Class and Support for Welfare State Spending in Canada, 1993-2000

J. Scott Matthews (johnmatt@interchange.ubc.ca)
University of British Columbia

Lynda Erickson (erickson@sfu.ca)
Simon Fraser University

** Draft version. Please do not cite without authors' permission. **

Paper prepared for the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meetings, June 3 to 5, 2004, Winnipeg, MN. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The authors would also like to thank Fred Cutler, David Laycock, Ana Lukatela, and Anthony Maragna for assistance in the preparation of this paper. None of these parties are responsible for the arguments of, or errors in, this paper.

Abstract

Little is known about the socio-demographic and psychological roots of opinion toward the welfare state in Canada. The present paper seeks to fill this gap in our knowledge by examining the impact of class and class-related sentiment on attitudes toward spending across five social program areas: health care, education, pensions, (un)employment insurance, and welfare. Drawing on data from the Canadian Election Studies for 1993, 1997 and 2000, we argue that class and class-related sentiment are more important determinants of opinion on UI and welfare spending than of opinion concerning spending on health care, education and pensions. We contend, in accordance with recent comparative work on welfare states, that this differentiation is traceable, at least in part, to variation in the distributive nature of these programs, insofar as the former programs are 'selective' and the latter are 'universal' in their distributive character.

Introduction

Although welfare state retrenchment has been a major issue in the literature on social policy-making since the late 1980s, students of Canadian public opinion have been slow to attend to the impact on mass attitudes of this important political development. Notwithstanding the persistence of arguments that imagine a shift in society's dominant ideas away from support for a relatively generous welfare state, comparatively little is known about the public's reaction to the large-scale social policy changes of recent decades. Questions about how or whether the public questions the validity of the various programs of the welfare state, and sustained analysis of the social and psychological roots of opinion toward the welfare state in general, have received comparatively little attention.

In earlier work (Erickson and Matthews 2003) we explored support for a number of welfare state programs and examined the psychological structure of opinion across a range of welfare state issues in the 1990s and until the 2000 election.[1] With respect to social policy, we found that public opinion appears to be structured by two underlying dimensions, which we characterized as support for universal social programs, on the one hand, and support for selective social programs, on the other. We also found, as one might expect, that support for the former was consistently and substantially higher than it was for the latter. In this paper we examine further this apparent differentiation in the pattern of support for various welfare state programs with particular focus on the differential impact of class interest and class related sentiment on support for selective versus universal programs. The programs we examine include health care, education, pensions for seniors, (un)employment insurance and welfare.

We begin our paper with a discussion of the selective/universal dimension and its relevance for the structuring of opinion about welfare state programs. We then describe the measures and methods we use for our empirical analysis and describe our results. We conclude with summary remarks and some speculations concerning the broader significance of our findings.

Programs of the welfare state: the selective/universal dimension

In the literature on welfare state provision, an important distinction is drawn between programs (and welfare state regimes) that are universal and those that are selective (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999; Korpi 1980; Korpi and Palme 1998; Rothstein 2001). Universal social programs cover the whole population, regardless of individual economic circumstances. By contrast, selective programs take into account ability to pay. Benefits are conferred on a minority, are targeted to low income families or individuals and often require means-testing. While there is debate concerning the precise redistributive

[1] Although our initial analysis began with the 1988 Canadian Election Study, we have focused here on the three studies from 1993 to 2000. This is because the questionnaire items for these three surveys were most comparable and our results most straightforward.

character of the two kinds of programs,[2] one reading of the politics of universal versus selective programs would tend to predict greater levels of support for the former programs and would anticipate more class-based differences in opinion on the latter (Rothstein 2001). Greater support for the former would follow from the generalized benefits distributed across the population.[3] Class-based differences on targeted programs, on the other hand, would arise from the greater benefits realized through such programs by the less affluent and the greater susceptibility of such individuals to risks that would leave them among the ranks of the poor.[4]

Evidence of greater support for generalized benefits is presented by Rothstein for Sweden. Examining data on attitudes to spending for various social programs covering the years from 1981 to 1997, he argues that "support for universal programs is unambiguously strong and stable, while the opposite is true for… selective programs" (2001: 228). Findings on the differential impact of class on support for different kinds of social policies are, however, surprisingly sparse, although indirect evidence on the class basis of attitudes about redistribution is available. Svallfors (1997), for example, finds clear class differences in attitudes to redistribution even across countries with different types of welfare regimes. And in Canada, Ornstein and Stevenson (1999) have documented class differences in support for redistribution. Even so, a sustained treatment of the—presumably—variable impact of class across support for different aspects of the welfare state has yet to be presented.

At first glance, the distinction between universal and selective programs, and the implications of this distinction for opinion on social policy in Canada, seem to be relatively straightforward matters. Universal social programs would clearly include ones such as medicare and education, which typically attract broad based support. Indeed, such programs, especially publicly provided health care, have, according to some, taken on almost emblematic status, defining what it means to be a Canadian.

Pensions for seniors, which include Old Age Security (OAS) and the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), may also seem clearly universal, given that old age is a circumstance anticipated by most of the population.[5] Still, the controversy that raged in the mid 1990s with respect to the sustainability of CPP, and resulted in a restructuring of the financing of the program in 1997, often tended "to put seniors' matters against those of other members of society" (Torjman and Battle 1994: 3), and in ways that were reminiscent of debates about selective programs (Rothstein 2001). Add to this the fact that a larger portion of the income of middle class seniors is now coming from private pensions and other private income (Statistics Canada 2003), and it seems likely that support for a sustainable and adequate system of public pensions may be increasingly distributed differentially across class groupings.

---

[2] See Korpi and Palme (1998) for a sample of this debate.
[3] This is, of course, contingent on the program being seen as providing benefits that are in general demand.
[4] This reading of the greater class-based support for selective programs can also be extrapolated from Esping-Andersen's position that in a liberal welfare regime, in which means-tested assistance is prevalent, class will become the most important political cleavage (1990).
[5] But here, note the Guaranteed Income Supplement of public pensions is targeted to poor seniors and OAS is subject to a 'clawback' provision.

Insurance for unemployment is another program whose status on our universal/selective grid may be ambiguous. It is, after all, a program that aims to provide temporary protection for the general working population, and it dispenses payments to people across income ranges (Lochead 1998). Still, (un)employment insurance payments are made to just a minority of those who are in the workforce and the public image of UI recipients may be of less affluent, less resourced workers. As a result, support for the program may reflect this image in terms of its popularity and where its support is strongest. This may be especially true given the longstanding debate over Unemployment Insurance that started at least as early as the 1980s and during which accusations of dependency were leveled at the program (Green 1994). Unemployment insurance, then, seems more likely to fit in the selective, rather than the universal, social programs domain.

