Political Trust for a New Regime
The Case of Immigrants from Non-Democratic Countries in Canada

Antoine Bilodeau
Neil Nevitte
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

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Abstract

We know remarkably little about how immigrants generally feel about the political institutions of the host-country, and we know even less about whether the experience with repressive and non-democratic countries affects their orientations towards a new host-country. This paper provides a clearer understanding of how immigrants feel about the new host-regime and what are the underpinnings of immigrants' regime support. Immigrants from NDCs exhibit overwhelming confidence in the political institutions of the new host-country. We call this overwhelming confidence on the part of immigrants from NDCs, a honeymoon effect. The honeymoon effect appears to reflect both an abundance of 'specific' and 'diffuse' support. Firstly, the abundance of 'specific' support appears to flow from the fact that immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada are evaluating differently the performance of Canadian institutions. Compared to people born in Canada, immigrants from NDCs are more satisfied with the performance of Canadian institutions, and these more positive evaluations lead them to have greater confidence in the political institutions. Secondly, the analysis shows that immigrants from NDCs exhibit higher levels of confidence than people born in Canada even after controlling for evaluations of institutional performance. This suggests that upon arrival in Canada immigrants from NDCs bring with them a 'reservoir' of diffuse support that is independent of how well or poorly the regime performs.

Political Trust for a New Regime
The Case of Immigrants from Non-Democratic Countries in Canada[1]

New patterns of immigration are profoundly changing the character of most advanced industrial societies. In Canada, the country of origin of immigrants has changed dramatically over the last decades. Between 1960 and 2000, the ratio of immigrants from non-democratic countries (NDCs) versus democratic ones shifted substantially from 1 in 4 to 3 in 4 (Immigration Statistics, CIC). Of the 1,300,000 immigrants who moved to Canada over the last 10 years, approximately 1,000,000 came from non-democratic countries. That same trend is evident, albeit on a more modest scale, in other advanced industrial states (see Ongley and Pearson 1995). And as the birth rate in advanced industrial countries remains very low, it is likely that such countries as Canada and Australia significantly increase the number of immigrants they receive every year to augment present population levels or to achieve growth (Ley 1999; Ley and Hiebert 2001: 45). This trend represents a critical challenge for the host-countries. A central question becomes: 'how do immigrants develop trust in new host-political institutions and governments?' Having lived under non-democratic regimes for several years, can immigrants develop a certain amount of trust in any types of political institutions and governments? This paper investigates these questions.

Important practical implications flow from these questions because political trust plays important functions in maintaining the stability of political regimes. When trust prevails public

authorities have greater capacity to meet commitments and take important decisions (Gamson 1968: 42). In difficult times, when governments require citizens to remain loyal to the regime, trust helps preserve a minimum level of "regime support" necessary for the functioning of the political apparatus (Easton 1975). The role played by political trust takes on a special importance in democratic regimes where governments can hardly use force and violence as much as non-democratic regimes do to obtain citizens' consent (Kornberg and Clarke 1983:3; 1992: 19). If trust must not be too low, it must also not be too high. A certain level of skepticism and distrust is essential to keep an eye on governments and public officials (Almond and Verba 1963; Gamson 1968: 46-48). Thus, unconditional trust in the government and political institutions is not necessarily better than the absence of trust.

The available research on immigrants offers few insights into how immigrants' experiences in a non-democratic country affect their orientations toward democratic institutions. Evidence from research on newly democratic countries may provide some clues. These studies typically show that people in newly democratic countries are skeptical about the democratic institutions of the new regime (Mishler and Rose 1997; 2001; Waldron-Moore 1999). Nonetheless, the situation of immigrants from non-democratic countries is not exactly comparable with that of people in newly democratic countries. In the former case, the host-regime has arguably a long history of democracy whereas emerging regimes are often not fully democratic yet.

[1] This paper is part of a broader project that examines how immigrants from non-democratic countries learn democracy in Canada. See Antoine Bilodeau, *Learning Democracy: Immigrants from Non-democratic countries in Canada* (Doctoral Dissertation – work in progress).

Central to understanding how much trust immigrants from NDCs will exhibit in the institutions of the host-country is the debate about the origin of political trust. Cultural theories of regime support argue that individuals learn political trust early in life; and trust is characterized as exogenous to the political institutions and the regime (Almond and Verba 1963; Easton and Dennis 1967 and 1969; and Eckstein 1966, Inglehart 1990; Waldron-Moore 1999). From this vantage point, political trust is seen as an enduring orientation and reflects what the regime represents for individuals rather than evaluations of what the regime does or does not do. Institutional theories of regime support, by contrast, argue that political trust flows from a rational decision based on evaluations of how well or badly the regime performs at delivering goods (Rogowski 1974; Whitefield and Evans 1999; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001a; Weatherford 1984, 1989). From this perspective, political trust is volatile and reflects current institutional performance. If the regime performs well, political trust is high, but if the regime performs poorly, political trust will be correspondingly low.[2]

These two perspectives produce different expectations. According to the cultural approach, the accumulated experiences of politics in non-democratic countries (NDCs) should predominate and produce immigrants with an enduring distrust and skepticism toward any type of political institutions. Immigrants from NDCs have, quite likely, learned to distrust the political

[2] These two characterizations of the origins of trust, arguably, are somewhat stylized. An important additional comment must be made in describing the two perspectives. Mishler and Rose (1997) argue that the theoretical distinctions between the two perspectives tend to be overdrawn: "Both perspectives conceive of trust as a product of experiences; they differ principally in their time frames. The socialization model emphasizes early or formative experiences, whereas the performance model emphasizes more recent and contemporary experiences." (Mishler and Rose 1997: 434). If we accept Mishler and Rose's experience based characterizations of the cultural and institutional performance approaches, the task now becomes to determine whether "past experiences" in the country of origin, or more recent experiences in the host-country, better explain immigrants from NDCs' levels of confidence.

regime in the country of origin, and if political trust is an enduring orientation, distrust will travel with immigrants in the host-country. The *cultural hypothesis*, then, predicts that immigrants will remain 'haunted' by the accumulated experiences in country of origin under a non-democratic regime, and as a result, they will remain distrustful of governments and political institutions even in a democratic host-political setting. The empirical implication is that immigrants from NDCs should exhibit lower levels of trust than people born in Canada.

The institutional performance hypothesis predicts quite different outcomes. If the levels of trust are based on rational evaluations, then the expectation is that immigrants' levels of political trust will reflect evaluations of the host-regime's performance at delivering goods, services and protection. This second hypothesis, *the institutional performance hypothesis,* argues that the host-regime will be judged for what it does. Experiences accumulated prior to migration will not influence immigrants' orientations with politics in the host-country. Because immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada evaluate the same regime, their evaluations of institutional performance should be approximately the same, and consequently, their levels of political trust should be quite similar.

