ABSTRACTS / SOMMAIRES

CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

June 8, 9, 10, 11, 1971

MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY, ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

Forty-Third Annual Meeting

les 8, 9, 10, 11, juin, 1971

Quarante-Troisième Congrès Annuel

ASSOCIATION CANADIENNE DE SCEINCE POLITIQUE

CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION/ASSOCIATION CANADIENNE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE

1971 ABSTRACTS/RESUMES 1971

*No Abstract +No Advance Paper

*No Abstract +No Advance Paper

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*No Abstract + No Advance Paper

Abstract of paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the CPSA, June 1971

1A

ON THE NATURE OF CHARISMA

by

Ladis K.D. Kristof
University of Waterloo

The concept of charisma and charismatic leadership originated in religious life. Theologians have distinguished between personal, collective, and institutionalized (attached to an office) charisma. In all cases charisma was seen as a "gift" (gift of grace) and whoever, or whatever, was vested with it was merely a messenger of God. Though personal charisma carried with it greater emotional appeal, and institutionalized charisma a more rational appeal, both were seen as "gifts" of God's wisdom, an expression of a higher rationality. In Marx Weber's view, on the other hand, charisma can be only personal (i.e., it can not survive institutionalization), and charismatic leadership is synonimous with a rejection of rational standards.

The question is whether charismatic leadership is indeed incompatible with reason. The religious leader claims that his charisma ("gift") belongs to the realm of understanding beyond the scrutiny by human reason. But the charisma of the secular leader does not transcend the essence of human understanding, however superior, and above-the-average its level may be. Weber himself points out that in politics the charismatic leader must stand the test; his followers must prosper, for, if his leadership fails, his charisma will dwindle. In other words, the followers have quite rational expectations which they feel unable to secure by traditional, routine means, relying on their own rationality, but which they hope the superior gifts of the leader will secure. Thus recourse to charismatic leadership is not an appeal to irrationality but to a superior rationality when in times of distress traditional rationality proves inadequate. The routinization of charisma after the crisis is successfully dealt with does not mean the rationalization of the irrational, but a levelling upward of the average rationality: incorporation of the innovative thinking of the genius into the general cultural heritage.

However, the leader-followers bond is forged in a moment when the average man does not have the capacity to judge the charisma of the leader; he simply believes in it. And he will believe in it only if the leader is endowed with auxiliaries of charisma - with ecstatic charisma which appeals to the unconscious, not the conscious (rational) in man. It is this visible, ecstatic charisma which mobilizes human energies while the (real or merely ascribed) rational charisma remains invisible. In a sense, rational charisma becomes visible to the followers only a posteriori, in its effects - positive if the charisma was genuine, negative if charisma was in fact illusory.

2A-3A

Abstract: "Classical Theories of Resistance and Revolution"

David V. J. Bell
Assistant Professor
of Political Science
Michigan State University

To the extent that they raise, explicitly or implicitly, the question of order and disorder in society, all political theorists confront the problem of resistance and revolution. Whether they address the problem from the perspective of the reactionary conservative, anxious to preserve order at any cost; or from the viewpoint of the impassioned radical, prepared to suffer the agonies of disorder in the name of a better society; or yet from the calm outlook of the "neutral" analyst -- political theorists cannot ignore resistance and revolution.

From among all those thinkers who have engaged in the "tradition of discourse" called classical political theory, this paper singles out a few specific theorists -- Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Burke, Marx, Sorel -- chosen because their work raises fundamental and enduring questions that are representative of most approaches to the problem.

If there is a common theme running through classical theories of resistance and revolution, it involves the notions of tyranny and injustice. Most theorists argue that individuals have a <u>right</u> to resist a tyrant, and that they <u>will</u> revolt against "injustice". Discussion then focusses on how tyranny and injustice are defined and recognized; and how reactions to them should and do come about. Thus classical theorists intertwine normative with empirical considerations, and they do so in the context of a theoretical framework which transcends the concepts of resistance and revolution.

All of these considerations inform the analysis undertaken in this paper, which concludes with a brief attempt to relate the views of the classical theorists to contemporary issues in the study of resistance and revolution.

2A-3A

CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION MEETINGS, 1971

10:45 a.m., June 19

Workshop: Marxism and Revolutionary Theory

ALIENATION AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR

R.G. Stevens, University of Waterloo

The heirs of a particular mode of thought must, if they are to understand that mode of thought, free themselves from it and, so to speak, look behind it. To understand Marx, it is necessary to be clear about that out of which and against which his views arise. It is as a critic of what is called "political economy" that he takes his stand. That political economy is, itself, rather a new thing. It is, in turn, heir of the new doctrines of political philosophy, particularly as exemplified by Locke. Those new doctrines speak of civil and political rights as being <u>fixed in</u> persons and that fixing or attachment is regarded as being from or according to nature. That view, which may be characterized as the "natural rights" doctrine, is a departure from older views of what is by nature right. But it shares with those older views the view that things, or characteristics, or qualities tend by habituation to be fixed in individuals. Such fixings bring about, so to speak, a "second nature". But it is regarded as perfectly in accord with nature in the primary sense that those second natures come about. A crucial aspect of that view of the naturalness of second natures is the doctrine of the division of labor. Marx speaks of the "estrangement of man's labor" as the root of the alienation of man from himself, from his nature. He also sees the whole system of rights fixed in individuals, setting them off one against the other, as a form of alienation of men from themselves and from their humanity. In this he <u>seems</u> to agree with the ancients. Secondly, he attacks the principle of the division of labor and that attack is connected with his disapproval of the system of rights fixed in persons, and so, with alienation. This paper will attempt to grasp the connection between the two things - alienation and division of labor - so as to understand why Marx goes beyond disapproval of obviously <u>crazy</u> divisions of labor to an apparent disapproval of <u>all</u> division of labor. It seems that for Marx, "callings" wrench men incurably, but unnecessarily from their humanity.

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2A·3A

MARX ON HUMAN EMANCIPATION

B. LeBaron, Brock University

"It is by no means sufficient to ask: Who should emancipate and who should be emancipated? Criticism has to be concerned with a third question. It must ask: What kind of emancipation?"
Marx, "On the Jewish Question"

A mistake frequently made by both Marxist and non-Marxist writers is the discussion of "revolution" solely in terms of the seizure of power and related problems, such as the concomittant changes in leadership, regimes, and governmental institutions. This type of discussion separates the problems of power from the problems of transformation, the goals desired from the methods appropriate for their achievement.

On the other hand, Marx argued against such separations. The revolution must be made by men who have already begun to be free, the goals must be immanent in the methods. The revolutionary goal of human emancipation must be part of revolutionary praxis. The revolutionary must free himself from a "commodity" mentality. He must begin to appropriate the world in a distinctively "human" way. He must bring "private" needs into conjunction with "public" needs, so that emancipation can begin to have a "human" rather than a particularistic and therefore divisive content. A Marxist revolution cannot take as its program: "First we vanquish our enemies; then we begin to be new men."

This does not mean that the revolution ignores the very real power factors involved in the struggle against the capitalist system. The people who wield the power in the capitalist system will not willingly give up this power. Those who have vested interests in the immensely profitable forms of oppression will not charitably step aside in favour of a new form of social and economic organization. The struggle against the old order may necessarily have to be violent. The development of class-consciousness may become exceedingly bitter.

It follows that a socialist revolution must be profoundly paradoxical. On the one hand the revolutionary must emancipate himself from the alienating oppression of capitalism, while on the other he must be prepared to commit acts of violence, to foment antagonisms, to participate in activities which, may in themselves, be dehumanizing and alienating. The dangers inherent in this paradoxical situation are very real, if the historical examples of other peoples give us any guide.

How can these dangers be avoided, and a genuinely socialist man come into being? I do not propose any blueprint, but I do re-emphasize Marx's warning that goals must be contained within methods. The revolutionary must not succumb to the exigencies of mere struggle without vision; he must maintain the tension and complexity inherent in a profound appreciation of that for which he struggles. The struggle must not blindly destroy all that surrounds it. Rather it must enhance "all the wealth of previous development" - the art, literature and music, as well as the forms of material production which are truly liberating.

This is especially important in modern industrial society. Our pressing need is not to learn how to create more things, but rather how to "humanize" an already enormous productive capacity. The central problem is to know how to take power out of the hands of priviledge where it is grasped so firmly, while at the same time not losing sight of how to utilize that power in a genuinely human way.

4A

Abstract

"JOACHIM OF FIORE AND MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT"

Thomas Flanagan

University of Calgary

Toward the end of the twelfth century the Calabrian abbot Joachim of Fiore developed a unique theology of history. He taught that human history contains three ages or status, corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity. He placed his own time at the end of the second age - the new Law - and at the beginning of the third era - the age of the Holy Spirit. In spite of the failure of the Holy Spirit to come as predicted, Joachim's doctrine had a wide following in the Middle Ages. It is to be found in the movement of the Spiritual Franciscans, in the widely spread adherents of the Free Spirit, and in various other heretical groups and movements. It is also undisputed that the expectation of an age of the Holy Spirit survived well into the Reformation; it was, for example, an element of the ideology of the revolutionary Anabaptists of Münster (1534-35).

It has been suggested by several noted scholars (Jacob Taubes, Norman Cohn, Friedrich Heer, Alois Dempf, Eric Voegelin) that Joachim's vision of history has had a considerable impact on modern thought. They appear to be based on three, e.g. Comte's loi des trois ètats, Mazzinio's Roma teraz, the National Socialist Third Reich, etc.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the entire question more closely. In the first section I give a description of Joachim's theories on history. This is not an original effort; rather it draws upon the works of medieval historians, which however are not known to most political scientists. I then briefly discuss the channels of transmission of Joachimite ideas through the Middle Ages, Reformation, and down to modern times. Finally, I turn to four case studies from the last two centuries: G. E. Lessing, August Cieszkowski, Moses Hess, and Dmitri Merezhkovsky. (Merezhkovsky is particularly interesting because of his close association with Moeller van den Bruck, popularizer of the term Third Reich). In each instance, I adduce evidence to show that the author used Joachimite categories to develop a futuristic vision of history. I conclude that the Joachim's three ages have indeed been transmitted to and have had an effect upon modern thought. Obviously not every analysis of history based on three can be traced to Joachim, but the topic is worth further exploration. I also address myself to the question why a medieval heresy should reappear in modern thought; the answer I suggest is that the experience underlying Joachimite Heresy, the hope for a coming realm of transcendence and freedom, is also one of the formative experiences of modernity. Where the experiential basis is similar, it should not be surprising that similar symbolic formulations will be passed on.

7A

"HUME'S SCIENCE OF POLITICS"

James Moore, Loyola College

An Abstract

The understanding of politics which one finds in the writings of David Hume is a distinctive philosophy of politics, one which has not occupied as significant a place in the literature of political ideas as perhaps it deserves. It will be the argument of this paper that the distinctive character of Hume's political philosophy derives from the social horizons of his understanding of human experience. Hume regarded the behaviour of man in society as the natural location or realm for human activities in general. And he was prompted to regard social behaviour in this way because it provided a set of assumptions about human nature which seemed appropriate for scientific inquiry. Hume was to show that a consistent application of the methods and assumptions of Newtonian science could provide a comprehensive understanding of man in society.

In this paper I will attempt to trace out the implications of this understanding of human experience for politics. I will endeavour to show how Hume's understanding of politics differs significantly from Hobbes and from Locke, and how the methodological horizons of his philosophy contributes to our understanding of these differences. I will explore the implications of Hume's philosophy of human nature for a theory of political obligation, political virtue, political power and authority. I will discuss Hume's theory of constitutional government and compare it with contemporary theories of constitutionalism such as those of Bolingbroke and Montesquieu. And finally I will attempt to say something of the legacy of Hume in the subsequent history of the scientific study of politics.

8A

Abstract

"On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science"

By Willard A. Mullins
Carleton University

Although the term "ideology" is ubiquitous in modern political discourse, the term is used in diverse and usually ambiguous ways which limit its value as an analytical concept. The main ambiguity arises from the fact that, as most writers use it, the concept of ideology does not provide criteria for distinguishing ideological thought from non-ideological thought. Lacking this power to make concrete discriminations, the concept fails to achieve empirical relevance. This paper will attempt to remedy that deficiency and save the concept of ideology for the explanation of politics.

The problem of conceptualization will be approached by viewing ideology primarily as a cultural phenomenon. As such, it will be argued, ideology has characteristics that distinguish it from other symbol systems. Of special importance in this regard will be the identification of basic differentia between ideology on the one hand, and myth and utopia (with which ideology is often confused) on the other. The features of ideology identified in this comparative analysis will then be discussed in fuller detail with a view to understanding (1) the significance of ideology in politics, and (2) the way in which the concept of ideology can help us to understand politics, insofar as politics involves ideology. The viewpoint in this part of the paper will be strongly influenced by notions found in Wittgenstein's later writings, especially as they are relevant to the concept of an action. In the closing section of the paper an attempt will be made to specify how ideology, as conceptualized in the preceding pages, can be measured empirically.

8A

THE MORAL FUNCTION OF IDEOLOGY

Bernard Wand, Carleton University

This paper is an attempt to argue that a coherent theory of morality is really not possible because morality itself is "an essentially contested concept" whose various elements have not always (Historically) been given the same weight, and, indeed, some of them have been ignored. Secondly, it offers a relatively "neutral" definition of ideology as a set of beliefs held by a given "cultural group" which may or may not embody some of these moral elements but by the nature of what morality is cannot consistently embody all. Hence, in principle, there is always the possibility of tension between the two. Thirdly, it offers a non-neutral definition of ideology as a set of beliefs which advances the interest of some class (not necessarily economic) and that this class interest could be seen as morally justified if it brought to our attention that some moral elements of an ideology, in the neutral sense, were either being ignored or not given appropriate weight. A reference to this triadic relationship between morality, ideology (in the neutral sense) and ideology (in the biased sense) should enable us to distinguish between ideological claims which are morally justified and those which are not.

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1B

THE USE OF INTER-NATION SIMULATION AS A RESEARCH TOOL

Harold Cummins (Alberta)
L. G. Yacuk (Alberta)

A B S T R A C T

Presentation will revolve around two basic areas. The first half will deal with the advantages and disadvantages of using simulation as a technique. It will close with the argument that we need to be more innovative and flexible in our use of simulation and that until we are we should stop attacking it as unworkable. The second section will deal with how simulation can most effectively be utilized. In this section we will use as an example our experience at the University of Alberta over the past three years.

Having set out the advantages and disadvantages of simulation we will deal with the most common complaints voiced by those who use it. Some of the most interesting of these are that theoretical links between models and the real world are weak, that participants are culture bound, that the time spent preparing the simulation is not justified by the results.

The second section will deal with similar considerations but will do so within the framework of our work in Projects Flag I, Flag II and Omega. We will open this second part with a discussion of the reasons why we chose to use the approach to test hypotheses about international politics. We will then consider the following areas in some detail: The research problem, that is, the questions we wanted to answer, the hypotheses we generated and the background literature; operationalization of the problem and hypotheses, here we explain how we developed the simulation world, its characteristics, history, etc., and how it is linked to the real world as well as the hypotheses we plan to test; organization, in this part we will discuss the more pedestrian but equally important problems dealing with preparation, training and the "doing" of simulation; analysis of results.

Our conclusion will be structured in two parts to cover the same two areas around which we built the paper: simulation generally and our experience as an example.

Prepared for Canadian Political Science Association, St. John's, Newfoundland, June 8-11, 1971.

