

**Why Nationalism Succeeds or Fails:
A Boolean Test of Major Hypotheses
in Greece and Turkey (1983-2003)**

By

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Abstract

The primary focus of this article is the study of majorities in times of crises, particularly of contentious episodes of majority nationalism in Greece or Turkey (1983-2003) tested with the Boolean method. Majority nationalism is defined here as the process of enticing collective activity or tolerance on the part of a majority group in order to serve its ethnopolitical objectives. Unlike minorities whose goals often include the creation of a new state, majorities manifest national feelings in the maintenance of an already achieved state sovereignty, the protection of ethnic kin elsewhere, and the safeguard of national culture. While most of the literature in the study of contentious ethnic politics deals with the study of movements oppositional to the state (e.g. by secessionist minorities), there are very few studies of state policies and social movements that support the objectives of dominant majority groups. In addition, despite the presence of a wide range of alternative perspectives on ethnic mobilization, testing competing hypotheses using comparable cases has been extremely rare. The topic of majority nationalism offers the opportunity to compare and contrast competing perspectives that generate determinant and testable propositions grounded on domestic politics (diversionary theory of war) or external threats (security dilemma). Using Boolean analysis, I check these perspectives against a set of event data/crises involving either Greece or Turkey, or both from 1983 to 2003. I have used retrieval databases, such as Lexis/Nexis, Dow Jones, and FBIS for the collection of my data, as well as my fieldwork interviews, and local newspapers from both Greek and Turkish sources. In spite of a number of important limitations, the Boolean method allows for testing competing hypotheses to illustrate whether they are qualitatively true or false, or whether they result in a large number of contradictions.

The Dog that Barked but did not Bite:

In early 2003, the villagers of northern Cyprus had every reason to laugh at nationalists in Turkey. Decades after the partition of Cyprus into "Greek" and "Turkish" enclaves, a large number of Turkish Cypriots became unwilling to tolerate mainland Turkish colonization, backing of local cronies, and the intransigence of their official leadership in negotiations. The Turkish Cypriot residents of Doganci (Elya in Greek) were the first to light a big fire in the middle of the village square, an anti-nationalist symbol of hope for the quick reunification of the island of Cyprus and its people. On a rainy January night, the news that a nationalist rally in Istanbul failed to attract more than 1,000 people, made the Turkish Cypriot villagers beam. It was hard for them to hide their amusement since the spontaneous pro-peace mobilization of a tiny Turkish Cypriot village was thought to outnumber the Turkish nationalist rally in a city of more than ten million inhabitants.¹ Moreover, only a week before, a spectacular pro-peace gathering of more than 60,000 Turkish Cypriots in divided Nicosia revealed how distant the approaches of Ankara and its island representatives were to those of the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Cyprus, and both Ankara and the local hardliner leadership of Rauf Denktas were exposed to the scrutiny of the international community. Thus, years of nationalist propaganda inside and outside Cyprus were smashed by the will of the Turkish Cypriot people. It was also reported that the American mediator and ambassador had attended the rally, and this eventually made headlines in major international newspapers.

¹ Up to 70, 000 people participated in one of the rallies see, "Rival Cypriot Leaders Discuss U.N. Plan to Heal Island's Split," *Toronto Star*, January 16, 2003; "Rally Shows Turkish Cypriots Want Settlement Based on UN Plan," *Agence France Presse*, US envoy January 16, 2003; "KKTC Rally Demonstrates Dangerous Polarization," *Turkish Daily News*, December 28, 2002. For pictures of these and other

The hardliners had every reason to seek legitimacy through nationalist protests, and they did try hard, both in Cyprus and in Turkey to mobilize public support against the UN initiative to reunite Cyprus. That was their only hope to justify the hardline policies of the Turkish political establishment, local interests in Cyprus, and the powerful Turkish military. To this end, the language of victimization was trotted out again, reminding the Turkish public how brutally the Greek Cypriots treated Turks before 1974, how heroically the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey resisted, and how the current UN initiative would displace up to 100,000 Turkish Cypriots.² Yet the public in Turkey stayed apathetic, unwilling to mobilize and to support the proposed confrontational policies over the Cyprus issue.³ Instead the Turkish crisis rhetoric in Cyprus eventually gave way to confidence building measures as well as pro-peace initiatives among different segments of the Eastern Mediterranean societies involved in the Cyprus conflict.

