Back to the Future? Making Sense of the 2004 Canadian Election Outside Quebec

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Abstract

This paper uses data from the 2004 Canadian Election Study to analyze the factors that motivated a vote for each party outside Quebec and to identify the ones that mattered most to the outcome of the election itself. The findings are then used to address some basic questions about the 2004 election and its larger meaning for electoral politics in Canada.

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Introduction

Coming out of the 2000 federal election, Liberal dominance seemed assured. For the Liberals to lose the next election, two things would have to happen: the right would have to re-unite and some short-term factor would have to be strongly against the Liberals. By 2004, both conditions appeared to be in place. The Alliance and the Progressive Conservative Party had merged to form the new Conservative Party of Canada and the sponsorship scandal had angered many Canadians.

The Liberals did come perilously close to defeat in 2004. Outside Quebec, their vote share dropped two points from 39.6 percent in 2000 to 37.7 percent. Meanwhile, the new Conservative Party drew almost level with the Liberals, attracting 36.8 percent of the vote outside Quebec. Compared with the combined vote share of the Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives in 2000, though, the merger of the two parties was less obviously a success: the former rivals' combined share of the vote was 47.2 percent in 2000. It was the the NDP that saw their share of the popular vote go up. Outside Quebec, the party's vote went from 11 percent in 2000 to 19.4 percent in 2004.[1]

This paper seeks to make sense of these changes in party fortunes.[2] Did the 2004 election mark the end of Liberal dominance? Who is supporting the new Conservative party and how do they compare with Progressive Conservative and Alliance voters in the 2000 federal election? Is the NDP rebuilding its traditional support base or is it attracting a new type of voter? Are we witnessing a return to traditional brokerage-style politics or a polarizing of the electorate along new lines of cleavage?

Using data from the 2004 Canadian Election Study, we analyze the factors that motivated a vote for each party and we identify the ones that mattered most to the outcome of the election itself. We then use these findings to address some fundamental questions about the 2004 election and its larger meaning for electoral politics in Canada.

Data and Methods

The 2004 Canadian Election Study involved a rolling cross-section campaign survey with a representative sample of 4,323 Canadians, a post-election survey with 3,129 of the campaign respondents, and a mail back questionnaire.[3] The data reported here are taken from the campaign and post-election surveys. Both surveys were conducted by telephone. The average campaign interview lasted 28 minutes, while the average post-election interview took 24 minutes.

[Figure 1 about here]

The analyses of vote choice are based on a multi-stage, bloc-recursive model (Miller and Shanks 1996; Blais et al. 2002). The estimation strategy involves identifying blocs of variables that are entered sequentially into the regression analyses, starting with the most causally distant variables (see Figure 1). Explanatory factors are only retained in the model if

their effect is statistically significant at the .05 level or higher (based on robust standard errors) when they are first entered. The basic idea behind this model is that some of the factors that affect vote choice, such as how we feel about the party leaders and the issues of the day, are closer in time to the vote, while other factors, such as our basic values and beliefs and our partisan loyalties, are more distant. These longer term predispositions can have a direct effect on vote choice, but they can also affect vote choice indirectly by influencing more proximate factors like leader evaluations and issue positions. A moral traditionalist, for example, is more likely to oppose same-sex marriage; a market sceptic is more likely to oppose private health care; a Liberal partisan is more likely to like Paul Martin. If we entered all of the potential explanatory variables into a single equation, we would under-estimate the impact of causally prior variables since a single equation would give us only the direct, or unmediated, effects of the causally prior variables. By estimating the model in stages, we are able to estimate the total impact of each explanatory factor, as opposed to only that portion that is not mediated via more proximate factors.

We are not claiming that all voters go through each of these stages in exactly the same order and we are not claiming that all voters engage in such lengthy reasoning chains. In fact, we are quite sure that many voters do neither. What we are claiming is that this explanatory schema captures a decision calculus in which many voters do participate, if only incompletely. It is a heuristic device that enables us to simplify a complex and heterogeneous decision process.