2B

AMERICAN HEGEMONY: A THICKET OF THEORIES

James R. Kurth
Harvard University

A b s t r a c t

This paper seeks to examine and explain the major features of American foreign policy toward small states and especially what I will call American hegemony. It focuses on U.S. interventions with military forces or advisors but also discusses international organizations and multinational corporations.

Ten historical hegemonial systems are described. Three of these are American: the U.S. in Latin America, in West Europe, and in East Asia. Other major hegemonial systems are the Soviet Union in East Europe, France in Subsahara Africa, Germany in Southeast Europe (1934-1939), and Austria in Germany and Italy (1815-1859). But the U.S. has an exceptional propensity toward hegemony; it is the American way of foreign policy.

Six classical theories or explanations of U.S. foreign policy are described: the strategic, psychological, bureaucratic, democratic, economic, and stylistic explanations; their prescriptive implications are respectively more radical. In selecting and applying these explanations to a particular foreign policy, two major problems arise: the problem of a posteriori overdetermination or alternative causes and the problem of a priori underdetermination or alternative consequences. Four classical solutions to these problems, and the biases of each, are evaluated: the empirical, analytical, skeptical, and existential solutions.

The paper then applies the different explanations to U.S. hegemonial policies. Strategic conditions (bipolarity and proximity) and economic conditions (stages of modernization and corporate structure) define the limits and, following Weber, load the dice; they establish the normal tendency of foreign policy. Of these, the dominant factor is modernity, as analyzed by Huntington and others. Within the normal pattern, different bureaucratic and, to a lesser degree, democratic conditions explain outcomes in different issue areas, such as the conduct and conclusion of military interventions.

The paper then examines the oft-argued transition of America to a post-modern society, its implications for U.S. hegemonial policies, and the conditions under which different kinds of U.S. interventions are likely to occur in the future.

ABSTRACT

CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
MEETING, ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND, 1971.

Pradip Sarbadhikari (Lakehead)

2B

"NON-ALIGNMENT, INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW"

The study of non-alignment has been mainly cast in terms of the balance of power theory. The policy emerged in the years after World War II as a function of what Morgenthau called the Nationalistic Universalism of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. The main proponents of the theory were also the nationalistic leaders in the Asian and (later) African states sought to explain it in terms of Carr's morality-power syndrome--a foreign policy of realpolitik which Meinecke would applaud yet morally justified by reasons of strategic war. There were variations in the emphasis between those who stress politics (Menon), economics (Mates), and culture (Mahadevan) creating a variety of responses outside the non-aligned world extending from the 'positive' response of a Bevin and progressive analysts (Martin) to the 'negative' response of John Foster Dulles and conservative analysts (Scalapino).

Little attention however was paid to the domestic aspects of the policy though the philosophical and social structure significance was not lost to a few observant and critical scholars (Karunakaran, Crabb).

Both changes in the international system and the resurgence of domestic conflict have brought into sharp relief many of the contradictions of the policy which despite ceremonial conferences threaten to obscure its viability and utility. Thus ideological, ethnic, regional, linguistic conflicts whilst extending into the realm of external policy have done so slightly diluting the essence of non-alignment without substituting it. Further, the international system has gone through significant changes since the inauguration of non-alignment and whilst the balance of power theory has universal validity there is historical evidence which would suggest that a quasi-detente system sometimes alluded to as 'peaceful co-existence' has greater relevance as a model of the contemporary international system (Wright, Herz, Tunkin, Appadorai). These pose a crucial threat to the existence of non-alignment as a foreign policy option. A way of meeting the threat to the policy would be to link it to new developments in international law underlined by the interest revealed by Third World, Western and Soviet scholars on enlarging the corpus of international law which till recently has been limited to the functioning of a restricted self-styled 'civilized' international society.

The result of these appraisals is a normative position that consists of two major assertions:

First, to fulfil its role as a policy of international peace non-alignment will have to adjust to domestic mass pressures and an international system of limited detente. This would entail shifting the emphasis from flexibility and policies reflecting the sovereignty of hastily drawn up individual 'sovereign' states to rigidity and 'collective' sovereignty of Third World blocks conceived in historico-economic terms.

Secondly, recent developments in international law stressing its universality and transcultural and multi-ideological orientation provide the jurisprudential basis for neutralizing the Third World block, ensuring disarmament and growth of international economic development law while providing the conditions for effective socio-economic change without great power intervention.

4B

Abstract: An Experimental Introductory Course in International Relations: Some Statistical Findings

by Pamela Butler, Kenneth George and Janet Hankin

This paper will try to evaluate the success of one of the objectives of an experimental course in international relations, given at the introductory level by Professor Janice Stein at McGill University in the fall of 1970. The experimental design had as one of its primary goals the development of the student's ability to analyze. The design sought to give to the students the tools which they would need to analyze foreign policy decisions. Deliberately, familiarity with the record of past foreign policy decisions was excluded as an objective; this record was relevant only insofar as it provided illustrative material. It was hoped, rather, that by the end of the semester, students would be able to analyze a foreign policy decision which they had not studied.

The ability to analyze is defined operationally as (a) the explicit use of concepts in dealing with empirical material; (b) logical consistency in argument; (c) the ability to marshall evidence; and (d) the ability to discern relationships and suggest their implications.

In attempting to evaluate the relative success of the course in achieving this objective, three sets of hypotheses were formulated for testing, using the subjective data of questionnaires answered by students and the objective data of student performance measured by grades. These grades were received in examinations which asked the student to analyze an unfamiliar foreign policy decision.

The first hypothesis will examine the impact of course structure on performance. It is suggested that students in less structured learning situations will do better than those in more structured options. The second hypothesis will examine the impact of structure on motivation and enjoyment, and then relate this data to performance. A related hypothesis will examine the relationship between interest in the field and performance. It is posited that positive attitudes toward the structure of the course will be correlated with better performance, and that those students who are more interested in the field of international relations will perform better. Finally, the third set of hypotheses will examine the effect of both structure and attitude on performance.

Hopefully, our findings will shed some light on techniques of teaching and methods of learning in the most difficult context -- the introductory course.

4B

Abstract: Report on an Experimental Introductory Course in International Relations: Success and Failure.

by Janice Gross Stein

This paper will attempt to evaluate the operation of an experimental introductory course in international relations. Two kinds of problems will be discussed; the first deals with the structural and administrative arrangements of the course and the advantages and disadvantages of various situations of learning.

The operation of four different learning options will be described and the problems and prospects of each will be assessed. In each case, evaluation by the students of their learning experience will be compared to that of the teaching staff. Technical and administrative problems connected with each learning option will be discussed and alternative modes of operation will be suggested. Finally, methods of examination and evaluation will be analyzed, both from the perspective of the students and the faculty.

Secondly, and more importantly, some of the basic value questions involved in this kind of experimental course will be considered. These kinds of questions are not amenable to quantitative analysis, either from the perspective of participating students or participating faculty. The principal objective of the course was to enable the student to analyze. Flowing from this were secondary objectives such as the furthering of independent thinking in students; and the recognition by students that in international relations, as in most of social science, paradigms of analysis will influence interpretations of data. The selection of one of several competing paradigms and the value choices flowing from such a selection, it was argued, was not the function of the faculty, but, rather, that of each student. This involved, for most students, a restructuring of their concept of the educational process.

How can these objectives best be achieved within the context of a large introductory course? Are these objectives, in fact, the most important considerations in such a context? Given these objectives, what is the most appropriate and most effective teaching method? How can the introduction to modalities and techniques of thinking best be accomplished? What is lost by relegating the role of faculty to that of 'animateur'; what is gained by increasing the participation of students in the resolution of the theoretical and intellectual problems they confront in international relations at the introductory level?

This paper will raise and provide some tentative and subjective answers to these questions. Although the answers may be tentative, the basic contention of this paper is that these questions constitute the core of the challenge confronting those who teach.

5B-6B

C.P.S.A. MEETING -- June 10, 1971

WORKSHOP ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Chairman: Mark Zacher (UBC)

I - Universal International Organizations and the Management of International Conflicts

A. Patterns of U.N. Involvement and Influence in International Conflicts: Description and Explanation -- Professor Mark W. Zacher.

B. The Use of Economic Sanctions by International Organizations -- Professor Margaret Doxey.

II - The Development of International Organizations: An Evaluation of "Functionalist" and "Neo-Functionalist" Theories -- Professor Charles Pentland.

8B-9B

MEMORANDUM FOR CPSA

PROGRAMME COMMITTEE - JUNE 1971

SUBJECT: Proposal for day-long seminar on Canadian foreign policy studies.

TENTATIVE SEMINAR TITLE:

"Approaches to the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy"

Outline:

(1) The Literature: Its Failings and Omissions (morning session)

A panel of three specialists evaluates the state of the literature, not so much with reference to specific titles as in terms of

(a) the types of studies that have been reproduced (policy-oriented analyses, historical interpretations and narratives, works of political advocacy, discussions of decision-making processes, and so on);

(b) the reasons why the literature displays whatever characteristics are thus identified;

(c) the utilities and disutilities of each type (as related to academic teaching, the making of policy, the derivation of general hypotheses about foreign policy behaviour, etc.);

(d) specific additional needs within each category;

(e) needs in other categories which may not yet have been explored in Canada.

Each panelist is given an initial 15-20 minutes (not more) in which to make his observations on these and related matters, and the seminar is then opened up to general discussion, with the Chairman (one of the three panelists, or someone especially appointed for the purpose) directing the contributions as much as possible towards the identification of concrete lines of future investigation. What kinds of studies are needed? Why are they needed? Should we concentrate first on empirical research? On theoretical innovation? On research designs? On the writing of textbooks? On problems of current policy? on several or all of these?

(2) Problems and Methods of Research (afternoon session)

Another panel of three specialists begins the discussion, this time with particular emphasis on the problem of how specifically our research into Canadian foreign policy behaviour can be improved. Are any conceptual frameworks available which might be useful in focusing our research effort? If not, why not, and is there any way of remedying the deficiency? Either way, what particular methods of practical research appear to have potential in the Canadian context? How can they be "operationalized"? To what extent is their potential utility diminished by restrictions on access and other practical problems? (As in the morning, each panelist would have an initial 15-20 minutes to present his views, after which there would be general seminar discussion.)

General Observations

(1) An informal discussion among International Relations specialists at the meeting in Winnipeg indicated general support for the seminar format, and the topic is one which should lead to extensive discussion. The need for such discussion is obvious to students of Canadian external relations, and the subject appears particularly appropriate for the discourse of political scientists attending a professional conference.

(2) The distinction between the morning and afternoon sessions is obviously blurred, the questions raised in the former having implications for the topics included in the latter, and vice-versa. The Chairman may therefore wish to schedule the panel presentations with some flexibility.

(3) The session will presumably be attended by specialists in foreign policy analysis generally, and by persons interested in Canadian foreign policy in particular. It is suggested in addition, however, that representatives of the CIIA (e.g., John Holmes and Gordon Hawkins) be informed of the plans for the seminar (if they are approved), and that they be invited to take part. (In December 1969 the Institute held a seminar on the teaching of university courses on Canadian foreign policy, and it has a continuing practical interest in Canadian foreign policy research.) It is also suggested that the Academic Relations Section of External Affairs Department be invited to participate.

(4) Invitations to potential panelists will not be sent out unless and until the proposal is approved by the Programme Committee. No difficulty in recruiting is anticipated. (A list of possibilities can be supplied if these are required.)

Respectfully submitted,

Denis Stairs,
Associate Professor.

1C

ABSTRACT

"Parliamentarians' Perceptions of Policy-Making under the West German Great Coalition, 1966-69."

F.C. Engelmann
University of Alberta

In the course of his analysis of the West German Great Coalition, the writer interviewed, in early 1969, a representative sample of the non-ministerial deputies of the coalition parties (46 Christian Democrats, 39 Social Democrats). These interviews dealt mostly with perceptions of the Great Coalition, with its influence on the partner parties, and with the evaluation of its policy output. They included also a number of questions regarding the perceived role of governmental institutions and the policy-making processes of the coalition. It is on these latter items that this paper is based. The writer wishes to emphasize that he elicited subjective perceptions. He plans later in his work to bring together these perceptions with objective data, but this paper deals with the parliamentarians' subjective perceptions only.

Items covered are the strength of the chancellorship, the independence of the Bundestag, the role of the parliamentary party, committee work, the role of the coalition committee, the relation between parliament and bureaucracy, the coalition's affect on the influence of interest groups, its effect on federalism, the speed and quality of legislative work under the Great Coalition, and the coalition's influence on parliamentary debate and caucus discussion.

The following are some of the hypotheses that will be tested in the paper:

a) the perceived strength of the chancellorship was reduced by the Great Coalition
b) the Bundestag, or at least its caucus leaders, were perceived as being more independent than before
c) parliamentary committee work was perceived as being more important than earlier
d) interest groups were perceived as having lost some of the influence they had on the cabinet and the governing party prior to 1966
e) discussion was perceived, under the Great Coalition, as being more constrained in plenary sessions and freer in the respective parliamentary parties
f) there are at least some important differences between the perceptions of CDU members, who had come into the coalition from a governing role, and those of SPD members, who had occupied an opposition role prior to the Great Coalition.

2c

ABSTRACT

The Foundations of Modern Sweden: The Swift Rise and Fall of Swedish Liberalism.

Douglas V. Verney,
York University.

Sweden's image abroad has been in the hands of historians and social scientists who have tended to ignore its modern political development. Historians have drawn attention to the meteoric empire gained by the autocratic Gustavus Adolphus (d.1632) and lost by Charles XII (d. 1718); to the so-called Era of Liberty (1721-1772) of the Hats and Caps; and to the return of Gustavian absolutism from 1772 to 1809. In 1808-9 the last of Sweden's possessions, Finland, was lost to the Russians and Bernadotte was brought from France to found a new dynasty guided by a new constitution. Sweden lapsed into obscurity.

Social scientists, on the other hand, have tended to consider Sweden ahistorically: as a contemporary welfare state; as a model social democracy practising 'the middle way'; or more recently as the home of 'functional socialism'.

But for political scientists Sweden's modern political history is of considerable importance. For although the Social Democratic party, formed in 1889 by Hjalmar Branting, has been in power almost the whole of the time since 1932, the way was paved for them by a Liberal party that was not formed until 1900 and which by about 1920 was a spent force.

This paper examines the political forces at work in this unusually brief Liberal era and especially in the crisis years between 1911 and 1914. In a very few years Sweden was modernized. The nineteenth century constitutional state was replaced by parliamentary government on the British model. The Liberal Prime Minister was involved in a constitutional dispute with the King somewhat analogous to the King-Byng controversy in Canada. The franchise was extended, the basis of the welfare state was introduced and the public sector of the economy extended - all at a time of international crisis when many Swedes wanted to increase defence expenditure and to ally their country with Germany against Russia.

The name of Branting, the Social Democratic party's able leader, was to become well-known abroad when the Entente powers whom he had supported had won the war. But few people outside Sweden know much about Karl Staaf (1860-1915) whose efforts as head of two minority Liberal governments in 1906 and 1911-14 laid the foundation of modern Sweden. It is arguable that the Liberal party was the real innovator. It is also arguable that after the dissolution of the war-time Liberal-Social Democratic coalition (1917-1920) Sweden gradually reverted to its traditional style of politics. Since 1932 a dominant Social Democratic party has been opposed by three 'bourgeois' parties (Conservative, Agrarian and Liberal). Is this analogous to the pre-1866 estate Riksdag where the Nobles dominated the three non-Noble Estates? Did the brevity of the Liberal era - little longer than the period of the Duma in Russia - mean that 'feudalism' was to give way to 'socialism' in a particularly Swedish way?