Introduction:

In this article, I offer an account of why nationalism, and more specifically dominant majority nationalisms, succeed or fail.⁴ In other words, why certain nationalist discourses

demonstrations, including a violent crackdown of these activities by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, see <http://www.yenicag-net.com/haber/d/250303/>.

² A large number of the current inhabitants of northern Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots and settlers) 63,000 or less will have to relocate in order to make space for more than half of the current Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their former homes and properties. In return, the Turkish Cypriots will receive a constituent state status within a reunited Cyprus, an effective participation in the central government, a disproportionate to their size control of territory and seacoast, and more importantly accession to the EU.

³ “Low turnout reported at support rally for Turkish Cypriot leader in Turkey,” TRT 2 television, BBC Monitoring, Ankara, in Turkish 1400 gmt 2 Feb 03/BBC. Monitoring/(c) BBC, 02/02/2003

⁴ Dominant majority nationalism is defined as the process of enticing collective activity on the part of a majority group, or those who claim to represent it, for the ethnopolitical objectives of the group. I use the term dominant majorities (or majority groups) for those politically dominant groups in a sovereign state. Nationalist mobilizations headed by organizations such as the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), the KLA (Kosova Liberation Army), and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) are not majority mobilizations, since their objective has been the development a new state. On the other hand, the non-state-seeking nationalist protest of the Greek and Turkish publics in the 1990s, in their respective countries, fit

resonate among the public while other discourses such as the latest mobilization efforts against the Annan plan in Turkey have failed do so. Both dominant majority nationalism and the variations in the response of majorities in crisis are seen as a puzzle.⁵ Theories of ethnic mobilization which rely on single factor explanations such as group status, relative (or actual or unexpected) deprivation, fear, and repression, offer no explanation of why these majorities protest. The majorities I examine below are in a more advantageous position than their ethnic antagonists; they are militarily secure and often lack easily recognizable grievances since their dominant position has long been established. In general, dominant majorities are not usually subject to political marginalization, intense insecurity, and other factors commonly associated with mobilization of nationalist sentiment. Nor do these majorities experience the daily repression suffered by some minority groups. Unlike repressed minorities, whose only alternative is contention, dominant majorities have by definition a voice, and therefore political and institutional alternatives to ethnic nationalist action.

In the analysis of 29 events from Greece and Turkey since 1983, I examine the attitudes of politically dominant majorities during times of crises. I focus on public response to nationalism among majorities involving at least one of the two countries (Greece or Turkey, or both).⁶ In some of these events, majorities have ignored nationalist

within the category. To fit the category of dominant majority a group should be both politically and numerically dominant.

⁵ In his 1957 article, Morgenthau defines [majority (specifically new majority)] nationalism as a paradox: “The paradox of B invoking the principles of nationalism against A and denying them to C both for the sake of its own survival...;” and, “If the peoples of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia could invoke these [nationalist] principles against Turkey, why could not the people of Macedonia invoke them against Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia?” Morgenthau explains this paradox by pointing out that the limits of national liberation are not determined by the logic of nationalism but by the configurations of interest and power between the rulers and the ruled and between competing nations. See Morgenthau Hans, “The Paradoxes of Nationalism,” *The Yale Review* 46,4 (1957): 781-797.

⁶The events selected from Greece and Turkey provide the data for the study of the paradoxes of majority nationalism. As has been noted, first the non-state-seeking nationalist protest of Greeks and Turks in the

discourses, while in others they have embraced nationalism in one form or another. While conducting my research on this topic, I was intrigued by two majority nationalism events: the Greek mobilization over the Macedonian issue in 1992 and the Turkish mobilization over the Ocalan issue in 1998, both of which drew the support of more than a million people in rallies, petitions, informal boycotts, and support for nationalist parties. For instance in 1992, in the northern Greek city of Thessaloniki, approximately a million Greeks (almost half of the city's inhabitants) attended a rally aimed at defending the exclusive right of the Greek nation to use the name and the symbols of ancient Macedonia.