All of the vote estimations are based on multinomial logistic regression. This enables us to model the vote as a multinomial choice (that is, a choice among more than two parties). It is important to underline how this differs from a strategy of simply modelling the vote as a choice between the Liberals, say, and the Conservatives and NDP combined. The latter strategy may be appropriate for some purposes, but it provides little insight into the "multifaceted process of choosing among multiple parties at once" (Whitten and Palmer 1996). The advantage of our approach is that it highlights the inter-party dynamics of support. Imagine a variable—say, union membership—that could plausibly make an NDP vote more likely while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of a vote for the Conservatives. If the vote was modelled as a choice between the Liberals and the other two parties, these effects would cancel one another out and we would conclude—wrongly—that union membership was not a factor in vote choice. Another benefit of modelling the vote as a multinomial choice is that it allows for different variables to play into different sets of choices. Take a variable like religion. Being Catholic is very relevant to the choice between the Conservatives and the Liberals, but counts for little when the choice is between the Conservatives and the NDP. Collapsing the choice into one between the Liberals and the other parties would necessarily mute this effect.

The coefficients estimated by multinomial logistic regression lack a straightforward, intuitively obvious interpretation.[4] They represent the predicted marginal impact of a given independent variable on the log-odds of choosing a given party relative to a baseline party. Their meaning depends on the values of the other variables included in the model. However, they enable us to estimate the independent impact of each variable on the probability of voting for any given party. These estimations take the form of a series of "what if?"

simulations. Take union membership, for example. On the basis of the estimations, we can compute the mean probability of voting NDP, first if everyone belonged to a union, and, second if nobody belonged to a union, keeping the effects of the other social background characteristics unchanged. The difference in the mean probabilities gives us an estimate of the average impact of union membership on voting NDP, everything else being equal.

It is quite possible for an explanatory factor to have a powerful impact on the probability of voting for a party and yet have little effect on that party's share of the vote. Take leader evaluations, for example: conceivably, for every vote a party loses due to negative perceptions of its leader, it may gain a vote from those who view the leader favourably. In this case, the net effect on the party's vote share will be minimal. Accordingly, we also need to estimate the impact of each explanatory varible on each party's vote. The most logical counterfactual for assessing how much any given factor contributed to the outcome is to ask: what if it had not mattered at all? What if the sponsorship scandal, say, had not hurt the Liberals? How many more votes would they have won? We can estimate how many percentage points the sponsorship scandal cost the Liberals by comparing the average estimated probability of voting Liberal, based on the multinomial regression model, with the average estimated probability of voting Liberal when the coefficient for anger over the sponsorship scandal is set to zero and all other coefficients are left unchanged.

Findings

Social Background Characteristics

The Liberals' dominance in 2000 hinged on the support of two key groups: Catholics and visible minorities. Together, these two groups helped to assure the Liberals a significant head start going into the 2000 federal election (Blais et al. 2002). The support of visible minorities continued to help the Liberals in 2004, boosting their vote share by over one and a half points. However, in 2004, visible minorities were not the bedrock of Liberal support that they had been in the previous election (see Figure 2). In 2000, the Liberals had done particularly well among visible minorities, attracting almost three-quarters of their votes; in 2004, they barely managed to get half.[5] It might be tempting to attribute this loss of support to the party's stance on same-sex marriage, given commentary in the media regarding the socially conservative views of some minority groups. However, it was not the new Conservative Party but the NDP that was the major beneficiary of the Liberals' loss of visible minority votes.

[Figure 2 about here]

The Catholic vote was also down in 2004 (see Figure 3). In 2000, the Liberals had secured over half of the Catholic vote, but in 2004 their support dropped seven points to 47 percent. Still, Catholics remain a key source of support for the Liberals. The sheer persistence of this pattern is remarkable given the changes in Canada's electoral landscape over the past five decades. Through all the shifts in the electoral landscape, the religious cleavage in voting has remained more or less intact. Without the support of Catholics, the Liberal vote would have been as much as three points lower in 2004. Adherents of non-Christian religions also continued to vote heavily Liberal. Indeed, they were even more likely than Catholics to vote Liberal. Their numbers remain too small, however, to do much to

boost the Liberal vote total. The same is true of French-speaking Canadians who also continued to give more than half of their votes to the Liberals.

[Figure 3 about here]

If the Liberals' assets were somewhat depleted in 2004, their chief liability remained. Even taking account of a host of social background characteristics, lack of appeal in the West cost the Liberals over six and a half points, and they only made up for it with one extra point in Atlantic Canada.