Has Sweden lessons for Canada? Daniel Johnson once suggested that Canadians had been innovative between 1763 and 1867, changing their political system five times. Have many English Canadians today become conservative, unwilling to replace the BNA act? It is true that for many Anglophones changes of régime are thought to be a symbol of failure or defeat - witness the changes in France, Germany and Italy. But Sweden, a parliamentary monarchy like Canada, changed its régime between 1906 and 1917 as well as in 1866 - and is changing it again at the present time.
The paper will concentrate on Sweden but the discussion may lead to comparisons with Canada and other countries that illustrate some of the difficulties in the attempt to compare political systems and to analyze their development.

1c

ABSTRACT

"Prediction and Democracy"

Harvey G. Simmons
York University

In the past few years there has been a tremendous increase in the number of organizations devoted to the problems of prediction and the future as they relate to the social sciences and to economic planning. What are the reasons for the proliferation of organizations of this kind and for the interest now being shown in an area previously considered the preserve of science fiction writers and readers?

The first development was the increased sophistication and widespread use of behavioural methods in the social sciences, the second was the interest in and development of economic planning techniques in the West and the third was the rapid evolution of computer technology. The first and third of these developments need little explanation. After social scientists became convinced it was possible to use quantitative techniques in the analysis of human behaviour, and to explain social action in terms of these techniques it was but a small step to begin research in prediction and the future rather than concentrating solely on explanations of past events or actions. The development of projective techniques arising out of game and decision-making theory also aided in the process. The second development had a profound impact in those countries interested in democratic planning for it has become apparent that the success of any plan depends on the quality of information obtained and on the reasonableness of economic forecasts and predictions made.

But these developments raise a number of questions. Who makes predictions? What values orient their predictions? What is the possibility that those involved in prediction and planning may be tempted to force conformity with their predictions? Where is the thin line between prediction and control? Is it true that in democracies unpredictability can be a base of power?

These are some of the questions and themes that will be examined in this paper.

8C

ABSTRACT

Pragmatic Centrism and Political Stability in Fragmented Political Cultures: The French Radical-Socialist Party in the Fourth Republic.

A.M. Macleod
Lakehead University

The general aim of this paper is to consider the problems of political stability in a fragmented political culture in a developed Western society, and in particular the problems of the French IVth Republic. There will be a critical examination of the theories of the "inevitability of static centrism" as defended by Duverger in his La Democratie sans le peuple and "immobilism" as put forward by Philip Williams in his Crisis and Compromise. An attempt will be made to give meaning to the concept of "political stability" as opposed to "ministerial" or "governmental stability" (which are very often confused) in the context of a political society such as that of the IVth Republic. It would also be differentiated from the notion of "stagnation."

The main thesis will be that the Radical-Socialist party, because of its pragmatic, centrist view of politics (to be defined) permitted the IVth Republic to function as a system. It will be considered as a vital factor in the processes of political and economic modernization. It will be claimed that it is only this approach towards politics which can allow for political development and political stability in a fragmented political culture in a Western democratic society.

It will be argued that one of the factors contributing to the disintegration of the IVth Republic was Pierre Mendes-France's attempt to convert the Radical-Socialist party into an ideologically left-wing oriented party in 1955. Obviously there were other factors as well, but the point I am trying to make is that the Radical-Socialist party could no longer play its vital role as a mediating, moderating influence as efficiently as before because it was itself deeply divided ideologically at a time when partisan divisions in Parliament were preventing the system from functioning effectively.

This session will be conducted in French.

Cette session sera en français.

9C

ABSTRACT

"System Performance and Objective Security"

TIMOTHY HENNESSEY
Michigan State University

This study focuses on a particular system development problem; namely, the effect of changes in democratic institutionalization on the relationship between changes in socio-economic and political mobilization and changes in public policy. Our major hypothesis suggests that the greater the democratic institutionalization, the more closely will changes in socio-economic and political mobilization be related to changes in public policy. This hypothesis is tested via a comparative longitudinal analysis of social service policies in England (1860-1930) and Sweden (1890-1930). Path analysis is employed to test the hypothesis by graphically representing relationships between these components of development. The analysis supports our hypothesis: the relationships are stronger for Sweden where democratic institutional reform was rapid and profound as compared to England where changes were more gradual. Finally, these findings are examined in light of England's role in the international system.

2D

ABSTRACT

Social Articulation and Aggregation in Political Party Organizations in a Large Canadian City

Henry Jacek (McMaster), John McDonough (Queens), Ronald Shimizu (McMaster) and Patrick Smith (London School of Economics)

Prepared for delivery at the 1971 meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. Johns, Newfoundland, June, 1971.

This paper deals with the question of how political party organizations respond to constituencies which are socially heterogeneous. This problem is approached in two ways. First, what social groupings are likely to give overwhelming support to one particular political party. Second, which party or parties are likely to aggregate a diverse number of social groupings as a support base and across what dimensions. The variables examined include occupation, education, income, ethnicity, generation Canadian and religion.

The research methodology employs three types of data: (1) social characteristics of three federal constituencies in Hamilton as collected by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics; (2) a survey of voters in all three constituencies during the 1968 federal election (approximately 857 respondents); and (3) social characteristics of party executive committee members in the three constituencies. The latter data-set was collected primarily in the summer of 1969 (180 respondents which was 93 per cent of the intended population). Both federal and provincial executive members were interviewed. In most cases an individual was a member of both party executive committees and even if the individual wasn't formally a member at both levels, it was usually expected that he take part in nomination and campaign activities at both levels.

The main hypothesis is that party organizations appeal to a relatively narrow social base of voters (at least where there is intensive and extensive competition among the three major parties). These appeals are most evident by the type of social recruitment into the important decision-making positions within the organizations (i.e., membership on constituency executive committees). These specific social appeals also show up in the voting patterns within the constituency although social articulation is less strong at the mass voting level compared with the party organizations themselves.

In general, it is difficult to order the three parties on a single social dimension because the parties do not order political life along the same dimensions. Not only do the parties appeal to different social groupings but they also relate to different dimensions. Thus, class appeals do differentiate the New Democrats and the Conservatives but not necessarily the Liberals. The latter party responds rather to ethnic divisions and is especially attractive to individuals with an Eastern and Southern European background generally irrespective of economic class. Both the Liberals and New Democrats appeal to first and second generation Canadians while the Conservatives draw strong support from individuals with deeper Canadian roots. Only religious groupings seem to order the three parties along a single dimension.

4D

REPRESENTATION IN THE CANADIAN CABINET

Although the Canadian Cabinet is commonly regarded as a representative body (e.g., as combining the functions of the British Cabinet and the American Senate), its behaviour has not been studied in light of a comprehensive notion of representation. In such a light it is evident that the traditional emphasis has been upon 'descriptive' representation (i.e., provincial and ethnic composition) at the expense of other, equally important aspects--notably those pertaining to the actual substance of representational activity within the Cabinet and to the relation between the representative and other members of the institution (e.g., in decision making).

With French Canadian representation taken as the most complex example, a number of conclusions appear concerning representational behaviour in the Cabinet. Initially, however, from the descriptive aspect, it must be observed that unwritten rules agreed upon in 1864-67 endured for half a century, with French Canadians holding about one-fifth of Cabinet seats regardless of party. After World War I sharp fluctuations appeared, with French Canadian composition varying from 5 percent to 40 percent, and with Liberal Cabinets containing, on the average, twice as high a proportion of French Canadians as did Conservative Cabinets (28 percent and 14 percent respectively). Concerning representational activity a distinction may be made between the 'general spokesman' role and the 'administrative' role. French Canadian representatives have been confined to the former role. At least one high prestige portfolio has been granted to a French Canadian in every Liberal Cabinet, while no prestige portfolio has ever been granted to a French Canadian in a Conservative Cabinet. In terms of decision making the norms of unity, secrecy, and deference to the prime minister place heavy constraints upon representatives, compelling them to adopt the trustee rather than the delegate style. Even though there is some evidence of Calhoun's concurrent majority principle in Liberal Cabinets, in each of the significant communal crises that have occurred in Canada the majority of French Canadian representatives involved have rejected the evident demands of their communal constituency.

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5D

PANEL

PLANS FOR A NATIONAL SURVEY AT THE TIME OF THE NEXT FEDERAL ELECTION

The panel will review the present state of survey data on Canadian electoral behaviour and will discuss a proposal that an institutional form be devised insuring that a regular and continuing survey be conducted at the time of each federal election. John Meisel will propose that the C.P.S.A. or the S.S.R.C.C. assume the final responsibility for these surveys.

It is hoped that at this session all interested political scientists will express their views on the numerous and complex organizational problems involved (which will be discussed by the panel) and on how they might be solved.

If the Meisel proposal seems feasible and desirable, plans might be laid at the time of the panel to hold a work-shop at an early date for those whose research is likely to centre on some aspect(s) of the next Canadian general election.

It is hoped that junior as well as more established scholars will participate fully in the discussion and that colleagues from all of the country's regions will attend.

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PARTICIPATION IN THE ESTATES GENERAL OF FRENCH CANADA

6D

John Trent (R.M.C.)

Abstract

What was the character of French Canadian nationalism in the 1960's? What sort of people were attracted by nationalist activism? Why did they prefer some kinds of political instruments to others? Some of the answers to these questions are sought in a detailed study of the Estates General of French Canada.

Three aspects are particularly interesting:

Organized in 1964 and prorogued in 1969, the Estates General straddles one of the most tormented decades in French Canadian history and can be seen both as a fomenter and as a vehicle of change in French Canada's political ideas and organization. Second, considered a "forum of the French Canadian nation," the Estates General eventually numbered more than 2,000 elected and appointed participants. As a group of activists dedicated to the survival of French Canada, they represent an excellent source of information on the background and attitudes of a significant group of nationalists. Third, following a partial reorganization in 1966, the Estates General concentrated on carrying out a wide ranging survey of opinions on constitutional matters. Thus, its deliberations and activities furnish us with a persepective on the nature and evolution of French Canadian thinking in the Canadian federal context.

This paper restricts itself to consideration of the general characteristics of the participants in the Estates General. Based on a survey of the membership and interviews of the leaders, it establishes the social background, the nationalist motivations and the political attitudes and behaviour of the members. An attempt is made to see these in the context of democratic politics in Quebec.

****

7D

ABSTRACT

Parliamentary Committees Since 1968

Roman R. March

During the first session of the 28th Parliament, Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau introduced a series of changes to the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. This paper begins with a brief examination of the necessity for the reforms and the key reforms themselves. Then a series of operational indices are constructed in order to measure Parliamentary "efficiency" in handling legislation. Particular attention is paid to the changes made in the use of the Standing Committees of the House to process legislation. The indices are designed to facilitate measurement of "efficiency" before and after the introduction of the reforms. Initial results suggest that while changes were necessary, the reforms have been rather slow to take. In part, it appears that skepticism about the reforms is inhibiting their full effects. It will also be suggested that additional changes in committee structure and procedures may be necessary.

8D

THE COLOUR OF DEMOCRACY - DRAB

Frank MacKinnon
University of Calgary

Colour has been a normal feature of public affairs in every state in every era. Celebrations, ceremony, honours, costumes and symbols have pleased senses, catered to emotions and served practical functions in administration. They are natural postures of governing like those of other human and animal activities. They can neither be ignored nor mixed with the wrong activities without unnatural consequences.

Our age is exceptional. In North America particularly, democracy has either lost colourful traditions or never had them. Government has neglected its postures and become drab. Consequently the typical democrat is like a mixed-up lyre bird using the mating dance for hunting or neglecting the ritual altogether and becoming alienated. We have cut the efficiency of government by neglecting the instincts, senses and pecadillos of politicians, administrators and the public. We have become so puritan as to invite an overdose of nonconformism, latitudinarianism and iconoclasm. With the best intentions we wanted to simplify government and avoid snobbery and frivolity. The first we have not done; and we are more snobbish than ever in an inverted way, and not frivolous enough to avoid taking ourselves too seriously. We are aggravating problems of the new technology by letting our affairs become inhuman. Democracy neither presupposes nor deserves this condition.

Drabness is undemocratic because it favors a tiny minority, limits interest and participation, and distorts the projection of relevant images. It is dangerous because it provides insufficient activity for the many in public life with little to do and for natural nuisances who, unable to control egos and emotions by harmless means, take to bedevilling their contemporaries and getting in other people's way. Drabness may cause a public reaction inviting a change to a more exciting, and perhaps undemocratic or less efficient, system which will provide colour in large measure. Our democracy can now be upset easily by the first colourful demagogue that offers a good show. Its alternatives are brightening up or disappearing because, like all humans of history, we need not only to be served by the state, but inspired, entertained, rewarded and amused by it as well.

IE

GERALD B. SPERLING
(UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN. REGINA)

THOMAS H. BROSE
(FAIRHAVEN COLLEGE, BELLINGHAM, WASH.)

SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF RANK AND FILE TRADE UNIONISTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

This paper follows the earlier study by us (and Martin Robin) into the backgrounds and attitudes of trade union leadership in British Columbia in 1968-69.

Using the questionnaire that was querrying the leaders with modifications and additions we have sampled membership from several unions in the B.C. Federation of Labour as well as Fishermen and Teamsters.

On the basis of the data we hope to show the relationship between leaders and members. especially as these relationships explore the differences within particular unions and between them. Following Porter's study of leadership we have we think. added other dimensions to the understanding of the trade union leadership in British Columbia. This paper will complement that research.

Our findings focus on several areas: militancy, political party activity. political effectiveness. inter-union rivalry and disagreement over the role of trade unions in the society, social attitudes and values of the rank and file. and awareness about contemporary political and social issues in Canada.

Finally. the paper attempts to assess the impact of leader-follower relationships on the development of associations in the province and on the health of the trade union movement. Through a discussion of the theories about working class movements, it is hoped to clarify meaningfulness of the several hypotheses.

3E

PAUL C. LEGER (NEW BRUNSWICK CIVIL SERVICE)

SOCIAL POLICY FORMULATION IN A PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Like other provincial governments, the government of New Brunswick is deeply involved in "social policy". Broadly interpreted, nearly two-thirds of the annual budget is devoted to a wide spectrum of social concerns, comprising well over 100 separate programs in more than fifteen separate government agencies. Even for a province as small as New Brunswick, social policy is a large and complex subject.

The objectives of social policy in New Brunswick are contemporary: general improvement in social conditions for both citizens and communities, social adjustment to economic growth, and special assistance to the disadvantaged. But the problems are especially acute, given a relatively weak economic base, low incomes, high unemployment and under-employment, and intra-provincial disparities in wealth. Moreover, New Brunswick has a unique ethnic character, which adds a special dimension to problems of social policy.

Social policy formulation, during the Program for Equal Opportunity, was characterized by integration, rationalization, and structural adjustment and change. But strong elements of fractionalism, and short term reactive planning, continue to persist, without the cohesion that would appear essential to effective policy making and program performance. Given the province's limited resources and severe social problems these would appear to be major difficulties.

Study of the policy-making process in responsive political systems leads to the tentative conclusion that these continuing difficulties may be chiefly due to characteristics of the political culture.