Finally, welfare programs that provide money for the poor seem, in terms of program design, the most unequivocally selective. They are explicitly targeted and heavily means tested. Class effects seem likely to be strongest here.

Our first efforts in charting the structure of opinion on these five programs over the 1990s indicated a clear pattern. Healthcare, education and pensions were consistently found to have the highest levels of support, with (un)employment insurance (UI) and welfare programs much less popular in all three of the years we examined. The only deviation from this pattern occurred in 2000, when support for pensions spending dropped markedly, although still not to the levels recorded for welfare and UI. We performed a series of factor analyses in an effort to confirm at the structural level this distinction between healthcare, education and pensions on the one hand and UI and welfare on the other. In general, our results provided strong support for our 'two-dimensional' view of the determinants of opinion on welfare state spending.[6]

What then do these patterns lead us to expect with respect to the correlates of opinion on these five different welfare state programs? If our theoretical supposition is correct, class-related variables, including class demographics and class-related sentiments, should have a greater impact on opinion concerning welfare and unemployment insurance spending than on opinion concerning health care, education and, generally, for pensions as well. While other forces no doubt underpin the contrasting pattern of support for universal and selective social programs, it is our view that the differential impact of class-related variables is an important part of this broader story.

Data and Methods

To examine our hypotheses, we estimate and compare OLS models of the determinants of opinion in these areas in 1993, 1997 and 2000. The data for this analysis, as with our

[6] Again, results from 2000 suggested the status of pensions may have become more ambiguous. In that analysis, support for pensions loaded on the same dimension as did support for UI and welfare, if a little less strongly than did opinion in these other areas. Subsequent efforts to confirm this finding, however, suggest that this apparent pattern may have been largely statistical artifact.

earlier work, come from the Canadian Election Studies (CES) in these years.[7] These data are well-suited to the present inquiry, insofar as they include an extensive battery of items suited to uncovering socio-demographic and psychological effects in public opinion. The bulk of the present section describes the construction of our variables. The section concludes with more precise specification of our hypotheses.

The dependent variables in our analysis are measures tapping attitudes toward spending in the five relevant program areas. In 1993 and 1997, the questions take the following general form:

> [1993] If you had to, would you cut spending in the following areas a lot, some or not at all? Welfare?… [cpsl7b- cpsl7f]
>
> [1997] If you had to make cuts, would you cut spending in the following areas a lot, some or not at all? Welfare?… [pese6b-pese6f]

In 2000, the question wording differs:

> [2000] And now government spending. Should the Federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now on the following areas? Welfare? …[pesd1b-pesd1f]

Although it is possible that the wording change may mean the results for 2000 should be treated differently than those for 1993 and 1997, a comparison of the distribution of responses to these items across the survey years would seem to suggest the opposite (see Table 1).[8] If anything, the dominant pattern across the survey years is one of aggregate response stability in spite of the wording change (save for the case of opinion on pensions/OAS spending). This suggests to us that the questions for all three years primarily tapped respondents' priorities among programs. Crucially, however, whatever impact the wording variation might have in the aggregate, there is little reason to expect this variation to interact with the relationships under examination here. The wording of neither the 1993-7 nor the 2000 questions seems to invoke class or class-related sentiment in any obvious way and, to the extent that they might, there is little reason to suspect that one question primes class-related considerations to a greater extent than the other. In short, then, it is our view that these items are sufficiently similar to treat them as essentially equivalent, at least for the purposes of the present investigation, which

---

[7] Data from the 1993 Canadian Election Study were provided by the ISR. The survey was funded by the SSHRC and was completed for the 1992/93 Canadian Election Team of Richard Johnston, André Blais, Henry Brady, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte. Data for the 1997 Canadian Election Study were provided by the ISR. The survey was funded by the SSHRC and was completed for the 1997 Canadian Election Team of André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau and Neil Nevitte. Data from the 2000 Canadian Election Study were collected by the ISR and the Jolicoeur & Associates for André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau and Neil Nevitte. The survey was funded by the SSHRC, Elections Canada and the Institute for Research on Public Policy. Neither the organizations that collected and distributed the data, the agencies that funded the data collection, nor the election teams that supervised the data collection are responsible for the analyses and interpretations presented here.

[8] A literal comparison of the responses in 93 and 97 with those in 2000 would suggest collapsing the responses 'a lot and 'some' in 93 and 97 and collapsing 'spend more' and 'about the same as now' in the 2000 survey. That would give two, literally equivalent, categories of 'cut' and 'do not cut'.

focuses on within-year, rather than cross-year, comparisons. Thus, we have five dependent variables—support for spending on health care, education, pensions/OAS, unemployment insurance, and welfare—measured at three time points. In the analysis, these variables are recoded to vary across the 0,1 interval. The over time distribution of these variables is reported in Table 1.

Our independent variables can be separated into two broad groups: socio-demographic variables and variables tapping long-term political dispositions. Most important among the former are variables capturing aspects of class position. The objective measurement of class is a notoriously contested matter, especially in the context of survey research[9], so our approach here is self-consciously catholic. We include five separate variables designed to capture both the material (economic) and symbolic (status) differentiations typically associated with the class concept. These are now discussed in turn.

Education is perhaps the most enduring measure of class in the literature on Canadian voting, and is routinely found to relate in significant ways to a variety of behavioural and attitudinal variables (Blais et al. 2002; Nevitte et al. 2000; Johnston et al. 1992, 1996).[10] Part of the impact of education no doubt turns on forces other than the class differentiations with which it is associated. Still, insofar as education level is involved in the "sorting" of individuals across a range of socially important outcomes (Nie et al. 1996), its significance as a measure of class position should not be discounted. Furthermore, it is crucial that education be included as a control variable when assessing the impact of other indicators of class. Two dummy variables, thus, are included in the models to capture education effects on support for welfare state spending. We separate degree-holders and those with less than a high school education from all others.

Income also regularly figures as a measure of class position in analyses of Canadian voting and attitudes, although its impact is typically smaller and less stable than other would-be ciphers for class.[11] Still, income variation would seem to go to the heart of the material differentiations that should govern rational evaluations of the utility of welfare state spending (Weakliem and Heath 1994), and so its inclusion in our models is essential. Our measure of income is a ten-level scale, where the bottommost category includes all those earning less than $20k/yr., the topmost category includes all those earning $100k/yr. or more, and in between categories are bounded at $10k intervals.

Union membership has a somewhat checkered past as a force in Canadian attitudes and vote decisions (Archer 1985; Johnston et al. 1992) and, furthermore, has a somewhat unclear bearing on class theoretically. Net of the structural differentiations with which it tends to be associated—such as income, wage-earner status and workplace autonomy—union membership may not function as a 'class variable' at all. Instead, its impact may

---

[9] Wright (1985) employs the most complex class typology in modern survey research, with mixed results. For recent discussions of conceptual and measurement issues in relation to class, see Evans (1999) and Ornstein and Stevenson (1999).

