to support social policies than men and Protestants. Other scholars contemporaneously authored a pair of early publications that cast light on Canadians' redistributive attitudes (Gibbins and Nevitte 1985; Nevitte *et al*. 1989). In the second of these publications, they conclude that postmaterialists seem more likely to support redistribution than materialists, but that the left-right scale they develop is more effective at explaining attitudes toward redistribution than is their postmaterialism scale.

More recently, a group of researchers has investigated Canadians' perspectives through a paradigmatically Canadian lens: an emphasis on the impacts of immigration, ethnic diversity and multiculturalism. In a series of articles, these researchers present the most comprehensive appraisal of Canadians' social policy attitudes to date. Two examine the determinants of support for the public provision of health care, pensions, and a redistributive dimension, and in a third they focus specifically on citizens' outlooks toward health care, redistribution, and welfare.

The first of these examines the intersection of ethnicity, trust, and welfare state support (Soroka *et al*. 2007). In this article, their measure of redistribution seems to be largely oriented toward an economic security aspect. Their principal findings are that while trust clearly seems to be an important factor, they uncover no ethnicity effects; neither ethnicity, immigrant status

nor the degree of ethnic diversity in a respondent's community has an obvious impact. A broad range of other factors are important, however. Women, francophones, and those with lower incomes and self-reported health are more likely to support redistribution, whereas education and age appear to have curvilinear effects. They also reveal a number of community-level effects. Those from communities that have lower median incomes and higher levels of resident stability and population density are more supportive. They identify no significant effects of macroeconomic performance on micro-level policy outlooks, however. In the second they investigate the role of national identity and anti-immigration sentiment (Johnston *et al*. 2010). These findings suggest that although national identity may decrease support for redistribution, it also mitigates opposition to redistribution among high-income Canadians. While this effect is comparatively modest, however, the effect of anti-immigrant sentiment is more substantial. Amongst those in higher or lower economic positions and those with higher or lower levels of national identification, anti-immigrant attitudes decrease support by over ten percent. They also find that more positive macroeconomic evaluations tend to decrease support for redistribution. In the third, the authors focus on the impacts of both anti-immigrant and anti-First Nations outlooks on support for public health care, redistribution, and access to welfare (Banting *et al*. 2013). These results suggest that while perceptions of immigrant welfare dependence merely reduce support for welfare assistance itself, the negative impacts of these perceptions seem to be limited to this particular type of social policy. In fact, perceptions that immigrants rely heavily on welfare may instead increase support for redistribution and health care. Whereas they find that negative perceptions of Aboriginal welfare dependence reduce not only support for welfare assistance itself, but other social programs also. As such, Banting *et al*. draw the conclusion that "immigrants in Canada clearly benefit from a more privileged space in Canadian cultural imagery" (2013: 180). In the discussion of their findings, they also speculate that the "negative connection between [attitudes toward] Aboriginals and support for welfare may help explain overall regional differences in welfare support more generally" (2013: 117).

While they do not strictly investigate citizens' redistributive policy outlooks, Cochrane and Perrella (2012) instead examine views toward government economic intervention. They find that francophones, women, immigrants, visible minorities, and those with lower incomes, who worry more about losing their job, and who come from constituencies with higher unemployment rates are more likely to support government intervention in the economy. Andersen and Curtis (2013) also incorporate both micro- and macrolevel determinants to explain redistributive policy issue positions. Their analysis suggests that both aggregate-level economic prosperity and inequality have clear effects on citizens' attitudes toward poverty, welfare, and childcare spending. They also find that—at the individual level—lower income Canadians are much more likely to support targeted government intervention than are comparably placed Americans. In the United States, income differences seem to have surprisingly little impact on redistributive outlooks, while in Canada this is clearly not the case.

Two investigations of the Canadian case undertake comparative analyses of orientations toward the two redistributive policy types under consideration. First, Jæger

(2006a) uses two modelling strategies,[1] the results of which suggest that women, younger adults, and the less healthy are more likely to favour more targeted distribution, but that other factors may be relevant for explaining preferences for more generalized redistribution. The employed, retired, and those with higher incomes and education are all less likely to support this second form of redistribution, but those who identify with the Liberal party are particularly more likely to do so. There are some methodological concerns with this analysis, however. These include the time frame between survey waves, the approach taken to measure ideology, and a potentially contentious instrumental variable. In the second, the authors conclude that while economic inequality has distinct cross-sectional and longitudinal impacts, these effects on support for the two redistributive policy types are largely comparable (Sealey and Andersen (2015).

§ 2.2 Preceding Cross-National Analyses

Some of the earliest research that considers citizens' social policy outlooks tends to identify redistributive policy orientations as particular policy items within the broader class of orientations toward welfare state policies, and emphasizes the complex, multidimensional nature of these attitudes (Coughlin 1979, 1980; Taylor-Gooby 1982; Cnaan 1989). They also suggest that more general measures of support for redistribution or welfare state programs may obscure substantial differences in outlooks toward different types of programs (Schlozman and Verba 1979; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Papadakis 1990; Cnaan *et al*. 1993). Sihvo and Uusitalo note that while these empirical studies reveal some similarities in the cross-national structuring of welfare state attitudes, comparisons between them are problematic because the types and numbers of dimensions considered "vary from one study to the next and depend on the questions asked" (1995a: 215).