Thus increased rationalization of social policy is more likely to occur through exogenous, rather than endogenous change. The latter is likely to produce only incremental shifts, having little impact in modifying social policy formulation processes.

3E

L. RICHARDS (CALGARY)

HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN ALBERTA

The Human Resources Development Act (1967) (Chapter 35, Laws of Alberta) created a new organization for the Province, the objective of which was to "develop, co-ordinate and supervise provincial and regional programs and services to encourage and help individuals and communities develop their human resources to their fullest potential ..."

The policy and the underlying philosophy was set out in the Provincial Government's White Paper on Human Resources Development (1967) and a model for total resources development was produced. Although both physical and human resources development were seen as being complimentary to each other, government statements tended to place the emphasis on human resources development. For Alberta, this was a new approach.

Community development was seen as being an important and integral part of the human resources development programme. A Community Development Branch had been established in the province in 1964 and, in 1967, this became a part of the Human Resources Development Authority's organization.

Although the Government of the Province declared that it had no wish to create a new bureaucratic structure, never-the-less, a structure was created and a particular process for development palnning and programming emerged.

Changes in policy, structure and process have been occuring at a fairly rapid pace and this makes it difficult to present an up-to-date picture of what exists and what is happening in the field of human resources development in this province. However, in this paper, the writer attempts to present the main elements of policy and structure for human resources development in Alberta.

4E

ROBERT J. WILLIAMS (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

RECRUITMENT TO THE ONTARIO LEGISLATURE

This study is an addition to the body of literature on individuals who fill political roles in Canadian society. Here an attempt will be made to examine a group of elected officials -- Members of the Ontario Legislative Assembly -- from the point of view of their recruitment experiences.

Recruitment is considered as a process of moving from one role in the political system to another -- in this case from various non-elective roles to that of an elected, professional office-holder.

Generally, the study considers a series of central tendencies in the recruitment experiences of candidates elected to the Legislature in the General Election of 1967. This approach is based on the following variables which are examined in turn:

1. Eligibility
   A. Means - characteristics applicable in electoral contests
   B. Skills - relevant abilities

2. Selection
   A. Supply - of candidates
   B. Demand - for candidates

3. Perspective
   A. Expectations - contributions
   B. Evaluations - costs

More specifically - and probably not surprisingly - the suggestion of this study is that recruitment experiences differ in each political party on the Ontario scene. In the case of the governing Progressive Conservatives, eligibility factors tend to be most important in recruitment. For New Democratic candidates, perspective considerations tend to be significant. Liberals tend to be recruited because of distinctive selection circumstances.

6E

MICHAEL SEMLER (WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS)

THE BLACK MAN IN CANADA, THE FORGOTTEN MINORITY

There never has been much recognition given by social scientists to the Negroes in Canada. This holds even though black Canadians exhibit a distinct, but closely related, historical pattern to those blacks in the United States. Historically both groups have evolved from a similar tradition, but the blacks of Canada have had a longer period of independence, social and political neglect, and covert prejudice directed toward them. None of these factors have been much explored aside from a historical perspective, and this study has found a number of "historical" findings to be in error.

With such a gap in research this paper attempted to discern the magnitude and direction of the political behavior of black Canadians juxtapossed to their immediate neighbors. We employed aggregate voting analysis to examine several accepted hypotheses of Canadian ethnic politics and the electoral system. For numerous reasons we basically used the 1957 and 1962 federal elections and a number of provincial elections for Nova Scotia. The findings suggest a significant degree of racial consciousness and cohesion among the black population. This is especially pronounced in rural, self-segregated communities and in Nova Scotia. There is no national consciousness, but there is evidence of a strong desire on the part of the black population to establish a distinct and separate pattern of political existence, i.e., voting for third parties, a pattern of voting for the "out" party, and the more liberal the better.

9E

A B S T R A C T

Continuity and Change in Newfoundland Politics

Paper proposed by S. J. R. Noel and P. F. Neary for C.P.S.A. meeting, 1971

The subject of this paper is the twentieth century 'political culture' of Newfoundland - its style, paradoxes, ironies, traditions and potential. Although the political experience of Newfoundlanders contains many unique elements, it also exhibits traits which bear a striking resemblance to political behaviour in other communities east of what may well be the greatest of all Canadian political divides - the Ottawa River. Indeed, it can be argued that the political behaviour of Newfoundlanders demonstrates in an extreme fashion the governmental and institutional consequences of the persistant financial instability, uneven and slow economic development and resultant occupational dualism which has been commonplace in eastern Canada at the periphery of the Laurentian economy and beyond. At the beginning of the century the focus of economic activity in Newfoundland was shifting away from the staple industry - fishing - around which the population of the island had been formed, and towards extractive resource industries dependent both for capital and markets on more developed economies. This trend has persisted, except for brief periods, ever since, but the advancing 'modern' sector of the Newfoundland economy has never been able to achieve the breakthrough to self sustaining economic growth and full employment. Newfoundlanders have, therefore, remained in a half-way house between two economies and two styles - the traditional and the modern. Newfoundland's dual economic substructure produced a unique political and constitutional superstructure. It is the latter which will be examined in detail in this paper. Special emphaiss will be given to the place of the charismatic leader in the Newfoundland party system. Characteristically, the charismatic leader has been able to mobilize mass support from the traditional elements of Newfoundland society while bargaining successfully with the 'outside' interests bent on exploiting the resources of the island and, latterly, of Labrador. For the purposes of this paper the tradition of charismatic leadership will be taken to begin with Edward Morris and to culminate in Joseph Robert Smallwood.

9E

ANTHONY P. COHEN (QUEEN'S)

THE MANAGEMENT OF MYTHS: QUASI-CULTURAL SYMBOLS AND DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGIES IN NEWFOUNDLAND

Forms of political structure imply the values with which they are to be regarded by their subjects, and these values are manipulated as symbols by elites. The symbols suggest beliefs in accordance with which the political structures are said - by those who have power in them - to be organized, beliefs which are critical to the efficacy and stability of the structures. (They are given the status of myths by the nature of their highly particularistic interpretations of reality). Hence, a structure called 'democratic' depends for its success and durability on the belief of its subjects that it is democratic; the legitimacy of a structure justified by the 'myth of the enemy' is contingent on the belief of its subjects in the existence of an enemy.

The significance of such symbols varies inversely with the stability of, and support for, political structures and, therefore, they are especially critical in societies undergoing imposed or stimulated processes of change. This paper deals with the employment of such quasi-cultural symbols by two competing local elites in their attempts to provoke political development, and is based on data collected in a Newfoundland community. It will also show cross-cultural examples of similar Phenomena. (Political development is used here to refer to the adaptations of the population to new political structures or structural exigencies, rather than to any terminal or directional process).

There are two aspects of the management of myths evident in the behaviour of both elites. The first is the mediation and, hence, control of information coming in to the community from the outside world. The second is the creation, from salient cultural values, of a mythology of symbols legitimating the elites' behaviour.

Each of the competing elites has a distinctive strategy by which it manages myths, and generally, each aims its myths at different audiences. The first strategy, to which is given the name of

'cultural extension', consists in demonstration of the consistency of new or existing structures with traditional political values, and is employed to mobilise support from the 'mass'. The second strategy, 'cultural substitution', involves rejection of traditional values in favour of contextually new and, hence, culturally alien ones which support new developmental structures, and is directed towards those rising white-collar workers and merchants who comprise a group of aspiring community activists.

Both elites manage myths in the interest of political change, but are distinguished by their advocacy of different rates of change, and, hence, by quite different myths. They thus constitute conflicting structures creating a condition described by Costa Pinto as one of "structural marginality". However, the intensity of the conflict, and the nature of the strategies, neutralises the efforts of both structures to bring about political development: the first, because it reinforces the traditional cultural values of deference and submissiveness; and the second, because it is socially exclusive and maintains its exclusiveness by denying participation to the 'ordinary' citizen. Further, the very nature of the condition of structural marginality in this community prevents the emergence of a symbol or a myth sufficiently salient to provoke political development amongst the non-activist population. The paper goes on to suggest the kind of symbol, and its strategy of management, which might have efficacy in this respect. The symbol, one of organisational assertiveness based on community co-operation, is provoked by the strategic withdrawal of the typical bases of elite ascendancy - governmental patronage - for which the elites act respectively as acquiescent brokers ('Culture-extenders') and uninhibited requitors ('Culture-substitutors'). It is argued that such a symbol can break down the structural dichotomy which is inhibiting development, and stimulate the cultural adaptation required to operate the new political culture - which are demanded by the exigencies of economics.

Finally, further comparisons will be drawn between the instances of the management of myths in this community and in historically and culturally different societies in the attempt to relate kinds of myths and strategies of myth-management to stages in the processes of cultural adaptation to the structures of political development.

9E

A B S T R A C T

THE MAINTENANCE AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF NEWFOUNDLANDERS

John H. Calhoun, Jr.
(Auburn University at Montgomery)

The primary purpose of this study is to consider the effects of twenty years of political integration on the national identity patterns of Newfoundlanders. Before Confederation, Newfoundlanders possessed a very distinctive life style and appear to have had a strong national identity. In the years immediately after union, there were symbolic displays of a Newfoundland national identity. Newfoundlanders may still identify with the regional community (Newfoundland), or they may have developed an identification with the federal community (Canada), the continental community (United States), or the imperial community (Great Britain). This study also recognizes the possibility of a multiple national identity: identification with more than one of these identity communities.

In order to evaluate the potential for identifying with these four communities, six common and distinctive characteristics will be utilized: history, language, religion, culture, race, and geographical contiguity. When these characteristics are shared by community members, it allows the individual to distinguish himself from members of other communities. The possession of these cohesive characteristics creates a high potential for identification, lack of possession creates a low potential for identification.

National identity involves an awareness of the community and a belief in the community which leads to a commitment. In order to evaluate the national identity of Newfoundlanders, some overt manifestations of the individual's awareness and commitment will be utilized. These indicators are communications flow, migration, political participation, and military recruitment. These should provide an assessment of national identity.

2F

THE EMERGENCE OF DE-FACTO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN VANCOUVER

(Abstract)

Through a process best described as "the quintessence of gradualism", metropolitan government, of the local federation variety, is emerging in greater Vancouver. The actual institution of government, The Greater Vancouver Regional District, was created in 1967. Two sets of actors are important: The provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs and his senior officials, and the local elected and appointed officials. Both sets share the basic values of the 'economy and efficiency' approach to local government and of the non-partisan ideology. They differ on perception of scope of the modern urban community, with provincial officials having set out purposefully to downplay the established municipalities (of which there are 14 in greater Vancouver) as the prime focus of community and to foster the emergence of a regional community. Provincial strategy (benefiting from lessons learned in the failure of explicit attempts to introduce metropolitan government in 1957-60) has rested upon presenting <u>the</u> regional district as merely a composite of existing single-purpose regional authorities in the form of a multi-purpose regional body which would be no more than a sum of its parts - local municipalities would decide which functions the multi-purpose body would assume, and individual municipalities could opt-out of any particular function. In fact, however, the provincial government has imposed several key functions (planning, hospital construction financing, water supply, and sewage disposal) and regional integration quickly proceeded to the point that opting out was removed at the request of the GVRD itself. The GVRD on its own initiative has acquired the functions of air pollution control, public housing, control of rock festivals, contract planning for member municipalities, contract servicing for local municipalities, and is considering acquiring the function of regional transportation route determination.

At this stage then, in 1971, the GVRD has acquired major functional responsibilities, and has commenced to establish its own bureaucracy.

It has not yet commenced active rule-making and rule-implementation.

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4F

1971 C.P.S.A. CONFERENCE

ABSTRACT - L.J. SHARPE.

There are grounds for doubting that the distinction usually drawn between the American style of local democracy and the British is accurate, especially in so far as it sees the American system as more participatory, more open, and possibly more representative than the British.

But there seem to be other more profound differences between the concepts of local democracy in the two countries. The most important centres on the notions of accountability and functional effectiveness. Although central to British, and perhaps other nations' conceptions of democracy, they seem to be absent from the American. If anything fragmentation of power and the absence of an identifiable executive agent are seen as positive virtues.

There seems to be then a <u>prima facie</u> case for arguing that there may be significant differences in the conceptions of democracy in the two countries. This assumption is re-enforced by the existence of different attitudes to certain other key features of democracy in the American literature. This is notably so in relation to corruption, brokerage leadership, the status of municipal government itself, and above all, the notion of public interest. It appears that these U.S. attitudes are not only different to the British but to most other advanced industrial democracies.

Possible reasons for this, apparently unique, character of American local democracy may include: the heterogenous nature of American cities, abundant resources, the absence of a social democratic party and the sacrosant character of American political forms.

8F

British Political Science and the Study of Community Power:

The study of community power and local politics has been extremely fashionable over the last decade, both in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the case of the latter, the academic work of several U.S. political scientists stimulated British academic interest in local government and local politics, an interest further revived by the activities of various government committees and of the Royal Commissions on Local Government in England and Scotland (Redcliffe - Maud and Wheatley commissions).

As a result of this renewed interest, a series of research projects on local politics have been undertaken over the last three years, largely financed by the U.K. Social Science Research Council. Despite the initial impact of the U.S. studies, notably those of Dahl, Hunter and Agger et al, in terms of the questions they sought to answer and the methodology employed, few of the British studies have been a straightforward replication of U.S. studies. Most in fact have sought to answer different questions and to develop different approaches.

This paper seeks to suggest why this should be so in terms of the traditions of the study of local government in Britain; the appropriateness or otherwise of the U.S. questions and methodology in the British context; the importance of different cultural, structural and constitutional factors in determining questions to be asked when analysing local politics, and the need for alternative approaches to be developed if different questions are asked. These themes will be illustrated by reference to current British studies, both in an attempt to highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties involved and to suggest how British experience might be relevant for similar studies in a Canadian context.

M. Goldsmith
Institute of Local Government
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario
January 1971

8F

Abstract of Proposed Paper on

The Doctrine of Local Self-Government: Some Twentieth Century British Approaches

It is a common claim that there is no systematic justification of British local self-government. Although some might acknowledge the conflicting contributions of certain nineteenth century theorists, virtually no attention has been given to the local government writings of the Fabians and Guild Socialists. As modern reformers attempt a theoretical defence of their proposals for a restructuring of British local government, it might be useful to relate their problems to those of the earlier, socialist reformers.

As we look back at the total effect of the work of the Fabians and Guild Socialists we tend not to associate it with a strong defence of local self-government. But if we turn to their original writings we find eloquent and well thought out pleas for the values of local government. We find elaborate schemes whereby socialists would first capture power on a local level and then use 'Municipal Socialism' as an important tool for bringing about the socialist commonwealth. We find fascinating proposals for changing the internal structures and territorial boundaries of local authorities so that they would act as a means through which true community participation could take place.

Unfortunately for the advocates of strong local government, these proposals never made their mark. Because of the great difficulty of capturing power in hundreds of local government areas and because of the powerlessness of these governments once they were captured, 'Municipal Socialism' gave way to an emphasis on more central government power in order to promote the over-riding value of equality. Proposals for means of bringing about more participation were strangled in their own complexity. The expansion of central power often took place with the full approval of those who had written so eloquently on the values of local self-government.

Since World War II there has been increasing academic concern with theoretical justifications of strong local authorities as well as many government reports which simply assumed their value. The recent Report of the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission includes a fairly systematic attempt to justify local government in modern Britain. Its case rests primarily on the grounds that British local government promotes the commonly accepted values of efficiency and democracy. On examining the Commission's argument it becomes clear that their notion of democracy can best be interpreted as emphasizing the values of pluralism and participation.