These stark versions of the cultural and institutional theories, however, may not entirely capture the dynamics of how immigrants from NDCs adjust to new political environments. A third hypothesis is that immigrants from NDCs may grant the host-political institutions with a honeymoon. The literature on electoral behaviours, for example, suggests that newly elected governments usually benefit from a honeymoon (Nadeau 1990; Stimson 1976). Weil suggests that a similar phenomenon may apply to people's evaluations of new regimes (Weil 1989).

Because democracy is novel in immigrants' life, and offers them a new start in life, immigrants from NDCs may grant democracy and its institutions with a honeymoon. The empirical implication of the honeymoon hypothesis is that immigrants from NDCs, at least in the beginning, should exhibit higher levels of confidence in political institutions than people born in Canada.

This paper, which empirically explores which of these three hypotheses best explain immigrants' levels of trust in political institutions of the host-country, is organized into three parts. It starts by describing immigrants from NDCs' levels of political trust upon arrival in Canada and compares it to that of people born in Canada. It then examines whether and how these levels of trust change with the passage of time in Canada. Are they dynamic? And if so, are the dynamics consistent with expectations from any of the three hypotheses. The third section evaluates what explains the similarities or differences in political trust between immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada.

The data used are drawn from two different surveys. First, the 2000 World Values Survey Canada (WVS) and its boosted sub-sample of recent immigrants (New Immigrant Survey -NIS) provide a useful set of recent data. The WVS/NIS provide a representative sample of people born in Canada (N=1551) and of recent immigrants in the three main metropolitan areas in Canada: Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. The sample includes 446 immigrants from non-democratic

countries.[3] Because there have been dramatic changes in the country of origin of Canada's immigrants in the last 40 years, the New Immigrant Survey mostly includes respondents from non-democratic countries. Analyses conducted with the WVS/NIS do not provide information about immigrants from democratic countries.[4] Examining the immigrant population from democratic countries (DCs) is an important step in assessing how pre-migration experiences affect trust in the host-regime. Because immigrants from NDCs and immigrants from DCs have different pre-migration experiences of politics, immigrants from DCs constitute a relevant control-group to assess whether a phenomenon observed is linked to immigration (affect both groups of immigrants) or is linked to pre-migration experiences (affect only immigrants from NDCs). To investigate the immigrant population from DCs, the paper relies on the 1983 Immigrant Survey.

The 1983 Immigrant Survey was conducted at a time when a substantial proportion of immigrants were still coming from democratic countries, and so it is useful because it provides a representative sample of immigrant respondents from both democratic and non-democratic

[3] Immigrants who arrived in Canada before the age of 15 are excluded from the analyses. Socialisation theories claim that a significant amount of political learning occurs early in life. Accordingly, immigrants who left their country of origin before the age of 15 experienced a mixed socialisation: the theory suggests that both their country of origin and their host-country have significantly influenced them. In effect, the levels of confidence of immigrants who arrived in Canada before the age of 15 may resemble more that of the Canadian-born population than that of their fellow nationals. Consequently, including in the analysis immigrants who arrived in Canada before the age of 15 is likely to attenuate differences in political outlooks between immigrants and Canadian-born residents. For that reason, they are excluded from all analyses.

[4] The sample size of this group of respondents would not have yielded reliable results (N= 61). The NIS interviews were conducted in English, French or Chinese. Response rates among people eligible for the survey (i.e. born outside of Canada and in Canada for less than 10 years) are for the NIS, 27% for Montreal, 19% for Toronto, and 18% for Vancouver. The WVS 2000 interviews were conducted in English or French, and the response rate is 46%. The interviews for the 1983 Immigrant Survey were conducted in 6 languages: English, Italian, Portuguese, Greek, Polish, and Croatian.

countries interviewed in the Toronto Metropolitan Area in 1983. The sample consists of 290 non-immigrants and 605 immigrants (328 from democratic countries and 277 from non-democratic countries). The analysis draws primarily on the WVS/NIS data, it relies on the 1983 Immigrants Survey to replicate findings observed with the WVS/NIS among immigrants from DCs.[5]

Immigrants' Levels of Confidence and Trust

The starting point of the analysis is to examine immigrants' levels of political. There are several dimensions of political trust (see Norris 1999). This paper examines confidence in political institutions rather than trust in current government incumbents because it refers more specifically to the political regime (Norris 1999). The WVS/NIS ask respondents: '*I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all:* The government in Ottawa, Political parties, Parliament, the Civil service?" Figure 1 shows that the vast majority of immigrants from NDCs say that they have a 'great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in political institutions of Canada. About 78% of immigrants who have been in Canada for 5 years or less say they have a 'great deal' or 'quite a lot' confidence in the

[5] Immigrant respondents are classified according to the political context in which they have lived for the 15-year period prior to migration using the Freedom in the World Country Rating (Freedom House). The classification compares countries that have democratic political regimes like Canada (classified as 'free') with those that have non-democratic regimes (classified as 'non-free' and 'partially free'). These are broad categories that each includes a variety of political systems with different institutional settings and specific political cultures. The idea is to distinguish countries that are classified as 'completely free' from all the others. The relevant point of comparison here is whether countries have democratic practices or whether they have undemocratic practices. Ideally, countries would be classified in a larger number of categories but increasing the number of categories, even to three categories, would not yield reliable results because of the sample size. The classification of countries is presented in appendix.

government in Ottawa. 81% supply the same answer when asked about the civil service, and 71% for the parliament. The political parties seem to suffer from lower levels of confidence from the immigrants population socialised in non-democratic environment. Only 39% of immigrants from NDCs in Canada for 5 years or less exhibit great confidence in political parties.

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The important finding, however, is not the absolute levels of confidence that immigrants from NDCs exhibit but rather the striking gap between people born in Canada and immigrants from NDCs. Immigrants from NDCs are almost twice likely as people born in Canada to say they have a 'great deal' or 'quite of lot' of confidence for each of the political institutions mentioned above: 78 vs. 39% for the government in Ottawa, 81 vs. 47% for the civil service, 71 vs. 38% for the parliament, and finally 39 vs. 22% for political parties. What explains these substantial differences?

The first step in investigating the origin of these high levels of confidence is to examine whether it is unique to immigrants from NDCs, or whether immigrants from democratic environments also exhibit an overwhelming confidence in the political institutions of their host-country. The 1983 IS to provide information about the immigrant population from democratic countries. The 1983 Immigrant Survey asks respondents: '*Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or disagree with the following statement: Most of the time, we can trust the government to do what is right?*'[6] Again, immigrants from NDCs exhibit greater confidence in the government of host-country than do people born in Canada. 71% of immigrants from NDCs in

[6] This question refers more explicitly to government incumbents rather than the political regime (Norris 1999). But the question is the best available indictor in the 1983 Immigrant Survey.

the country for 5 years or less (compared to 49% of people born in Canada) say that most of time they "trust the government to do what is right". How do immigrants from DCs feel vis-à-vis the government of their host-country? As Figure 1 shows, immigrants from DCs in Canada for 5 years or less occupy the middle ground; 57% agree with the statement. Immigrants from NDCs exhibit greater confidence than do people born in Canada, but also exhibit significantly higher levels of trust than do immigrants from DCs. These findings are consistent with McAllister and Makkai's research (1992: 293) that shows that experiences in non-democratic countries increase levels of political trust of immigrants in the host-country.