In 2000, there was a striking contrast between the Alliance and Progressive Conservative votes. Aside from its support in Atlantic Canada, the Progressive Conservative Party lacked a clearly defined social base (Blais et al. 2002). As in 1997 (Nevitte et al. 2000), the Progressive Conservative vote was largely unstructured. To the extent that it appealed to voters, its appeal typically cut across social divisions. The Alliance vote, by contrast, was clearly rooted in Canada's cleavage structure. The party fared best among Westerners, Protestants, rural voters, married couples, people of Northern European ancestry, and men. In 2004, the social profile of the typical Conservative voter was very similar, with two key differences.

Like the former Alliance, the new Conservative Party depended heavily on a Western base of support. Indeed, Western votes boosted the new party's share of the vote by over five points, net of other social background characteristics. However, the Conservatives' share (46 percent) of the Western vote fell far short of the combined share (60 percent) of the former Alliance and Progressive Conservative parties in 2000. The same was true in Atlantic Canada, where lack of appeal cost the new party almost one and a half points.

The new Conservative Party was the big winner, though, in the religion stakes (see Figure 3). Not only did the Conservatives poll as well among Protestants as the Liberals did among Catholics, but they decisively outpolled the Liberals among fundamentalist Christians. Conservative support was particularly high among Protestant fundamentalists: almost two-thirds of Protestants who consider the Bible to be the literal word of God voted for the new party. Altogether, the support of fundamentalist Chistians gave the Conservatives a boost of well over three points.

Like the Alliance, the new Conservative Party enjoyed more support among married voters. Their votes gave the party a boost of over six points, at the expense of both the Liberals and especially the NDP. In 2000, rural residents were among the Alliance party's strongest supporters. In 2004, they voted disproportionately Conservative. In fact, almost half of the rural vote went to the Conservatives, contributing almost three points to the party's vote share. Unfortunately for the Conservatives, though, there are many more urban voters than rural voters, especially in vote-rich Ontario.

Despite these important elements of continuity, there were two key differences between the support bases of the former Alliance and the new Conservative Party. Unlike the Alliance, the Conservative Party did not attract disproportionate support from Canadians of

Northern European ancestry. In 2000, half of these voters supported the Alliance and less than a third voted Liberal. In 2004, the gap narrowed to only five points, and once factors like region and religion were taken into account, Northern European ancestry failed to have a significant impact on vote choice.

[Figure 4 about here]

The really critical difference, though, lay in the impact of gender (see Figure 4). Like the Reform Party, the Alliance had much less appeal to women (Gidengil et al. forthcoming). The gender gap was 11 points in 2000, and the party's lack of appeal to women was one reason why the Alliance could not defeat the Liberals in 2000 (Blais et al. 2002). However, gender had virtually no impact on vote choice in 2004. The almost complete disappearance of the gender gap is one of the most important indicators of the success of the new Conservative Party.

In 2000, there was also a significant gender gap in support for the NDP (see Figure 4). This gender gap shrank as well. Men (19 percent) were still a little less likely than women (22 percent) to vote for the party, but even this small difference vanished when other social background characteristics were taken into account. The resurgence in men's support is not the only indicator of a reconstitution of the NDP's traditional support base (Archer 1985). In 2000, union membership was not a factor in NDP voting (see Figure 5). Indeed, the Alliance outpolled the NDP by more than two to one among union households. In 2004, the NDP doubled its share of the union vote, drawing almost as much supprt from union households as the Conservatives did. In all, the union vote boosted the NDP's vote share by almost three points, at the Conservatives' expense.

[Figure 5 about here]

By far the most interesting pattern to emerge in NDP voting, though, was the high level of support among younger Canadians (see Figure 6). Among the under-35s, the NDP did almost as well as the Liberals and the Conservatives. There is a striking age gradient to NDP support: voters under the age of 35 were twice as likely to vote NDP as voters aged 55 years and older. This is new. There was no hint of a similar effect in 2000. For their part, both the Liberals and the Conservatives fared best among older voters.