Efficiency, pluralism and participation have consistently been cited in the twentieth century as values promoted by British local government. Because of the Fabian commitment to equality rather than to pluralism and because of the difficulty of implementing most of the Guild Socialist proposals for increased participation, these reformers are usually seen as enemies rather than defenders of local self-government. Present day reformers must be careful to avoid a similar fate.

A. B. Sancton

2G

A B S T R A C T

APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF PLURALISM TO

THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

Bohdan Harasymiw (University of Calgary)

This paper sets out (1) to determine the extent to which the concept of political pluralism, as commonly understood, can be accepted as applying to the Soviet Union, (2) to reconceptualize as necessary the development of political pluralism with regard to that country, and (3) to assess empirically such development in terms of this reconceptualization. A multidimensional concept of pluralism is offered in which there are several measures of political pluralism, including decision-making.

The paper traces briefly the evolution of pluralism from its philosophical and sociological origins to its honing as a tool for political analysis by students of community power (Dahl, Nisbet, and Polsby) and of development (Apter and Almond). While pluralism, it is noted, may serve as ideology or as justification for the political systems of liberal democracy, the chief concerns here are the elaboration of a theoretically sound concept of political analysis and the application of it to at least one Communist system. The first of these is pursued by a careful synthesis of the analytical contributions of the leading contemporary exponents of political pluralism, as applied to both Communist and non-Communist systems. From this is elaborated a hopefully more sound concept, its utility not restricted by ethnocentric considerations. The second goal is realized by applying the author's conceptualization as derived to various scholars' reported findings regarding the leadership system, interest group formation, elite attitudes, and decision-making in the U.S.S.R. Some assessment of the actual development of political pluralism in the Soviet Union is thus attempted. The general conclusion is that pluralism in the Soviet Union is still confined to the institutional framework of the Communist Party.

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2G

A B S T R A C T

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLICY-MAKING IN THE SOVIET UNION

Donald V. Schwartz (University of Toronto)

An important variable in the decision-making process is the way in which the participants themselves perceive the decision-making process. A major factor in determining the way in which any set of decision-makers define their situation is the set of rules which define the behaviour patterns to which they are expected to conform.

Recently a new and fairly comprehensive set of general guidelines has been provided for Soviet decision-makers in the area of social policy. These directives have been set down in a deries of works published under the auspices of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The directives issued by the Academy of Social Sciences will be examined in my paper. Special attention will be paid to guidelines regarding the use of new types of feedback mechanisms and information provided by social scientists. On the basis of my analysis tentative conclusions will be drawn regarding the relation between social science and decision-making in the area of social policy in the Soviet Union.

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4G

ABREGE DE COMMUNICATION

(ACSP A MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY)

Théofil I. Kis (Université d'Ottawa)

Thème: La problématique de convergence: théories et hypothèse.

A la lumière de l'évaluation des travaux déjà faits dans ce domaine, et après avoir complété des recherches bibliographiques complémentaires, nous nous proposons:

1. Préciser et définir le phénomène, la notion et le concept de convergence, tels qu'étudiés dans les sciences sociales contemporaines.

2. Etudier l'état de conceptualisation de convergence faite par les scientistes "occidentaux" comparativement aux critiques formulées par les scientistes de l'Europe de l'Est.

3. Vérifier les hypothèses et les théories de convergence telles qu'elles se présentent dans les systèmes sociaux "occidentaux" et "orientaux".

4. Etudier les perspectives réelles de convergence des systèmes sociaux, leurs possibilités et leurs limites.

5. Méthode optée: l'analyse systémique comparée, optique structurelle-fonctionnelle.

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4G

THE MODERNIZATION OF PARTY PROPAGANDA IN THE USSR

In spite of the high policy priority which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has placed on the development of the apparatus of propaganda and agitation, there has been little effective differentiation between the two and little attention paid to the efficient development of specialized propaganda personnel. This study investigates the trend now visible which indicates new departures in the direction of the modernization of the propaganda sphere. Propaganda is here narrowly defined, after Plekhanov and Lenin, and refers only to the instruction or socialization of CPSU members; agitation is the appropriate form of ideological activity for the "non-Party masses." Modernization is analyzed in terms of functional specificity, reliance on universalistic norms of conduct, and concern with achievement considerations.

Since the departure of Khrushchev, agitation has been split off from propaganda, and at the highest level, the Department of Propaganda has replaced the former Department of Agitation and Propaganda. The content of propaganda is now being differentiated from that of agitation, and the propagandist is increasingly becoming a professional, commanding a specified expertise and certified by the Evening University of Marxism-Leninism, the institution now reorganized in part for the preparation of the professional propagandist. The use of universalistic norms, based on rational and verifiable principles can be seen in the new emphasis on survey research and in the rapid development of courses and faculties of social psychology for Party propagandists. Achievement criteria are obvious in the new procedures for the planning, coordination, supervision, examination, and assessment of propaganda personnel.

The strains of a developing polity and the rising level of education of Party members may well be influential in the modernizing reform of the political education of Party members.

Ellen Mickiewicz
Michigan State University

5G

POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN A SOVIET CITY--THE CASE OF KUTAISI

Although chosen at random, Kutaisi proved to be a rewarding choice for research and in many respects typical of Soviet cities in its problems and institutions.

Kutaisi is growing rapidly and industrializing, thus burdening the city administration with problems of housing and power shortages which strain its limited budgets and create new social and cultural problems. Some of these take on forms distinctive to the Georgian culture of the city.

The administration of Kutaisi is characterized by a dense network of institutions within and ancillary to the soviet, providing independent and often parallel channels of information and mobilization based on both functional and territorial bases. These vary in their operational style and effectiveness but the existence of competing organizations motivates each of them to maintain at least a minimum level of efficiency. This also safeguards the executive committee against blockage of information on any subject due to a monopoly on the part of any individual group.

The organizations of the soviet act as a liaison between the bureaucracy and the citizens, facilitating communication by virtue of their access and knowledge and acting as a primary screen for citizens' requests and thus alleviating both strain on the bureaucracy and friction between bureaucracy and citizen.

The elected deputies of Kutaisi do comparatively little as individual representatives of their constituents. They work mainly through deputies' groups, of which eleven exist, or through the standing committees of the soviet in which two thirds of the deputies are members. The nature of the deputy's activities and the extent of his contact with his constituents is dependent on the individual's other responsibilities and his personality.

The deputies' organizations and the fifty-four neighbourhood committees organized under the guidance of the secretary of the soviet's executive committee rely on large numbers of volunteer workers to carry on their mobilizational, control and executive functions. This keeps the paid staff of the soviet to a minimum, helping realize the Marxist dictum of "cheap government".

Unlike the plenum of the soviet, the executive committee is dominated by members of the communist party. Two thirds of the executive committee are paid staff of the soviet--directors of its departments and administrations. Along with its functional departments, the executive committee has its own Organization and Instruction Department which acts as a troubleshooter and intelligence agency attempting to prevent and repair any weaknesses in the operation of the various sub-bodies of the soviet.

Recruitment into positions in the administrative elite appears to be totally local and based on personal contact and co-service in peripheral activities such as sports organizations, Komsomol committees, trade union work and factory committees. Party membership and voluntary activity are two common factors observed in all those who are part of the administrative and political elite. A series of positions in the city are reserved for those who are part of this elite, providing them with some measure of freedom of movement and resources which can be applied to party or soviet tasks without incurring direct outlays chargeable to the soviet or the party committee's budget.

Ted Friedgut
Columbia University

5G

"SOCIALIST" VERSUS "URBAN" CULTURES IN CHINA AND IN THE U.S.S.R.

In both China and the U.S.S.R. attempts have been made to create and develop uniquely "socialist" structures and values in an urban setting. These attempts have, by and large, failed in both societies for a number of reasons, such as a lack of human and material resources, conflict between desired "socialist" values and the imperatives of industrialization/urbanization, and inadequately developed urban policies which were often hastily conceived and improperly executed.

In the U.S.S.R., the neighbourhood unit concept, which was advanced a dozen years ago as the new form of "socialist" urban life, has apparently failed to develop. Other forms of urban community organization, such as apartment house committees, comrade's courts and street committees, have proven relatively ineffective. Soviet scholars and officials are again casting about for new "socialist" solutions to the problem of life within the urban setting, with proposals for New Units of Settlement (to provide an improved functional structure for the urban environment), and for New Way of Life Apartment house complexes (with integrated communal service and eating facilities).

In China, the urban commune, which was created a dozen years ago in order to unite town and country within the Chinese city, also failed in its goals. The urban commune experiment was basically abandoned. Other forms of urban community organization such as resident's committees, have met with some success, but they, too, have fallen far short of developing "socialist" values and culture. It appears that Chinese planners are not now publically advocating any radical new "socialist" solutions to the problems of urban life within Chinese cities.

This comparison of "socialist" urban structures and values also shows that the Chinese and the Soviets perceive the "socialist" city in strikingly different ways. The U.S.S.R. considers the city to be the logical environment for modern, "socialist" man, and Soviet planners are trying to create "socialist cities". The Chinese would like to "ruralize" the city--to create "socialist anti-cities". These differences are based upon a number of factors, such as contrasting levels of economic development, the influence of traditional pre-revolutionary attitudes towards the city in each society, and the impact of personality on urban policies (Mao and Stalin).

B. Michael Frolic
York University

A B S T R A C T 7G

THEORIES OF INTEGRATION AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLAND AND THE U.S.S.R.

M. Debicki (University of Manitoba)

This paper examines the theories of integration (in particular, the model which K. Deutsch uses in his study of the European Common Market) and their applicability to the relationship between Poland and the U.S.S.R.

It appears that this approach can be used as a methodoligical argument with Z. Brzezinski's position. One can propose and defend a position that there are identifiable sub-systems within the Polish political system and that the process of integration occurs differently in different sub-systems, and that one can measure the process of integration as well as disintegration. The paper will produce partial evidence of the operation of such a model, and an attempt will be made to present different operational models of integration for different historical periods. One can attempt to build several general hypotheses as to the integration of Poland into the Communish system which can at the same time explain the disintegrative factors within some of the sub-systems, e.g., agriculture.

This approach has particular use in explaining the economic relationship with the Soviet Bloc.

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FOUR SOVIET IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 7G

Frank Griffiths (University of Toronto)

This paper analyses the postwar Soviet literature on state-monopoly capitalism and on the American system in particular. It begins with a brief description of the perennial debate on state-monopoly capitalism, and then proceeds to characterize in detail four reasonably distinct images of the American system that continue to be advanced right up to the present. These images are designated as Stalinist, Neo-Stalinist, Moderate Party-Line, and Expert, and are derived from an examination of some 275 sources.

The term "image" is customarily employed to connote the organized representation of an object in an individual's cognitive system. Owing to the unreliability of published Soviet analyses as an indicator of individual belief, an "image" is taken to mean the representation of an object that is expressed in the interaction of two or more persons. It is suggested that a given image of the American system is expressed as part of an argument for a particular line of policy toward the United States. For example, Stalinist assertions that the American state is subordinate to the financial oligarchy and that the electoral process is farcical are the equivalent of arguing that the "peaceful path" to socialism is illusory. They also amount to a denial of the recommendations of other Soviet spokesmen who argue for diplomatic action to influence American electoral politics and public opinion for purposes of detente and agreements. Contending images of American state-monopoly capitalism thinly veil a clash of foreign policy recommendations. Their study casts new light on the Soviet foreign policy process.

8G

"TRENDS IN THE CIRCULATION OF

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST

ELITE SINCE 1949"

This paper, dealing largely with the period up to 1969, is an attempt to discover certain underlying regularities in the mobility of officials into positions in the Chinese party, government and military.

Examining data on several thousand individuals drawn from standard Hong Kong and Mainland sources the author shows the growth of functional specialization and implicit, non-ideological, criteria for movement into office. He concludes that such patterns show a trend to conformity with the usual requirements of modernization.

In that such bureaucratization has been a source of conflict within the elite, coming to a head in 1966-68, the author suggests that changes in the size and composition of the Central Committee reflect the necessity of providing a forum for the representatives if increasingly more numerous and diverse social interests. He concludes that this may put severe limits on any future policies seeking to substitute mass mobilization for a specialized division of labor.

Geoffrey Lambert
University of New Brunswick

8G

The People's Republic of China 1969-70: Some General Trends in Politics and Foreign Policy since the Retrenchment of the Cultural Revolution.

The paper takes the position that towards the end of 1968 the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had passed its peak, and was drawing, at least, to a temporary or intermediate conclusion. While the future occurrence of new high tides of cultural revolution is thus by no means excluded, it is assumed that there has been a partial achievement of the aims attributed to the Cultural Revolution by the Party leadership (as currently constituted). The paper proceeds to identify new aims now coming to the fore, such as the restoration of order the consolidation of power for new elite groupings, the rebuilding of the Communist Party of China, the assumption of a new, more important political role by the People's Liberation Army, and the cementing of a new position of unchallengeable ideological primacy and leadership for Mao Tse-tung and his designated successor Lin Piao as revealed in the new Communist Party Constitution of April 1969. It is asserted, however, that the aims enumerated above are by no means assured of achievement and that a number of conflicting trends continue to be in operation.

A generally more outgoing attitude in China's foreign relations is observed as the fires of the Sino-Soviet dispute appear temporarily to burn somewhat less brightly and the government of the People's Republic seems to adjust her postures to her capabilities. While the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China (April 1969) is seen as a significant reflection of emerging new internal power realities, the foreign policy adjustments may indicate the diplomatic caution and realism of the emerging new leadership, which might even consider tactical initiatives towards the West.

Klaus H. Pringsheim
McMaster University

8G

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Klaus H. Pringsheim
McMaster University

2H

LE FEDERALISME CAMEROUNAIS -- L'influence des structures fédérales sur l'activité économique ouest-camerounaise

par Jacques Benjamin
Université de Montréal

La Constitution fédérale camerounaise de 1961 ne mentionnait nommément aucune source de revenus pour les deux Etats fédérés; elle indiquait cependant que les revenus de la douane, source traditionnelle de revenus des deux territoires sous tutelle, iraient dorénavant remplir les coffres du gouvernement fédéral.

L'autonomie économique ouest-camerounaise n'en demeurait pas moins réelle en 1961: ses structures économiques, inspirées de la colonisation britannique, ne ressemblaient en rien, avec le Marketing Board unique et les Sociétés d'Etat, aux structures économiques est-camerounaises. A cette différence s'ajoute une différence de conjoncture, le niveau de vie étant fort inférieur au Cameroun occidental. C'est pourquoi la frontière intérieure fut maintenue durant les années 1961-1966. Mais une fois cette frontière retirée, la hausse des prix ne risquait-elle pas d'être catastrophique pour le Cameroun occidental? Les droits d'entrée et de sortie des biens étaient inférieurs au Cameroun occidental; le régime douanier fédéral voulut tenir compte de cette situation en accordant un statut particulier à l'Etat fédéré ouest-camerounais.

Mais les aspects centralisateurs de l'activité économique camerounaise semblent cependant prédominer neuf ans après l'instauration du régime fédératif. L'entrée du Cameroun occidental dans la zone franc a provoqué dans l'Etat fédéré une "souffrance considérable": les importations de produits de la zone sterling, auxquels les Camerounais-Occidentaux étaient habitués, furent limitées; la nouvelle monnaie fut mal accueillie par la majorité des citoyens; et les débouchés des produits exportés traditionnellement dans les pays de la zone sterling n'ont pas pu être remplacés.