Some public opinion researchers, however, often consider attitudes toward different forms of redistribution as components of the same underlying dimension, combining them with other items in order to identify more general latent concepts. For example, orientations toward the two aforementioned redistributive policy types have been included with attitudes toward public versus private ownership of the means of production, the extent of the state's role in macroeconomic planning, and support versus opposition to expansion of social welfare expenditures in order to create 'socio-economic radical' (Alt 1979), 'socio-economic' (Lijphart 1984), 'economic left-right' (Inglehart 1990), 'socialist-laissez faire' (Heath *et al*. 1994), 'left-right materialist' (Knutsen 1995a), 'class cleavage' (Dalton 1996), 'economic attitudinal' (Norris and Inglehart 2009) and 'market liberalism' (Gidengil *et al*. 2012) dimensions. Other researchers may instead combine outlooks on these redistributive types in order to create a latent dependent variable that measures attitudes toward both, suggesting that citizens' attitudes toward the two redistributive policy types are merely different indicators of the same underlying disposition toward redistribution (e.g. Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Fong

[1] To be specific, random effect (RE) and finite mixture concomitant variable (FM-CV) models. He indicates a preference for the latter.

2001; Luttmer 2001; Linos and West 2003; Fong, Bowles and Gintis 2005; Busemayer *et al*. 2009; Dallinger 2012; Alesina and Giuliano 2011).

Schlozman and Verba's (1979) extensive analysis of the impact of unemployment in the United States is one of the earliest investigations that highlights the multidimensional nature of support for different redistributive programs. In it, they provide independent examinations of citizens' outlooks toward different redistributive policy types, and assess the effect of financial insecurity on a range of social policy attitudes, including support for public provision for 'those in need' as well as a willingness to 'tax the rich to redistribute income' dimensions that seems to correspond to the two key redistributive policy types under consideration. While given that they include such a broad range of independent and dependent variables of interest, the presentation not entirely systematic, one of their key results is particularly informative. It seems evident that while the financial insecurity caused by unemployment appears to increase support for both forms of redistribution, the impact on support for redistribution toward 'those in need' is greater than for the 'tax the rich' dimension (1979: 213). In another early analysis, Kluegel and Smith assess American's views about two distinct redistributive policy types: policies that redistribute (1) 'away from the rich' through limitations on incomes and inheritances or government ownership of industry and (2) 'toward the poor' via welfare, guaranteed jobs and guaranteed income (1986: 151). Their chapter incorporates regression analyses examining potential determinants of attitudes toward the two redistributive policy types which include both self-interest as well as value and belief dimensions. As the results are presented separately and are thereby not directly comparable, their analyses do not reveal many consistent results, but they emphasize the importance of class status effects and egalitarian versus inegalitarian attitudes. They also drawn attention to the role played by beliefs about the causes of poverty, which seems as though it may have a greater impact on support for targeted than generalized redistribution.

In a series of chapters of an edited collection, Roller (1995), Pettersen (1995), and Newton and Confalonieri (1995) use cross-national data to draw distinctions between types of redistributive policies. In many respects, Roller's contribution serves as the lynchpin of the discussion. In it, he distinguishes between four types of policies: those which focus on (1) equality of opportunity, (2) socio-economic security, (3) national minima, and (4) redistribution. Their discussions in these chapters principally center on a distinction between 'security' and 'equality' dimensions, however. Each author distinguishes between interest- and value-based explanations of support for redistributive policies, including discussions of both Wilensky's (1975) welfare backlash and Inglehart's (1977; 1990) postmaterial value change hypotheses.

Other scholars also use a line of reasoning that resonates with Wilensky's welfare state backlash thesis, authoring a series of publications that distinguish between 'economic egalitarianism' and 'anti-welfare' outlooks. Derks (2004) suggests that while the underprivileged working class may support a more egalitarian economic perspective, they may also be highly critical of the welfare state. He analyses Flemish data using principal components analysis to demonstrate differences between two distinct attitudinal dimensions: pro- versus anti-equality and pro- versus anti-welfare state outlooks. He finds that those with lower income and occupational status, seniors, and those with a greater sense of defeatism, political distrust

and economic individualism are more likely to support economic egalitarian positions while still disapproving of the welfare state. Van der Waal *et al*. (2010) also use factor analysis to illustrate differences between 'economic egalitarian' and 'welfare universalism' attitudes—on this occasion using data from the Netherlands—and find that the association between these two dimensions is differentially impacted by cultural insecurity and conditional upon respondents' level of education. Acterberg *et al*. also use Dutch data to argue that new-right European populist parties evince a position critical of "self-interested civil servants who cater to a class of 'welfare scroungers' that freeloads on the common man" (2011: 749). These authors again present findings from confirmatory factor analyses that provide evidence of differences between two comparable attitudinal dimensions. Their regression analyses indicate that those with lower education are more egalitarian but less inclined to support welfarism. Women, the older and the economically insecure are more likely to support both egalitarianism and welfarism, whereas a general sense of distrust of others and of social institutions—which the authors describe as a sense of 'anomie'—leads to lower support for welfarism.

Most recently, Cavaillé and Trump (2015) extend this line of research both to the British case as well as cross-nationally. They too employ confirmatory factor analysis to distinguish between 'redistribution from' and 'redistribution to' dimensions, whereas their comparative analysis between Germany, France, Sweden and Great Britain, identifies (1) a 'redistribution from' as well as (2) pro- or anti-welfare as well as (3) 'government responsibility' dimensions.[2] They also demonstrate that in Britain, income has a substantial impact on attitudes toward the 'redistribution to' but not the 'redistribution from' dimension.