Do Levels of Trust Change the Longer Immigrants Live in Canada?

If immigrants from NDCs express greater levels of confidence in the democratic institutions of their host-country than either the Canadian-born population or immigrants from democratic countries, it raised the question: 'do immigrants from NDCs become more, or less, critical of the government and other democratic institutions the longer they live in Canada?'

Figure 1 shows that the opinions of immigrants from NDCs do change substantially with the passage of time. Levels of confidence in the government in Ottawa, the civil service, the parliament, and political parties decline substantially after immigrants have been in Canada for more than 5 years. Even though the decline is substantial, however, immigrants from NDCs still exhibit significantly higher levels of confidence than those found in the Canadian-born population. Confidence in the government in Ottawa drops from 78 to 71% after immigrants have lived 5 years and more in Canada, leaving a 32-point gap with that of the Canadian-born

population. Similarly, levels of confidence among immigrants from NDCs drop from 81, 71, and 39% to respectively 67, 66 and 34% for the civil service, the parliament and political parties.

The data from 1983 Immigrant Survey yields similar results. Levels of trust in the government among immigrants from NDCs decline somewhat after a few years in Canada but remain significantly higher than those of the Canadian-born population. The proportion of immigrants from NDCs who say they "trust the government to do what is right" drops from 71 to 66% after immigrants have lived more than 5 years in Canada, 17 points greater than that of the Canadian-born population.

The WVS/NIS and the 1983 IS provide reliable evidence for a short-term estimation for changes in immigrants' orientations but they provide little evidence for immigrants who have lived in Canada for more than 10 years.[7] Fortunately, some of the items in the Canadian Election Studies (CES) asked questions that were similar to those in the WVS/NIS, and the CES include relatively large samples of immigrants from NDCs who have lived in Canada for 10 years and more. Consequently, it is possible to examine the levels of confidence of immigrants from NDCs after they have lived in Canada for more than 10 years.[8]

[7] In both surveys, the vast majority of immigrant respondents have lived in Canada for less than 10 years.

[8] By combining the 1993, 1997 and 2000 Canadian Elections Studies, we obtain a sample of 262 respondents born in NDCs who have lived in Canada for more than 10 years. The Canadian Elections Studies contain very few immigrant respondents who have lived in Canada for less than 10 years because respondents must be Canadian citizens to be interviewed. Unfortunately, the CES do no provide enough immigrant respondents born in democratic countries to conduct reliable analyses for this group of respondents. The CES also provide a question identical to that of the 1983IS. However, the 1980 and 1984 CES provide only small samples of immigrants, and comparison with more recent CES (1993,1997, 2000) would not yield reliable analyses because of the 10/20-year period that separate the interviews.

The 1993, 1997 and 2000 CES provide two survey-items similar to those of the WVS/NIS that tap on confidence in political institutions: confidence in the government in Ottawa, and confidence in the civil service. The data from the CES provide further support for the hypothesis that the levels of confidence exhibited by immigrants from NDCs decrease with length of residence in Canada and become more alike that of the Canadian-born population. After immigrants from NDCs have lived more than 10 years in Canada, they exhibit levels of confidence in the government and in the civil service that resemble those of people born in Canada. The gaps in confidence in the government in Ottawa and in the civil service are of 4 and 2 points after immigrants from NDCs have lived more than 10 years (CES).[9] The Canadian Election Studies data strongly suggest that the longer immigrants from NDCs live in their host-democratic environment, the more their orientations toward the political institutions come to resemble those of people born in Canada. Immigrants from NDCs appear to become less trustful of the host-political institutions with length of residence in Canada. These findings are consistent with other research (Goldenberg and Saxe 1996; Brown 1981; 1988, Black 1982; 1987) showing that the political outlooks of immigrants come to resemble that of the local population after immigrants have lived a few years in the host-country.[10] What requires explanation, though, is the reason why levels of confidence decline with the passage of time.[11]

[9] There are no statistically differences between immigrants from NDCs in Canada for more than 10 years and people born in Canada (CES sample) even when controlling for SES and year of interview (results not shown).

[10] None of these studies was concerned with trust in government, however.

[11] It is possible that our democratic/non-democratic division is too simplistic and masks variation that might be attributable to the fact that immigrants come from countries that have completely different political realities. The present classification does nothing more than identify those countries that have regimes that are not fully democratic; it does not take into account the possibility that some regimes are more or less democratic. It is possible to classify countries based the democratic status of countries and their regional location and still obtain categories with sample sizes that allow more detailed analyses. For more information on the justification on the 'regional' categories please refer to the Appendix A. This new classification still group

Explaining Confidence in Political Institutions

So far, the data do not provide clear support for either the *cultural* or the *institutional* hypotheses. Upon arrival in Canada, immigrants from NDCs do not exhibit a profound distrust or skepticism in the host political institutions nor do they present a political outlook similar to that of the local population. Rather, immigrants from NDCs exhibit overwhelming confidence and trust in the host political institutions. The findings might be interpreted as reflecting the honeymoon hypothesis, but it is not clear why exactly immigrants from NDCs grant the host-institutions with such a honeymoon. And why would that honeymoon not last after immigrants have lived several years in the host-country?

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together countries with quite different political and cultural realities. This additional analysis is exploratory and aims at identifying potential greater variation in confidence for political institutions. Appendix B shows that there is some regional variation in the levels of confidence and trust. Immigrants from non-democratic countries in the Asia category exhibit the highest levels of confidence for the government in Ottawa, the civil service and politics parties, whereas immigrants from non-democratic countries located on the African continent exhibit the highest levels of confidence for the parliament. Respondents from China provide answers that resemble those of respondents from the Asia category. The exception, though, is for confidence in political parties. On that last item, respondents from China resemble more those from Hong Kong and Taiwan who exhibit lower levels of confidence that resemble those of respondents born in Canada. Respondents from Kong Kong/Taiwan even exhibit lower levels of confidence than do people born in Canada. The data do not allow further analysis for why it so, but a plausible hypothesis is that respondents from China and Kong Kong/Taiwan exhibit lower levels of confidence in political parties because they associate 'political parties' with the Communist Party in China. Overall, respondents born and raised in Hong Kong and Taiwan exhibit levels of confidence resembling more those of respondents from the China and Asia categories than those of people born in Canada. This is an important finding because this group of immigrants is that most likely to have experienced a type of politics closer to that in a democratic regime. Appendix B shows that there is significant variation in the levels of political confidence within the non-democratic grouping, and this shows that our democratic/non-democratic classification is a simplification of reality. But the important finding is that people born and socialised in non-democratic countries, regardless of the specific type of regime, systematically exhibit higher