Why Greece and Turkey:

The key reason for using these two countries as case studies is the presence of ongoing contention in the area. Subsequent crises can help to confirm or refute my current findings, particularly whether my explanatory variables could explain or even predict the outcome of interest. This is particularly important for testing my theoretical perspectives, as critics have expressed a concern with the development of models based on not-so-easily-operationalized paradigms, which often tend to be poor in analytical or predictive value, as well as tautological by nature. Because the explanatory variables I test below are often multifaceted and subject to multiple interpretations, they can be easily manipulated in a post-event situation, according to the critiques of established scholars in

90s fits within the category of majority nationalism. On at least two occasions, namely the Macedonian issue (Greece 1993) and the Ocalan extradition crisis (Turkey 1998), more than a million people participated in nationalist protests. The manifestation of nationalist protest was similar despite the differences in the background settings. Second, Greece and Turkey offer a rich pool of low and high nationalist contention. Out of my data, one can identify a wide spectrum of values in both my independent and dependent variables.

the field.⁷ Thus, a rigorous research design, which takes into consideration the presence of future cases and the necessity to account for these, might prevent the development of a tautological explanation.

Unlike the Eastern Mediterranean, areas such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which receive much current attention, are not ideal for this type of design. On the one hand, because of the rapid decline of contention in these societies and the major shifts in background conditions, it is impossible to test our hypothesis in forthcoming crises. On the other hand, the ongoing nationalist contention in Greece and Turkey offers the opportunity to develop a theory that can be tested in forthcoming crises. For the coming years, scholars have predicted a number of crises: the Cyprus-EU accession process, the future of North Iraqi Kurds, and the possible refusal of the EU to grant a negotiation date to Turkey.⁸ The significance of all these issues to both EU and US foreign policy priorities makes the topic intriguing for a wide audience, including non-experts in the region or in the Boolean method I use below in order to analyze my data.

In Table I below, titled “Event Crisis Short Descriptions,” I summarize each crisis involving Greece or Turkey since 1983.

Table I: Event Crisis Short Descriptions

Event Crisis	Description of the Event Crisis
Cyprus83 (G)	Greek reactions to the unilateral declaration of an independent Turkish republic in the northern part of Cyprus supported and recognized only by Turkey since 1983.

⁷ James Fearon and David Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Identity,” *International Organization* 54, 4 (2000): 845-877.

⁸ Henri J. Barkey and Philip H. Gordon, “Cyprus: The predictable Crisis,” *The National Interest* 66 (2001/02).