[10] For a general discussion of the importance of education in political behaviour, see Nie et al. (1996).

[11] For a recent example, see Blais et al.'s (2002) discussion of the impact of income on voting in the 2000 general election.

be more a species of social group identification, like religion or ethnicity. Yet, as with education, union membership is an important control when estimating the impact of other indicators of class position and, furthermore, may capture the effects of aspects of class unmeasured elsewhere in the model. Thus, we include a binary indicator of union membership in the analysis.

Two final, less conventional indicators of class position are included in the models. Here, we draw on recent theoretical work that suggests new, 'post-industrial' cleavages associated with material dependency on welfare state goods may be increasingly significant politically.[12] The basic idea here is that, just as income and wage-earner status shape the individual-level utility of different patterns of welfare state provision, social divisions according to, for instance, employment status and sector of employment may figure in evaluations of the welfare state. Our analysis in this domain is confined to employment status. Two dummy variables do the work here—we separate the retired and the unemployed from all others.

One obvious variable omitted from our analysis is an indicator of occupation. In many ways, occupation would seem to be the most faithful empirical rendering of the concept of class, at least in its Marxian formulation. Alas, a consistent measure of occupation is not included in the CES across our analysis period. Nevertheless, the empirical record is dubious on the political impact of occupation in Canada (Alford 1969; Pammett 1987; Franklin et al. 1992; Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf 1999) and, to the extent that variables such as income and union membership track occupational effects, such impact as there might be is likely absorbed elsewhere in the models.

The remainder of the socio-demographic variables are standard fare in Canadian voting research and are included principally as controls. Along with a scalar age variable, dummy variables tapping ethnicity (non-Europeans vs. others), religion (Catholics and non-religious vs. others), and region (West, Quebec, and Atlantic vs. others) are included in the models.

Among the variables tapping long-term political dispositions, the variables capturing the effects of value commitments are most important. These are the variables we expect to pick up the impact of 'class-related sentiment' on welfare state spending opinion. Four variables are included here. The first three are addressed quite directly to attitudes regarding the nature of class conflict in Canadian society. One asks respondents to express their level of agreement with the following statement: "People who don't get ahead should blame themselves, not the system."[13] Another question queries respondents on the proper role of unions: "How much power do you think unions should have: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less?"[14] The final item in this domain registers respondents' level of agreement with this statement:

---

[12] Kitschelt (1994) offers a general statement in this domain; see also Clark and Lipset (2001) and Evans (1999). Svallfors (1999) provides a rare empirical treatment of this topic with data on Swedish attitudes.
[13] Variable names as follows: mbsa2 (1993), pese19 (1997), pesg15 (2000).
[14] Variable names as follows: mbsc1b (1993), pese3 (1997), pesd2 (2000).

"When businesses make a lot of money, everyone benefits, including the poor."[15] Following Blais et al. (2002), we interpret response to these items as an indication of the degree to which individuals' perceive the interests of social classes as in conflict, and so potentially in need of government protection. In the analysis, these variables are recoded to vary across the 0,1 interval, where 1 reflects the most harmonious image of class relations.

The remaining values variable is more tangential to the issue of class conflict, but is addressed quite directly to the proper role of government in society. Respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with the following statement: "The government should leave it entirely to the private sector to create jobs."[16] In accordance with our earlier paper (Erickson and Matthews 2003), we interpret response to this item as an indicator of respondents' assessment of the technical capacity of the welfare state. Thus, at stake here is the ability of government to take effective action in the pursuit of its social and economic goals. While attitudes here are not unconnected to broader attitudes toward class conflict, our earlier work demonstrated that these two domains are not empirically reducible to each other (Erickson and Matthews 2003). Thus, it is important to include this variable both for its intrinsic interest and as a control on those variables more directly addressed to class conflict. This variable is recoded to vary across the 0,1 interval, where 1 indicates the least sanguine attitude toward the technical capacity of the welfare state.

The other long-term political disposition in the analysis is party identification, and it is included essentially as a control. A set of dummy variables captures differences in support for welfare state spending attaching to federal partisanship.[17] These terms round out our model.

To reiterate, our theoretical expectations lead us to the following hypotheses. First, those variables tapping aspects of class position (i.e. education, income, union membership, and employment status) will have more effect on attitudes toward spending on unemployment insurance and welfare—'selective social programs'—than on attitudes toward spending on health care, education and, pensions/OAS—'universal social programs'. Second, we hypothesize that those variables tapping value commitments relating to the nature of class conflict in Canadian society will have more effect on attitudes toward selective social programs than on attitudes toward universal social programs. We have no specific expectations for the remaining socio-demographics or for partisanship.

---

[15] Variable names as follows: mbsa13 (1993), pese20 (1997), pesg16 (2000).
[16] Variable names as follows: pese15 (1993), cpsf6 (1997), cpsf6 (2000).
[17] Dummies are entered for Liberals, Tories, Reform/Alliance supporters, Bloc Québécois supporters, and New Democrats. The reference category for this variable includes those who responded 'none' or 'don't know' to partisanship queries.

Results

We consider our models in two stages. First, we examine models including socio-demographics only, then we examine our full models, which add partisanship and values terms to the equations. This approach allows us to examine the 'total effects' of our socio-demographic variables. These effects are partially obscured in the presence of variables tapping long-term political dispositions, with which the socio-demographics are correlated. A major downside of this approach is the multiplicity of tables and coefficients it produces. To keep things manageable, we focus attention on the general pattern and key coefficients of interest.

Tables 2 through 5 contain the 'socio-demographics only' models for 1993, 1997 and 2000. Overall, the pattern of coefficients provides good support for our hypothesis regarding class effects in support for welfare state spending. Consider our 'class variables.' Looking across the three analysis years, in every case but one, these variables have a greater impact—often a far greater impact—on support for unemployment insurance and welfare spending than on support for the 'universal' social programs. The pattern is most stark in the case of income, which (appropriately) has a negative impact on support for spending whenever it is significant. This variable's impact is typically twice as large on support for UI or welfare spending than on support for health care or pensions/OAS, the two universal social programs in relation to which significant income effects appear—income never emerges as a significant predictor of support for education spending. Furthermore, income's impact is consistent only in the domain of 'selective' social programs. That is, income has a statistically and substantively significant impact on UI and welfare spending support in every year, whereas it emerges as significant only sporadically in relation to health care and pensions/OAS.[18]

The effects for unemployment status broadly comport with the pattern for income, if imperfectly. Unemployment effects emerge somewhat inconsistently over the years, but when they do, they are generally confined to a theoretically expected positive impact on support for selective social programs. The one exception to this rule occurs in 1993 when unemployment effects appear in relation to support for health care spending. Still, even here, the overall pattern conforms with our hypothesis, as the impact of the variable is twice as large on UI and welfare spending support as on support for health care.