§ 3 Theory

The central argument of this paper focuses on the idea that egalitarian redistributive public policies are multidimensional, and that public outlooks toward these policies include at least two distinct forms: targeted redistribution toward the poor and generalized redistribution away from the rich. Figure 1 below presents a graphic conceptualization of two redistributive policy types, with the large arrow in the middle of each frame indicating the path of redistribution for each type. While the direction of both forms is egalitarian—i.e. from those who have more to those who have less—as this figure suggests, policies that target redistribution in order to provide for economic security may have a much smaller pool of recipients. They tend to be oriented disproportionately toward the poor, whereas the social programs that sustain them tend to be funded by both middle and higher income earners. Generalized redistribution that more broadly equalizes incomes, however, entails social

[2] A key distinction that might be drawn is between attitudes toward welfare state programs and support or opposition to 'welfare'. It has been demonstrated, however, that in both the American and Canadian case, important question wording effects have been identified when the term 'welfare' is included in contrast to items that tap attitudes toward the poor (Smith 1987; Harell, Soroka, and Mahon 2008). This seems a feasible explanation for the apparent distinction.

Figure 1: Illustrating the Difference between Redistributive Policy Types



policies that are funded disproportionately by higher income earners while the benefits are more widely distributed amongst a greater share of the citizenry.

Four principal hypotheses can be used to identify lines of thinking that lead many citizens to express different outlooks on the two forms of redistribution. Of these, perhaps the most basic motivation is the role of self-interest. Consider one of the most important known determinants of support for redistribution: income. The effect of hearing a prompt about redistributing away from the rich may resonate differently for different income groups, and seems likely to have a particularly strong effect for rich respondents who seem much more likely to oppose this form of redistribution relative to other respondents. The role of education also seems likely to play a similar role. One prominent theory that considers the educational experience describes it as a process of human capital development. As such, particularly during the earlier stages of the lifecycle, education may be a process that increases expectations about one's upward income mobility, such that the more highly educated may be relatively more likely to oppose redistributing away from the rich, a group amongst whom they may not be located presently but may hope to be in the future. These considerations lead to the first hypothesis:

> H_1: *Those with higher levels of income and education are more likely to oppose generalized redistribution away from the rich than targeted redistribution toward the poor.*

While this conjecture may appear to verge on near tautology, explicitly testing the hypothesis at very least seems an apt approach to verifying whether the two redistributive policy dimensions in fact tap the attitudes that they are presumed to.

A second basic premise that may lead citizens to hold different outlooks toward the two forms of redistribution may be derived from a distinction drawn between the essential purposes of each of the two key policy types. As a growing number of scholars have emphasized, redistribution is only one of the primary motives of a range of welfare state policies (Dryzek and Goodin 1986; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Moene and Wallerstein 2001, 2003; Iversen 2005). While the principal aim of generalized distribution may be egalitarianism *per se*, the primary motivation for targeted redistribution may instead be economic insecurity. As such, the second hypothesis focuses on the role of risk.

> H_2: *Those subject to greater levels of economic insecurity—including the unemployed, and the young—are more likely to support targeted rather than generalized redistribution.*

The third set of factors that may effect different views about the two forms of redistribution can be understood under the general rubric of what Zaller (1992) refers to as a 'predisposition', or what Sniderman *et al*. (1991) refer to as 'affect'. Identities dimensions seem particularly likely to potentially predispose citizens to support one form of redistribution rather than the other. For instance, one set of factors that has been found to be an important determinant of redistributive attitudes is citizens' orientations toward a range of social outgroups, such as immigrants and Aboriginal Canadians. Because members of these groups may be either over-represented amongst the poor or in media depictions of poverty, such sentiments may inculcate lower levels of support for policies that endeavour to ameliorate these groups' disadvantaged social circumstances.

Nationalism is another identities dimension that may be important. Some argue that nationalism can foster sentiments of social solidarity and in-group cohesion that reinforce redistributive politics (Barry 1991; Tamir 1993; Miller 1995; Béland and Lecours 2006), whereas others contend that nationalism may be a divisive force that competes with notions of class solidarity (Hobsbawm 1990; Shayo 2009; Solt 2011). Distinguishing between types of redistribution may in fact reconcile these competing visions. To the extent that nationalism is a force of positive affect, it may foster sentiments of social solidarity that are compatible with an impetus to redistribute toward the poor. For instance, as members of a political community, some may believe that all citizens may have the right to a basic minimum level of social protection. Nationalism may simultaneously foster not only positive predispositions toward poor compatriots, however. It might also diminish negative predispositions toward the rich, thereby leading nationalists to be otherwise more inclined to favour targeted redistribution that favours the poor than generalized economic equalization which redistributes away from the rich. Similarly, authoritarian values may mitigate negative affect toward financial and political elites. To the extent that these predispositions play a key role in the determination of relative predisposition to support one of these two forms rather than the other, then, positive affect for both the rich and poor are complementary rather than competing forces that lead to

increases in relative support for generalized redistribution. But negative affect would have the opposite impact:

> *H_3: Factors that lead citizens to have greater affect for the rich or poor—such as pro-nationalist sentiment or authoritarian values—will increase citizens' willingness to support targeted rather than generalized redistribution, whereas negative affect would increase their willingness to support generalized rather than targeted redistribution.*

Finally, there is the role of economic beliefs. Those who place little faith in market mechanisms or the potential for economic mobility may be more likely to believe that luck or connections have a greater influence—and are thus more likely to perceive greater risk—than those with more confidence in market mechanisms. More right-leaning economic views may also result in comparatively less positive affect for the rich relative to the extent to which it leads to negative affect for the poor, to the extent that the disadvantaged may be perceived to have earned their social position. These ideas suggest a final hypothesis:

> *H_4: Those with more confidence in market mechanisms should be more likely to support generalized, rather than targeted redistribution.*

The four hypotheses specified in the preceding discussion provide us with expectations for a range of factors that may have differential impacts on citizens' willingness to support each of the two forms of egalitarian redistribution at the center of the current analysis. Taken together, this set of factors represent a collection of some of the most influential determinants of public outlooks toward redistributive social policies. Next, we move to determine whether this set of factors does, in fact, lead to substantial differences in Canadians' redistributive policy issue positions.