Aegean87 (G)	Greek reactions to the dispute with Turkey over territorial waters and oil exploration in the Aegean that almost led to a war in 1987.
Albania90 (G)	Greek reactions to human rights violations of Greek minority in Albania. Killings reported in 1990.
Thrace90 (G)	Greek reactions to perceived secessionist moves orchestrated by Turkish MPs in Western Thrace.
Macedonia92(G)	Greek reactions to the use of the name Macedonia and the symbols of the ancient Macedonian Empire by the Macedonian Republic.
Albania94 (G)	Greek reactions to continuous imprisonment of Greek minority activists in Albania in 1994.
Thrace92-95 (G)	Greek reactions to several incidents in Thrace in the period 1992-95.
Macedonia 94 (G)	Greek reactions to the Macedonian issue leading to an embargo against the Macedonian republic in 1994.
Macedonia95 (G)	Greek reactions to the Interim settlement between Greece and the Macedonian Republic in 1995.
Cyprus96 (G)	Greek reactions to the assassination of Greek Cypriot demonstrators by members of the Turkish security and paramilitaries in 1996.
Aegean 96 (G)	Greek reactions to the dispute with Turkey over the Imia-Kardak islets in 1996.
Cyprus98 (G)	Greek reactions to a Turkish <i>casus belli</i> in Cyprus over the deployment of Russian S-300 missiles in the island. Crisis ends in 1998 with no deployment.
Minorities 00 (G)	Greek reactions to a government policy to recognize informally ethnic minorities (George Papandreou statement).
Cyprus02 (G)	Greek reactions to Turkish threat to annex northern part of Cyprus and over grievances related to the peace process and the UN plan.
Cyprus83 (T)	Turkish reactions to the situation in Cyprus resulting to declaration of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in 1983.
Bulgaria89 (T)	Turkish reactions to the violations of human rights of Bulgarian Turks resulting to the exodus of more than 300, 000 Turkish refugees to Turkey in 1989.
Aegean87 (T)	Turkish reactions to the Aegean dispute with Greece in 1987.
Armenia87-93 (T)	Turkish reactions to the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulting to almost several hundred thousand Azeri refugees during the years 1987-1993.
N. Iraq92 (T)	Turkish reactions to the declaration of a federal Kurdish state in northern Iraq in 1992.
Thrace90 (T)	Turkish reactions to the mistreatment of the Turkish minority in the Greek part of Thrace in 1990 and the pogrom against Turks in 1990.
Kurdish93 (T)	Turkish reactions against the Kurdish minority party leading to the closure of the party and the imprisonment of Leyla Zana and other Kurdish origin parliamentarians.
Aegean96 (T)	Turkish reactions to the 1996 crisis with Greece in the Aegean.
Cyprus96 (T)	Turkish reactions to Greek Cypriot demonstrations in the Green Line dividing Cyprus leading to the deaths of two Greek Cypriot demonstrators.
SyriaOcalan98 (T)	Turkish reactions to Syria’s support of Ocalan and the PKK.
ItalyOcalan98 (T)	Turkish reactions to Italy’s refusal over the extradition of Ocalan to Turkey.
Greece99 (T)	Turkish reactions to Greek attempts to protect and hide Ocalan.
France(Gen.)01(T)	Turkish reactions to the recognition of the Armenian genocide by the Young Turks in 1914-25.
Cyprus02-03(T)	Turkish reactions to Cyprus accession to the EU and the perceived injustices included in the Annan plan for the Turkish people.
N. Iraq02-03 (T)	Turkish reactions to the possibility of declaring a Kurdish state or federal entity in

The Boolean Method:

The Boolean analysis is a tool for organizing small size data sets consisting usually of twelve to forty cases.⁹ Unlike standard regression techniques, it is an ideal tool for dealing with a small number of cases. It addresses explicitly the idea that there can be multiple causal mechanisms producing the same outcome. That is, the same outcome can result from different combinations of factors. The basic idea in Boolean addition is that if any of the additive terms is satisfied (present), then the outcome is true (occurs). The word Boolean is used in WWW search engines, and it is equivalent to the OR sign. The best way to understand it, according to Charles Ragin, is to think of the Boolean analysis in logical terms, not arithmetic. For example, there might be several things a person could do to lose his or her job. It does not matter how many of these things a person does. If an employee does any one (or all) of them, he or she will be fired. Doing two of them will not cause one employee to be more fired than another employee who does only one of them. Fired is fired, according to Ragin, a truly quantitative state. His example illustrates the nature of the Boolean addition: satisfy any of the additive conditions, and the expected outcome follows.

⁹ One could consult the following readings for the Boolean method: Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987; Rajat Ganguly, "The Move Towards Disintegration: Explaining Ethnosecessionist Mobilization in South Asia," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3, 2 (1997): 101-130; Gisèle De Meur and Dirk Berg-Schlusser, "Conditions of Authoritarianism, Fascism and Democracy in Inter-War Europe: Systematic Matching and Contrasting of Cases for "Small N" Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies* 29, 4 (1996): 423-468.

I use this method in my own study of event crises from Greece and Turkey below. The logic of the method is that crises might occur either because of domestic diversionary conditions or external security considerations or both. In spite of a number of important limitations, this method allows for testing of competing hypotheses to illustrate whether they are qualitatively true or false or whether they result in contradictions across a larger number of cases. The test will allow us to identify the degree of empirical validity between the two competing theoretical perspectives. In general, the Boolean analysis is useful in distinguishing between perspectives which require no further investigation because they fail to identify adequately the conditions conducive to nationalist action, and those perspectives which provide important cues or contradictions and therefore require further theoretical and empirical investigation through qualitative research.

The Event Crisis Truth Table:

Table I below is titled "Event Crisis Truth Table" and contains some of the characteristics of the cases under investigation. A Truth Table is a major component of this analysis. It provides all possible combinations of independent variables, which are coded discontinuously to indicate the presence or the absence of the alleged causal factors. The validity of the test depends on whether the independent variables can be dichotomized as 1 (present) or 0 (absent), as well as whether the outcome of interest can be judged to have occurred 1 (presence of extreme nationalism) or 0 (absence of extreme nationalism).

