

Beyond Inclusion Politics: Reconstituting the Political Order

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The theme of inclusion is central to considering ways to reconstitute the political order, both theoretically and practically. In the discipline of political theory there are wide-ranging theories on how to promote the inclusion of Othered people, ranging from the expansion of differentiated rights, plural and flexible forms of citizenship, increased participation and representation, and democratic deliberation and dialogue. Politically, governments promote inclusion through wide-ranging policies including those related to multiculturalism, employment, and immigration and citizenship. The essential premise of these theories and policies is that by reorganizing socio-political arrangements through inclusion, democracy will be further legitimized. Yet whilst the discourse of inclusion enables scholars and governments to consider ways to accommodate and ‘integrate’ subjugated identities, and to take account of some identity-based differences, I contend that inclusion alone will not suffice in reconstituting the political order. Specifically, it is critical to expose the underlying subtext of inclusion, analyze the other side of inclusion namely exclusion, and identify modes of resistance and disruption. These three aspects draw explicit attention to issues of power that are, at times at least, under-theorized in inclusion discourses. It is only by illuminating arrangements and dynamics of power is it possible to radically re-shape the political order.

To illustrate why these dimensions are critical, I analyze the recently announced 2005 Canadian government policy ‘A Canada for All: Canada’s Action Plan against Racism’ (hence forth CAPAR or ‘the plan’), a key policy document that is intended to promote inclusion through substantive changes in employment, education, health, approaches to crime and justice, and immigrant integration policies. This involves a six point action plan to combat racism and discrimination, where the goals are to: 1) assist victims and groups vulnerable to racism and related forms of discrimination; 2) develop forward-looking approaches to promote diversity and combat racism; 3) strengthen the role of civil society; 4) strengthen regional and international cooperation; 5) educate children and youth on diversity and anti-racism; 6) counter hate and bias. The government’s commitment to the CAPAR is evident in the \$56 million investment made (over five years) to support implementation of the action plan.

The plan is framed in the context of liberal multiculturalism, an aspect of politics that is aimed at including different national and polyethnic groups.¹ For instance, in the introduction it states that “We have policies and programs to enhance the multicultural nature of our society and to combat all forms of discrimination” (Heritage, 2005: iii). Later, it is stated that the CAPAR complements multiculturalism, a policy that is declared to be “a positive aspect of life in Canada” (Heritage, 2005: 27). At the same time, the CAPAR departs from liberal multiculturalism in that the focus is on the effects of racism rather than cultural diversity; as such this document marks an important turning point in federal government approaches to reconstituting the political order, where the emphasis is on the politics of race rather than culture. As stated in the plan, the CAPAR is “the first-ever horizontal, coordinated approach across the federal government to combat racism” (Heritage, 2005: iii). Yet despite this important political shift, the elimination of racism is premised on the same principle as liberal multiculturalism, namely inclusion. In the foreword of the plan, Prime Minister Paul Martin states that the government has “made a commitment to be steadfast advocate of inclusion and to strengthen Canada’s ability to combat racism” (Heritage, 2005: ii). The document goes on to state that the plan will help to “realize the shared Canadian vision of an inclusive and equitable society,” “build a more resilient, harmonious, and creative society,” and that “Through policies, programs and services, this action plan strives to enhance Canada’s identity as an inclusive, multicultural society” (Heritage, 2005: iii, 2, 56). Though the plan states that the concern “is not just about inclusion – it is also a call to action to combat racism” (Heritage, 2005: 4), the strategy to combat racism is itself dependent on inclusion.

The CAPAR reflects many of the concerns of contemporary political theorists, especially those that advocate versions of identity/difference politics in which the goal is to promote the inclusion of marginalized groups. In the tradition of liberal multiculturalist Will Kymlicka (1995a; 1995b; 1998) who focuses on ways to best promote the individual as a member of a minority culture, the plan employs rights discourse as a key tool of

¹ Whilst the plan situates the struggle against racism in the context of multiculturalism it is striking to note that it has taken the government 34 years to present a coherent anti-racism strategy since the introduction of the first multicultural policy. It is not entirely clear why the CAPAR has become policy at this time in political history, although one can speculate that it continues in the tradition of other Liberal government policies such as multiculturalism, employment equity policies, and the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. The plan was also presented by a minority Liberal government at a time when its electoral support was waning; as such it may have been presented to appeal to key ethnic and racialized communities.

inclusion. It states that “All human beings have the right to live in security, to work, to participate in society, and to develop their full potential. Racism violates these rights” (Heritage, 2005: ii). The emphasis on shared citizenship in the plan also reflects the theoretical focus in multicultural thought on the need to promote the ties that bind (Cairns, 2000; Kymlicka, 1998). For example the plan states “In the context of this growing diversity, Canada has developed an evolving approach to citizenship based on shared core values, rights and responsibilities, anchored in a robust legislative and policy framework” and “Citizenship and Immigration Canada will continue to build on efforts to promote shared citizenship” (Heritage, 2005: 2, 50). This commitment to inclusive citizenship is in part dependent on increasing the involvement and representation of marginalized people, where the goal is to “Eliminate barriers that prevent full and active participation in civil society of groups affected by or vulnerable to racism and related forms of discrimination” and “Assist communities to target hate and bias through the use of media and other avenues, and increase representation and participation of racial and ethnic groups in mainstream media” (Heritage, 2005: 14, 44). As such, the plan reflects the concerns of theorists such as Iris Marion Young (2000) and Melissa Williams (1998) for the need to promote activities and structures that enhance participation and representation. Finally, the plan contains a commitment to improving and increasing dialogue, a theme that has been the focus of James Tully (1995; 2000; 2002), Seyla Benhabib (1996; 2002) and Charles Taylor (1994a; 1994b). For instance, the plan states the need for an on-going dialogue on national security in a diverse and pluralistic society, continuing dialogues started in forums such as the Canada-Aboriginal Peoples Roundtable, and collaboration and coalition building between communities (Heritage, 2005: 21, 23, 33, 52).