There are at least four possible explanations for the apparent honeymoon effect. The first explanation is that the higher levels of confidence in political institutions flow from quite positive evaluations of institutional performance. Immigrants from NDCs have experienced very difficult life conditions in the country of origin, conditions that might be substantially more severe than those faced in the host country. This sharp contrast in the conditions in the country of origin and the host-country may lead immigrants from NDCs to evaluate the performance of the host-regime by comparing it to that in the country of origin. The empirical implication of that line of speculation is that immigrants from NDCs may be more tolerant for the ups and downs in the performance of the host-regime, and consequently, may exhibit more positive evaluations of institutional performance than the Canadian-born population. For instance, a rising unemployment rate, a slowdown in economic growth, and a few political scandals may be the source of great dissatisfaction, and distrust, for the Canadian-born population. Immigrants from NDCs may evaluate these events negatively, but less negatively than their Canadian counterpart. Thus immigrants from NDCs evaluate institutional performance more positively than people born in Canada, and then exhibit higher levels of confidence in political institutions.

Research on countries that experience democratization illustrates this first possibility. For example, Mishler and Rose (1997; 2001a) show that in post-communist societies, the primary source of political trust is the evaluation of how well or poorly the new post-communist regime performs. These evaluations, however, are not solely the reflection of how good or bad the new regime is currently performing; past-experiences with the old communist regimes influence evaluations of the current regime by providing a relevant point of comparison. As Mishler and

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levels of confidence and trust (and by a substantial margin) than do people born and raised in democratic countries and in Canada.

Rose (1997; 2001a) suggest, the new regime is judged not only for what it does, but also in comparison to what the old communist regime used to do. The first explanation for the honeymoon period is that the same dynamic holds for immigrants from NDCs in democratic countries.

We call this first explanation, the *comparative performance hypothesis*. It incorporates elements of both the institutional performance and the cultural hypotheses. Evaluations of institutional performance in the host-country exert a direct influence on levels of political trust, but past-experiences in a non-democratic regime exert an indirect influence on political trust by providing immigrants from NDCs with more positive evaluations of institutional performance in the host-country. In short, immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada evaluate differently the Canadian political institutions because they have different points of comparison.

Immigrants from NDCs' higher levels of confidence would moderate with the passage of time because immigrants accumulate new experiences in the host-country. With the passage of time, immigrants from NDCs would stop comparing the performance of Canadian institutions with that of the pre-migration regime, and begin to compare it to how well or poorly the Canadian institutions perform across time. In short, the 'external' point of comparison would lose its relevance as 'internal' points of comparison gain relevance. The empirical implication is that the gap between immigrants from NDCs and other respondents is essentially explained by different evaluations of institutional performance. And the gap in confidence disappears because immigrants develop less positive evaluations of institutional performance with the passage of

time. In David Easton's terminology (Easton 1975), the honeymoon effect reflects an abundance of *specific support* linked to institutional performance.

It is also possible, of course, that the honeymoon effect could reflect support for democracy that is not associated to institutional performance. This second line of speculation suggests that confidence in democracy and its institutions does not flow from what they do, but from what they are and represent (Rose and Mishler 1994). Immigrants from NDCs might grant democracy and its institutions with a 'reservoir' of diffuse support because they are 'Democracy'. Democracy gives immigrants from NDCs a new start in life (Hoskin 1989: 356), and for that reason, immigrants from NDCs grant it high levels of confidence regardless of how well or poorly it performs. With the passage of time, a certain disillusionment or realism might prevail, however, and this would explain why levels of confidence fall. Confidence in political institutions would slowly start to become more sensitive and informed by institutional performance and become less grounded in the 'blind enthusiasm' that flows from the novelty that democracy offers to newcomers.

The empirical implications of this line of reasoning are twofold. Firstly, if immigrants from NDCs' higher levels of confidence are a reaction to the novelty of democracy and are independent of institutional performance, immigrants from NDCs should exhibit higher levels of confidence than people born in Canada even after controlling for evaluations of institutional performance. Secondly, the influence of these evaluations of institutional performance on confidence should increase with the passage of time in the host-country. Finkel, Humpries and Opp (2001) demonstrate that people's structure of regime support changes the longer they

interact with a new regime. They show that if socialist values play a significant role in predicting East Germans' support for democracy in the early period that followed Germany's reunification, its impact decreases substantially after East Germans accumulate several years of experience in the new Germany, and become more reflective of evaluations of institutional performance. In David Easton's terminology (Easton 1975), the second explanation for the honeymoon effect is an abundance of *diffuse support*. Political institutions benefit from a 'boost' of confidence for what they represent, their symbolic value. This explanation might be called the *comparative symbolic hypothesis*.

The third explanation is that the honeymoon effect may reflect the absence of knowledge about the host-political system. The role that information and knowledge play in the formation of opinions and preferences is well documented (Zaller 1992; McClosky and Zaller 1984). Similarly, Easton (1975:437) underlined the role played by knowledge and awareness in specific support for governments and institutions. The empirical implication of that line of speculation is that immigrants from NDCs are more likely to trust the host political institutions because they do not know much about them. The argument is that immigrants' overwhelming confidence is based on either weak or wrong information about the political system. The acquisition of a greater knowledge about the host political system would lead immigrants from NDCs to develop evaluations and levels of trust that resemble those of the Canadian-born population. This hypothesis might be referred to as the *knowledge hypothesis*.

The final hypothesis to consider links immigrants' higher levels of confidence to their specific socio-economic situation in Canada. Newcomers are, more often than not, concentrated

in disadvantaged socio-economic groups in the host-country (Couton 2003; Ley 1999). They have a lower income, more precarious jobs, or even problems finding a job or at least a job that corresponds to their qualifications.[12] Furthermore, immigrants may exhibit lower levels of psychological engagement with the host-country upon arrival in Canada because they have more pressing concerns than politics. Research on political behaviours shows that socio-economic and psychological factors affect levels of political trust (Hetherington 1998; Abramson 1983). Consequently, the specific socio-economic situation of immigrants from NDCs and their levels of psychological engagement may in turn be associated with specific levels of confidence. Finally, immigrants from NDCs' decline of trust may reflect a life cycle effect.