§ 4 Data and Methods

§ 4.1 Data

Data are a particular problem for the proposed investigation. This is partly an effect of the decision to focus on the Canadian case, rather than comparative data more broadly. But it is moreso a result of the fact that the chosen dependent variable of the analysis measures relative support for two different policy types. As such, not only must the available data include identifiers of support for both types of redistribution to be compared, but in order to contrast differing redistributive preferences, only respondents who hold opposing views toward the two policy types are considered. This requirement substantially curtails available sample sizes.

In order to address this deficiency, data is pooled not only from various iterations of a given survey, but also across two separate surveys. First, data are taken from the 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2011 iterations of the Canadian Elections Study (CES). In total, 7,939 respondents replied to questions regarding each of the two redistributive policy types, but

substantially fewer indicated opposing preferences for them. These 1,822 CES respondents are located in one of 60 distinct province-year contexts.[3] Second, additional data are drawn from waves II, IV, and V of the Canadian component of the World Values Survey (WVS). 5,458 WVS respondents replied to questions regarding the two redistributive policy types, but only 2,074 of them indicated opposing preferences for them. These WVS respondents are located in one of 30 distinct province-year contexts. As such, the combined six CES and three WVS surveys account for a total of 3,896 respondents in one of 90 province-year contexts.

§ 4.1.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of the analysis taps citizens' relative preferences for two distinct egalitarian redistributive policy types: targeted and generalized redistribution. To be more specific, the dependent variable of the analysis identifies those with a relative preference for generalized instead of targeted redistribution. Respondents who indicate this preference ordering are coded as a 1 in the analysis, whereas those who prefer targeted to generalized redistribution are coded as a 0. Because they do not convey information about relative preferences, all respondents who were either in support of or opposition to both redistributive policy types are excluded from the analysis.

The items used to measure each of the two orientations that are used to construct the dependent variable of the analysis—provided below in Figure 2—differ substantially in each of the two data sets. While the questions included in the CES and WVS data sets are distinct, a high degree of consistency in the micro-level results presented in the following empirical section seems to strongly suggest that these items are capturing comparable policy issue positions. The CES questionnaire item tapping support for targeted redistribution has only two response categories, and the measure of support for generalized redistribution has some minor variation in the number of response categories across the six iterations of the CES.[4] In order to maximize comparability and harmonize responses across survey years, these measures were recoded into two categories representing 'pro redistributive' and 'anti-redistributive' attitudes. Likewise, while the WVS measures for both targeted and generalized redistribution were each initially coded using ten categories, these measures were dichotomized at the midpoint in order to allow for the integration of these data into the overall analysis.

§ 4.1.2 Explanatory and Control Variables

Each of the included explanatory and control variables has been recoded in order to promote comparability. In particular, each has been coded as a binary, nominal or ordinal level variable, such that all micro-level elements included in the models are coded as either a 0 or a

[3] Respondents from the 2006 iteration of the CES only answered questions about one of the two forms of redistribution under consideration and so are not incorporated in the current analysis.

[4] There is a modest change in response options between the 1997 and 2000 elections in the CES.

Figure 2: Question Wordings of Indicators Used to Measure the Dependent Variable

Type of Redistribution	Data Set: *World Values Survey* (*WVS*)	Data Set: *Canadian Elections Study* (*CES*)
Targeted Redistribution	Respondents are asked: "How would you place your views on this scale (1-10)? 1 means you agree completely with the statement 'Individuals should take more responsibility to provide for themselves', 10 means you agree completely with the statement 'The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for,' or you can choose any number in between." Respondents who indicated that they are more inclined to favour the first of these two statements are counted as being in favour of this type of redistribution, while those favouring the second are considered to be opposed.	Respondents are asked whether they agree more with the statement "The government should see to it that everyone has a decent standard of living" or that it should "Leave people to get ahead on their own." Respondents who indicated that they are more inclined to favour the first of these two statements are counted as being in favour of this type of redistribution, while those favouring the second are considered to be opposed.
Generalized Redistribution	Respondents are asked: "How would you place your views on this scale (1-10)? 1 means you agree completely with the statement 'Incomes should be made more equal', 10 means you agree completely with the statement 'There should be greater incentives for individual effort,' or you can choose any number in between." Respondents who indicated that they are more inclined to favour the first of these two statements are counted as being in favour of this type of redistribution, while those favouring the second are considered to be opposed.	Respondents are asked: "How much do you think should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less?" Respondents who indicated that either somewhat more or much more should be done are counted as being in favour of this type of redistribution, while those indicating otherwise are considered to be opposed. There is some minor variation in the question wordings and response categories in earlier *CES* waves. See footnote ??.