The basic data of my analysis are presented below. For each of the main dimensions discussed in the literatures under investigation (superiority of offensive over defensive action, internal elite competition, indistinguishability between offensive and

defensive action, economic crises, and enduring “ethnic rivalries”), I have selected one major indicator, as outlined in the table. In order to operationalize the cases for a Boolean type of analysis, I have dichotomized each variable according to certain thresholds of “high” and “low.” In the first example, below [Cyprus83 (G)], Greece in 1983 did not respond confrontationally to the crisis in Cyprus caused by the Turkish declaration of independence of a Turkish Cypriot state in Cyprus. On the Greek side, there was no superiority of offensive over defensive action, little internal competition within Greece, and no economic crisis at that moment. There was an important element of indistinguishability between both the offensive and defensive actions of the two sides, and the enduring ethnic rivalries resulting primarily from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In this case, these two conditions proved insufficient to produce significant elements of majority nationalism.

Table II: Event Crisis Truth Table

Event Crisis	Superiority of Offensive over Defensive Action ¹⁰	Internal Elite Competition ¹¹	Indistinguishability between Offensive and Defensive Action ¹²	Periods of Economic Crises ¹³	Enduring Ethnic Rivalries ¹⁴	Majority Nationalism ¹⁵
Cyprus83 (G)	0	0	1	0	1	0
Aegean87 (G)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Albania90 (G)	1	1	1	1	0	0
Thrace90 (G)	1	1	0	1	1	1
Macedonia92(G)	0	0	1	1	0	1

¹⁰ This is demonstrated on a combination of factors, such as size, technology, and geography. For each crisis, an offensive and a defensive strategy was proposed. I compare the advantages of the two.

¹¹ These are conditions that may lead to the fall of an incumbent government (either because of imminent elections, or significant threat of defection, or weak health of the main political protagonist). Also short periods before and after democratization.

¹² This is dependent on a combination of factors, both military and psychological.

¹³ Approximately ten years out of twenty for each of the two countries are labeled as economic crisis times: Greece 1987-1997 and Turkey 1993-2003.

¹⁴ The group had at least one major crisis with an “ethnic rival” in the past 10 years.

¹⁵ According to the writings and criteria of the Western European press operationalized using Lexis/Nexis.

Albania94 (G)	1	1	1	1	0	0
Thrace92-95 (G)	1	1	0	1	1	0
Macedonia 94 (G)	0	1	0	1	1	1
Cyprus96 (G)	0	1	1	1	1	0
Macedonia95 (G)	0	0	0	1	1	0
Aegean 96 (G)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Cyprus98 (G)	1	0	1	0	1	0
Minorities 00 (G)	0	0	0	0	1	0
Cyprus02 (G)	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cyprus83 (T)	1	1	1	0	1	1
Bulgaria89 (T)	1	0	1	0	0	0
Aegean87 (T)	1	1	1	0	1	1
Armenia87-93 (T)	1	1	1	1	0	0
N. Iraq92 (T)	1	0	1	0	1	0
Thrace90 (T)	1	1	1	0	1	0
Kurdish94 (T)	0	0	0	1	1	1
Aegean96 (T)	0	1	1	1	1	1
Cyprus96 (T)	0	1	0	1	1	1
SyriaOcalan98 (T)	1	1	1	1	1	1
ItalyOcalan98 (T)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Greece99 (T)	0	0	0	1	1	0
France(Gen.)01(T)	1	0	1	1	1	0
Cyprus02-03(T)	1	1	1	1	1	0
N. Iraq02-03 (T)	1	1	1	1	1	0

Cases of majority nationalism are labeled “negative” (0) when a crisis results in low support from a dominant majority and “positive” (1) when there is significant support for nationalist policies.¹⁶ A case is labeled positive regardless of whether it is