Do any of these hypotheses explain the higher levels of confidence of immigrants from NDCs upon arrival in Canada? And can they account for the decline of confidence with the passage of time in Canada? It is to these questions that we now turn. To simplify the analysis, the four WVS items that measure confidence in political institutions are combined into a single scale that ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 means a very high level of confidence.[13] We use a multi-stage explanatory model in which each block of variables is entered one at a time starting with the most general factors to the most specific ones: 1) the origin, 2) the socio-economic situation, and 3) the institutional performance and the knowledge of politics.[14] What needs to be examined,

[12] Data used for this paper show that immigrant respondents in the 1983IS and the 2000 WVS/NIS compared to Canadian-born respondents do suffer from a disadvantageous socio-economic situation upon arrival in Canada (results not shown).
[13] Merging all 4 indicators results in a loss of about 11% of the immigrant sample and 7% of the sample of people born in Canada. The analyses that follow have also been conducted separately for each of the four items. The results do not differ significantly from those presented in the paper. The standardized alpha coefficients for the 4 items are respectively .81 and .84 for immigrants and people born in Canada.
[14] The model is inspired by Blais et al. (2002) multi-stage model of vote choice.

then, is the impact of each block of variables and their capacity to explain the gap between immigrants from born in Canada.

Confidence in Political Institutions: A Reflection of the Socio-Economic Situation in Canada?

Table 1 (Model 1) shows that the difference in levels of confidence in political institutions between immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada is statistically significant. The data show a .25-point gap upon arrival in Canada between immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada. The data also confirm a slight decline in immigrants levels of confidence with the passage of time. The gap between immigrants from NDCs who have lived in Canada for more than 5 years and people born in Canada is some .22 points. Table 2 (Model 1) also shows that the differences between people born in Canada and immigrants from NDCs at saying that they "trust the government to do what is right" are statistically significant.[15] Notice, however, that Table 2 (Model 1) shows that the difference between immigrants from DCs and people born in Canada is not statistically significant. These findings show that immigrants from NDCs stand apart from other respondents.

INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE

Table 1 (Model 2) shows that there are no systematic socio-economic predictors of confidence in political institutions. The only significant predictor to emerge is interest in politics. Respondents who say that they are interested in politics exhibit higher levels of confidence. But the socio-economic and psychological engagement factors do not explain why immigrants from NDCs exhibit higher levels of confidence in political institutions than people born in Canada.

[15] The variable here is a dummy that equals 1 if respondents agree with the statement and 0 if they disagree.

The gaps between immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada remain the same after controlling for the socio-economic situations and levels of psychological engagement.

The results reported in Table 2 (Model 2) show that age is a significant predictor of trust in government in the 1983 IS. Older respondents are more likely to say that they "trust the government to do what is right". The socio-economic situation of immigrants from NDCs only partly explains why they are more likely to say that they "trust the government to do what is right" (see Table 2). The difference between immigrants from NDCs in Canada for more than 5 years is not significant when the model controls for SES. These findings do not correspond with those of the WVS/NIS; this may be related to the different question wording in the WVS/NIS and the 1983IS. The difference between recent immigrants and people born in Canada remains statistically significant when the model controls for SES. Overall, however, the SES and psychological engagement are not the main source of immigrants from NDCs' higher levels of confidence. The findings also suggest that the decline in immigrants' levels of confidence is not the reflection of life-cycle effect. Age is a positive predictor of trust in government whereas a life-cycle effect would have been associated with age as a negative predictor to account for the decline in trust with the passage of time.

Confidence in Political Institutions: A Reaction to Institutional Performance?

The WVS/NIS contain a series of indicators that measure evaluations of institutional performance. Firstly, respondents were asked whether they were satisfied with the government. Secondly, respondents were asked to evaluate whether democracy is good and efficient at 1) maintaining order, 2) handling the economy and 3) taking decisions and getting things done.

Similarly, respondents were also asked to evaluate whether they were satisfied with the way democracy evolves in Canada.[16] The model also included variables that indicate respondents' life satisfaction and financial satisfaction, a strategy that allows us to isolate effects of government satisfaction from other sources of satisfaction.

The data show that upon arrival in Canada immigrants from NDCs have more positive evaluations of institutional performance than do people born in Canada. Furthermore these evaluations come to resemble those of people born in Canada with the passage of time. Upon arrival in Canada, immigrants from NDCs are more satisfied with the government (.68 vs. .64), with the way democracy evolves (.75 vs. .70), with democracy's capacity at maintaining order (.62 vs. .58), at handling the economy (.67 vs. .59), and at taking decisions (.56 vs. .48).[17] Variables that measure life and financial satisfaction indicate the opposite trend. Upon arrival in Canada, immigrants from NDCs are less satisfied with their life and with their financial situation (.66 vs. .79 and .54 vs. .69). For those last two indicators, however, the gap with people born in Canada narrows with the passage of time (results not shown). What needs to be explored, though, is the question of whether the more positive evaluations of institutional performance in Canada are associated with higher levels of confidence. Table 2 (Model 3) reports the results of the multivariate analyses.

[16] These indicators refer more explicitly to democracy's performance (as a form of political system) than to the government's performance. There is in fact a debate about whether 'satisfaction with democracy' measures support for current authorities or for the regime (See Canache, Mondak and Seligson 2001). These last indicators are nevertheless included in the model. The last four indicators, if they are not measures of government's performance, may be considered as measures of regime performance. The main distinction between the comparative performance and the comparative symbolic hypotheses is that the first one emphasizes support for the regime for what it does, whereas the second one emphasizes support for regime for what it is. Arguably, all the above indicators constitute measures of support for what the regime do.

[17] All variables are on a 0 to 1 scale. See appendix for description of variables.

Satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with the government are the two strongest predictors of confidence in political institutions. Respondents who are satisfied with the way democracy evolves in Canada and with the way the federal government handles public affairs exhibit higher levels of confidence in political institutions than other respondents. The findings are clear. Respondents who say that democracy is efficient at getting things done also exhibit higher levels of confidence in political institutions than other respondents; the impact is relatively small, however, compared to that of satisfaction with democracy and with government's performance. Evaluations of democracy's performance at handling the economy and maintaining order do not appear to be significant predictors of confidence in political institutions, nor are the variables concerning satisfaction with life and financial satisfaction. These findings are consistent with research demonstrating that regime support reflects institutional performance (Rogowski 1974; Whitefield and Evans 1999; Weatherford 1984, 1989).

The coefficients that measure gaps between immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada decrease substantially when the model controls for evaluations of institutional performance (from .25 to .11 points, and from .22 to .10 points). This suggests that part of the explanation for immigrants from NDCs' higher levels of confidence is that they evaluate the performance of Canadian institutions differently and more positively than people born in Canada. Arguably, these findings are consistent with Mishler and Rose's (1997) hypothesis of a comparative dynamic, and they support our comparative performance hypothesis.