1. In many instances this coding was simply a function of the manner in which the data were originally gathered. In others, variables were recoded such that the breadth of the measures constructed from indices was intentionally reduced to a more limited range of—typically two to four—categories. This was done in order to ensure that the relative magnitudes of the effects of both single- and multi-item measures were comparable. Or put differently, it was done in order to ensure that when the effects of factors that were measured using indices were compared to factors that were not, the effects of the former did not appear to dominate merely because of the method of construction.

A series of highly comparable measures from each of the two data sets has been coded in order to test the hypotheses presented in the preceding section of the paper. Each of the micro-level independent variables can be stylized corresponding to one of the four hypotheses of the analysis: interests, risk, affect, or economic beliefs. The *interests* dimensions incorporate two factors: income and education. Income is a six-category variable (very low, low, medium low, medium high, high, very high), whereas education (did not complete high school, completed high school, attended some post-secondary, completed university) is a four-category variables. There also two factors that are linked to *risk*: age and occupational status. Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60+) is a four-category variable, while employment status includes six (employed, self-employed, student, retired, unemployed, and other). Four *affect* variables are included. Two of these are negative affect dimensions toward those who might be considered as more likely recipients of targeted redistribution. Here, there is a discrepancy in the available measures in the respective data sets. In the CES data, both anti-immigrant and anti-Aboriginal sentiments are four-category variables (low, medium low, medium high, high). In the WVS, the anti-immigrant sentiments dimension is binary (low, high), but there is no comparable measure of anti-Aboriginal sentiment included in this data set. In contrast, the other two affect varibales are positive predisposition dimensions. Nationalism is a single-item measure, whereas the measures of authoritarian values are derived from two items which tap confidence in the police and in the armed forces, respectively. Both nationalism and authoritarianism are included as four-category dimensions (low, medium low, medium high, high). Finally, two economic beliefs dimensions are included. One gauges views about opportunities for economic mobility, while the other considers attitudes toward private markets and the public-private divide. These two variables are also each coded using four categories (low, medium low, medium high, high).

In addition to these ten explanatory factors, seven sociodemographic control variables are also included. Gender, the urban-rural divide, and immigrant and union status are coded as dichotomous variables. Marital status is coded using three categories (single, couple, married). Religion is a four-category variable (Protestant, Catholic, none, other) and ethnicity is a five-category variable (Caucasian, East Asian, African Canadian, Aboriginal, other).

§ 4.2 Statistical Methods

The principal analytic method employed is a series of logistic regression models. These models are used to determine the statistical significance and estimate the marginal effects of the range of explanatory variables outlined above. In this instance, the marginal effects indicate the anticipated change in the likelihood that a given individual will support a given policy type as a particular explanatory characteristic is changed when all of the other variables included in the model are held constant. The larger the estimated regression coefficient, the larger is its anticipated *ceteris paribus* effect. Logistic regression, a familiar method amongst public opinion survey researcher, is used because the dependent variable of the empirical investigation is binary, measuring support for generalized but not targeted redistribution. As such, positive coefficient estimates suggest a relative preference for more broad-based generalized redistribution, whereas negative coefficients instead indicate a preference for more focused, targeted redistribution. But given that Canadian provinces have distinctive welfare state programs, (Boychuk 1998; Noël 2013), redistributive effects (Haddow 2013) and political cultures (Simeon and Elkins 1974; Elkins and Simeon 1980; Wiseman 1996, 2007), three-level multilevel binomial logit models fitted using restricted maximum likelihood estimation that account for the clustering of individuals within survey years as well as provinces by specifying a random intercept for each.[5]

§ 5 Empirical Analyses

The results of the empirical examinations are displayed below in Table 1. This table presents estimates from a series of three logistic regressions in three sets of columns. The first set of columns on the left of the table provides the findings from CES data, the second set in the center from WVS data, while the third set of columns on the right gives the results from the combined CES and WVS data. The results of each of the relevant explanatory variables used to test the hypotheses of the paper are presented in the rows of the table. To reiterate, for this results, positive coefficient estimates suggest a relative preference for generalized redistribution, while negative coefficients indicate a relative preference for targeted redistribution. On the second page of the table, this is followed by the estimated effects of the sociodemographic controls included, as well as a dummy to distinguish between data sets in the third model, model intercepts, and sample sizes at each of the three levels of the models.

Overall, the results largely conform to the expectations established in the theory section of the paper. First, consider the estimated impacts of the interests factors. Here, theory suggests that those with higher levels of income and education should be more opposed to generalized than targeted redistribution, as they will be more inclined to view themselves as the direct financiers of the former redistributive policy type. Here, the evidence seems clear.

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[5] Specifically, a generalized linear mixed effects in R (glmer) models with family = binomial(link = ''logit'') are used (Bates *et al*. 2013; R Core Team 2013). See http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/lme4.pdf and http://lme4.r-forge.r-project.org/.