Union membership has an irregular impact on support for welfare state spending over the years, but still generally in accord with our expectations. Its strongest and most consistent impact is an (as expected) positive effect on support for unemployment insurance spending, which appears in 1993 and 2000. The variable also positively affects support for health care and pensions/OAS spending at times (in 1997 and 2000 for the former, in 1993 for the latter), but significant coefficients here are roughly half the size of those for spending on the selective social programs.

[18] That the impact of income on pensions/OAS is strongest in 2000 is consistent with our earlier findings about pensions/OAS reported above.

The effects of the remainder of our class variables have a somewhat equivocal bearing on our hypothesis. The impact of retirement is essentially nil across the analysis years, but for a modest—and not readily explicable—positive impact on support for education spending in 1997. The effect of having less than a high school education is confined to a positive effect on support for UI spending in 1997 and 2000—an effect we should expect if this variable truly is a proxy for aspects of class position. The pattern for degree-holders is less readily interpretable. Its only consistent effect is to (ceteris paribus) strongly increase support for welfare spending. This effect appears in each year. At the same time, the variable effects negative impacts on UI spending in 1993 and 2000, on health care spending in 1993 and 1997, and on pensions/OAS spending in 2000. If having a university degree equated simply with class position, the negative effects would make *some* sense. But, in view of the variable's positive impact on support for welfare spending—where we might expect class effects to be strongest—this interpretation seems hardly credible. It might be that, in the presence of income, the education variable captures only the imprint of social liberalism sometimes attributed to higher education (Nie et al. 1996; Johnston et al. 1996). But, again, if this were so, we would expect this variable's sign in the other equations to be reversed. We can not sort out this confusing pattern here. For now, we conclude that the impact of degree-holding does not comport with our hypothesis.

The pattern of effects for the socio-demographic controls are essentially as we would expect. Women are typically more supportive than men of welfare state spending, a finding documented by Gidengil et al. (2003). A variety of significant regional effects appear across the years, as we might expect, but sustained treatment of this pattern is beyond the scope of the present paper. Ethnicity and religious status have very modest and irregular effects in this domain, and merit no further comment. Somewhat more interesting is the pattern of age effects. First, age typically has positive effects on unemployment insurance and welfare spending. One possible interpretation here is that, in an era when Canadians were told that spending cuts were 'inevitable,' older Canadians were simply less likely to be persuaded by these arguments than younger Canadians. This is pure speculation, but it does make some sense of the facts. Second, surprisingly, age has no net effect on support for pension spending. This finding is interesting in light of the arguments made during the pensions debate of the 1990s that public pensions posed problems of intergenerational justice. Third, age has a consistently negative impact on support for education spending. And this is as would be expected on the grounds of economic rationality. It makes sense for older Canadians—who are less likely to make use of educational opportunities than the young—to be less enthusiastic about spending in this area. The consistent effect here is striking, however, given the fact that there are otherwise no substantively important class effects on education spending—save again for the positive impact of retirement status in 1997.

To summarize the findings thus far: In general, we find in the socio-demographic models relatively strong support for our contention that class effects are larger on attitudes toward selective social program spending than on attitudes toward universal social program spending. This finding is robust across the three analysis years under consideration and in the presence of a range of socio-demographic controls. Note also

that the socio-demographic model generally explains more variance, as measured by R-squared, in selective than in universal social program spending attitudes. Overall, then, our hypothesis survives the first empirical cut.

What of the impact of our values terms? That is, does the pattern for our variables tapping 'class-related sentiment' also sustain our hypothesis? The short answer here is yes. Consider tables 5 through 7, which include values and partisanship variables. In every case, the impact of the three 'class conflict' variables is much larger on attitudes toward welfare and UI spending than on either health care, education or pensions/OAS spending. Indeed, in some cases the impact is as much as ten times larger, although ratios of 4:1 or 5:1 are more typical.

Consider first the variable that taps respondents' propensities to 'blame the system.' This variable has a consistently strong, negative impact on support for spending on selective social programs, and has no impact whatsoever on support for universal social program spending—save for its negative impact on pensions/OAS spending in 1993, an effect which is, nonetheless, roughly half as large as the variable's impact in the selective domain. Those who would reduce the power of unions in Canadian society are also consistently negative on selective social program spending while, at the same time, this group does not take a significantly distinctive stand on universal social programs—at least in 1993 and 1997. In 2000, the 'reduce union power' variable has a significant negative impact in all spending areas, although its impact on attitudes toward selective social program spending is typically twice as great. The overall pattern still conforms with our hypothesis, but the findings for 2000 raise some questions. We turn to these briefly in our conclusion. Finally, the pattern for the final 'class conflict' variable—regarding the 'social benefits of business success'—also comports with expectations, though more equivocally. The variable is not always significant, but when it is, effects are typically limited to attitudes toward selective social program spending. The one exception is in 1997, when its only impact is a modest negative effect on pensions/OAS spending.

The final values item, which we argue registers respondents' evaluations of the 'technical capacity of the welfare state,' seems to have roughly equal impact in both the universal and selective social program domains. The variable has a consistent, negative impact on support for spending in two areas in each year: health care and welfare. It has an irregular, if uniformly negative, impact in each of the other spending areas, most notably on unemployment insurance spending in 1993. Overall, then, this item's impact would seem to run afoul of our hypothesis. But, in fact, these findings may be the exception that proves the rule. Insofar as this item taps not positional commitments on the appropriate level of welfare state expenditure but, rather, absorbs valence considerations relating to the capacity of government to implement such positional commitments, it makes sense that it should defy the asymmetrical pattern of effects across the universal-selective divide. Take health care, for instance. Canadians are essentially united on the importance of spending in this area (see Table 1). Where they seem to divide is over government's ability to make spending decisions wisely. On welfare spending, by contrast, Canadians are divided over both the level of government spending and

government's capacity to spend money effectively. In short, findings on this variable, among other things, confirm that Canadians bring different considerations to opinion on different aspects of welfare state spending, even as they raise some of the same considerations across spending areas.

Overall, then, the findings on the values measures strongly conform to expectations. Attitudes on class conflict are more important in opinion-making regarding selective social programs than regarding universal social programs. What of the partisanship effects? One general statement that can be made is that New Democrats and Reform/Alliance supporters are the only partisan groupings that are consistently distinctive in their attitudes toward welfare state spending. This is, of course, as we should expect, given the centrality of classic left-right ideological conflict to the imagery of these parties. There are other sporadically significant effects of partisanship over the years, but these suggest no straightforward interpretation.