Political theorists have increasingly considered ways to radicalize inclusion by confronting the actual particularity of Others’ experience and directly introducing the perspectives of marginalized cultures into institutional contexts (Williams, 1995: 79-80). This includes, as Melissa Williams (1995) has argued, that a political rather juridical approach to justice is critical. In particular, her analysis points to a shift from understanding rights as a legal tool to a political tool. This is echoed by Miriam Smith

who suggests that rights can be used to *validate* claims of identity/difference rather than act as the source of claims:

In this view, rights discourse and equality-seeking are deployed by social movements in order to legitimate claims both to their constituency and to the wider society of which they are part. The main goal of litigation and of equality-seeking discourse is to build the movements rather than achieve substantive legal or policy change. (1999: 20)

In this, Smith is shifting the emphasis from the litigious aspect to the political dimension of rights. Smith argues that through the 1970's, rights played a key role in activating lesbian and gay citizenry and organizing groups into effective political units (1999: 21). It was the declaration of rights, the employment of rights discourse -- rather than the actual gaining of rights -- that helped activists to politicize the meaning of their claims. According to Smith, prior to the advent of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, litigation was employed as part of a broader strategy for social transformation:

Rights claims before the courts were a means of naming names, outing the issues of sexual preference, of mobilizing social and political identities, and of developing networks and organization. In the interpretative frame of gay liberation, rights claims were seen as intimately linked to the process of movement creation and mobilization; the goal of building the social movements was as important, if not more important, than the achievement of legal and legislative victories from the state. (1999: 21)

Rights, in this sense, were not simply employed as a legal strategy. This is not to say that the legal application of rights is irrelevant; rather it is to shift the focus from simply employing rights as a legal mechanism to identifying the ways in which organizing around rights enables political mobilization. To mobilize around rights claims is to enact the possibilities of dissent and change rather than just the desire for inclusion. In this way, rights can be radically deployed as a tool of what Chela Sandoval (1991) calls 'oppositional consciousness'. Sandoval treats equality rights as one of five tactics of raising oppositional consciousness (the other four being 'revolutionary,' 'supremacism,' 'separatism' and 'differential' tactics). Sandoval acknowledges that there are limits to the rights tactic in that rights presumes a desire for inclusion or assimilation within present traditions and values of the social order; radical societal transformation is not the goal; and rights do not nurture differences but rather rights discourse only has limited potential

to protect existing differences and express toleration (Sandoval, 1991: 12-13). Nonetheless Sandoval acknowledges that rights have the potential to raise *collective consciousness* about ways to defy domination. As such, rights can be reconceived as a way to radicalize inclusion, not simply as legal tools, but as point of mobilization.

Other scholars have theorized fluid and flexible models of citizenship. Jeremy Webber (1994) appeals to the idea of an on-going conversation rather than tight social bonds; Joseph Carens (2000) conceptualizes a heterogeneous and contextual model of citizenship; Iris Young (1990) advances a theory of differentiated citizenship; Melissa Williams (2001) argues that citizenship can be understood as act of shared fate rather than shared values; and Shane Phelan (2001) calls for the 'queering' of citizenship. These forms of citizenship attempt to present thin rather than thick understandings in which there is not one fixed model. This is not to say that for people, and some of the time, citizenship is not thickly conceived. However, in order to begin with the lived experiences of subjects, these theorists advocate that the state must be able to adapt to changing notions of citizenship.

A minimalist account of citizenship is especially significant in this global age because it can accommodate significations of transnational citizenship. Johanna Waters (2003) study of Chinese immigration from Hong Kong and Taiwan to Canada illustrates the changing meaning of citizenship for Chinese immigrants. She suggests that at first it may be the case that some Chinese immigrants see citizenship instrumentally -- in that they are hyper-mobile, moving back and forth from Canada to the place of origin, waiting to fulfill the legal requirements of attaining a Canadian passport -- but as time goes on many Chinese immigrants develop a stronger meaning of citizenship. Waters notes that this is especially true of the wives of 'astronaut husbands' (husbands that take off to return to Hong Kong and Taiwan) and children (2003: 228-229). Waters is particularly interested in self-perceptions of citizenship, rather than adopting a standard by which to evaluate the meaning of Canadian citizenship. This leads her to conclude that there is "new generation of citizens forming distinctive attachments and laying down roots despite the intensity of their overseas ties" (Waters, 2003: 233). Waters analysis demonstrates the transient nature of citizenship, which changes over time and through shifting ties and attachments to particular geographies. Her study further illustrates the

ways in which a minimalist account of citizenship leaves room for people to adopt thin or alternatively thick significations of citizenship, depending on their experiences. The flexibility of citizenship is essential because inclusion does not have to depend on a fixed notion about the ties that bind members of society.

Other theorists have also explored ways to promote inclusion but with a focus on ways to accommodate political tensions that arise from power differentials. Chantal Mouffe (2000) argues that an agonistic vision of democracy enables an open conflict of interests and vibrant clashes between political positions. She contends that whereas attempts at consensus inevitably lead to the exclusion or forced assimilation of some by dominant groups, democratic contestation enables negotiation on moral values as an open conflict between different interests; for Mouffe, the essence of democracy is dependent on this insufficient consensus (1993: 6). Mouffe rightly asserts that a lack of consensus is not a threat to democracies, contrary to liberal arguments, but rather, contestation is a condition of democracy. This suggests that whereas inclusion tends to require harmony and consensus, this need not be the case with radical forms of democratic inclusion.