¹⁶ Support can take both noisy and quiet forms. Quiet forms of nationalism are philosophically and sometimes empirically equivalent to noisy forms of nationalism. Occasionally, majorities back nationalist action, leading to confrontational policies that nearly produce wars or result in state embargoes, deadly conflict, and state border transformations. Because of the seriousness of these events, and because majority support or toleration is present, I sought to brand these event outcomes as positive cases of majority nationalism (i.e. positive in the sense that majority nationalism was present). The following examples illustrate the relationship between noisy and quiet forms of nationalism. In the counterfactual scenario that Greece used its military strength against the Macedonian Republic, the Greek public would not have any reason to demonstrate against the name issue, which could be resolved through the use of military threats. Similarly, the Turkish public did not have a special reason to mobilize against the Kurdish PKK, knowing that state retaliation would be so brutal that any majority nationalist mobilization was unnecessary. However, the support or lack of reaction to state brutality against the Kurds is philosophically equivalent to

manifested in “noisy” forms of nationalism (when the public actively engages in nationalist mobilization) or “quiet” forms (when the public quietly supports state confrontational nationalist projects). More specifically, in the Boolean test below, event outcomes are labeled as positive when they include strong manifestations of majority nationalism: 1) shown with the participation of more than a million people in a single event; or 2) shown through the support or toleration of serious confrontational state policies (i.e. economic sanctions, efforts to change internationally recognized borders, and closures of ethnic minority parties, etc.).¹⁷ The logic behind this operationalization of the dependent variable is that these forms of nationalism are empirically similar regardless of its diverse manifestations.

Theories of Nationalist Mobilization:

The “scapegoat hypothesis” or “diversionary theory of war” suggests that conflict with an outgroup increases the cohesion of a well-defined in-group.¹⁸ Group leaders are aware of the cohesive effects of external conflict and sometimes deliberately create or maintain external conflict in order to eliminate ingroup competitors; examples include: dictatorships, such as the Argentinean one with respect to the Malvinas islands; or early democracies, such as the Turkish one of the 80s. Here we see a politically motivated nationalism that serves primarily and often exclusively domestic political purposes

events of active mobilization against the Kurds. For an explanation of noisy and quiet forms of nationalism see Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

¹⁷ In future work, I concentrate on noisy forms of nationalism trying to explain the massive and active participation of citizens in mass mobilizations. An additional paradox is that it is often more productive and less costly for majorities to follow quiet forms of nationalism to repress ethnic antagonists, than to select highly publicized forms of noisy majority nationalism, such as mass mobilizations.

¹⁸ Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 139-165.

regardless of external considerations, opportunities, and threats.¹⁹ Three necessary conditions for the operationalization of this diversionary theory are: a) political and economic challenges for the dominant elite; b) strong domestic opposition to the governing elite; and c) presence of enduring “ethnic rivals.”

Security Dilemma:

Unlike diversionary theory, the security dilemma focuses on the external environment of the group. In the view of Barry Posen, the security dilemma is particularly intense when two conditions hold: firstly, when offensive and defensive actions are indistinguishable, dominant majorities cannot signal their defensive intents without provoking similar actions from their ethnic antagonists; secondly, a superiority of offensive over defensive action, makes a preemptive mobilization necessary. The presence of windows of vulnerability and opportunity can be caused either by the collapse of central authority or the withdrawal of colonial or imperial authorities, or more importantly, from expectations of outside intervention or its absence. Finally, for the operationalization of the security dilemma there should be a background of (perceived) group hostility, or fear should be present before the crisis.²⁰

¹⁹ Jack Levy describes numerous historical cases in which the public has appeared all too eager for war, from the American Civil War, to the eve of World War I in Europe, to the contemporary “identity wars.” See Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 139-165. In some cases, this enthusiasm for war may push political leaders into adopting more aggressive and risky policies than they would have preferred. In other cases, according to Mueller, leaders will undertake risky foreign ventures or hardline foreign policies because they anticipate popular support for a victorious war. See J.E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*, New York: Wiley, 1973.