[Figure 6 about here]

In other respects, though, the NDP story is one of continuity. The party continued to benefit from the support of secular Canadians (see Figure 3). Other things being equal, people who professed no religion were almost ten points more likely to vote NDP than their non-secular counterparts; their support boosted the NDP vote by two points. As in 2000, the NDP's support was much less regionalized than the other parties. Atlantic Canadians and Westerners alike were a little more likely than Ontarians to vote NDP, but the combined impact on the party's vote share was less than two points, with most of it coming from the West.

As in previous elections, there was no sign of a class vote in the classic sense: manual and non-manual workers voted much the same way, as they have done for the past 40 years or more (Alford 1967; Pammett 1987: Gidengil 2002a). Income also remained a relatively minor factor for the NDP. People with low household incomes were more likely to vote NDP than those with high incomes. However, the net impact on the NDP vote was minimal, since these effects offset one another. Income actually mattered more for Liberal and Conservative voting: the Liberals received the most votes from high-income households, while the Conservatives fared best among middle income households. Had income not mattered, the Conservative vote would have been over two and a half points higher and the Liberal vote three points lower. What mattered more to the NDP vote was education. The probability of voting NDP was 13 points higher for voters with less than a high school education. But for their support, the NDP vote would have been almost one and a half points lower, and the Conservative vote would have been almost one and a half points higher. However, the most important aspect of socio-economic status for NDP voting was whether a vote rented or had a mortgage.[6] The party did almost as well as the Liberals and the Conservatives among renters. But for the impact of renting or having a mortgage, the NDP vote share would have been almost four points lower, and the Liberal vote almost five points higher.

Fundamental Values and Beliefs

The vote in Canada may not be sharply differentiated along socio-economic lines, but the traditional left/right divide nonetheless remains one of the keys to understanding how Canadians vote. We do not typically think of Canadian voting behaviour as being ideologically motivated. After all, many Canadians seem to lack even a minimal grasp of the concepts of "left" and "right" (Lambert et al. 1986). Despite all the media commentary about the "fight-for-the-right" and the "demise of the left" in the run up to the 2000 federal election, at the time of the election only one Canadian in three could correctly identify the NDP as being on the left and the Alliance as being on the right (Gidengil et al. 2004). It would be a mistake, though, to infer from this that traditional left-right ideology is largely irrelevant to vote choice in Canada. Difficulty in defining and using left-right terminology may indicate a lack of political sophistication, but it does not necessarily mean that people do not think about political issues and personalities in ideologically coherent ways (Gidengil 2002b). This becomes apparent from analyses that examine whether Canadians' fundamental values and beliefs go together in ideologically meaningful ways (Nevitte et al. 1997). One of the dimensions to emerge from such analyses corresponds very closely to the traditional left-right dimension. At its heart are opposing beliefs about the virtues of free enterprise and the appropriate role of the state versus the market. Equally important, where voters stood on this dimension proved to be closely related to their vote in both the 1997 and 2000 elections (Nevitte et al. 2000; Blais et al. 2002).

Views about the free enterprise system and the role of government continued to have an influence on vote choice in 2004. In order to assess their impact, we constructed a scale that combines people's responses to questions about employment opportunties and job creation, business and unions, the profit system, and individual responsibility.[7] These responses reveal very mixed feelings about the virtues of free enterise. While many Canadians subscribe to the idea of individual responsibility, there is also a good deal of scepticism about the way that the system actually works. Sixty-one percent of respondents,

for example, agreed that "people who don't get ahead should blame themselves, not the system," and yet almost as many (56 percent) rejected the notion that "when businesses make a lot of money, everyone benefits, including the poor." The majority of those interviewed (71 percent) believed that "if people can't find work in the region where they live, they should move to where there are jobs," but only a minority (38 percent) thought that "the government should leave it entirely to the private sector to create jobs." Overall, though, favourable views of free enterprise outweighed unfavourable ones: 26 percent of respondents scored above +.25 (on a scale that ran from –1 to +1), while only 16 percent scored below -.25. The dominant position, though, was one of ambivalence.

These views mattered, especially when it came to a choice between the NDP and the other two parties. The likelihood of voting NDP increased by 31 points for someone who was very sceptical of the free enterprise system, while the likelihood of voting Conservative increased 15 points for someone who was strongly pro-market (compared with someone who was ambivalent). The Liberals fared best among those who were ambivalent. If views about free enterprise had not mattered, the Conservative vote would have been almost one point lower and the Liberal vote would have increased by over one and a half points. The contribution to the NDP was more modest, at a little over half a point, reflecting the fact that deep scepticism about free enterprise is very much a minority view.