James Tully (1995; 1999; 2000; 2001) also presents a theory of public deliberation that also demonstrates the positive aspects of agonic democracy. For Tully, deliberations over recognition and redistribution are activities of disclosure and acknowledgement rather than pursuits for definitive justice (Tully, 2000: 479). Mutual disclosure and acknowledgement do not inevitably lead to full constitutional recognition or inclusion, Tully continues, but the struggle itself is “an important achievement in its own right for all the actors involved” (2001: 22). Through disclosure and acknowledgement, groups are forced to articulate meanings and publicly justify these meanings both to other members of their group and those outside the group; this is true for all actors of deliberation including dominant meaning-makers. Tully contends that even when recognition and agreement is not achieved, reciprocal disclosure and acknowledgement can still affect, to some extent, the outcome. For Tully, the politics of disclosure and acknowledgement are productive because a) public deliberation and civic virtues are initiated and b) disclosure “acts as a kind of public catharsis; it forces minorities to convert their alienation into public argumentation rather than into private frustration” (Maclure, 2003: 7). Whatever the outcome of deliberation, the process has

the potential to enable self-confidence for those articulating their claims. Further, listening to alternative perspectives can lead one to alter one's position. The intersubjective aspect of deliberation provides the opportunity to re-evaluate and/or refine an argument. The activities of mutual disclosure and acknowledgment can also "generate levels of self-empowerment, self-worth, and pride that can overcome the debilitating and psychological effects of misrecognition" (Tully, 2000: 479).² In the end, according to Tully, such activity can enable a "process of citizenization" (2001: 25). In this regard, deliberation and dialogue are not simply intended to promote inclusion; rather they provide ways to identify the tensions and relations of power between subjects.

Yet despite these tools and principles of radicalizing inclusion, I argue that reconstitution of the political order cannot depend on inclusion alone. At the very least, it is critical to problematize inclusion by identifying i) the subtext of inclusion; ii) the other side of inclusion, namely exclusion; and iii) the ways in which the political order is also constituted by Othered peoples through modes of resistance and disruption. These aspects of politics provide an understanding of power that is otherwise masked or obscured by an emphasis on inclusion.

The Subtext of Inclusion

Inclusion is generally presented as if it led to the absence of oppression and discrimination. To consider whether this is accurate it is critical to expose the subtext of inclusion, particularly to explore whether inclusion is promoted by those already included as a way to sustain hegemonic arrangements of power. This is important because as Amarpal Dhaliwal states

[The politics of inclusion] does not account for the ways inclusion can still oppress or fail to alter structures of domination. The inability of radical democratic inclusion politics to deal with inclusion retaining peripheralization is a key limitation, especially given that, in many liberal democratic societies, many democratic groups have been 'included' by being accorded certain formal rights like the right to vote. If inclusionary attempts often reaffirm a hegemonic core to which the margins are added without any significant destabilization of that 'core' or continue to valorize the very centre that is problematic to begin

² This is also echoed by Benhabib who says that "the very procedure of articulating a view in public imposes a certain reflexivity on individual preferences and opinions" (1996: 71).

with, then it is clear that the motivation to include needs questioning.
(1994: 43)

The concept of inclusion, according to Dhaliwal, assumes that there is a delimited core to be included into. When this is problematized, it becomes apparent that an inclusive sphere only exists in relation to a sphere of exclusion. As such, the dichotomy of insider/outsider remains stable; there remains an overarching need to define who does and does not belong in the core, and an assumption that those currently included are equally included. This is often without full consideration of the fact that many peoples are sometimes included and other times excluded or sometimes closer to the periphery than the core without entering the periphery. Moreover, the assumption is that there is one legitimate core or centre and yet many of us have our own places of belonging, in which the 'core' is not pre-determined. For example, those immigrant women of colour who are marginalized by mainstream society have alternate spaces through work, activism, families, and cultural communities in which we are not on the margins but rather at the centre of political life.

In *Inclusion and Democracy* Young echoes this critique of inclusion. Young states that “a concept of inclusion presupposes some bordered unit into which those excluded can be included. As a concept it thus depends on some continued exclusion” (2000: 12). Drawing from the work of Robert Goodin (1966), Young is particularly interested in the nation-state as an inappropriate exclusive political forum. She contends that

The ideal of inclusion presupposes bounded states whose function is as much to exclude some people as to include others. Calls for inclusion rarely question this nation-state form, and merely aim to rectify political and social inequalities among people already dwelling under the jurisdiction of the nation-state. (Young, 2000: 12)

Young concludes that the bounded nature of the nation-state is exclusionary because “the scope of relationships across which principles of justice apply is often global” (2000: 249). Whilst Young’s criticism is valid and important to an analysis of inclusion-exclusion in this global era, it is also helpful to focus on the boundaries of the inside/outside *within* the nation-state in order to consider the subtext of inclusion more locally.

In particular, analysis reveals that power arrangements are not fundamentally altered through inclusion. Instead, inclusion can enable dominant agents to reclassify categories of the Othered. In the context of multiculturalism and feminism, Jo-Anne Lee and Linda Cardinal argue that:

...the political strategy of 'inclusion' has become another system of race and gender classification. As Foucault might have observed, the political strategy of 'inclusion' has been transformed into a technology of disciplinary power....The liberatory potential of multiculturalism and feminism is thus reinscribed within a nationalist framework. (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 227)

Lee and Cardinal explore the ways through which multicultural programs in Canada organize participants (especially women) to help reshape the nation through indirect means "by working concretely to enlarge the cultural resources through which the nation is imagined" (1998: 232). This imagining of Canada takes place through the language of inclusion but sometimes carries an alternate agenda of managing and reclassifying the Othered.