²⁰ The Security dilemma appears under conditions of anarchy in which even non-aggressive moves to enhance one's security are perceived as threatening by others and trigger countermoves that ultimately and paradoxically reduce one's own security. See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30,2 (1978): 167-214; David Lake and Donald Rothchild., “Containing Fear,” pp. 97-131 in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, edited by Michael Brown *et al.*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999; Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival* 35, 1 (1993): 27-47. Both majorities and their ethnic antagonists face inter-ethnic security dilemmas, even if and when neither group has expansionist or confrontational inclinations. By strengthening their security, majorities diminish the

Table II: A Comparison of the Distinct and Common Features of the Diversionary Theory and the Security Dilemma

Theoretical perspectives	Superiority of Offensive over Defensive Action	Internal Elite Competition	Indistinguishability between Offensive and Defensive Action	Political and economic Crises	Enduring “Ethnic Rivalries”
Diversionary Theory	?	1	?	1	1
Security Dilemma	1	?	1	?	1

Diversionary Theory Indicators:

Working from Table II, I test my data on the three variables necessary for the operation of the diversionary theory of war, here modified to account for majority nationalism (internal elite competition, economic crises, and enduring “ethnic rivalries”). On the one hand, it becomes apparent that diversionary theory predicts eight crises and twelve non-crises. On the other hand, this approach fails to account for five cases where majority nationalism was expected but did not occur and another four cases where it was not expected but it actually happened. Thus, diversionary theory, as demonstrated in the chart below, can account for a little more than two thirds of the cases distinguishing between low and high levels of majority nationalism.

Types of Crises:	Cases	Number of Cases
Crises where majority nationalism was expected and occurred according to the predictions of the diversionary theory of war.	Aegean87 (G), Thrace90 (G), Macedonia94 (G), Aegean96 (G), Aegean96 (T), Cyprus96 (T), SyriaOcalan98 (T), ItalyOcalan 98 (T),	8
Crises where majority	Thrace92-95 (G), Cyprus96 (G),	5

physical security of their ethnic antagonists, and vice versa, resulting in a less secure environment for both the majority and its ethnic antagonists.

nationalism was expected but they did not occur despite the predictions of the diversionary theory of war.	Armenia87-93 (T), Cyprus02 (T), N. Iraq (02-03) T,	
Crises where majority nationalism was not expected and did not occur validating the diversionary theory of war	Cyprus 83(G), Albania90(G), Albania92-95 (G), Macedonia95 (G), Cyprus98 (G), Minorities00 (G), Cyprus02 (G) , Bulgaria89 (T), N. Iraq92 (T), Thrace90 (T), Greece99 (T), France.gen. 01 (T)	12
Crises where majority nationalism was not expected and did occur disproving the diversionary theory of war.	Macedonia92 (G), Cyprus83 (T), Aegean87 (T), Kurdish94 (T),	4

Security Dilemma:

Also from Table II, I test my data on the three variables necessary for the operation of the security dilemma, here modified to account for majority nationalism (superiority of offensive over defensive action, indistinguishability between defensive and offensive action and finally enduring “ethnic rivalries”). The results are similar to those of the security dilemma approach, explaining slightly less than two thirds of the cases. More specifically, the security dilemma predicts six cases of majority nationalism that occurred and eleven cases that did not occur and were not hypothesized to occur. A further six cases were expected but did not occur, while six occurred despite the paradigm’s predictions to the contrary. As can be seen, then, a number of cases are not successfully addressed by either theoretical perspective.

Types of Crises:	Cases	Number of Cases
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Crises where majority nationalism was expected and occurred according to the predictions of the security dilemma.	Aegean87 (G), Aegean96 (G), Cyprus83 (G), Aegean87 (G), SyriaOcalan98 (T), ItalyOcalan98 (T),	6
Crises where majority nationalism was expected but they did not occur despite the predictions of the security dilemma.	Cyprus98 (G), Armenia87-93 (T), N. Iraq92 (T), Thrace90 (T), Cyprus02 (T), N. Iraq (02-03) T,	6
Crises where majority nationalism was not expected and did not occur validating the security dilemma.	Cyprus83 (G), Albania90 (G), Albania92-95 (G), Thrace92-95 (G), Cyprus96 (G), Macedonia95 (G), Minorities00 (G), Cyprus02 (G), Bulgaria89 (T), Greece99 (T), France(gen.)01 (T),	11
Crises where majority nationalism was not expected and did occur disproving the security dilemma.	Thrace90 (G), Macedonia92 (G), Macedonia94 (G), Kurdish94 (T), Aegean96 (T), Cyprus96 (T),	6

Conclusions:

There are many conclusions that one can draw from the presentation of these data.