The failure of institutional performance indicators to fully account for the gap between immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada also lends support for the comparative symbolic hypothesis. Immigrants from NDCs appear to grant political institutions with a certain 'boost' of confidence that is independent of institutional performance. Arguably, this 'boost' of confidence might be attributable to the novelty of democracy. The comparative symbolic hypothesis also suggests that confidence will become more and more a reflection of institutional performance with the passage of time. This possibility needs to be explored.[18]

Changes in the Sources of Confidence

To verify for possible changes in the sources of political confidence, the analysis unpacks the respondent pool into three subgroups. Separate analyses are conducted for 1) immigrants from NDCs in Canada for 5 years or less, 2) for immigrants from NDCs in Canada for more than 5 years, and 3) for people born in Canada. The goal is to verify whether the strength of the relationship for some variables changes with length of residence, and the analysis for people born in Canada serves as the benchmark point of comparison.

As the data reported in Table 3 show, there are significant changes for the impact of satisfaction with the government. The coefficient for 'satisfaction with the government' increases from .48 to .71 after immigrants from NDCs have lived more than 5 years in Canada. This suggests that immigrants from NDCs who have lived in the country for more than 5 years are more sensitive to government's performance than those who have been in Canada for 5 years or less. A change in the evaluation of the government's performance will produce a greater change

[18] The impact of evaluation of institutional performance cannot be tested with the 1983 Immigrant Survey because it does not include the appropriate indicators.

in levels of confidence for immigrants from NDCs in the country for more than 5 years than for those in the country for 5 years and less.[19] The impact of the other variables does not appear to change significantly with the passage of time in Canada. The only exception is education, although precisely why the impact of education decreases is not clear.

The comparison of those findings with those that come from analysis of people born in Canada yields intriguing results. Upon arrival in Canada, the coefficient for the impact of satisfaction with the government for immigrants from NDCs resembles that of people born in Canada (the coefficient for people born in Canada is .45 and that for immigrants from NDCs is 48). The impact of satisfaction with government becomes greater, however, for immigrants from NDCs after they have lived more than 5 years in Canada (the coefficient rises to .71). It is difficult to explain why the impact of satisfaction with the government become a stronger predictor of confidence in political institutions among immigrants from NDCs than people born in Canada with the passage of time.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The findings suggest that there are some transformations in the sources of confidence in political institutions. The impact of satisfaction with institutional performance increases with length of residence, and suggests that support for the host-political institutions becomes more

[19] Additional analyses show the same results for different specification of length of residence. When divided in three groups instead of 2 (1-2 years, 3-5 years and 6-9 years) the coefficient for satisfaction with the government increases from .45 to .55 to .73.

'specific' (less 'diffuse') with the passage of time in Canada. These results support Finkel et al.'s (2001) findings and lend greater support for the comparative symbolic hypothesis.[20]

Confidence in Political Institutions: A Lack of Knowledge about the Host Country?

None of the above findings take into account the potential role that knowledge might have in shaping immigrants relatively high levels of confidence in political institutions. What appears to be a honeymoon might simply reflect an unwarranted optimism that is grounded in a lack of knowledge about the host-political system. This hypothesis cannot be examined directly with the WVS/NIS because these surveys do not have indicators measuring respondents' level of political knowledge. But we can explore this question by turning to the 1983 Immigrant Survey. The 1983 IS includes a series of questions that measures respondents' knowledge of Canadian politics.[21] Upon arrival in Canada, both immigrants from NDCs and immigrants from DCs appear to suffer from Canadian politics knowledge deficit when compared to people born in Canada, and the lack of knowledge is more severe among immigrants from NDCs. Upon arrival in Canada, more than 32% of immigrants from NDCs fail to provide one correct answer to five factual questions about Canadian politics, and 20% of immigrants from DCs do so. By contrast, that proportion is less than 2% for people born in Canada. The picture is the exact opposite if we compare the proportions of respondents who provide correct answers to all 5 questions: only 1% of immigrants from NDCs, about 7% of immigrants from DCs, and 30% of people born in

[20] Table 3 also suggests that the decline in political confidence among immigrants with the passage of time in Canada is not due to a life cycle effect. Age is not a significant predictor of confidence within each sub-group of length of residence. Nor is there a life cycle effect among people born in Canada. On opposite, Table 2 suggests that there might be a life cycle effect for trust in government. The effect, however, is positive and that does not match with the decline of trust with the length of residence. The life cycle explanation does not appear to be a compelling explanation for immigrants from NDCs declining levels of confidence with the passage of time in Canada.

Canada. There is a significant knowledge gain, however, the longer immigrants live in the country. After immigrants have lived more than 5 years in Canada, the proportion of those from NDCs who answer all 5 questions correctly jumps from 1 to 16%, and that of immigrants from DCs jumps from 7 to 20%. Despite these major increases in immigrants' knowledge of Canadian politics, immigrants' knowledge levels are still significantly lower than those of people born in the country. But do these lower levels of knowledge explain the gap and the decline in political trust? The empirical strategy is to explore whether the difference in trust in government between immigrants from NDcs and people born in Canada remains statistically significant when the model controls for knowledge of Canadian politics.

Table 2 (Model 3) shows that respondents with a greater knowledge of Canadian politics have levels of trust similar to that of respondents with less knowledge.[22] Not surprisingly, then, knowledge of Canadian politics cannot explain the gap in trust in government between immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada (the coefficient for the difference between recent immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada decreases from .99 to .85) when knowledge is included. Immigrants from NDCs still exhibit higher levels of trust in government than do other respondents after controlling for socio-economic situations and levels of knowledge.[23] These findings suggest that the decline in trust and confidence with the passage of

[21] See appendix for the list of questions asked.
[22] Additional analyses show similar findings with the 1997 and 2000 Canadian Election Studies: knowledge of Canadian political is not a significant predictor of confidence in political institutions (results not shown).
[23] It is possible that knowledge of politics is a significant predictor only for immigrants from NDCs. This possibility must be discarded, however. Additional analyses show that knowledge is not a significant predictor for any of the three groups of respondents (immigrants from NDCs, immigrants from DCs, and people born in Canada); nor does the impact of knowledge changes with length of residence in Canada (results not shown).

time in Canada is not related to the acquisition by NDCs of a greater knowledge of the host-institutions.

The essential findings that emerges from these analyses is that the most plausible hypotheses for explaining NDCs overwhelming confidence and its decline with the passage of time in Canada are the comparative performance hypothesis and the comparative symbolic hypothesis.

Conclusion

We know remarkably little about how immigrants generally feel about the political institutions of the host-country, and we know even less about whether the experience with repressive and non-democratic countries affects their orientations towards a new host-country. This is surprising given the importance of immigration to Canada's development. We know also little about how people develop confidence for a new regime late in adulthood. It is even more surprising given the important legitimization and stabilizing role that orientations such as political trust play for political systems. This paper provides a clearer understanding of how immigrants feel about the new host-regime and what are the underpinnings of immigrants' regime support.