Table 1: Microlevel Estimated Effects on Relative Support for Generalized rather than Targeted Redistribution

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Canadian Elections Studies Data Only			World Values Survey Canadian Data Only			CES and WVS Combined Data		
	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	P-Value
Explanatory Variables									
Interests Factors									
Income (Base = Low Income)									
Medium Low	-0.31	0.22	0.163	0.28	0.19	0.134	-0.01	0.14	0.946
Medium	-0.30	0.22	0.183	0.42	0.20	0.030 *	0.08	0.14	0.564
Medium High	-0.56	0.23	0.017 *	0.42	0.21	0.041 *	-0.04	0.15	0.785
High	-0.56	0.24	0.018 *	0.03	0.21	0.901	-0.24	0.15	0.119
Very High	-0.98	0.26	0.000 ***	-0.42	0.25	0.091 †	-0.64	0.17	0.000 ***
Education (Base = Incomplete Highschool)									
Highschool	0.04	0.17	0.798	0.08	0.12	0.511	0.07	0.09	0.468
Some University	-0.09	0.17	0.571	-0.02	0.17	0.880	-0.13	0.11	0.212
University	-0.13	0.18	0.483	-0.40	0.16	0.011 *	-0.29	0.11	0.009 **
Risk Factors									
Age (Base = Low)									
Middle	0.31	0.19	0.107	0.39	0.14	0.006 **	0.32	0.11	0.004 **
High	0.66	0.20	0.001 **	0.63	0.16	0.000 ***	0.61	0.12	0.000 ***
Senior	0.69	0.25	0.006 **	0.40	0.22	0.065 †	0.54	0.16	0.001 ***
Employment Status (Base = Unemployed)									
Other	0.14	0.34	0.672	0.25	0.22	0.249	0.20	0.18	0.263
Student	-0.01	0.41	0.973	0.10	0.32	0.752	0.07	0.24	0.778
Retired	0.32	0.32	0.310	0.26	0.24	0.287	0.25	0.18	0.180
Employed	0.43	0.28	0.126	0.21	0.18	0.244	0.29	0.15	0.050 *
Self-Employed	0.34	0.30	0.263	0.19	0.28	0.490	0.27	0.18	0.129
Affect Dimensions									
Anti-Immigrant (Base = Low)									
Medium Low	-0.22	0.23	0.339	---	---	---	---	---	---
Medium High	0.21	0.23	0.356	---	---	---	---	---	---
High	0.38	0.24	0.114	-0.13	0.22	0.559	0.20	0.11	0.062 †
Anti-First Nations (Base = Low)									
Medium Low	-0.17	0.15	0.260	---	---	---	---	---	---
Medium High	-0.22	0.16	0.163	---	---	---	---	---	---
High	-0.08	0.18	0.664	---	---	---	---	---	---
National Pride (Base = Low)									
Medium Low	-0.15	0.22	0.514	-0.16	0.52	0.763	-0.21	0.20	0.288
Medium High	-0.30	0.19	0.114	-0.09	0.47	0.839	-0.28	0.17	0.091 †
High	-0.40	0.20	0.045 *	-0.27	0.46	0.557	-0.40	0.17	0.020 *
Authoritarianism (Base = Low)									
Medium Low	-0.21	0.18	0.257	-0.25	0.17	0.152	-0.21	0.12	0.087 †
Medium High	-0.32	0.17	0.062 †	-0.28	0.16	0.089 †	-0.30	0.11	0.010 **
High	-0.64	0.18	0.001 ***	-0.10	0.17	0.560	-0.34	0.12	0.005 **
Economic Belief Dimensions									
Economic Mobility (Base = Low)									
Medium Low	-0.07	0.23	0.756	0.08	0.16	0.630	0.03	0.13	0.828
Medium High	0.20	0.22	0.367	0.35	0.15	0.022 *	0.31	0.12	0.011 *
High	0.34	0.22	0.124	0.73	0.18	0.000 ***	0.55	0.13	0.000 ***
Private Market Efficiency (Base = Low)									
Medium Low	0.03	0.15	0.814	0.62	0.15	0.000 ***	0.34	0.10	0.001 **
Medium High	0.26	0.15	0.078 †	0.70	0.15	0.000 ***	0.51	0.10	0.000 ***
High	0.54	0.17	0.002 **	0.82	0.16	0.000 ***	0.70	0.11	0.000 ***

Sociodemographic Controls									
Gender (Base = Woman)	-0.16	0.11	0.133	0.03	0.10	0.731	-0.05	0.07	0.484
Marital Status (Base = Single)									
Partner	0.22	0.21	0.278	-0.16	0.17	0.357	0.01	0.13	0.908
Married	0.35	0.13	0.005 **	-0.03	0.12	0.794	0.16	0.08	0.060 †
Rural (Base = Urban)	0.24	0.12	0.049 *	-0.11	0.12	0.345	0.03	0.08	0.697
Religion (Base = Protestant)									
Catholic	0.15	0.13	0.241	0.12	0.13	0.330	0.11	0.09	0.212
Not Religious	0.03	0.15	0.829	0.17	0.15	0.254	0.12	0.10	0.257
Other	0.03	0.24	0.910	-0.11	0.18	0.525	-0.05	0.14	0.705
Ethnicity (Base = Caucasian)									
East Asian	-0.13	0.33	0.690	-1.09	0.25	0.000 ***	-0.65	0.19	0.001 ***
African Canadian	0.29	0.71	0.686	-0.30	0.25	0.231	-0.21	0.23	0.373
Aboriginal	-0.58	0.41	0.155	0.62	0.70	0.377	-0.19	0.34	0.574
Other Ethnicity	-0.01	0.34	0.969	-0.13	0.19	0.508	-0.11	0.16	0.516
Immigrant (Base = Not)	0.43	0.17	0.010 *	-0.12	0.12	0.346	0.14	0.10	0.131
Union Membership (Base = Not)	-0.05	0.11	0.683	0.24	0.13	0.066 †	0.06	0.08	0.445
CES Data Dummy	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.26	0.11	0.021 *
Intercept	0.06	0.07	0.386	0.30	0.08	0.000 ***	0.31	0.09	0.000 ***
Sample Sizes									
Microlevel (Survey Respondents)		1822			2074			3896	
Mesolevel (Province-Year Contexts)		60			30			90	
Macrolevel (Provinces)		10			10			10	

Significance Indicators: 0.050 < † < 0.100 0.010 < * < 0.050 0.001 < ** < 0.010 *** < 0.001

Sources: The 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2011 iterations of the Canadian Elections Study (CES) and Waves II, IV, and V of the Canadian components of the World Values Survey (WVS). Missing data values are imputed using Honaker, King and Blackwell's Amelia II software.