First, the results suggest that structural, rational choice, and cultural conditions do not offer a complete reasoning for the causes or variations of majority nationalism during crises. Economic, political, security, as well as numerous other factors explain a number of cases, while failing to explain others. Additionally, nationalist mobilizations occur in an environment with little recent history of conflict while they fail in places with tense history of intergroup conflict, thus refuting the “ancient hatred” or even the “modern hatred” thesis. Here, my operationalization suggests that theories based on even very recent negative outgroup sentiments cannot explain variation in my dependent variable.

Also one of the findings of this research is that nationalism often barks but rarely bites. Out of the 29 cases, only twelve resulted in confrontational majority nationalism. Even among those twelve, only a couple led to deadly violence. Thus, cases such as the latest “absence” of mainland Turkish mobilizations against the UN plan for a settlement in Cyprus are not exceptional if one takes into consideration that nationalist reactions are less frequent than non-confrontational.

Further to this, the latest case from Cyprus might be also explained by the fact that there is a current attempt in the various societies of the Eastern Mediterranean to disengage from politics of nationalism. A more detailed analysis of each case suggests that with the exception of the status of the Northern Iraq Kurds there has been some improvement in all other issues. We can see improvements in state capacity to deal with terrorism in both Greece and Turkey, with the Aegean issues, Turkish-Bulgarian minority issues, Greek-Albanian relations, Greek-Turkish minorities, Ocalan’s death penalty, Turkish-Syrian relations, the Macedonian issue in Greece, negotiations for the ESDP, Turkish-Armenian relations, and finally with the rights of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Therefore, any complications in Cyprus would have gone against a general tendency of détente in the region, perhaps even reversing this tendency.²¹ This latter observation suggests, moreover, that the outcome of each crisis is not completely independent from the outcome of previous ones. A more refined operationalization of these crises should take into consideration the learning experiences and shifts in preferences of the actors involved in the crises.

Furthermore, it can be concluded that there is significant variation in the outcome of interest (majority nationalism), regardless of the background conditions. My test

shows that major hypotheses grounded on domestic politics (diversionary theory of war) and external factors (security dilemma) result in contradictions across a larger number of cases. The security dilemma explains slightly fewer than two thirds of the responses of majorities in Greece and Turkey, and the diversionary theory of war explains slightly more than two thirds. There are cases which can be explained by both, while others are explained by only one of the theories, thereby indicating that the theories are not mutually exclusive. But in any event, reliance on either or both of these two theories for predictive purposes cannot offer us a credible interpretive anchor of majority nationalism. Further to this, in episodes where elements of the security dilemma and diversionary theory of war are present, the crisis receives more attention, and as result, more timely international intervention. Arguably, results could have been more positive in favor of the two theories presented above if such interventions had not taken place.

The most interesting paradox derived from this discussion is the following: why do societies in Greece, Turkey, and elsewhere, fail to mobilize collectively on shared grievances, even when “objective” conditions appear otherwise ripe, and why did they do so, even when these conditions are absent. Often “rational,” “structural,” or “objective” conditions exist without generating the phenomenon of interest. One can think of examples where nations do not behave in ways that can actually enforce their own interests, such as the reluctance of Turkey to free Kurdish politician Leyla Zana, or that of Greece to allow repatriation rights for ethnic Macedonians refugees of WWII, or finally the delay among the Greek Cypriot leadership in ending the economic blockade of the Turkish Cypriot northern enclave, not to mention the rejection of the UN plan for Cyprus by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

²¹ For more details on cases see <http://www.utoronto.ca/ethnicstudies/research.htm>.

Finally, I conclude that the five causes presented in my operationalization of the two paradigms are probably necessary but insufficient conditions for generating the outcome of interest, in this case confrontational or non-confrontational shifts in policymaking and civic engagement. One way to deal with this anomaly is to supplement “rational” explanations with ideational and other factors: social brokerage, misperception, justice frames, cognitive shifts, agency, etc. In fact, my future research will demonstrate that this paradox can be resolved by supplementing the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war with approaches based on ideational factors such as framing, including the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings, and showing how these can often override the assumed “realities” of the Eastern Mediterranean societies.