Le fédéralisme par agrégation ne semble donc pas avoir été économiquement profitable aux Camerounais-Occidentaux.

3H

REGIONAL CONTEXTS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: SOME ILLUSTRATIONS FROM SOUTH INDIA

by David J. Elkins
University of British Columbia

Assuming that two regions within a country (or two countries) differ significantly in aggregate levels of political participation, there are two main strategies one can pursue in trying to account for these differences. The first strategy relies on some of the well known relationships among micro phenomena (for example, that the likelihood of participation increases with education, social status, certain attitudes such as efficacy, and the like). If the region with the higher participation rate has more individuals possessing the "appropriate" characteristics, one attributes the observed differences to the varying proportions of such individuals. In India, for example, Kerala has the highest voting turnout (one form of political participation) and also has the highest literacy rate in the country. Most research to date has concentrated on this sort of strategy. In other words, implicit in most such work has been the assumption that regional differences can be explained in terms of different proportions of people with characteristics conducive to participation. It is clear, however, that this is not always the case. In some cases this "reductionist" form of analysis can be shown to be spurious (for example, I show in my paper that Kerala's high turnout is not due to literacy). In other cases, there is considerable variation "left over" after one has exhausted the plausible explanatory variables at the individual level. For example, voting turnout is higher in India than in the United States, despite the grossly lower proportions of people there who possess "appropriate" characteristics.

The research reported in the present paper follows a second strategy, namely to try to explain regional variations in participation at least partly in terms of some holistic features of the regions themselves. These features, such as degree of linguistic and social diversity, differences in social hierarchy, and extent of party competition, cannot be reduced to characteristics of individuals but must be analysed areally. Thus, the aims of my research are: (a) to show that context variables (i.e., variables defining these supra-individual regional contexts) are important, (b) to delineate and explain the observed regional differences in two forms of political participation in south India, and (c) to provide an example of how aggregate data can be interpreted in terms of holistic characteristics of the regions and still allow some legitimate inferences about participation at the individual level (i.e., use aggregate data without committing the "ecological fallacy").

The quantitative data are Census figures and official election statistics aggregated into district, sub-state, and state level regions. In addition, ethnographic, linguistic, and historical evidence is used to supplement the quantitative characterizations of the regions. Thw two forms of political participation to be explained are voting turnout (per cent valid votes) and the number of candidates per constituency. Ideally, it would be desireable to have "intermediate" forms of participation, such as joining political organizations, attending rallies, and the like, but such data are not generally available at the present (though the Marvick and Eldersveld, and the Verba and Nie surveys in India in 1967 will eventually be of some value here).

The quantitative Census data and the discursive material are interpreted in terms of a model of social organization which has considerable independent support by other scholars who have worked on Indian material. The model allows me to make certain predictions which are checked against the quantitative data by means of cross-tabulations and regression analyses. With a few simple variables from the model, I am able to account for anywhere from one-third to two-thirds of the variance in voting behavior and number of candidates, depending on the assumptions made and on the particular dependent variable. In addition, urban-rural differences within regions, and overall urban-rural differences throughout the South, can be interpreted in terms of this model.

The implications which can be drawn from these conclusions (not spelled out in detail here) are quite interesting. For example, it appears that at least for south India, Deutsch's analysis in terms of "social mobilization" is not valid. Furthermore, it is obvious from the urban-rural analysis referred to above that there are fundamental differences between the process of urbanization in the United States and that in India. I mention the US because much of the behavioral literature has focused on that nation; but it would appear from my data that the US may be quite exceptional or statistically "deviant" in this respect. Obviously, it would be fruitful to explore regional differences in Canada along lines similar to those used in India, since variation between and within Canadian provinces is considerable on political as well as social indicators.

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3H

A TEST OF SOME PROPOSITIONS IN ELITE THEORY

by Donald G. Morrison and Hugh Michael Stevenson

Data has been gathered on ethnicity, age, education, birth place, and occupational background on about 1,000 members of the political elites of 32 sub-Saharan African nations. This data is used to test various theories relating to effects of differential primary and secondary socialization on small group stability. This data is then specifically related to measures of elite instability such as cabinet turnover copus and attempts, and other measures of elite instability. Specific propositions being tested include a) effects of ethnic homogeneity, b) generation (age) gap, c) education and occupational differences, and d) urban-rural background differences. This work is part of a larger study of political conflict in black Africa.

5H

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COUNTERREVOLUTION

Miles D. Wolpin
Dept. of Political Science
St. Francis Xavier University
Antigonish, Nova Scotia

Abstract

Since the Second World War, military aid has become increasingly important in America's arsenal of foreign policy instrumentalities. Due to the weakness and corruption which characterize civil regimes in the underdeveloping areas and the incessant challenge by nationalistic and socialistic groups, the United States has been compelled to rely upon military elites as guarantors of an "open door" to American corporate investment. The study emphasizes political indoctrination and the establishment of personal relationships as central features of the U.S. military assistance training programs for officers from the "Third World." It is argued that such socialization increases the probability of Conservative intervention against civil governments which adopt economically nationalistic domestic or non-aligned foreign policies. Official testimony, scholarly observations and a time series analysis support this hypothesis, although the efficacy of such training is modest--particularly during the initial period. Quantitative data indicate that when a large proportion of a recipient's officer corps have been trained and/or where the relationships have existed for more than eight years, the foreign military leadership functions as a fairly reliable instrumentality of American neo-colonialism.

The quantitative Census data and the discursive material are interpreted in terms of a model of social organization which has considerable independent support by other scholars who have worked on Indian material. The model allows me to make certain predictions which are checked against the quantitative data by means of cross-tabulations and regression analyses. With a few simple variables from the model, I am able to account for anywhere from one-third to two-thirds of the variance in voting behavior and number of candidates, depending on the assumptions made and on the particular dependent variable. In addition, urban-rural differences within regions, and overall urban-rural differences throughout the South, can be interpreted in terms of this model.

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Antigonish, Nova Scotia

Abstract

Since the Second World War, military aid has become increasingly important in America's arsenal of foreign policy instrumentalities. Due to the weakness and corruption which characterize civil regimes in the underdeveloping areas and the incessant challenge by nationalistic and socialistic groups, the United States has been compelled to rely upon military elites as guarantors of an "open door" to American corporate investment. The study emphasizes political indoctrination and the establishment of personal relationships as central features of the U.S. military assistance training programs for officers from the "Third World.£ It is argued that such socialization increases the probability of Conservative intervention against civil governments which adopt economically nationalistic domestic or non-aligned foreign policies. Official testimony, scholarly observations and a time series analysis support this hypothesis, although the efficacy of such training is modest--particularly during the initial period. Quantitative data indicate that when a large proportion of a recipient's officer ccrps have been trained and/or where the relationships have existed for more than eight years, the foreign military leadership functions as a fairly reliable instrumentality of American neo-colonialism.

6H

The Concept of Political Party in African Politics

Roberta E. Mapp and Robert E. Kauffman, the University of Alberta.

In the research and literature on African politics, the role of the political party has been conceptualized basically in two ways. The first, chronologically, was to view its functional contributions in terms of a set of evaluative criteria based on western democratic norms. The second broad conceptualization evolved from the first. Forced to accept the fact of the single-party state, there is an increasing attempt to justify this structure in terms of its functions--specifically, the mobilization and integration functions that a party might perform. In this paper, we use aggregate data and the independent variables of type of party system in 1963, and change therein by 1968, in order to examine the effectiveness of party as an analytic category in twenty-five sub-Saharan states. We look first at the extent of the shift toward the single party state from 1963-1968; then at the relationships between both type of party system in 1963 and stability of party system type between 1963-68 and various socio-economic and political variables. These include percentage of labour force in subsistence agriculture, number of wage earners as a percentage of active population, difficulty of achieving economic growth and actual economic growth rate (1958-66), level of urbanization, and political instability as measured by two broad indices: general turmoil and communal instability as well as elite instability. The relationships expected from the general literature on both party systems and development are not substantiated by the data correlations. Our conclusion is that party type and stability of party type are not useful political variables within the context of African politics, and suggest why this should be so. The major explanatory factors seem to be the low level of social and economic development in African states and a too-easy acceptance of the label, party, for a reality that is something else, as well as a too heavy reliance upon Western conceptual frameworks.

6H

CLIANTAGE FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN TROPICAL AFRICA

by Richard Sandbrook
University of Toronto

Under certain circumstances, conflict within central and local political arenas is likely to spill over to create or exacerbate conflicts within ostensibly apolitical organizations. The most important of these circumstances occur in societies in which political office is highly prized as the main source of wealth and social status, but in which there is neither established rules of the game governing political competition nor common ideological commitment. Voluntary associations, such as trade unions, co-operative societies and tribal unions, and governmental "institutions", such as the civil service and the army, are drawn into political conflict, as politicians compete for influential allies. Politicians enter into patron-client relationships with trade unionists, co-operative society chairmen, tribal union officials, civil servants and military men in which each party agrees to work for the advancement of the other. Because of these clientage relationships linking politicians and leaders of various organizations in society, struggles for control of these organizations frequently have a political dimension.

This conception of the political process is examined within the context of Kenyan politics since the late 1950s, focussing mainly on the relationships between politicians and trade unionists.

6H

ABSTRACT

Political Discontent and Party Support in an African

Polity: The Case of Sierra Leone

John Cartwright

University of Western Ontario

Discontent with political institutions can take a variety of forms. At the level of social groups, it can take regional or "tribal" forms, in which the actions taken through national political institutions are perceived as discriminating against one's region or tribe, and "class" forms, in which persons of one's status or occupational group are seen as subject to discrimination by national or local authorities. At the level of the individual, discontent may be manifested as the result of feelings of powerlessness (lack of political efficacy) or as the result of an awareness of actions taken through a political institution which are disapproved of by the individual. Whether discontent felt by members of the polity will be translated into political action will depend on further variables involving the nature of the political institutions themselves; specifically, it will be affected by the extent to which any discontents may be articulated in competition for positions of authority within the polity and by the nature of the competition.

On the basis of interviews with a stratified sample of adult male Sierra Leoneans, it is suggested that: (a) discontent in 1968 was directed more strongly against the national government than against local government institutions, and more specifically, against the behaviour of the country's erstwhile Prime Minister, Sir Albert Margai; (b) that the strongest manifestations of discontent were directed against tribally discriminatory policies practiced by Sir Albert; but (c) that there was also a significant component of "class" discontent with the behaviour of both the national and local government authorities. It is further suggested that because of the structural variable that opposition parties were permitted to compete with the governing party for popular support, there was a channel through which these discontents could be articulated, but that because of the further structural variables of the single-member constituency electoral system and weakly articulated parties, the "tribal" component of discontent received substantially more effective articulation than did the "class" component.

At the personal level, there was only a very weak inverse correlation between discontent and sense of political efficacy at both the national and local levels, but there was somewhat stronger direct correlation between awareness of political events and a sense of discontent with the performance of both national and local political actors. This implied that governments would be dealing with increasingly critical subjects as communications networks spread, leaving the government with the choice of being more responsive to popular demands or more repressive.

7H

A B S T R A C T

CARIBBEAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND CANADIAN AID

Rudolph W. Grant (York University)

This paper examines the structure of Caribbean underdevelopment and its political consequences. Against this background Canadian-West Indies relations are examined with special exphasis on the question of aid.

Between the negotiations of the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement of 1925 and 1966 Conference, little progress was made. The 1966 Conference in Ottawa between the Heads of the various West Indian Governments and the Canadian Government led to expectations out of all proportion to the realities of Canada-West Indies relations. The promises made and hopes raised at the Conference have hardly been fulfilled.

The second part of the paper seeks to explain the attitude of the Canadian Government towards the West Indies since 1966. In other words, the question to be examined is the dramatic failure of the agreements of the 1966 Conference. The main thesis of the paper is that the 1966 Conference, coming as it did at the height of "Pearsonian internationalism," produced overly optimistic expectations about Canadian-West Indies relations.

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A B S T R A C T

DETERMINANTS OF CARIBBEAN FOREIGN POLICY: SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CANADA-CARIBBEAN RELATIONS

Carl D. Parris (McGill University)

Canada officially became a nation in 1867 and fifty years later was staking a claim to the Commonwealth Caribbean colonies. Being however herself economically controlled by British and American capital, she could not consummate that claim. Today she is now openly entering the Caribbean arena as a political ally and economic extension of the U.S. to help retain in the Anglo-American orbit, the English speaking Caribbean.

This paper attempts to come to grips with the reasons why Canada is able to openly enter and exploit the Caribbean. To this end, the author examines the foreign policy of the independent Caribbean states as well as the existing political and economic relations between Canada and the non-independent territories and advances the thesis that Canadian exploitation of the Commonwealth Caribbean is a function of the mendicant nature of Caribbean foreign policy.

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4I

THE PUBLIC SERVICES OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GOVERNMENTS AS EMPLOYERS

O.P.Dwivedi
University of Guelph

ABSTRACT:

Modern government has become the principal means for translating community demands into action; as such it is not only the major distributor of goods and services but also the largest employer of the nation's labour force. Unlike the pre World War II days, government is now looked upon as the model employer by private industries and their workers. Determination of wages and working conditions for government employees has far reaching effects in the private industries and the community. The importance of government as employer is the central theme of this paper.

This study in comparative public administration examines those factors which have caused the growth of governmental functions thereby swelling the numerical proportion of the labour force under government employment. Focussing on the federal public services of Canada and Australia, this paper highlights the importance of government as employer competing for an ever larger proportion of the skilled labour force in the community. A projection of government employment is made to emphasize the extent of government incursion into the nation's available trained manpower and the implications for the future.

Although governments in both countries are the biggest employers of countries' human resources, their recruiting agencies such as the Public Service Commission of Canada and the Public Service Board of Australia have had to compete with private industries and instituions of higher education for attracting talents. This reflects on the public prestige of government employment in both countries. Hence an analysis of the prestige value of public services is combined with the examination of the staffing process which includes recruitment, selection, appointment, probation, transfer and promotion aspects of government employees. The terms and conditions of employment such as tenure, fringe benefits, and restrictions against political activities are also compared.

In Canada, collective bargaining is considered as the major contemporary civil service reform. This development in Canadian public personnel administration is analyzed against the background of several decades of negotiations and arbitrations in the Australian public service. In conclusion, an attempt has been made to outline some salient features of "Governments as Employers" which are peculiar to the administrative settings of respective countries compared.

5I

Stephen Clarkson
University of Toronto

Policy-Making in the Liberal Party:
The Possibilities and Constraints of Participatory Democracy in a Party

"Participatory democracy" loosely designates a broad range of behaviour from extra-parliamentary opposition to more active citizen involvement in the traditional electoral process. This paper will discuss "participatory democracy" by examining the possibilities that are open and the constraints which limit the extent of non-elected party member activity in the Liberals' policy-making processes (1969-1971). The paper will report the theoretical implications of a number of empirical studies that are currently in process designed to get at the following specific problems.

1. The extent to which participation in the policy process is a function of a prior ideological commitment by the party leadership to democratization. (Study of the impact of the pre-conference political and planning decisions on the outcome of policy conferences.)

2. The extent to which participation by delegates at a conference can be encouraged or controlled by "technical" problems such as the voting system, scheduling and volume of material handled. (Study of several recent policy conferences' group dynamics.)