This is evident in the CAPAR, where although notions of accommodation and tolerance are used to frame inclusion as a benefit for the Othered, inclusion is also subtextually a necessity for Canadian nation-building and nationalism. Indeed, the inclusion of Others is central to (re)imagining Canada as a tolerant society. As Paul Martin states in the opening statement of the CAPAR, "We are listening to Canadians and *we want our country to continue to be recognized internationally as a land of freedom and equality*" [emphasis added] (Heritage, 2005: ii). One of the key objective of the plan is "to demonstrate federal government leadership in the international fight against racism" (Heritage, 2005: 10). Whilst this is admirable, it also demonstrates that policies of inclusion construct and promote a particular image of Canada as a tolerant nation for the external world to recognize. This would not be troubling if the plan also acknowledged the policies, practices and legislation of the state that are/were racist. The repeated self-congratulatory tone of the plan (particularly with regards to Canada's involvement with international institutions who challenge racial discrimination, such as the UN) leaves the impression that racism is a recent phenomenon in Canada rather than a historically embedded feature; this has the effect of erasing Canadian histories of racism and

colonialism. The report leaves one to wonder who the policy is really directed at: for those who face racism,³ or for particular groups of Canadians to feel good about themselves, or for the international community to whom the Canadian government wants to present an image of tolerance and progress? In the end it is unclear whether inclusion is really an exercise in anti-racism or in nation-building. Indeed, many of the actions that the CAPAR celebrates as successes have been criticized for being racist and neo-colonial. For instance, the plan states that it will continue to develop partnerships with Indigenous communities through the Indian Residential Schools Resolution, even though this has been deemed as an abysmally flawed structure by many Indigenous activists and claimants.

Furthermore, inclusion discourses can potentially relativize and trivialize differences (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 226). The CAPAR goes to some length to avoid this. It cites the Ethnic Diversity Survey which found that nearly 50 percent of Blacks reported discrimination or unfair treatment compared to 33 percent of South Asians and 33 percent of Chinese respondents (Heritage, 2005: 8); it acknowledges that in exploring “the different experiences of ethno-racial and ethno-cultural groups and to provide meaningful statistics on racism, race must be compared with other factors such as gender, age, education and income” (Heritage, 2005: 9); and it specifically identifies the value of intersectional analysis because of the particular “issues affecting Aboriginal women, racial minority women, and migrant, immigrant and refugee women” (Heritage, 2005: 27). Yet despite these measures, it is striking to note that the plan conflates racism with colonialism and anti-Semitism, thereby undermining the ability to address differences. Whilst the plan acknowledges particular kinds of experiences -- such as employment discrimination against ethnic groups, disproportionate numbers of Indigenous people in prisons, and attacks against Jewish synagogues -- it does not name these as racism, colonialism and anti-Semitism. Thus even though the plan lays out a working definition of racism (Heritage, 2005: 7-9), it fails to identify the differing forms of racialized, colonial and anti-Semitic experiences. This is important, for instance, because of the ways in which Indigenous people are addressed in the CAPAR without reference to

³ The report does not make clear whether the government is concerned with racism against all people of colour and Indigenous peoples, including visitors, refugees and non-citizens, or just citizens and landed immigrants.

historical and on-going colonial legislative acts that are racially oppressive, including for the example the *Indian Act* which continues to be used by the state to control status determination and band membership.⁴ Though Indigenous peoples are racialized in ways similar to people of colour through white supremacy, the attempted erasure of Indigenous bodies, knowledge, resources and land is distinct from the racism faced by people of colour in Canada. As Lee and Cardinal state, “By not recognizing hierarchies in categorical difference, strategies of inclusion contribute to the erasure of inequality by pluralizing differences and ignoring power and resource differentials” (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 226). The role of power should be critical in any analysis of racialized, ethnic and/or cultural identities and relations, and yet is strangely neglected in the CAPAR.

Instead, the plan articulates inclusion through a discourse of collective unity. One of the three objectives of the CAPAR is “to strengthen social cohesion through anti-racism measures” (Heritage, 2005: 10). The conclusion reiterates this point in which it is stated that the priorities of the CAPAR “enhance the value of Canadian citizenship by strengthening our social bonds, and making our shared values more relevant to contemporary life in Canada” (Heritage, 2005: 56). In particular the plan highlights the role of Citizenship and Immigration Canada in integrating immigrants. Whilst the framing of integration presents ways to include otherwise excluded peoples, the discourse of inclusion masks the ways in which integration itself can be wrought with conformist and assimilationalist tendencies. Whilst the necessity to develop bonds of social cohesion

⁴ The act organized Indigenous people through the reservation system in which members had to be registered with a band. The legal definition of Indian split Indigenous peoples, placing thousands outside the law, in which all Métis people legally ceased to exist, and Inuit people fell into judicial limbo (Boyko, 1995: 180). The act also meant that the federal government controlled the finances of Indigenous people; for example, except under special circumstances Indians could not own land on reserves, and the sale of livestock and crops was illegal unless organized by an Indian agent. The eradication of Indigenous cultural practices was at the heart of the enactment of *Indian Act*, as Sir John A. Macdonald stated in his speech about the *Act*: “The great din of our legislation has been to do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the inhabitants of the dominion, as speedily as they are fit for change” (Boyko, 1995: 180). In 1884 the federal government amended the *Indian Act* to abolish the potlatch and other ceremonies. The potlatch was widely significant because of the ways in which this practice organized communities; this practice was of particular significance for some Indigenous nations because it involved inviting guests to witness and affirm the ratification of new treaty’s and trade agreements.⁴ The *Indian Act* also banned all Indigenous laws and traditional systems of justice, and authorized instead the government to appoint and administer judicial systems on reserves. Despite some changes to the *Indian Act* over the past century, as Patricia Monture-Angus states, the “*Indian Act*, a single statute, controls almost every aspect of a registered Indian person. For all other Canadians, there is no parallel experience. No single statute controls every aspect of non-Indian life” (1995: 155).

and shared values and citizenship should be an important feature of the political order, mechanisms of inclusion can also potentially erase differences that some groups want to maintain. Many Indigenous leaders made this argument following the 1969 White Paper which suggested that erasing the requirement of status for Indians would bring this group of Indigenous people to the same level of citizenship as other Canadians. As Indigenous activist and scholar Harold Cardinal (1969) argued shortly after the White Paper was published, while First Nations people have historically been excluded because of their status they also depend on their legal status as ‘Indians’ to assert treaty rights and make claims of self-determination.⁵ Inclusionary goals, in other words, presume that integration is desirable but without fully accounting for the fine line between integration and assimilation.