Does the entry of the values and partisanship variables alter the pattern of socio-demographic effects? As we might expect, class effects diminish in the presence of the partisan and ideological markers—income and unemployment effects shrink, though they remain statistically significant and, for the most part, substantively important. The effect of union membership is essentially erased, which comes as little surprise given that one of the values terms explicitly addresses union-related attitudes. Those with less than a high school education still bear a distinctive attitudinal imprint, at least insofar as UI is concerned, with effects stable across the models in two of the last three surveys. Apart from class effects, the only other significant story concerns the effect of gender—it would appear that most of the impact of gender is absorbed by partisanship and values, as almost all coefficients are indistinguishable from zero in this model. Age effects are, essentially, undisturbed in the full model.

In short, our hypothesis finds good confirmation in the statistical analysis. In general, class interest and class-related sentiment are more important to opinion on unemployment insurance and welfare spending than to opinion on health care, education and pensions/OAS. The most concise indication of this is to be found by comparing the R-squareds across the full models. In most cases, within years, this statistic is 2 to 3 times larger for the selective social program models than for the universal social program models. In short, to the extent that our models are dominated by variables addressed to class divisions, it would seem that class politics help us explain far more of the variation in attitudes on the former than it does in the case of the latter.

Conclusion

While the politics of retrenchment has received much attention in literature on the welfare state in Canada, scholarly work on public opinion regarding this arena of public policy is surprisingly sparse. Particularly lacking are analyses of the social and attitudinal roots of support for the various programs that are central elements of the welfare state. This paper has been an attempt to address this void in the literature by examining the role

of class and class-related sentiment in support for two different kinds of social programs - selective versus universal ones. It was our hypothesis that the greater benefits that accrue to less affluent citizens would result in more class-based differentiation in support for selective programs, while the generalized benefits distributed by universal programs would result in more undivided support across the population.

The evidence from two sets of models incorporating both demographic and attitudinal measures of class and class-related sentiment confirmed our hypotheses. Measures of class were more important in the structure of support for selective programs than they were for universal ones. These findings suggest that, contrary to the frequent conclusion that class doesn't really matter in Canadian politics, a more nuanced position is appropriate. Class may matter sometimes, especially if we look beyond voting.

In terms of the politics of the welfare state, our findings imply what politicians who have been cutting selective social programs already seem to know—other things being equal, it is easier to cut here than elsewhere. Conversely, in spite of decades of exhortations about the need to cut the welfare state, support for universal social programs remains steadfast– the general lack of social or ideological divisions of any kind over support for health care and (especially) education makes the case that these are truly consensual aspects of Canadian political culture, just as popular political commentary would have it.

In closing, the somewhat novel pattern of results for 2000 merits some comment. In short, we find that in this year support for welfare state spending across areas *apparently* became more explicable in terms of class and class-related value commitment than earlier in the decade.[19] This finding would tend to comport with depictions of the 2000 federal electoral contest as among the most ideological and policy-oriented elections of recent years (Blais et al. 2002: 99-113). And this is a pattern that is likely to continue. Indeed, just days before a likely election call, Prime Minister Paul Martin told Canadians that the social policy differences between his Liberal Party and those of his chief opponent, the Conservative Party, "could not be more stark."[20] To the extent that such messages frame political divisions in the next election, our paper forecasts an electorate divided more deeply along class lines than during any recent election.

[19] Recall that variations in question wordings across the survey years confound rigorous over-time comparisons.
[20] *The Globe and Mail* (on-line edition), 'Voters have 'stark' choices, PM says,' May 6, 2004.

Bibliography

Alford, Robert. 1963. *Party and Society*. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.

Archer, Keith. 1985. 'The Failure of the New Democratic Party: Unions, Unionists, and Politics in Canada.' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 18-2: 353-66.

Blais, Andre, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau and Neil Nevitte. 2002. *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election*. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press.

Clark, T. and S. M. Lipset, eds. 2001. *The Breakdown of Class Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Erickson, Lynda and J. Scott Matthews. 2003. "The Mass Politics of Social Citizenship." Paper presented at the meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, 2003.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Evans, Geoffrey, ed. 1999. *The End of Class Politics?: Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Franklin, M., T. Mackie, H. Valen et al., eds. 1992. *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in western Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. 2003. 'Women to the Left? Gender Differences in Political Beliefs and Policy Differences,' in *Gender and Elections in Canada*, eds. Manon Tremblay and Linda Trimble (forthcoming).

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Korpi, Walter. 1980. "Social Policy and distributional conflict in the capitalist democracies: a preliminary comparative framework." *Western European Politics,* 3: 291-316.

Korpi, Walter and Joakim Palme. 1998. "The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in the Western Countries" *American Sociological Review*, pp. 661-687.

Green, Christopher. 1994. "What Should We Do with the UI System?" *Unemployment Insurance: How to Make It Work,* ed. John Richards and William G. Watson. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, pp. 1-35.

Johnston, Richard, André Blais, Henry Brady, and Jean Crête. 1992. *Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Johnston, Richard, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte. 1996. *The Challenge of Direct Democracy: The 1992 Canadian Referendum*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Lochhead, Clarence. 1998. "Who Benefits from Canada's Income Security Programs?" *Perception*. 21 no. 4 http://www.ccsd.ca/perception/214/insite7.htm

Nevitte, Neil, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Richard Nadeau. 2000. *Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nie, Norman, Jane Junn and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry. 1996. *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Nieuwbeerta, Paul and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 1999. 'Traditional Class Voting in Twenty Postwar Societies,' in Evans 1999.

Ornstein, Michael and H. Michael Stevenson. 1999. *Politics and ideology in Canada : elite and public opinion in the transformation of a welfare state*. Montreal : McGill-Queen's University Press.

Pammet, Jon. 1987. 'Class Voting and Class Consciousness in Canada.' *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 24-2: 269-90.

Rothstein, Bo. 2001 "The Universal Welfare State as a Social Dilemma", in *Rationality and Society* 13: 213-233.

Svallfors, Stefan. 1997. "Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A Comparison of Eight Western Nations" *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 13: 283-304.

Svallfors, Stefan. 1999. 'The Politics of Swedish Welfare Policies,' in Evans 1999.

Statistics Canada. 2003. "Canada's Retirement Income Programs," *The Daily* Friday February 14. http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/030214/d030214a.htm.

Torjman, Sherri and Kenneth Battle. 1994. "Senior's Beware: This Review's for You Too." *Caledon Commentary* Toronto: Caledon Institute of Social Policy.