3. The extent to which participation can be tested by the openness of the process to interest group activity. (Study of one interest group joining the party from the outside and of one group formed from the inside, each fighting to get a specific area of policy adopted.)

4. Criteria to evaluate the quality of the participation:
a) continuity. (Statistics on degree to which delegates kept with the policy process from the beginning to end, or got involved at the end without going through the educational process.)

b) relevance. (Study of the responsiveness of certain policy issues to social concerns of the time.)

c) expertise versus representativeness. (Study of number of experts involved in the preparation of policy conference material as compared with the number of party members.)

d) satisfaction. (Study of evolving attitudes by the members of selected riding associations to the policy process.)

5. Impact of the ultimate policy decisions on the performance of the party. (Study of impact of policy decided in conference on the subsequent election campaign.)

The paper will conclude with an assessment of how the movement towards participatory democracy has affected the nature of the Liberal party federally, provincially and municipally in the Toronto district.

I9

Recherche scientifique et structures fédérales : organisation et financement de la recherche scientifique en Allemagne (1919-1933)

La constitution weimarienne, fédérative, avait laissé aux Etats fédérés la compétence en matière culturelle. La recherche scientifique relevait donc, en principe, de la juridiction des Etats.

Le gouvernement central avait hérité de l'Empire, d'un certain nombre d'institutions de recherche et de promotion culturelle, mais s'engagea très tôt dans une politique de promotion de la recherche scientifique à l'échelle nationale par le truchement de la Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft (fondée en 1920) et de la Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft (dont il assurait en partie, depuis 1921, le financement). Il trouvait les moyens grâce à des fonds spéciaux insérés dans le budget du Ministère de l'Intérieur.

Les résistances auxquelles se heurtait cette politique aux allures centralisatrices venaient des bureaucraties plutôt que des milieux intéressés, et l'Etat le plus fort, la Prusse, hébergeait dans son Ministères des Cultes et de l'Education les partisans les plus vigoureux d'une Reichskulturpolitik. Il fut même question, à certains moments, de faire fusionner ce Ministère avec le Département des affaires culturelles du Reichsinnenministerium, - amorce d'un Ministère (fédéral) des sciences et de l'éducation qui échoua d'ailleurs à cause de l'opposition des Etats.

De la fédération de 1871, la République de Weimar avait conservé le caractère hégémonique. Dans le secteur culturel, de l'enseignement et de la recherche, la prépondérance prussienne était aussi écrasante que dans d'autres domaines. Ce facteur n'est pas le seul cependant, dont il faut tenir compte si l'on veut évaluer, à sa juste mesure, l'effet intégrateur éventuel de la politique du gouvernement central en matière scientifique.

On aurait tort de sousestimer, en effet, l'influence de la situation politique particulière au lendemain de la guerre. L'élite académique était convaincue que l'Allemagne avait conservé intacte son leadership scientifique et que ce rang de "grande puissance scientifique" pouvait en quelque sorte se substituer au rang de grande puissance politique, économique et militaire dont elle était déchue. Les réalisations de son génie scientifique devinrent ainsi un "substitut de puissance" et la recherche fit figure de service national. Pour la communauté scientifique allemande, les grands problèmes de la recherche scientifique ne se posaient donc guère en termes d'unitarisme contre fédéralisme.

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I6

THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN ONTARIO

The principal concerns of this paper are the sources of information of public officials in Ontario regarding public issues and the influence of these sources on decision-makers. A survey of elected and appointed officials from municipal, provincial and federal levels of government on the general subject of environmental pollution provided basic data for the study. As well, case studies of the information flow in a limited number of specific pollution problems have been undertaken. This paper does not attempt to examine the vast multiplicity of problems related to this contemporary issue, but rather uses the problems of pollution to provide a focus for questions of broader significance.

The predominant role of the mass media as a prime source of information on public issues is apparent in the questionnaire responses. All groups exhibit a strong dependence on the media as their most common source of information on pollution problems, with a significantly smaller dependence on personal communication and communications from all levels of government. Relatively little variation appears among the groups regarding their most common source of information, but responses as to their most influential source vary considerably. While the mass media retains the highest overall ranking, it appears that many respondents who consider the media their most common source of information view other sources as more influential

The survey indicates clearly the importance of such general issues as pollution in the minds of public officials in Ontario. They differ as to who should bear primary responsibility for pollution control within the Province, but agree that the responsible party is not fulfilling its responsibility. As to methods of ensuring fulfillment of responsibility they place their greatest faith in government legislation--little faith is placed in either the media or extra-Parliamentary means, and almost no faith at all in industry itself.

Public officials in the Province believe that they have an important role to play in pollution control, and their involvement with the problem in its many forms appears high, both in bringing the problem to the attention of the responsible government or polluter and in suggesting solutions to the problem. Furthermore, although they disagree as to the best method of making their contribution, they feel that they are achieving a high degree of success in effecting solutions to particular problems with which they are involved.

Lack of information does not appear to be a problem for individual public officials in Ontario, though the type of information received may be. It is interesting that the sources of information concerning specific pollution problems which most influenced the decision-makers differed markedly from their most influential sources on pollution generally. It also appears evident that the lines of communication between constituents and their elected and appointed officials are functioning satisfactorily, but it is equally clear that the officials themselves, while able to intervene effectively on behalf of the public to resolve minor pollution problems, believe that the full powers of the provincial and federal governments are required to treat thoroughly the larger problem of general pollution.

Patrick Kyba John B. Black,
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1J

POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENTS' ATTITUDES

SUMMARY

John Woods

An exploratory survey was made of Political Science Students' attitudes toward their studies, the staff, various methods of learning and toward the university as a whole. Each attitudinal score was also compared with the respondent's personality characteristics, his background and his other attitudes in hopes of determining whether or not there are identifiable types of students.

The attitudes were scored by means of Osgoods' three dimensions of meaning: evaluation, strength and activity. The students' relative uniformity of attitudes toward all aspects of university life is apparent from the aggragate scores. Lectures, 'studies', political science and 'university' itself were all seen as moderately good and strong, while not particularly active. 'Job' is viewed in about the same way, while 'high school' and 'university administration' are viewed as inactive, and neither good nor strong. There was general agreement between students on most scores, but those for 'job' and 'university administration' exhibited substantial deviations.

Factor analysis of attitude scores did suggest the existence of a number of attitudinal clusters, each based on an affinity for one or more of the entities scored. There may, then, be student types, identifiable by their adoption of a particular set of attitudes, different from the sets held by other types.

The personality scores, although proving to be of doubtful validity, suggested some directions for further investigation. For instance, the 'tough-minded' appear to place a low evaluation on the university and its practices and personnel, while placing a higher evaluation on job--a finding more in accord with the views of the institution's critics than with those of academics.

A comparison of academic records to attitudes revealed that A and C students tend to exhibit one set of attitudes, and B students another. This is a rather intriguing result, particularly in view of the fact that similar U-shaped curves appeared for parents' income vs. various student attitudes, and for the student's age vs. his attitudes. No explanation for these bi-modalities springs to mind, but they invite further investigation.

A university-wide sample survey was later conducted employing essentially the same survey instrument, and some of its results will also be discussed in the paper.

February, 1971

2J

"Toward a Science of Politics: Clearing Away Some Underbrush"
R. L. Jackson

Abstract

It is the thesis of this essay that a good part of the present debate between the advocates and opponents of political science qua science is a pseudo-debate resting on a faulty conception of science shared by both antagonists. In this debate the pro-science/anti-science issue has tended to be confused with other issues such as behavioralism/anti-behavioralism and political conservatism/ political radicalism. Though pseudo, this debate is of importance for its result will help shape the discipline. A victory for current pro-science forces would actually be a victory for bogus science. Their defeat might be a defeat not just for a bogus science, but also--the baby being thrown out with the bath water--for science more properly conceived.

The main question considered is: What is "science" to those who advocate and oppose political science qua science. In connection with this question two main hypotheses will be examined. The first is that the conceptions of science held both by those who advocate and those who oppose a political science qua science are importantly similar. Their similarity will be investigated with reference particularly to the nature and role of scientific method. It is concluded that when the debate rages over the virtue or application of science the contestants share a notion of scientific method. Their debate concerns the use to which the method is put, not its claim to being scientific method.

The second hypothesis is that the conceptions of science based on scientific method held by the debators differs from persuasive conceptions of science explicated by some contemporary philosophers of science, especially neo-positivists. The difference lies in conceptions as to how science is and may be done.

Because science like any activity has two aspects: One that commands the attention of the actor and one that compells the spectator and because the observation of natural science is no doubt the basic source of the conceptions of science held by political scientists, most political scientists focus on the most visible aspect of science. The most visible aspect of science is the context of justification. This context consists of the finished products of scientific research as presented to one's professional collegues. A conception of science developed by spectators on the basis of this context overlooks a second and less visible, but no less important, context--the context of discovery. It is in this second context that the creative work of science occurs. A conception of science that makes this analytic distinction between contexts is quite different from one which is formed on the basis of the first context alone. A conception of science uninformed by the context of discovery mistakenly sees science as being entirely constituted of a rigid set of procedures for deducing, generating, or discovering truths. It is such a conception that is shared by the advocates and opponents of political science qua science. This conception can only itself inhibit progress towards science.

In any event the first thing political scientists interested in achieving a political science qua science must do is to stop such emulation of natural science.

mj/

6J

THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, or CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE?

Canada, like political science itself, is a creation of the nineteenth century. Canadian political science, however, is not much more than a generation old in the sense of being recognized as a distinct discipline, unless contributions by men like Alpheus Todd and le révérend père G.H. Lévesque are counted.

If there is a Canadian political science distinguishable from political science in a universal sense, it seems that it would have two major characteristics. It would be about Canadian subjects and problems, and it would be written primarily by Canadians. Whether it would be written in French or English is not too important except where an absence of suitable translations would limit the reading audience of works published in only one language.

A distinction must be made between the discipline and the profession as the former is the substance of what is taught, while those who teach it constitute the profession. The profession is being currently studied jointly by Professors Hull and Gabory for the C.P.S.A. and la S.C.S.P. It is the profession that is concerned with making a contribution to our society and to advancement of the Canadian aspect of the universal discipline.

The development of Canadian political science can be viewed as having several phases. The most important of these phases are; the Dawson era and before; the great and rapid expansion in the numbers of professors and students in the 1950's and the 1960's; the importation of the behavioralistic concept from the United States; the creation of La Société canadienne de science politique; the C.P.S.A. becoming officially bilingual and wholly devoted to political science; and most recently the concern over there being a Canadian political science at all, now and in the future.

What are the classical questions that constitute the core of Canadian political science? Some only of these questions can be suggested, much less definitely answered: the political significance of the Conquest; the true meaning of 1867 and the Constitution; the principles of the Canadian system of government; how culturally diverse groups agree to, and actually do, live together; and the relations between and among autonomous provincial and central governments.

Part of the fascination of examining Canadian political science is akin to studying Canada herself, her geographical position, her history, her parents, the big brother to the south and so on. If Canadian political science is ever to be distinct from British, French, and American conceptions and to have a recognizable character of its own, it must contribute something to political philosophy. So far this has not occured, unless someone in the future inside or outside the ranks of professional political scientists will provide the fundamental work or works of Canadian political philosophy that are needed, not only for Canadians' benefit, but as proof that Canadian political science does exist.

A. R. Kear

1K

Attitudes towards freedom of Speech in
a Canadian Community: a study of Social,
Psychological and Political correlates.

This paper considers a number of theoretical and empirical questions relevant to the study of freedom of speech orientations in a Canadian community. Initially the paper deals with some implications of freedom of speech outlooks for democratic political processes. The central focus of the paper is upon two questions: (a) who supports and who opposes freedom of speech? and (b) why do individuals vary in their outlooks on freedom of speech?

These questions are dealt with in terms of key social, psychological and political indicators with a view: (a) to map some characteristic correlates of attitudes towards freedom of speech; and (b) to examine some causal implications of relations among the variables. Considerable attention in the paper is devoted to the development of a general measure of attitude towards freedom of speech, one devoid of left or right bias. Key variables include ethnic background, religion, social class, authoritarianism and anomie, and political participation and partisanship. The study is based on interviews with a random sample of 1008 [redacted] RESIDENTS of a large Western Canadian City.

In concluding the empirical analyses attention is directed to two areas: (a) policy implications of the findings; and (b) behavioural theoretical implications of the findings.

Ted G. Harvey
University of Western Ontario

2K

A Critique of "Empirical Democratic Theory":
Aggregate Data Analysis and Empirical Reality.

Tom Truman
McMaster University

A number of sociologists and political scientists e.g. Lipset, Cutright, Neubauer, McCrone and Cnudde have attempted to develop an empirical theory of democracy by proving a causal relationship between "advanced" levels of economic development, i.e., industrialization, and the emergence and maintenance of democratic government. Usually this is done by constructing indices of economic development using the aggregate data on compilations of international statistics and attempting to show correlations between them and an index of democratic development or, sometimes, political development. Some e.g. Lerner and Winham have thought they have discovered a causal sequence from economic development to urbanization to education to communications to democracy.

Lipset's claims are fairly easily challenged because of the dubious use of political culture areas and because his own statistics show East European dictatorships doing better on indices of economic development than Latin American democracies. Cutright, Neubauer and Winham fall down mainly through the inadequacies of their indices of democratic development which result in such curious findings as Panama coming out as more democratic than Norway, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Belgium and Netherlands; Venezuela coming out as more democratic than Chile, Switzerland and Ireland; and Japan as more democratic than New Zealand, Canada and the United States. These "empirical" theorists have failed to check their findings against the evidence of other political scientists who have actually observed over a considerable time the political systems of the countries dealt with.

Evidence is presented in this paper that a number of countries such as the United States, Norway, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand became political democracies before they became industrialized, suggesting that the relationship between economic development and democratic development is by no means as simple as the theorists make out. Modern Political democracy is seen as arising out of a complex of factors peculiar to Western European culture. Its success and dissemination throughout the world seems to be related to the military strength, technological development, good fortune and prestige of the western powers.

3K

A B S T R A C T

Canadians" Membership in Voluntary Associations

National Data in Comparative Perspective[1]

James Curtis (University of Waterloo)

Data from a national sample of Canadians and secondary analysis of findings from Almond and Verba's Civic Culture study in the U.S. and four other nations are offered in order to provide perspective on the "Americans as a nation of joiners" observation and other propositions in the literature. The broad hypotheses considered are that: (1) the uniqueness and scope of the American pattern of association joining have been overemphasized; and (2) previous American findings on selected correlates of association membership should obtain in Canada and other democracies as well. For Canada and the other nations, findings on the relationship of membership to education, sex and age level are in essential agreement with earlier American findings. The data also show that Canadians and Americans have similar, comparatively high, overall proportions of association memberships. Analysis by sex shows that the uniqueness of the American and Canadian membership patterns may be largely a result of national differences in the participatory role of women.

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A B S T R A C T

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN'S PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL SUTHORITY ROLES:

SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

T.G. Carroll, D.J.H. Higgins, M.S. Whittington

In this paper we have attempted to trace the development of children's perceptions of political authority roles in Canada to show how these change between the ages of 7-14. We have examined the cognitive and affective orientations of children to such political roles as the Queen, Governor-General, the Prime Minister and so on. Because of the proximity of the U.S. we have also attempted to measure the relative importance of American political roles such as President, and Congressman for Canadian children. Our analysis is based on data derived from questionnaires administered to approximately 4000 school children in the Ottawa, Peterborough and Lethbridge areas during the past year.