That is not to say that the CAPAR promotes a model of forced assimilation. Rather, the plan expresses the desire for inclusion through what Richard Day calls ‘seductive integration’ (2000: 9). Day argues that dominant groups create a society in which excluded Others are implicitly seduced into dominant norms, values and structures because their chances of political, economic and social success are dependent on integrating (or being included) into the core. As such, inclusion is framed for the benefit of racialized Others rather than as a way to demand forced conformity; if ethnic and racial minorities become included into mainstream society through participation in dominant practices and structures, or so the argument goes, they will reap material benefits. This not only overestimates the potential of inclusion to eliminate repressive and productive forms of power (where one outcome is racism), but it also underestimates the ways in which inclusion enables the state to manage the ‘strangeness’ of Others through indirect measures. Put differently, inclusion does not necessarily end racism and at the same time it allows the state to regulate racialized Others by bringing those on the outside into the core.

⁵ On behalf of the Indian Association of Alberta, Cardinal also provided the strongest critical response to the White Paper in 1971 with a document entitled ‘Citizens Plus’. This document illustrated that the *Indian Act* was paternalistic and inherently racist but also argued that it was a necessary evil until Indigenous rights, treaty claims and land questions were settled. Other scholars, such as Patricia Monture-Angus (1995; 2002) and Taiaiake Alfred (1999) have since argued that the treaty process is a colonial exercise, and warn against it. See below.

Finally, the CAPAR carries a subtext in which anti-racism is promoted not to disrupt oppressive power but because inclusion serves an economic agenda. Scattered throughout the document are statements that express the need for inclusion in order that “our economy benefits” (Heritage, 2005: 10). Whilst there are definitely some important steps included in the plan to promote the labour and economic opportunities of racialized Others -- such as the recognition of foreign credentials and skills training for Indigenous peoples -- there is an unsettling focus on the need to utilize immigrant skills as well as Indigenous land and resources. Inclusion, it appears, is not simply about providing access and opportunity for racial and ethnic minorities but it is also necessary in order for the state to financially prosper. This is not to suggest that some immigrants of colour and Indigenous people do not themselves see economic opportunities as a way to become included, but it is to highlight that inclusion is not primarily about the disruption of power; rather it is a way for the state to promote economic goals whilst at the same time seductively integrate racialized Others who have useful skills. Analysis of inclusion as a positive goal masks this dimension of the state’s agenda.

Locating Exclusion and Other Outcomes of Oppression

Though inclusion is, and should be, theorized and developed as a political practice, it is critical to simultaneously address the politics of exclusions. This would enable an understanding of the *sources* and *impact* of exclusionary power, aspects that are deemed to be important in the CAPAR (Heritage, 2005: 14) but are shadowed by the goal of inclusion. This is because, as dominantly interpreted, the discourse of inclusion “transfers attention onto those who ‘need’ to be included and away from practices of exclusion. Responsibility for ‘absence’ is shifted onto those ‘not here’. Actual exclusionary practices that need to be identified, named and dismantled remain untouched” (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 225). As such, analysis and strategies of inclusion need to be supplemented by an analysis of the politics of exclusions. This requires a fuller understanding of the concepts of exclusion and inclusion. Young rightly points out that the “concepts of exclusion and inclusion lose meaning if they are used to label all problems of social conflict and injustice,” and that “Where the problems of racism, cultural tolerance, economic exploitation, or a refusal to help needy people, they should

be named so” (Young, 2000: 13). These problems can overlap where, for instance, as Makeda Silvera analysis of Caribbean domestic workers in Canada in *Silenced* (1983) illustrates, some women workers are economically exploited because of gendered-racism.

This is not to say that it is not possible to make general (rather than universal) claims about the similar effects of racialized structures, practices and processes that codify Others. In particular racism (as well as colonialism) is predicated on a relation of systemic domination of heterogeneous subjects. Analysis of power is consequently central to an understanding of racism and the production of racialized identities because power identifies the sources and impact of domination. Yet the approach in the CAPAR does not adopt power as the central organizing principle. Though there is one reference to the fact that racism “is created and perpetuated by inequalities of power, resources and opportunities or unfair treatment” (Heritage, 2005: 7-8), this is not a central feature of the action plan. Indeed, the plan is premised on liberal principles and moral values. This is particularly evident in the introduction which states “Our approach is organized around the foundational principles of the *inherent dignity and worth of all persons* and the *right of minorities to protection* and to equal employment opportunity” [emphasis mine] (Heritage, 2005: iii). The political order, however, is both structurally and discursively organized by power differentials rather than just moral values. This means that racism cannot be dismantled (let alone eliminated) without first identifying the power relations that lead to racialized and racist outcomes, including exclusion.

Whilst exclusion is central when analyzing inclusion, it is by no means the only process or outcome of racist (and colonial and anti-Semitic) discrimination and domination. In *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, for instance, Young identifies five faces of oppression that distinguish between exploitation (“a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labour of one social group to benefit another”); marginalization (which occurs when “the system of labour cannot or will not use” certain people, and expels them from useful participation in social life leading to material deprivation and even extermination); powerlessness (in terms of lacking authority and status, structurally and institutionally; cultural imperialism (“the universalization of a dominant group’s experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm”); and systematic violence (“fear of random, unprovoked attacks on persons or property, which

have no motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy the person”) (Young, 1990: 49, 53, 58, 59, 61). In making such distinctions, Young is highlighting the differing forms of oppression, beyond the scope of exclusion. Whilst Young’s five faces of oppression can be challenged, her analysis shows that there are various ways of understanding the processes and specific outcomes of power in which exclusion is only one formation. Though the plan shows some awareness of these different expressions of power in sentences that identify “racism and related forms of discrimination” (Heritage, 2005: i), these are mentioned only in passing and uncritically addressed.