What mattered more than views about free enterprise was continentalism. From their very first campaign ads, the Liberals had played on feelings about the United States. The party's first television ad, for example, had Paul Martin saying, "Look, you can have a country like Canada or you can have a country like the U.S.". This rhetoric was clearly aimed at the Conservatives. Views about Canada's relationship with the United States did prove to be a key factor in the Conservative vote, but this helped rather than hindered the party. Thirty-nine percent of respondents favoured closer ties with the United States and 58 percent thought that "overall, free trade with the U.S. has been good for the Canadian economy." Meanwhile, only 19 percent wanted ties to be more distant and only 35 percent rendered a negative judgment on Canada's trade relations with the U.S. When responses to these two items were combined with feelings about the United States, almost one third scored above +.25 on the resulting –1 to +1 scale, while a mere 12 percent scored below -.25. The probability of voting Conservative was almost 30 points higher for someone who viewed Canada's relationship with the US in a positive light, while the probability of an NDP or Liberal vote was about 15 points lower. Overall, continentalism boosted the Conservative vote share by over four and a half points, but cost the Liberals three and a half points and the NDP one point.

The Liberals has also tried hard to paint the Conservatives and their leader as just too extreme. Social conservatism did cost the Conservatives, but it was the NDP, not the Liberals, who benefited at their expense. In order to examine the impact of social conservatism, we created a scale that combined feelings about gays and lesbians, feelings about feminism, conceptions of gender roles, and views about how much should be done for women. Twenty-seven 27 percent of respondents expressed negative feelings about gays and lesbians, providing a score of less than 50 on a 0 to 100 scale. Another 21 percent either gave a neutral rating (50) or said that they did not know when asked how they feel about gays and

lesbians. Feelings about feminists were more positive: only 18 percent provided a negative rating, while 21 percent were neutral or did not reveal their feelings. Fifty-eight percent thought that more should be done for women, but fully 40 percent agreed that "society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children." Overall, socially liberal views prevail: half the sample scored less than -.25 on the social conservatism scale (which ran from –1 to +1).

This clearly hurt the new Conservative Party. Being socially liberal decreased the likelihood of a Conservative vote by 18 points, and increased the probability of an NDP vote by almost the same amount. The net impact on the parties' electoral fortunes was also substantial: social conservatism may have cost the Conservatives as much as four points and given the NDP a boost of almost four and a half points. Meanwhile, the Liberal vote was only slightly affected.

Cynicism about politics had surprisingly little impact on the Liberal vote share. True, the probability of voting Liberal dropped 27 points for people who were highly cynical about politics and politicians, but political disaffection cost the Liberals barely one and a half points. Despite the sponsorship scandal, cynicism was not much higher, at least among those who actually voted, than it was at the time of the 2000 election, which may be one reason why the Liberals did not pay a higher price at the polls. For example, voters gave politicians in general an average rating of 45 on a 0 to 100 scale, while political parties in general received an average rating of 52. In 2000, the comparable figures were 48 and 53.

In 2000, regional alienation helped the Alliance. In 2004, it fuelled support for the Conservatives. Frustration with the workings of the federal system boosted the Conservative vote share by well over a point, at the expense of both the Liberals and the NDP. Clearly, the Conservatives have taken over the mantle of the regional protest party, but paradoxically this could limit the party's growth potential, especially in vote-rich Ontario. While 36 percent of Canadians believe that the federal government treats their province worse than other provinces, 20 percent actually believe that their province is better treated. In Ontario, the latter figure rises to 35 percent.

The Conservative Party also attracted votes from people who wanted to take a tougher line on Quebec. A significant minority of Canadians (41 percent) thought that less should be done for Quebec, and this boosted the Conservative vote share by one point. Interestingly, views about Quebec were simply not a factor in the 2000 election. The Quebec question had hurt the Reform Party in the 1997 election (Nevitte et al. 1997), but in 2000, the Alliance had succeeded in neutralizing the issue. The fact that views about accommodating Quebec played into vote choice in 2004 may reflect the linking in voters' minds of the sponsorhsip scandal with efforts to promote the federal option in Quebec.