Some of the relationships that exist between children's perceptions and such independent variables as sex, grade in school, exposure to T.V., place of residence, and family background are established. Our most important conclusions, however, are themselves preliminary hypotheses about the nature of the process of political socialization in Canada.

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4K

Maitres Chez Nous and Black Power: Correlates of Support for Nationalism

William P. Irvine
Queen's University

In the first part of this study we try to see if we can distinguish between supporters of two types of nationalism that are conceptually distinct: linguistic nationalism and political nationalism. The former seeks to increase the use of French throughout the country; the latter complains of the present political influence of French Canadians or of Quebec in Canada. In a survey done in 1965 a number of questions were asked which, on their face, seemed to tap one or another of these dimensions. The initial stage of the analysis sought to develop Guttman scales of each of these nationalisms and to see if, indeed, they were perceived by respondents as two different things.

An acceptable scale of Linguistic Nationalism was derived, but I could find no meaningful scale of political nationalism that met the Guttman criteria. I, therefore, created two indices: a support for constitutional change index and an index of political protest. These, plus the linguistic nationalism scale, form my three dependent variables. They are only very weakly intercorrelated.

The next stage of the analysis, which is not yet complete, involves measuring a number of social and psychological correlates of these factors, and comparing the results with those reported by Gary T. Marx for his Index of Conventional Militancy. (See Gary T. Marx, Protest and Prejudice, Harper and Row, 1967).

The discussion of these findings will be cast against a background of theory of social movements and of the sources of support for political protest. In particular, we shall evaluate the models offered by William Kornhauser and Maurice Pinard.

7K

THE MEASUREMENT AND IMPACT OF REGIONALISM
IN CANADIAN VOTING BEHAVIOUR

By Donald Blake
University of British Columbia

This research confronts two conflicting perspectives on the pattern of party-related social cleavages in Canada, in particular, on changes in the "territorial cleavage." One perspective, from comparative politics, predicts that the importance of the territorial cleavage in patterns of party support should gradually decline as a nation develops economically with growth in industrialization, urbanization, and inter-regional communication. Such socioeconomic changes are expected to reduce regional distinctiveness whether based on religious and/or ethnic distinctiveness, or on economic distinctiveness. Corresponding to the decline in such differences between regions, this approach expects that social class position will become the primary determinant of party choice.

The contrary perspective points to the lack of evidence for the importance of class-related voting behaviour in Canada, the differences between regions which still persist, and the fact that provincial governments in Canada have considerable political and economic importance which, if anything, is increasing.

This paper reviews some of the findings on regionalism in party support patterns, some of the attempts to measure changes in the impact of regionalism on voting behaviour, and presents an alternative measurement method designed to remedy the shortcomings in previous attempts.

Multiple regression models relating party support to socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate in English Canada were developed for the elections of 1911, 1921, 1949, and 1963. Quebec is excluded from this analysis because of statistical problems. Included in the models were terms designed to measure the two principal manifestations of regionalism in the Canadian case: the association of certain parties with certain regions, and variations in the party support patterns of particular social groups from region to region. If the hypotheses contained in the first perspective are correct we would expect to see a decline in the explanatory power of such regional variations over time.

The results of this research indicate that the impact of regionalism measured in this fashion has not declined appreciably, but that perhaps the relationship between party support and social class characteristics is subject to less regional variation than is the case with other characteristics.

9K

ABSTRACT

"Partisan Identification: The Case of Spatially Mobile Parties"

Jane Jenson
University of Rochester

This paper is an attempt to discriminate between, and test, the two major models in Political Science which have incorporated a partisan identification variable. The first is that model developed by the authors of the American Voter and subsequently widely adopted. The second is the rational choice model developed by Anthony Downs et al., as it is modified to take into account an uncertain world and the subsequent information costs. The Canadian party system provides a unique source of data. This is because only in a system in which the parties are spatially mobile is it possible to discriminate successfully between the two models. In a stable party situation both models provide an explanation which can not be disproved. However, different predictions of behavior are made for the case of mobile parties, which is a characteristic of the Canadian experience. Therefore, a complete examination of the two models is possible.

The hypotheses made about behavior in such a situation are tested using the results of the Canadian national election studies of 1965 and 1968. The results of this analysis allow one to make statements about the proportion and characteristics of the population whose behavior is best accounted for by each model.

9K

ABSTRACT

by Robert B.Cunningham
McMaster University

Personality, Family, and Party Identification Among Canadian University Students

Political parties have various stereotypes associated with their labels. Progressive Conservatism may be thought conservative, a characteristic sometimes linked to authoritarianism. Liberalism connotes a lack of firm conviction, a willingness to go along with the dominant mood. Opponents of the War Measures Act were termed "bleeding hearts" by Prime Minister Trudeau. Since only the NDP as a party stood against imposition of that act, the public image of the NDP is thereby partly shaped. Do personality characteristics of party supporters in any way correspond to stereotypes of the party? Do certain personality types tend to support one political party rather than another? Or is one's party identification so determined by social factors that personality has little to do with party choice? The question is whether party identification can in any way be attributed to personality factors.

By investigating the personalities and party attachments of students the voter (or potential voter) is reached when he is perhaps least affected by society. His party preference would seemingly be under greatest pressure for change, for the student occupies an ambiguous role vis-a-vis wider society. He is physically and emotionally mature, yet he is not usually self-supporting and does not play a productive role in the wider community. Consequently, personality characteristics should play a heightened role in determining vote. This paper will link personality characteristics of students to party preferences to test some general stereotypes. Then the switchers, those who changed from the party affiliation of their fathers, will be checked to see whether personality might have played a role in the changed party affiliation. Finally, are there implications that can be speculated on regarding political change, the party system, or participatory democracy?

9K

"The Meaning and measurement of Political Alienation:
Variations on Some Old Methodological Themes in Attitude Theory."

J. Paul Johnston

The concept of "attitude" has been widely used, yet its meaning is unclear. Moreover, it appears that, in a de facto sense at least, whatever the conceptual specification of meaning is made, little attention has been seriously devoted to consideration of the parallel specification of meaning set up operationally in the efforts to empirically measure attitudes as they have been conceptualized. Rokeach notes that insofar as attitude measurement is concerned it seems to make little difference what definition of attitude is employed. I take this statement to relate to practical research applications more than to the abstract logic of different scaling models, although it may apply to the latter as well, with reference to the selection of one approach over another. This situation is directly relevant to that set of issues which Blalock has characterized as "the Measurement Problem", involving (as he claims) a "gap between the language of theory and the language of research." It is also relevant to that tantalizing paradox that Coombs has characterized as "the researcher's dilemna", i.e., whether we are to impose a functional form strictly derived from a theoretical model or, rather, inductively specify the form of relations between elements of our conceptual definition as a consequence of those which emerge from our empirical analysis of the relations among the indicators employed in our operational specification of meaning. Finally, I would suggest that whatever discussion of these issues is undertaken with reference to the attitude concept, ought to give due weight to the matter of the empirical relevance of the conceptual meaning set for a particular attitude in question; the contextual constraints placed on its meaning as a result of the perspective taken up by the theorist and by the persons under study to whom such an attitude has been attributed; and, to the distinction set out by MacCorquodale and Meehl, some twenty-three years ago, between the notions of "intervening variables" and "hypothetical constructs."

All of these issues are obviously relevant to the use of the attitude notion by political scientists concerned with the study of political behaviour. The consequences that result from ignoring the methodological issues noted above are perhaps nowhere better illustrated in political science and sociology than in the attitudinal research relating to the notions of "political alienation" and "social alienation". All of the problems described in the first part of this precis can be found in the research literature in these two social sciences which deals with these two "attitudes". Both are treated usually as "global" in character, ignoring potential contextual constraints. The conceptual meanings specified are usually ambiguous and confounded with those set out for other, supposedly distinct political or social attitudes, almost invariably with little consideration of the conceptual meaning implicitly given by adoption of the parent concept, "attitude". And, finally, the "gap" about which Blalock wrote is frequently artifactually widened into a yawning chasm.

In my paper, I propose to take up the implications of these issues with reference to the concept of "political alienation". Also, I will set out some ideas concerning how one might deal with them in this instance, given the particular position one takes on the conceptual meaning and theoretical role ascribed to the parent concept, "attitude". Finally, I will argue that one must consider the contextual relevance of the surplus meaning that resides in the historical development of the notion of "alienation"; and, that one must build into one's operational definition a test of the functional form of the relations among theoretical components as specified in whatever conceptual model one posits as representing the concept "attitude". These points will be illustrated by use of data I have collected in a program of research on political attitudes and their measurement carried out over the past three years.

1L

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN CANADA: A Critical-Comparative Analysis of Drybones
Eugene E. Dais, Political Science Department, University of Calgary
For presentation at the CPSA Meeting, June 1971, Memorial University

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in *The Queen v. Drybones* (1969) has innovative tendencies. The intriguing questions concern the scope and direction of those tendencies. One fact is undeniable. By a 6-3 decision, the Court held a statute of Parliament inoperative for the first time on grounds other than an entrenchment on powers exclusively provincial under the B.N.A. Act. The Court acted, quite respectably, on the Bill of Rights. Nonetheless, it has been argued that *Drybones* signifies a departure from the British tradition of parliamentary sovereignty towards the American practice of judicial supremacy.

The on-going partisan activity to re-write the B.N.A. Act expectedly sparks emotional overtones over the innovative potential of *Drybones*. Thus it is specially important to analyze objectively the potential of the decision for shaping constitutional change, and the desirability of that potential.

Assessing the scope and direction of the potential involves queries concerning principle, role and structure. In holding the prosecution of Joseph Drybones under section 94(b), Indian Act, for being intoxicated off a reserve, a denial of "equality before the law," has the Court created the Canadian version of *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954)? In invoking section 1(b), Bill of Rights, has the Court adopted a policy-making stance, analogous to *Lochner v. New York* (1905), in lieu of its traditional judicial role of the positive interpretation of enacted law? In holding a statute inoperative, although it was admittedly *intra vires* of Parliament's power under section 91(24), B.N.A. Act, has the Court laid the basis for its judicial supremacy much as did the U.S. Supreme Court in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803)?

In critically assessing the innovative potential of *Drybones*, it should be stressed that whatever changes the decision may induce must take place within the existing arrangements of the Canadian political system. Two confusions should be avoided. Developments are not necessarily desirable or undesirable because they are or are not (a) literal replications of aspects of the British parliamentary system or (b) exact duplications of various practices in the American system of the separation of powers. While ultimately proving what is desirable or not in constitutional change is logically impossible, such judgments can be usefully informed by comparative systems analysis.

The central problem in this context has to do with how courts and legislatures interact in the process of protecting fundamental rights. This interaction differs substantially in the American and British political systems. But in each case the interaction is such that courts make their functionally different but equivalent contributions in such a way that the political system's output in fundamental rights protection, relative to the demands on it in that connection, is functionally adequate.

In Canada, therefore, the problem of comparative systems analysis may be stated thusly: Relative to the future demands on the political system for fundamental rights protection, what interaction of court and legislature is most functional? The thesis of this paper is that the arrangement can be neither British judicial deference nor American judicial activism. It will have to be an interactive arrangement that, although not wholly dissimilar from either, is distinctively different from both. Further, *Drybones* will likely be a more viable indicator of the scope and direction of how that interactive arrangement develops than any effort in superimposing constitutional change in the abstract. What eventually develops in organic fashion, barring superimposed deviations, will likely be very much in the direction of judicial supremacy, but without the broad scope of judicial activism that seems indigenous to the activity in the American political system.

2L

A B S T R A C T

LAW AND POLITICS: THE CASE OF POLICE INDEPENDENCE IN ONTARIO

A. K. McDougall

The growth of insulation by occupational groups at the local level of government has been recorded for some time. This paper analyses the process of insulation insofar as it relates to policing in Ontario. Two significant external groups are involved in this process: the municipal politicians, and the spokesmen for the judiciary. The former desires to control policy affecting their municipality, the latter desires to ensure the impartiality and credability of the legal system. Their desires conflict at times, however, and when they do some of the symbols used by each group conflict. These symbols have provided other groups, in this case the police, with a vehicle through which they can legitimate their demands for insulation from external interference.

The approach of the paper is evolutionary. It is based on the records of the police and government interests and analyses the rationalizations and arguments of the municipal politician, the judicial spokesman and the policeman in response to his contemporary environment. The case is of interest since it follows the arguments of a police pressure group through a complete switch in demand. The group at first demanded independence from municipal political control while today it is arguing for increased citizen control at the municipal level in response to a changed structural environment. This change has occurred with no inconsistency in the goal of the association. The paper then concludes with a model of the insulation of special interests in the context of provincial-municipal relations and some suggestions of the significance of the symbols of "rule of law" and "due process" not only to litigants but at least to a protion of the administrative structure of government.

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3L

A B S T R A C T

LAW AND POLICY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - JUDICIAL SCHIZOPHRENIA?

THE PROBLEM

Leo D. Barry (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

The Canadian judiciary has traditionally professed that its only role in statutory interpretation is to apply the policy (projected program of goal values and practices) which the legislature has expressed to be law. For the judiciary to concern itself with the choice of policy would be for it to subvert the communicated command of the sovereign legislature. Such judicial creativity is accordingly, in theory, frowned upon. This concept of "parliamentary supremacy" is apparently consistent with our liberal democratic tradition. It purports to ensure that only those directly accountable to the people, their elected representatives, should prescribe the policy which is to be applied as law. In practice, however, the impact of the concept is blunted by the strategies or methods of interpretation adopted by the judiciary. To a dangerous extent these strategies permit the Courts to usurp the legislative function.

The author will define these judicial strategies, explain how they enable the Courts to usurp the legislative function, and outline their consequences for the legal and political system. He will then offer a solution to the problem. He will propose that the judiciary set themselves the task of examining without advance bias all features of the context relevant to decision and adopt an appropriate framework for the analysis of such context.

PLENARY SESSION JUNE 9th 8:15 p.m.

Rousseau and Contemporary Theories of Radical Democracy

The plenary panel session on Rousseau and radical democracy is intended both to serve as a bridge between members of the discipline primarily concerned with political philosophy and the rest of the discipline, and to address our attention as students of politics to an issue of considerable practical and theoretical significance. It was supposed in establishing the session that the widespread dissent in contemporary universities and society was, of necessity, a matter with which we must concern ourselves, that such dissent when given theoretical voice tended to criticize liberal democratic institutions from the perspective of a kind of "radical democracy", and that those who base their political action upon that notion and we who are generally unconscious heirs of liberal democracy could mutually benefit from a rigorous examination of that notion. Granting these suppositions it made sense to turn to Rousseau who more than any other modern has subjected the assumptions of liberal democratic state and society to a radical re-examination. While differing significantly among themselves, the members of the panel may be said to share an interest in the understanding of Rousseau and in the issues suggested by the notion of radical democracy. It would seem that such is not an accident, that each member of the panel has naturally turned to Rousseau for guidance in grappling with these serious issues. The aim of the discussion is not then to identify the "paternity" of the notion of radical democracy, but rather, through a discussion of that notion focused on the teachings of Rousseau, to transcend assumptions that tend to prevent dialogue where such dialogue is especially necessary.

THE PANEL: Chairman-Discussant: C.B. Macpherson (Toronto)

Allan Bloom (Toronto), D. R. Cameron (Trent)
Marshall Berman (CCNYU), Anne M. Cohler (Chicago)