Furthermore, the plan does not adequately attend to the ways in which the lived experiences of racialized and ethnic subjects are shaped by other ideological systems of signification beyond the scope of race and ethnicity. This is particularly important to note because the CAPAR displays a poor understanding of the ways anti-racism is interlinked with the fight against different forms of oppression, including (but not limited to) power constituted through patriarchy, sexism, homophobia, disablism, and capitalism. People of colour and Indigenous people are not simply racialized, but also experience multiple and interacting forms of privilege and oppression. If anti-racist transformation is to take place there has to be an understanding that inscriptions of race and ethnicity are embedded in and through multiple interacting systems. This kind of analysis is evident, for instance, in Stuart Hall’s analysis of labour and race on slave plantations. Hall points to the ways in which plantation slavery was embedded through racist discourses of Blacks as objects (rather than subjects), class structures of property ownership, and capitalist imperatives of economic production (Hall, 2002: 58). He states, “Race is thus, also, the modality in which class is “lived,” the medium through which class relations are experienced, the form in which it is appropriated and “fought through.” This has consequences for the whole class, not specifically for its “racially defined” segment” (Hall, 2002: 62). In this sense, the signifying status of Black slaves was a product of interactive systems of racialized poverty that justified and characterized owner-slave relations.

In considering the interactions between ideological systems of significations, it is important not to assume that the operation of systems always produce the same end product; significations are locally, contextually, temporally and spatially specific. The inscriptions of waged workers are, for instance, markedly different between different

groups of women racialized as white, Asian, Black or Indigenous. Despite these differences, it is clear that any project of emancipation or anti-subordination requires that *all* systems of oppression and privilege are dismantled. This is because people of colour and Indigenous people are not only racialized, but also carry significations of gender, class, sexual orientation, and disability/ability. A conception of politics that takes this seriously is fundamental to radical change, and yet is markedly absent in the plan. This is in part because inclusion tends to focus on some aspects of oppression whilst ignoring other dimensions.

Even when the plan acknowledges differences within groups, it does not situate the role of the state in creating and perpetuating racist relations. On the one hand, the plan states that Indigenous women (among other vulnerable women in Canada) compose a high percentage of those who are unfairly confined to lower-skill and lower-paying jobs, have not completed secondary education, served prison sentences, and/or have experienced domestic violence. On the other hand, the plan makes no acknowledgment of state legislation and policy that has caused (and continues) the structures of racism. For instance, the plan fails to be accountable for the *Indian Act*, a legal tool that signifies Indigenous women as wards of the state and as colonial subjects. The state disciplines those First Nations women who do not remain within the legal confines of the states colonial definition of 'Indian'. Despite changes to the *Act* in 1985 with Bill C-31 which removed some restrictions to Indian status, Indigenous women continue to experience discrimination because the act effectively denies grandchildren Indian status if and when First Nations women marry non-Indigenous men. As such, the plan veils the responsibility of the state and governments in generating power differentials based on racism.

This veiling takes place in part through the way in which the government embraces "action against racism as a *shared task*" (Heritage, 2005: 4). Though the government is right to argue that the struggle against racism is a responsibility we all share, this strategy also allows them to avoid naming those who are responsible for racism. Though the plan states that "Efforts to combat racism must recognize the historical, regional and global factors underlying it," the emphasis is on activities that "assess the impact on specific groups" (Heritage, 2005: 14) rather than the actors and

roots of racist and colonial provisions and discourse.⁶ This is not to say that there are not some very important initiatives organized in the CAPAR, including the need to report back to Canadians via the Annual Report on the operation of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (Heritage, 2005: 51-54).⁷ The CAPAR notes that the accountability framework is yet to be developed but it does provide some important directions: through SSHRC and the Multiculturalism Program, indicators will be developed to monitor progress in the fight against racism; there is a commitment to building partnerships with provincial and territorial governments, and engaging with stakeholders to assess progress; and the plan declares that the federal government will report to the United Nations as part of Canada's regular reporting on the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Heritage, 2005: 53). This all illustrates an important commitment to accountability for the *future*, but it erases the need to hold the state accountable for its historic and existing role in structuring and perpetuating racism and colonialism.

Sherene Razack states that "Accountability begins with tracing relations of privilege and penalty. It cannot proceed unless we examine our complicity. Only then can we ask questions about how we are understanding differences and for what purpose" (1998: 170). In the context of white supremacy, gendered relations and capitalism, Razack describes accountability as "a process that begins with a recognition that we are each implicated in systems of oppression that profoundly structure our understanding of one another" (1998: 10). For Razack, accountability requires that "we direct our efforts to the conditions of communication and knowledge production that prevail, calculating not only who can speak and how they are likely to be heard but also how we know what we know and the interest we protect through our knowing" (1998: 10). This is important in formal spaces of deliberation and dialogue because accountability can limit the ways in which privilege impacts those racialized as non-white by identifying the power dynamics between subjects.

⁶ A notable exception to this is the Canadian Race Relations Foundation which, according to the plan, operates at arm's length from the Government of Canada; as stated, "It sheds light on the causes and effects of racism and provides independent, outspoken national leadership" (Heritage, 2005: 34).

⁷ It is by no means evident that reporting back through the Annual Report will be adequate as a measure of accountability.

At times, this activity of accountability may present contention during formal processes of deliberation. This, however, is part of the project of disrupting and challenging racist and colonial systems of signification. Without contention, there is no discomfort, doubt and anxiety produced; these uncomfortable, uncertain, and anxious spaces can disturb cultural inscriptions and lead to self-reflection of one's own role in reinstituting subjugating meanings. This is a crucial dimension of performing accountability in deliberative spaces. But it need not produce paralysis; in other words, the spaces of discomfort, doubt and anxiety should not permanently silence people (including those signified as privileged), but rather accountability demands that when we exercise privilege we are responsible for it, that we 'clear the space' for experientially grounded alternate meanings, and that we work towards altering damaging significations. This requires a fuller appreciation of the historical and on-going relations of power.