Note: The questions used to measure support for each of the respective redistributive policy types in each of the CES and WVS studies are presented in Figure 1.

Although in each of the respective data sets, some of the effects appear to be somewhat uncertain, the estimates are nonetheless each negative for those with the highest levels of income and education. And when the data are combined, the results achieve a high level of statistical significance. Because these coefficient estimates are negative, this suggest that those with higher levels of income and education do not prefer generalized to targeted redistribution. Rather, they prefer the latter to the former.

The estimates for the risk factors—captured by the age and employment status dimensions—are also consistent with the proposed theory, which anticipates that those exposed to greater risk will be relatively more likely to support targeted rather than generalized redistribution. For these two dimensions, those subject to the greatest risk—younger adults and the unemployed—are excluded as a base category of reference, such that these presented estimates demonstrate the effects of *decreasing* risk. Here, because the estimated effects are positive for older respondents and for respondents with more employment security relative to the unemployed—such as the employed or self-employed—this indicates that those with lower levels of risk generally prefer generalized to targeted redistribution. Which thereby implies that those with higher levels of risk instead favour targeted to generalized redistribution.

The findings presented for the affect dimensions are in some cases more equivocal. This is particularly the case for the two negative affect dimensions, anti-immigrant and anti-Aboriginal sentiments. Here, theory proposes that those who dislike these groups are less likely to support targeted redistribution that may disproportionately benefit their members. There is some evidence that this may be the case for those who hold anti-immigrant attitudes—those who do so are, if anything, more likely to favour redistribution away from the rich rather than redistribution toward the poor—but there appears to be no evidence whatsoever that this may be the case for those with negative perceptions of Aboriginals. Note, however, that this should not be taken to suggest that these factors are unimportant for explaining citizens' redistributive outlooks. In fact, further analyses (not presented) clearly indicate that both factors, and particularly anti-Aboriginal views, play a substantial role in decreasing support for both types of redistribution. But because the size of the effect is comparable for each, those with animosity toward Canada's First Nations communities do not appear to be clearly predisposed to support one redistributive policy type instead of the other.

For the two positive affect dimensions, however, the results seem more apparent. Theory suggests that nationalist sentiment may increase affect for both the rich and poor. As such, contrary to the discussion of negative affect in the preceding paragraph which proposes that those who dislike the poor may favour generalized redistribution, instead those who have positive affect for the poor should tend to prefer targeted redistribution. And likewise, those with positive affect for the rich may also tend to be relatively more inclined to support targeted redistribution, to the extent they tend to oppose more generalized redistribution that taxes their wealthier compatriots. Similarly, authoritarians who may be more inclined to have more positive predispositions toward wealthy financial and political elites may also be more likely to oppose generalized, thus also relatively favouring targeted redistribution. These arguments are consistent with the available evidence. Again, in each of the respective data sets, some of the

estimated effects appear to be somewhat uncertain. But the coefficients are all negative for those with more national pride and higher levels of authoritarian values. The results of the combined regression for both factors are each statistically significant at, at least, the generally accepted 0.05 level of significance.

The relative impacts of the two economic belief dimensions are also clear-cut. As theory suggests, while those with greater beliefs in economic mobility and the effectiveness of private markets are more likely to oppose both types of redistributive public policies, they are even more likely to oppose targeted than generalized redistribution. This thereby implies a relative preference for generalized redistribution. As the coefficient estimates for those with higher levels of support for both of these types of economic beliefs are all positive, this suggests that that those with more right-wing economic beliefs do in fact seem to prefer generalized to targeted redistribution. Or conversely, they seem to oppose targeted redistribution toward the poor more than they do generalized redistribution away from the rich.

Finally, the results also provide clear indications about the relative magnitudes of the included types of determinants. Notice that the sizes of the coefficients for the income and economic belief dimensions are the largest of the included factors. But given that those with higher income are more likely to oppose both types of redistribution, the fact that these coefficients are negative suggests that the extent of their relative opposition is greater for generalized than for targeted redistribution. In light of the preceding discussion, this makes sense. But it also tells us that as such, income is a greater driver of differences in attitudes toward generalized than it is for targeted redistribution. Conversely, given that those with more right-leaning economic beliefs are also more likely to oppose the two types of redistribution, the positive coefficients for these factors indicate that the extent of their relative opposition is instead greater for targeted than for generalized redistribution. This is also consistent with the preceding discussion. But it also implies that economic beliefs a greater driver of differences in attitudes toward targeted than it is for generalized redistribution.