Weakliem, David and Anthony Heath. 1994. 'Rational Choice and Class Voting.' *Rationality and Society* 6-2: 243.

Wright, E. O. 1985. *Classes*. London: Verso.

Table 1. Support for Welfare State Spending, 1993-2000 (CES)

	1993	1997	2000
	Health Care Spending		
Cut a lot/Spend less	3.05	2.26	1.03
Cut some/Spend about the same	25.09	16.14	10.61
Cut not at all/Spend more	71.86	81.60	88.37
N	3,742	3,142	2,828
	Education Spending		
Cut a lot/Spend less	1.98	2.11	1.67
Cut some/Spend about the same	16.72	17.72	15.44
Cut not at all/Spend more	81.30	80.17	82.88
N	3,738	3,132	2,810
	Pensions and Old Age Security Spending		
Cut a lot/Spend less	1.98	2.05	1.57
Cut some/Spend about the same	17.39	15.92	37.04
Cut not at all/Spend more	80.63	82.03	61.38
N	3,737	3,128	2,794
	(Un)employment Insurance Spending		
Cut a lot/Spend less	9.74	6.68	12.45
Cut some/Spend about the same	46.39	45.15	49.41
Cut not at all/Spend more	43.87	48.18	38.13
N	3,686	3,070	2,722
	Welfare Spending		
Cut a lot/Spend less	21.20	16.16	20.22
Cut some/Spend about the same	47.59	46.51	44.98
Cut not at all/Spend more	31.21	37.33	34.80
N	3,675	3,081	2,750

Cell entries are percentages.

Table 2. Welfare State Support by Spending Area, 1993 – Socio-demographics Only (OLS Estimates)

	Health Care	Education	Pensions/OAS	Unemployment Insurance	Welfare
Age	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.002	0.001
	(0.43)	(2.92)**	(0.19)	(3.21)**	(1.87)
Woman	0.044	0.014	0.024	0.040	0.006
	(4.20)**	(1.42)	(2.57)*	(3.08)**	(0.42)
Non-European	0.012	0.006	-0.013	0.013	0.012
	(0.66)	(0.32)	(0.75)	(0.53)	(0.43)
Catholic	-0.007	0.012	0.011	0.021	-0.016
	(0.51)	(0.99)	(0.97)	(1.24)	(0.88)
Non-religious	0.024	0.041	0.017	0.024	0.050
	(1.54)	(2.92)**	(1.16)	(1.16)	(2.29)*
Degree	-0.050	0.011	-0.012	-0.051	0.069
	(3.34)**	(0.97)	(0.98)	(2.99)**	(3.57)**
No High School	0.004	-0.018	0.015	0.033	-0.025
	(0.30)	(1.38)	(1.26)	(1.87)	(1.31)
Income	-0.007	-0.002	-0.003	-0.015	-0.014
	(2.96)**	(0.83)	(1.60)	(5.26)**	(4.76)**
Union Member	0.012	0.015	0.024	0.066	0.000
	(1.06)	(1.42)	(2.38)*	(4.62)**	(0.01)
Retired	0.021	-0.040	0.006	0.042	0.031
	(1.03)	(1.70)	(0.35)	(1.60)	(1.04)
Unemployed	0.042	0.002	0.008	0.086	0.111
	(2.00)*	(0.11)	(0.47)	(3.39)**	(3.50)**
Quebec	-0.084	0.025	-0.006	0.081	0.103
	(5.07)**	(1.82)	(0.43)	(4.15)**	(4.74)**
Atlantic	0.009	0.070	0.006	-0.005	0.100
	(0.48)	(4.94)**	(0.34)	(0.21)	(3.56)**
West	-0.025	0.023	-0.014	-0.023	0.051
	(2.08)*	(1.93)	(1.21)	(1.42)	(2.85)**
Constant	0.889	0.920	0.881	0.567	0.468
	(33.06)**	(37.48)**	(37.94)**	(17.11)**	(12.91)**
N	3133	3129	3126	3096	3089
R-squared	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.08	0.05

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

Table 3. Welfare State Support by Spending Area, 1997 – Socio-demographics Only (OLS Estimates)

	Health Care	Education	Pensions/OAS	Unemployment Insurance	Welfare
Age	-0.000	-0.002	0.001	0.002	0.004
	(0.31)	(4.18)**	(1.71)	(3.38)**	(4.96)**
Woman	0.035	0.029	0.025	0.031	-0.006
	(3.19)**	(2.72)**	(2.36)*	(2.16)*	(0.37)
Non-European	-0.009	0.005	0.000	0.010	-0.087
	(0.47)	(0.27)	(0.02)	(0.33)	(2.75)**
Catholic	0.025	0.024	-0.003	0.023	0.002
	(2.02)*	(1.92)	(0.24)	(1.30)	(0.09)
Non-religious	0.003	0.014	-0.011	0.013	0.029
	(0.16)	(0.83)	(0.69)	(0.57)	(1.17)
Degree	-0.037	0.004	-0.019	-0.024	0.082
	(2.48)*	(0.28)	(1.31)	(1.22)	(3.99)**
No High School	0.005	0.003	0.011	0.054	-0.028
	(0.39)	(0.20)	(0.83)	(3.02)**	(1.36)
Income	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.012	-0.015
	(2.16)*	(1.67)	(2.11)*	(3.67)**	(4.68)**
Union Member	0.022	0.016	0.006	0.028	0.013
	(2.01)*	(1.42)	(0.56)	(1.93)	(0.81)
Retired	-0.000	0.051	-0.024	-0.015	-0.020
	(0.01)	(2.09)*	(1.18)	(0.53)	(0.67)
Unemployed	0.004	0.013	-0.023	0.019	0.068
	(0.19)	(0.57)	(0.87)	(0.61)	(1.98)*
Quebec	-0.025	-0.028	-0.035	0.005	0.117
	(1.57)	(1.70)	(2.15)*	(0.22)	(5.12)**
Atlantic	0.047	0.062	0.026	0.063	0.086
	(2.96)**	(4.07)**	(1.63)	(2.68)**	(3.05)**
West	0.020	0.047	-0.013	-0.031	0.033
	(1.57)	(3.65)**	(1.08)	(1.76)	(1.68)
Constant	0.896	0.949	0.893	0.617	0.429
	(29.63)**	(33.00)**	(29.40)**	(16.14)**	(10.35)**
N	2535	2527	2523	2481	2485
R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.07

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

Table 4. Welfare State Support by Spending Area, 2000 – Socio-demographics Only (OLS Estimates)