This approach to accountability is markedly absent in the plan. In particular, the plan makes no mention of the ways in which an anti-racism strategy involves an understanding of the racialized and ethnic identities of *dominant* groups. In light of the burgeoning literature on whiteness in contemporary race studies,⁸ it is somewhat surprising that the racialized identities of dominant groups are missing from the plan. This reinforces the notion that racism is the problem of, and for, the Othered rather than an ideological process that we all truly share responsibility for changing. In failing to identify whiteness as a racialized identity, the plan further erases the ways in which those excluded are relationally positioned with those who are privileged through their inclusion. As such, an anti-racism strategy that does not locate dominance and privilege continues to assume that the Othered is ontologically, rather than ideologically, racialized. Analysis of who is doing the excluding would not only challenge the notion that races and racial superiority/inferiority naturally exists but it would also further an understanding of the ways in which membership in dominant racialized groups changes over time. This is important because, as David Roediger (2002) and Vic Satzewich (2000) both illustrate, groups who are now racialized as dominant because of their whiteness were not necessarily always dominant. As an example, Satzewich traces the

⁸ See, for instance, the work of Ruth Frankenberg (1993; 1997); the essays by Dalton Conley, Howard Winant, Jasbir Kaur Puar, Michael Omi amongst others in an edited collection by Birgit Brander Rasmussen et. al. (2001); Sherene Razack (1998); and David R. Roediger (1999).

ways in which Ukrainians in North America were ‘peripheral Europeans’, or what Roediger calls ‘the not-yet-white ethnics.’ An understanding of the changing character of dominant racialized groups would not only emphasize the constructed production of ‘races,’ but it would also add knowledge of who constitutes the core and the ways in which the borders of inclusion are patrolled by those who exercise repressive power.

Disruption and Resistance

An aspect of politics that often gets neglected when considering ways to reconstitute the political order is the way in which those marked as racialized and colonized Others disrupt and resist racist relations of power. As such, though inclusion politics enhances some rights and goods it does not address ways that those signified as Others can resignify arenas of domination, normatively, semiotically and structurally. This is especially when the Othered is constructed as a victim. This is repeatedly the case in the CAPAR, where one of the six objectives specifically includes the need to “Assist victims and groups vulnerable to racism and related forms of discrimination” (Heritage, 2005: i).

The construction of the victim has two effects. First, as Wendy Brown (1995) despairs, in identifying the victim through particular kinds of identity claims (such as racialization) that identity becomes grounded and invested in subjection. Put differently, Brown worries that the very acts to combat subjection compulsively reopen and re-infect the wound of the injured (Bickford, 1997: 114). She states that “Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can not hold no future – for itself or others – that triumphs over this pain” (Brown, 1995: 74). According to Brown, the logic of politicizing identities is to publicly maintain and reiterate representations of a group that is suffering (1995: 73-4). This spirit of pain creates meanings of powerlessness, victimhood, and purity (Bickford, 1997: 115). If Brown’s analysis is applied to those marked as racialized and colonized Others, she would presumably conclude something along the following lines: there is disciplinary power in the assertion of racialized and colonized identities, and that certain forms of anti-racism political action run the risk of further entrenching biological formations of ‘race’ thereby reiterating the existence of an already injured identity. In this sense, Brown’s analysis would suggest that in constructing an image of racialized Others as victims,

the CAPAR perpetuates the very racial categories and socio-political positions it purports it wants to dismantle.

I largely agree with Brown that “certain forms of political action run the risk of further entrenching normalizing conceptions of identity and the power of regulatory apparatuses to enforce and police them” (Bickford, 1997: 118). Yet at the same time, Brown slips into the very role of gazer that she wants to critique. As Susan Bickford notes, Brown accepts dominant perspectives that mark Othered people as injured without full appreciation that this may not be way in which the Othered views themselves (Bickford, 1997: 117). This leads me to the second effect of emphasizing the victim, namely that the status of the injured subject falsely erases the agency of that subject. Whilst Brown implies that injury leads to powerlessness, I see such significations as potential motivating factors of political mobilization. Though injury is important to politics because it reflects the ways in which people feel about their position in society as a whole, the states of injury do not only signify suffering because they can also prompt political resistance and mobilization. As Bickford argues, “suffering and citizenship are not antithetical; they are only made so in a context in which others hear claims of oppression solely as assertions of powerlessness” (1997: 127). In this regard, identities, including those of racialized peoples who experience racism, can be both constraining *and* enabling. It is, after all, not only suffering that preoccupies or fundamentally marks those signified as the racialized Other. Rather, it is *anger* about our situations, *desire* and *passion* for change and the *courage* to act that shapes our identities and social positions.⁹ In other words, emotions are powerful responses to subjugating meanings and have the potential to incite action, resistance and oppositional consciousness. Bickford ends with a quote from Audre Lorde (1984) that sums up this point: “I am not only a casualty, I am also a warrior” (Bickford, 1997: 127).¹⁰ It is precisely this underlying drive for anti-racist action and decolonization that many people of colour and Indigenous people *already practice* that is often erased in discourses of inclusion.

⁹ Bickford also explores the ways in which courage, anger and fearlessness are resources for political action (1997: 126-127).

¹⁰ In his forthcoming book, Taiaiake Alfred (2005) also takes up the theme of the warrior. He speaks to other Indigenous people through his writing in order to promote and preserve Indigenous existence. For him, the historical experience of colonization and the on-going colonialism is a source of political, philosophical, and physical mobilization rather than simply a sign of injury and defeat.