§ 6 Discussion

The empirical results presented in the preceding section speak to a range of both Canadian and comparative scholarship that focuses on factors which explain differences in citizens' redistributive policy preferences. For instance, the findings seem to speak directly to the emphasis Banting *et al*. (2013) place on differences in Canadians' negative perceptions of immigrants and Aboriginals. They find that while perceptions of immigrant welfare dependence merely reduce support for welfare assistance itself, the negative impacts of these perceptions seem to be limited to this particular type of social policy. Whereas they find that negative perceptions of Aboriginal welfare dependence reduce not only support for welfare assistance itself, but other social programs also. As such, Banting *et al*. draw the conclusion that "the toxic effects of negative views of Aboriginal reliance on welfare spreads throughout the entire welfare state" (2013: 180). This conclusion is supported by the results from the negative affect dimensions presented in the preceding section. While the impacts of anti-immigrant sentiment

seem to, if anything, more negatively impact support for targeted redistribution, anti-First Nations sentiments has comparable negative effects on support for both redistributive policy types. In these data also, the negative effects of anti-immigrant attitudes seem to be if anything more restricted to targeted redistribution, while anti-First Nations outlooks have similar detrimental consequences on support for both of the redistributive policy types considered.

What can we learn from the Canadian case about the contemporary comparative politics literature by distinguishing one type of redistributive policy preference from another? The results seem to corroborate a range of findings from other countries. First, interests matter. As Derks (2004) establishes in the Flemish, and Cavaillé and Trump (2015) demonstrate in the British case, Canadians with lower incomes are relatively more likely to support general redistribution away from the rich than targeted redistribution away from the poor characteristic of the role of the welfare state. And as Acterberg *et al*. (2011) demonstrate in the Netherlands, the same is true for education. Risk also seems to matter, and the available data also establish that risk plays a role. Like Derks (2004) and Schlotzman and Verba (1979) show in Belgium and the United States, for age and employment status respectively, those who face the greatest risk—younger and unemployed Canadians—tend to favour targeted to generalized redistribution.

The two positive affect dimensions—nationalism and authoritarianism—also speaks to a range of literature. First, the findings are relevant to Shayo's (2009) proposition that nationalism decreases support for redistribution. The current analysis suggests that the extent and veracity of this result may depend on the type of redistribution under consideration. While it may hold for more broad-based economic equalization, it may do so to a lesser extent when considering more targeted redistribution. This is consistent with the claim that—in this case Canadian—nationalism seems to mitigate disaffection for the rich, thereby providing support for Hobsbawm's (1990) suggestion that nationalism may be a divisive force that competes with notions of class solidarity. It is also relevant to the broader range of scholarship that addresses Wilensky's (1975) welfare backlash theory, which posits that anti-institutional attitudes may channel into greater support for more general economic redistribution rather than targeted welfare programs that ensure social provision of modest levels of economic wellbeing. For instance, Derks (2004) demonstrates that those with greater levels of political distrust are more like to hold economic egalitarian positions than to be supportive of the welfare state, and Acterberg *et al*. (2011) show that a greater sense of 'anomie' decreases support for welfarism. Hence, it is reasonable to find that nationalism—linked with positive views of the state—and authoritarianism—attached to more favourable attitudes toward elites—generally increases relative support for targeted redistribution. Less enthusiastic attitudes toward the state and authorities, however, may thereby translate into greater relative support for more broad-based generalized redistribution. Or more broadly, that positive affect dimensions tend to increase relative support for targeted redistribution, whereas negative affect dimensions instead increase relative support for generalized redistribution.

That more right-leaning economic beliefs are also linked to support for more generalized redistribution away from the rich rather than more targeted redistribution toward

the poor is consistent with Derks' (2003) finding that those who believe in greater economic individualism are more predisposed to hold economic populist attitudes that characterize this preference ordering. The results presented above also speak to the range of scholarship that emphasizes the role citizens' beliefs about social mobility play in shaping their redistributive outlooks (Feagin 1975; Hochschild 1979, 1981; Feldman 1983, 1988; Taylor-Gooby 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Hansenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Cnaan *et al*. 1993; Piketty 1995; Fong 2001; Linos and West 2003; Fong, Bowles and Gintis 2005; Bowles 2012). The extent to which beliefs in social mobility affect popular support for redistribution again seems to depend on the redistributive policy type. While mobility beliefs certainly play a role in shaping attitudes toward both policy types, they appear to have a much greater impact conditioning outlooks on targeted than generalized redistribution. And it seems that beliefs about the efficacy of private markets and the effectiveness of government intervention may play an even more substantial role than do views about social mobility.

§ 7 Conclusion

This investigation's findings provide a range of evidence that supports many of the findings hitherto presented in the comparative scholarship which has investigated the determinants of two key types of egalitarian redistributive public policies: targeted and generalized redistribution. To the extent that one accepts the general characterization of an economic populist as one who prefers more generalized than targeted redistributive social policies, then this paper's results suggest that the role played by many key determinants of economic populism in other contexts also seem to be at work in Canada. The portrait of an economic populist that is drawn is one of lower income and education, who is older in age and with more secure employment, anti-elite and perhaps to some extent anti-poor, and who holds more right-wing economic beliefs. These are depictions that dovetail well with general descriptions of Brexit voters in the United Kingdom and Trump voters in the United States. Note, however, that negative affect dimensions—linked to increases in relative support for generalized redistribution and thus economic populism—were a prominent aspect of the American experience. The current findings seem to suggest that these factors may not play as prominent a role in Canada. Nevertheless, given that economic populism is more likely to rise during periods of disaffection with elites, those concerned with a potential rise of economic populism in Canada should hope that our political leaders will be as effective as possible at engendering public optimism, and do little to engender potential disaffection with elites and the political and economic status quo more broadly.

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