	Health Care	Education	Pensions/OAS	Unemployment Insurance	Welfare
Age	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.002	0.005
	(0.35)	(2.83)**	(0.35)	(3.52)**	(6.69)**
Woman	0.028	0.034	0.011	0.021	0.025
	(3.19)**	(3.47)**	(0.91)	(1.42)	(1.50)
Non-European	0.003	0.021	0.014	0.014	-0.012
	(0.18)	(1.42)	(0.74)	(0.67)	(0.47)
Catholic	0.022	0.011	0.017	0.062	0.043
	(2.11)*	(0.85)	(1.08)	(3.34)**	(1.98)*
Non-religious	-0.023	-0.022	-0.030	0.017	0.007
	(1.32)	(1.17)	(1.43)	(0.74)	(0.28)
Degree	-0.012	-0.005	-0.038	-0.040	0.085
	(0.90)	(0.33)	(2.23)*	(2.19)*	(4.10)**
No High School	0.015	0.013	0.015	0.047	0.020
	(1.50)	(0.91)	(0.92)	(2.24)*	(0.91)
Income	-0.001	-0.003	-0.012	-0.021	-0.016
	(0.74)	(1.38)	(4.56)**	(7.26)**	(4.88)**
Union Member	0.028	0.009	0.024	0.052	0.014
	(2.76)**	(0.79)	(1.71)	(3.37)**	(0.78)
Retired	-0.001	-0.008	-0.024	-0.045	-0.023
	(0.06)	(0.36)	(1.02)	(1.70)	(0.78)
Unemployed	0.015	0.025	0.013	0.106	0.046
	(0.94)	(1.47)	(0.38)	(3.22)**	(1.06)
Quebec	0.007	-0.021	0.001	0.116	0.073
	(0.66)	(1.49)	(0.06)	(5.55)**	(3.18)**
Atlantic	0.045	0.026	0.018	0.027	0.030
	(3.99)**	(1.84)	(0.84)	(1.21)	(1.05)
West	-0.006	-0.010	-0.021	-0.068	-0.059
	(0.49)	(0.72)	(1.21)	(3.55)**	(2.75)**
Constant	0.912	0.961	0.837	0.545	0.368
	(38.32)**	(40.62)**	(26.19)**	(15.08)**	(9.03)**
N	2419	2407	2395	2344	2365
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.16	0.10

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

Table 5. Welfare State Support by Spending Area, 1993 – Full Model (OLS Estimates)

	Health Care	Education	Pensions/OAS	Unemployment Insurance	Welfare
Age	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.003	0.003
	(0.29)	(1.78)	(0.82)	(4.39)**	(3.42)**
Woman	0.030	-0.014	0.017	0.034	-0.013
	(2.05)*	(0.99)	(1.28)	(1.92)	(0.68)
Non-European	-0.009	0.034	-0.002	-0.008	-0.025
	(0.32)	(1.81)	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.62)
Catholic	-0.024	0.008	0.016	0.012	-0.017
	(1.29)	(0.50)	(1.01)	(0.56)	(0.70)
Non-religious	0.028	0.009	0.008	0.019	0.044
	(1.40)	(0.47)	(0.38)	(0.72)	(1.51)
Degree	-0.055	0.008	0.004	-0.048	0.041
	(2.90)**	(0.54)	(0.25)	(2.40)*	(1.70)
No High School	0.011	-0.022	0.004	0.018	-0.061
	(0.60)	(1.19)	(0.21)	(0.73)	(2.28)*
Income	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.014	-0.014
	(1.29)	(1.07)	(1.13)	(3.96)**	(3.59)**
Union Member	-0.015	0.002	0.015	0.020	-0.029
	(0.92)	(0.16)	(1.02)	(1.04)	(1.32)
Retired	0.017	-0.070	-0.020	0.017	0.031
	(0.60)	(2.16)*	(0.80)	(0.51)	(0.80)
Unemployed	0.066	0.022	0.010	0.078	0.106
	(2.53)*	(1.02)	(0.39)	(2.51)*	(2.67)**
Quebec	-0.056	0.037	-0.029	0.071	0.073
	(2.28)*	(1.78)	(1.38)	(2.46)*	(2.33)*
Atlantic	0.007	0.077	-0.013	-0.036	0.083
	(0.29)	(4.53)**	(0.53)	(1.21)	(2.37)*
West	-0.025	0.029	-0.005	-0.031	0.034
	(1.48)	(1.71)	(0.33)	(1.47)	(1.45)
Liberal PID	0.027	0.026	0.025	-0.032	0.002
	(1.36)	(1.36)	(1.45)	(1.35)	(0.09)
Conservative PID	-0.031	0.012	-0.002	-0.052	0.014
	(1.43)	(0.61)	(0.12)	(2.01)*	(0.52)
NDP PID	0.008	0.042	0.056	0.032	0.071
	(0.31)	(1.82)	(2.88)**	(1.08)	(1.82)
Reform PID	-0.041	0.001	-0.097	-0.052	-0.111
	(1.11)	(0.04)	(2.57)*	(1.33)	(2.72)**
BQ PID	-0.019	-0.010	0.040	0.011	0.031
	(0.58)	(0.36)	(1.46)	(0.31)	(0.85)
Blame self	-0.046	-0.018	-0.052	-0.098	-0.229
	(1.64)	(0.74)	(2.14)*	(3.02)**	(6.29)**
Reduce union power	-0.061	-0.044	-0.013	-0.157	-0.193
	(1.94)	(1.48)	(0.44)	(4.17)**	(4.36)**
Business benefits all	-0.018	-0.000	-0.041	-0.048	-0.090
	(0.64)	(0.02)	(1.63)	(1.46)	(2.49)*
Priv. sec. job creation	-0.093	-0.041	-0.041	-0.129	-0.079
	(3.72)**	(1.92)	(1.88)	(4.70)**	(2.51)*
Constant	0.986	0.981	0.926	0.787	0.757
	(22.26)**	(24.52)**	(21.13)**	(14.15)**	(12.80)**
N	1695	1693	1692	1679	1681
R-squared	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.16	0.15

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

Table 6. Welfare State Support by Spending Area, 1997 – Full Model (OLS Estimates)