Immigrants who have experienced non-democratic regimes clearly do not remain 'haunted' with the memories accumulated in the country of origin. Immigrants from NDCs exhibit overwhelming confidence in the political institutions of the new host-country, and that trend is not observed among immigrants from democratic countries. We call this overwhelming

confidence on the part of immigrants from NDCs, a honeymoon effect. These findings support other research that shows that new governments (Nadeau 1990; Stimson 1976) and new regimes (Weil 1989) benefit from such honeymoon effects.

The honeymoon effect appears to reflect both an abundance of 'specific' and 'diffuse' support. Firstly, the abundance of 'specific' support appears to flow from the fact that immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada are evaluating differently the performance of Canadian institutions. Compared to people born in Canada, immigrants from NDCs are more satisfied with the performance of Canadian institutions, and these more positive evaluations lead them to have greater confidence in the political institutions. Secondly, the analysis shows that immigrants from NDCs exhibit higher levels of confidence than people born in Canada even after controlling for evaluations of institutional performance. This suggests that upon arrival in Canada immigrants from NDCs bring with them a 'reservoir' of diffuse support that is independent of how well or poorly the regime performs.

Contrary to what research on that emphasizes the role of knowledge in the formation of public opinions shows (Zaller 1992), the analysis suggests that factual knowledge about the host-environment plays no significant role in immigrants' process of developing political trust in the host-political institutions. Immigrants who knew more about the host-democratic environment did not exhibit higher or lower levels of confidence than those who knew little.

But the evidence is also that the honeymoons do not last. After 10 years in the host-country, there are no significant differences between levels of confidence of immigrants from NDCs and people born in Canada. The structure of the relationships of immigrants from NDCs

with the host-institutions also changes with the passage of time. The analysis suggests that confidence in political institutions undergo transformation to become less 'diffuse' and more 'specific' with the passage of time in Canada. These findings support research that shows that people's support become more sensitive to institutional performance with the passage of time (Finkel, Humpries, and Opp 2001:341). To sum up, the findings suggest that gap in confidence between people born in Canada and immigrants from NDCs narrows the longer immigrants live in Canada because 1) immigrants' evaluations of institutional become less positive, 2) and support become more 'specific' and less 'diffuse'.

The most plausible explanation for this honeymoon effect lies in the experience of immigrants with non-democratic regimes. Firstly, as Mishler and Rose (1997) argue, the institutions of the new regime (or in this case the host-regime) appear to be judged not solely on their own performance. Rather, they may be judged in comparison to the old regime. We call this an indirect effect of pre-migration experiences. Experiences in non-democratic countries lead immigrants from NDCs to evaluate democracy and governments' performance differently, and more positively, and these more positive evaluations then lead immigrants from NDCs to exhibit higher levels of confidence. Secondly, democracy offers a 'new beginning' or a 'second chance' to immigrants from NDCs. The host-regime is judged not for what it does, but for what it 'is' and 'represents'. We call this a direct effect of pre-migration experiences. It is not possible to directly show the impact of the pre-migration experiences in non-democratic countries. Nevertheless, because only immigrants from NDCs exhibit a different political outlook (and not immigrants from DCs) it suggests that what happened prior to migration significantly affect immigrants.

The cultural and institutional theories of regime support appear inadequate for understanding how immigrants from NDCs' develop confidence for the host and new regime. Immigrants from NDCs' levels of confidence are not solely the reflection of what happened prior to migration or reflection of the performance of Canadian institutions. Rose and McAllsiter's (1990) life-time learning model, according to which people's political outlook is a reflection of past and current experiences, is of greater help to explain immigrants' from NDCs levels of confidence. Immigrants' levels of confidence appear to be shaped by the interaction of both past and current experiences. Arguably, with the passage of time, the accumulation of new experiences in the host political system have the effect of reducing substantially the impact of experiences accumulated prior to migration, to the point that the political outlooks of immigrants from NDCs come to be indistinguishable from that of people born in Canada.

Figure 1. Confidence in Political Institutions of the Host-Country



2000 WVS/NIS (Canada) and 1993/1997/2000 Canadian Election Studies. Question wording: For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much confidence , or none at all?
1983 Immigrant Survey. Question wording: Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or disagree with the following statement: Most of the time, we can trust the government to do what is right?

Table 1. Confidence in Political Institutions – WVS/NIS

	CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS								
	MODEL 1 ORIGIN			MODEL 2 ORIGIN+SES			MODEL 3 ORIGIN+SES+ INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE		
	B	**SE**		**B**	**SE**		**B**	**SE**	
Immigrants from NDCs									
(People born in Canada**)**									
In Canada for 5 years and less	.25	.03	***	.25	.03	***	.11	.03	***
In Canada for more than 5 years	.22	.04	***	.22	.04	***	.10	.03	***
Immigrants from DCs									
In Canada for 5 years and less	N.a			N.a			N.a		
In Canada for more than 5 years	N.a			N.a			N.a		
Socio-Economic Situation									
Age				.00	.00		.00	.00	
Income				.00	.00		.00	.00	
Employed				-.02	.03		-.02	.02	
Education				.01	.02		.00	.02	
Female				.00	.02		.00	.02	
Interest in politics				.17	.03	***	.13	.03	***
Evaluation of Institutional Performance									
Democracy is good at:									
Maintaining order							-.07	.04	
Handling the economy							.01	.04	
Taking decisions							.10	.04	**
Satisfaction with the way democracy evolves in Canada							.28	.04	***
Satisfaction with the government							.47	.04	***
Financial Satisfaction							.01	.00	
Life Satisfaction							.00	.01	
Constant	.37	.01	***	.29	.06	***	-.06	.07	***
N	1450			1450			1450		
Adjusted R^2	.07			.09			.27		

Source: 2000 World Values Survey/ 2000 New Immigrant Survey

*** p<.01; ** p<.05 ;* p<.10 Unstandardized OLS estimates are reported.

Table 2. Trust in Government – 1983 Immigrant Survey

	TRUST THE GOVERNMENT TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT								
	MODEL 1 ORIGIN			MODEL 2 ORIGIN+SES			MODEL 3 ORIGIN+SES+ Knowledge of Canadian politics		
	B	SE		B	SE		B	SE	
Immigrants from NDCs									
(People born in Canada**)**									
In Canada for 5 years and less	1.05	.23	***	.99	.24	***	.85	.26	***
In Canada for more than 5 years	.73	.22	***	.45	.25		.38	.25	
Immigrants from DCs									
In Canada for 5 years and less	.25	.25		.25	.26		.18	.26	
In Canada for more than 5 years	-.14	.20		-.32	.22		-.37	.22	*
Socio-Economic Situation									
Age				.01	.01	**	.01	.01	**
Income				-.03	.23		.01	.24	
Employed				-.23	.18		-.23	.18	
Education				-.68	.43		-.57	.43	
Female				-.04	.15		-.09	.16	
Interest in politics				-.03	.26		.07	.27	
Knowledge of Canadian Politics							-.40	.31	
Constant	-.05	.12		.30	.47		.39	.48	
N	775			775			775		
Pseudo R^2 (Cox & Snell)	.05			.06			.06		