This is especially when the Othered chooses not to be included into the core. Thus when Indigenous scholars such as Taiaiake Alfred advocate a politics of contention that calls upon Indigenous people to reject the treaty process because it is a colonial tool to maintain the existing power dynamic, he is declaring that Indigenous interests would be furthered by *not* being included into mainstream society, especially on terms defined by neo-colonial actors. For Alfred, the rejection of inclusion as a primary goal creates space for Indigenous people to avoid assimilation and co-optation, moreover, enables different nations to develop what he calls a self-conscious traditionalism (1999: 80). This type of strategy is contrary to the ethos of the CAPAR in particular because it would unsettle the current regime in which the state and governments manage and regulate the position and power of Indigenous peoples through neo-colonial acts and practices. But because the inclusion veils these kinds of anti-racism and decolonization strategies of resistance and opposition (especially those that challenge and disrupt the state), it does not capture why, when and who chooses to remain an outsider of hegemonic norms.

Such strategies are critical to the political order even if formal political change is not implemented by state actors. This is because the political order is not simply determined by the state but is also constituted by acts of resistance and disruption. Political change is in part a discursive project; when understood this way, it opens up the possibility of disrupting and deconstructing meanings that have gained authoritative meaning. For example, the meaning of ‘the immigrant’ as a member of a minority culture, ethnic, linguistic or national group has become a central feature of theories of inclusion. It is key to locate immigrants in such theories because immigration is at the heart of citizenship and nation-building.¹¹ It is further critical to identify the ways in which those immigrants who are racialized as white become normalized or characterized as non-immigrants, whilst Others continue to be signified as immigrants regardless of generation. At the same time it is also important to disrupt significations attached to immigrants that erase other dimensions of identity such as gender, class, sexual orientation and disability. These systems need to be situated in the analysis because to ignore them has the effect of skewing actual immigrant experiences.

¹¹ As a settler society which expropriated Indigenous lands and suppressed Indigenous ways of being and knowing, the British and French depended on immigration to build the nation now known as Canada.

As one example of this the *Irshad et. al. v. Ontario*¹² case highlights the ways in which disabled immigrants are signified as second-tier citizens once they arrive in Canada through negative significations of disability and not just their status as immigrants. This case involved a constitutional challenge to Ontario legislation, which excludes many immigrants with disabilities from Ontario Health Insurance Program (OHIP) coverage for the first three months or longer. The National Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), along with its coalition partners, DisAbled Women's Network Canada and the Ontario Council of Immigrants with Disabilities, argued that the exclusion of immigrants from OHIP coverage violated the equality guarantee in the *Charter* because it discriminated on the basis of immigration status and disability. Many immigrants could not obtain necessary medical treatment, such as treatment of ongoing disabilities (for example, cerebral palsy). Had these disabled immigrants not been disabled they would have satisfied the medical requirements under the 1976 *Immigration Act*. Had they been born in Ontario they would have been entitled to OHIP. It is because they are disabled *and* immigrants that they were not entitled to OHIP. In this regard, the signification of the disabled immigrant as Other is clearly constituted through immigration policies that medicalize disability.

Further, political change emerges from social action that is driven by resistance and oppositional consciousness practiced by those who are excluded or Othered. As such it is critical to identify the lived experiences of Othered people in contexts of power; this allows change by situating subjugated knowledge in ways elaborated by Michel Foucault (1982; 2003). Whilst change is not always quick, apparent, or even realized, resistance and disruption to the hegemonic order is fundamental to politics because the goals of democracy are, in part at least, to mobilize, raise awareness, organize, and agitate rather than to find ways to become included. For instance, Maher Arar -- the Syrian born Canadian citizen who was wrongly arrested in September 2002 on his way back from Tunisia by the American authorities for alleged links to al-Qaeda, then shortly after deported to Syria, held and tortured by Syrian authorities for alleged membership in a banned Muslim organization, and finally exonerated and released in October 2003 -- is currently organizing to illustrate the impact of racial profiling on Muslims. His fight against racism is not driven by the need for

¹² ("*Irshad et. al. v. Ontario* (Attorney General), Ontario Court of Justice, General Division, file no. 97-CV-126042,")

inclusion but by the importance of holding American and Canadian government officials accountable, raising consciousness of state-endorsed racial profiling, and shaping public opinion about the ways in which national security concerns have become a tool for governments not to be transparent. In other words, Arar and his supporters are attempting to unmask, challenge, disrupt and resist the processes and structures that create and signify racism.

Organizations such as Grassroots Women also engage in acts of resistance and disruption of the hegemonic order. Grassroots Women addresses the systemic political and economic marginalization of working class women caused by imperialism, mobilizing around issues such as health, immigration, childcare, and globalization. Their goal is not to achieve inclusion, but to challenge the very structures of society. For instance, as part of their strategy to oppose and defy the exploitation of women workers they demand a universal and accessible national child care system. This would serve to change the existing order not only by challenging traditional gender roles, but also by re-organizing gendered, racialized, and class-based arrangements of power. In other words, Grassroots Women attempts to resignify the identities of women workers *and* the social contexts of power, rather than simply name ways to become included. Regardless of their success in making changes, such organizations are central to the political order because they question the terms on which inclusion is premised.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the political order cannot be fundamentally changed through inclusion alone. Instead, as I have argued, inclusion needs to be problematized. At the very least, analysis of inclusion needs to be supplemented by an understanding of three dimensions of politics: first, there is a critical need to explore the subtext beneath the desire for inclusion, in particular to expose why dominant groups promote inclusion and whether this sustains or transforms hegemonic power. Second, it is crucial to consider the ‘other side’ of inclusion namely exclusion and related modes of oppression, especially to highlight the sources and impact of different forms of power. Finally, it is fundamental to acknowledge and respond to the politics of disruption and resistance in challenging and dismantling dominant power arrangements. An understanding of these dimensions of politics reveals the need to expose,

defy and challenge the order of things, not so that one becomes included but because power relations ought to radically change.

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