	Health Care	Education	Pensions/OAS	Unemployment Insurance	Welfare
Age	-0.000	-0.002	0.001	0.003	0.005
	(0.03)	(3.22)**	(1.90)	(3.71)**	(5.92)**
Woman	0.023	0.017	0.011	0.011	-0.033
	(1.90)	(1.49)	(0.93)	(0.69)	(2.02)*
Non-European	-0.007	-0.000	0.001	0.025	-0.076
	(0.33)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.81)	(2.44)*
Catholic	0.016	0.013	-0.010	0.008	-0.015
	(1.24)	(1.01)	(0.85)	(0.45)	(0.74)
Non-religious	0.001	0.013	-0.021	0.003	0.033
	(0.04)	(0.76)	(1.21)	(0.12)	(1.37)
Degree	-0.040	-0.003	-0.020	-0.042	0.067
	(2.69)**	(0.22)	(1.39)	(2.13)*	(3.28)**
No High School	0.000	-0.001	0.005	0.039	-0.033
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.34)	(1.97)*	(1.48)
Income	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006	-0.009	-0.011
	(1.85)	(1.43)	(2.11)*	(2.53)*	(3.36)**
Union Member	0.023	0.004	0.009	0.000	-0.021
	(1.79)	(0.34)	(0.72)	(0.01)	(1.20)
Retired	0.005	0.048	-0.029	-0.017	-0.031
	(0.20)	(1.80)	(1.28)	(0.55)	(0.99)
Unemployed	0.003	0.010	-0.022	0.018	0.063
	(0.12)	(0.39)	(0.79)	(0.51)	(1.73)
Quebec	-0.028	-0.025	-0.040	-0.007	0.101
	(1.39)	(1.26)	(2.01)*	(0.28)	(3.90)**
Atlantic	0.056	0.065	0.029	0.069	0.094
	(3.13)**	(3.91)**	(1.69)	(2.73)**	(3.16)**
West	0.020	0.049	-0.018	-0.034	0.049
	(1.44)	(3.60)**	(1.34)	(1.76)	(2.44)*
Liberal PID	0.010	0.005	0.014	0.019	0.051
	(0.70)	(0.33)	(1.01)	(0.98)	(2.36)*
Conservative PID	-0.037	-0.061	-0.026	-0.006	-0.001
	(1.81)	(3.05)**	(1.26)	(0.24)	(0.06)
NDP PID	0.043	0.010	0.050	0.096	0.120
	(2.69)**	(0.54)	(3.05)**	(3.02)**	(3.92)**
Reform PID	-0.034	-0.066	-0.002	-0.039	-0.064
	(1.31)	(2.62)**	(0.07)	(1.23)	(2.05)*
BQ PID	0.016	0.001	0.015	0.060	0.094
	(0.66)	(0.05)	(0.56)	(1.98)*	(2.84)**
Blame self	-0.028	-0.013	-0.018	-0.120	-0.174
	(1.51)	(0.65)	(0.96)	(4.99)**	(6.39)**
Reduce union power	0.011	-0.010	0.031	-0.101	-0.158
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(1.00)	(2.76)**	(4.46)**
Business benefits all	-0.022	-0.016	-0.042	-0.024	-0.027
	(1.10)	(0.87)	(2.22)*	(0.96)	(1.08)
Priv. sec. job creation	-0.050	-0.063	-0.027	-0.046	-0.092
	(2.60)**	(3.24)**	(1.47)	(1.84)	(3.64)**
Constant	0.938	1.008	0.916	0.777	0.636
	(29.29)**	(31.70)**	(28.09)**	(17.14)**	(12.33)**
N	2210	2213	2205	2185	2181
R-squared	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.10	0.16

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

Table 7. Welfare State Support by Spending Area, 2000 – Full Model (OLS Estimates)

	Health Care	Education	Pensions/OAS	Unemployment Insurance	Welfare
Age	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.003	0.005
	(0.18)	(2.10)*	(0.69)	(4.35)**	(6.88)**
Woman	0.014	0.024	0.003	-0.003	-0.009
	(1.55)	(2.42)*	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.57)
Non-European	0.002	0.017	0.017	-0.002	-0.025
	(0.12)	(1.14)	(0.88)	(0.11)	(1.00)
Catholic	0.016	-0.000	0.006	0.047	0.016
	(1.42)	(0.01)	(0.35)	(2.48)*	(0.71)
Non-religious	-0.029	-0.026	-0.038	-0.005	-0.041
	(1.61)	(1.36)	(1.74)	(0.21)	(1.69)
Degree	-0.020	-0.011	-0.043	-0.055	0.059
	(1.46)	(0.78)	(2.47)*	(3.10)**	(2.94)**
No High School	0.022	0.005	0.029	0.053	0.029
	(1.93)	(0.31)	(1.67)	(2.55)*	(1.24)
Income	-0.000	-0.001	-0.010	-0.016	-0.009
	(0.18)	(0.64)	(3.79)**	(5.73)**	(2.88)**
Union Member	0.014	-0.007	0.010	0.015	-0.037
	(1.23)	(0.55)	(0.65)	(0.97)	(2.07)*
Retired	-0.007	-0.007	-0.024	-0.047	-0.019
	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.95)	(1.83)	(0.66)
Unemployed	0.014	0.025	0.030	0.068	0.030
	(0.84)	(1.36)	(0.89)	(2.10)*	(0.71)
Quebec	0.015	-0.005	0.014	0.105	0.073
	(1.15)	(0.31)	(0.69)	(4.50)**	(2.87)**
Atlantic	0.043	0.021	0.012	0.010	0.022
	(3.35)**	(1.36)	(0.52)	(0.41)	(0.75)
West	0.006	-0.006	0.002	-0.047	-0.008
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.13)	(2.43)*	(0.37)
Liberal PID	0.045	0.025	0.050	-0.004	0.043
	(3.47)**	(1.81)	(2.79)**	(0.22)	(1.94)
Conservative PID	0.025	0.001	-0.007	-0.013	-0.013
	(1.28)	(0.03)	(0.29)	(0.52)	(0.42)
NDP PID	0.065	0.011	0.057	0.081	0.171
	(4.40)**	(0.45)	(1.97)*	(2.48)*	(4.67)**
Reform PID	-0.017	-0.020	-0.016	-0.072	-0.109
	(0.75)	(0.92)	(0.60)	(2.55)*	(3.72)**
BQ PID	0.037	-0.027	0.024	0.059	0.103
	(2.58)**	(1.30)	(1.01)	(2.29)*	(3.44)**
Blame self	-0.009	-0.015	0.006	-0.090	-0.137
	(0.60)	(0.86)	(0.27)	(3.60)**	(4.99)**
Reduce union power	-0.083	-0.109	-0.107	-0.246	-0.181
	(3.93)**	(4.59)**	(3.68)**	(7.52)**	(4.69)**
Business benefits all	-0.025	-0.017	-0.033	-0.082	-0.076
	(1.62)	(0.99)	(1.59)	(3.62)**	(2.88)**
Priv. sec. job creation	-0.041	-0.007	-0.046	-0.034	-0.090
	(2.90)**	(0.43)	(2.28)*	(1.60)	(3.60)**
Constant	0.977	1.039	0.897	0.790	0.615
	(31.22)**	(35.35)**	(22.39)**	(17.84)**	(12.11)**
N	2159	2155	2138	2113	2121
R-squared	0.08	0.05	0.07	0.25	0.19

Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level