Source: 1983 Immigrant Survey

*** p<.01; ** p<.05 ;* p<.10 Logit estimates are reported.

Table 3. Confidence in Political Institutions – WVS/NIS

	CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS								
	Immigrants from NDC (5 yrs and less)			Immigrants from NDC (more than 5 yrs)			People born in Canada		
	B	**SE**		**B**	**SE**		**B**	**SE**	
Socio-Economic Situation									
Age	.00	.00		.00	.00		.00	.00	
Income	-.01	.01		.00	.02		.00	.00	
Employed	-.03	.05		-.06	.09		-.01	.03	
Education	.18	.07	**	.02	.09		-.01	.02	
Female	.02	.05		-.06	.06		.00	.02	
Interest in politics	.03	.08		.12	.12		.14	.03	***
Evaluation of Institutional Performance									
Democracy is good at									
Maintaining order	-.09	.10		-.19	.15		-.04	.05	
Handling the economy	.03	.11		-.06	.15		-.01	.05	
Taking decisions	.08	.12		.11	.17		.11	.05	*
Satisfaction with the way democracy evolves in Canada	.35	.13	***	.31	.15	**	.26	.04	***
Satisfaction with the government	.48	.15	***	.71	.19	***	.45	.04	***
Financial Satisfaction	.02	.01		-.01	.02		.00	.01	
Life Satisfaction	-.01	.01		-.01	.02		.00	.01	
Constant	-.44	.26	*	.32	.28		-.07	.07	
N		197			103			1155	
Adjusted R^2		.19			.26			.22	

Source: 2000 World Values Survey/ 2000 New Immigrant Survey
*** p<.01; ** p<.05 ;* p<.10 Unstandardized OLS estimates are reported.

Appendix A. Classification of Immigrants

2000 World Values Survey / New Immigrant Survey

Non-Democratic Countries				People born in Canada
	(N)		(N)	
Eastern Europe		**Africa**		
Bosnia	5	South Africa	1	
Latvia	3	Rwanda	2	
Yugoslavia	12	Ghana	3	
Romania	16	Nigeria	5	
Russia	18	Morocco	9	
Ukraine	11	Cameroon	2	
Armenia	9	Tunisia	6	
Belarus	1	Algeria	6	
Kosovo	1	Cote d'Ivoire	2	
Estonia	13	Gabon	1	
Serbia	3	Togo	1	
Albania	3	Chad	3	
Bulgaria	1	Tanzania	1	
Belarus	2	Gambia	1	
	97	Egypt	3	
Asia		Guinea	1	
Korea	5	Senegal	1	
Bangladesh	14		**46**	
Philippines	12	**South/Central America**		
Pakistan	23	Haiti	1	
Vietnam	1	Peru	1	
Sri Lanka	26	Paraguay	1	
Nepal	2	Guyana	1	
Malaysia	5	El Salvador	1	
Indonesia	4		**5**	
Kazakhstan	**3**			
Tibet	1	**Middle-East**		
Afghanistan	2	Lebanon	9	
	97	Iran	2	
		Jordan	1	
China	**97**	Syria	2	
		State of Bahrain	1	
Hong Kong/Taiwan		Kuwait	2	
Hong Kong	46	Turkey	2	
Taiwan	19		**19**	
	65			
Total:		**446**		**1551**

1983 Immigrant Survey

Non-Democratic Countries	(N)	Democratic Countries	(N)	People born in Canada
Southern Europe		**United Kingdom**		
Greece	12	United Kingdom	96	
Italy	26	Ireland	11	
Spain	3		**107**	
Portugal	66	**Western Europe**		
	107	France	2	
Eastern Europe		Germany	2	
Germany	2	Holland	3	
Hungary	8	Italy	10	
Poland	86	Austria	1	
Russia	11	Denmark	1	
Yugoslavia	21	Norway	0	
Czech/Slovakia	10	Switzerland	2	
Ukraine	5	Belgium	1	
Bulgarian	2		**21**	
Romania	4			
Lithuania	2	**United States**	**9**	
Estonia	2			
Latvia	5	**British Isles**		
East-Germany	19	India	1	
	175	Barbados	7	
South America		Trinidad	49	
Dominica	2	Jamaica	79	
Chile	3	Australia	4	
Grenada	2		**140**	
Guyana	29			
Brazil	4			
	40			
Middle-East				
Pakistan	4			
Morocco	1			
Indonesia	1			
	6			
Africa				
Mozambique	1			
South Africa	2			
Zimbabwe	1			
	4			
Total:	**328**		**277**	**290**

Appendix B. Confidence in the Political Institutions of Host-Country by Regions



2000 WVS/NIS (Canada) . Question wording: For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much confidence , or none at all?
1983 Immigrant Survey. Question wording: Do uou strongly agree, agree, disagree, or disagree with the following statement: (1) Most of the time, we can trust the government to do what is right?

Appendix C. Description of Variables

Knowledge of Canadian Politics (1983 IS)
The variable measures the number of correct answers to the 5 following questions:

1. Which political party has the most members in the federal parliament? (A: Liberal)

2. Who is the Premier of Alberta? (A: Lougheed)
3. Which level of government is responsible for educational matters? (A: Provincial)
4. Who was John A. MacDonald? (A: First Prime Minister)
5. Which political party is in power provincially in British Columbia? (A: Social Credit)

Confidence in Political Institutions (WVS/NIS)
Question wording: "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all: The government in Ottawa, the parliament, the civil service, political parties?"

In Figure 1, the variables equal 1 for respondents who say they have a great deal of confidence or quite a lot of confidence, and equal 0 for respondents who say they have not very much or none at all. For other analyses, the variable ranges from 0 to 1 and equals 1 when respondents say they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence for each of the 4 institutions, and equal 0 for respondents who say they have not very much or none at all confidence for all 4 institutions.

Trust in Government (1983 IS)
Question wording: "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or disagree with the following statement: Most of the time, we can trust the government to do what is right?"
The variable equals 1 for respondents who strongly agree or agree with the statement, and equals 0 for those who strongly disagree or disagree.

Evaluations of Institutional Performance (WVS/NIS)
Life satisfaction
Question wording. "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card where 1 means dissatisfied and 10 means satisfied to help with your answer."
The variable has been transformed on a 0 to 1 scale.

Satisfaction with Democracy
Question wording: "On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?" The variable is a scale that equals 1 for respondents who say they are very satisfied and equals 0 for those not at all satisfied.

Performance of Democracy
Question wording: "I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them:

1) In democracy, the economic system runs badly?
2) Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling
3) Democracies aren't good at maintaining order
4) Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government

Satisfaction with the Government
Question wording: "How satisfied are you with the way the people now in **the federal government** are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?"
The variable is a scale that equals 1 for respondents who say they are very satisfied and equals 0 for those not at all satisfied.

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