Finally, it is worth noting two fundamental value orientations that did *not* significantly affect vote choice. Neither views about racial minorities nor religiosity factored into people's choice of party in the 2004 election. We have already seen that religious affiliation in general and Christian fundamentalism, in particular, both helped to shape vote choice, but self-defined religiosity *per se* did not make a difference, over and above these

factors. The non-finding for vews about racial minorities is more consequential. Like the Reform Party before it, the Alliance had been hurt by the perception that it was racist and ethnocentric. It seems that the new Conservative Party was able to avoid the same label.

Partisan Loyalties

In 2000, the Liberal victory rested in no small part on the fact that the Liberals began the campaign with a significant head start (Blais et al. 2002). In fact, in that election, the Liberal Party had as many partisans as the other three parties combined (see Figure 7).[8] Put differently, one partisan in two was a Liberal. As long as this partisan advantage persisted, it was difficult to see how the Liberals could be defeated. All the party had to do was to mobilize its loyal partisans and to do as well as the other parties among non-partisans. Two things changed in 2004. First, and most importantly, the merger of the Alliance and the Progressive Conservative parties erased the Liberal head start, and second the new party outpolled the Liberals among those with no party affiliation by a margin of 36 percent to 32 percent.[9]

[Figure 7 about here]

The Liberals did not lose their hard start because they lost partisans: despite the sponsorship scandal, the number of Liberal partisans remained much the same as it had been in 2000. Rather, the Liberals lost their partisan advantage because the new Conservative Party had as many partisans as the former Alliance and Progressive Conservative parties combined, if not more. As a result, in 2004, there were almost as many Conservative partisans as Liberal partisans.

The question remains, of course, as to whether these are genuine partisans: can people really have a strong psychological attachment to a new political party? If we think of these Conservative identifiers as identifying with a party of the right—and compare their number with the Progressive Conservative and Alliance combined in 2000—it is certainly plausible to anticipate that their tie to the new party is meaningful. If these attachments do prove durable, the Liberals are going to find it much harder to win elections.

Partisans, of course, typically vote for "their" party. Even allowing for the effects of social background characteristics and fundamental values and beliefs, the probability of voting for "their" party was 57 points higher for Conservative partisans, 60 points higher for NDP partisans, and 55 points higher for Liberal partisans. When Liberal partisans voted at odds with their party identification, they were almost as likely to vote Conservative as NDP. New Democratic defectors, on the other hand, mostly opted for the Liberal Party. If partisanship had not mattered, the Liberal vote share would have been over two points lower, and the NDP would have gained over two and a half points.

The Economy

Partisanship certainly matters, but there are more non-partisans than partisans. Lacking a strong predisposition to support any one particular party, non-partisans are more likely to be swayed by short-term electoral forces, like the state of the economy, the campaign issues, and the personalities of the party leaders.

According to the simple reward-and-punish model of economic voting, incumbents get re-elected in good economic times and get thrown out when the economy has been doing badly (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Norpoth 1996). But things are not so simple when the incumbent party has a new leader. One of the prerequisites for economic voting is that voters attribute responsibility for economic conditions to the incumbent (Clarke and Kornberg 1992). Voters may be less likely to assign credit or blame when the incumbent has only recently taken over the helm (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001).

In 2004, retrospective evaluations simply did not affect voters' choice of party. This was probably just as well since economic evaluations were not as positive as they had been in 2000. At the time of the 2000 election, 41 percent of Canadians thought that the economy had improved over the previous year, while only 16 percent believed that it had worsened. In 2004, by contrast, negative perceptions were as frequent as positive ones: only 23 percent thought that the economy was doing better, while 27 percent thought that it had deteriorated over the previous 12 months. People's evaluations of their own financial situation were also less positive, but the change between the 2000 and 2004 elections was smaller. In 2000, 28 percent reported that they were better off than they had been a year earlier, while 20 percent said they were worse off, compared with 22 percent and 27 percent, respectively, in 2004. The economy, though, was simply not a salient issue in the 2004 election. Only 16 percent expected the economy to worsen over the next year, and 25 percent thought that it would actually improve. People's prospective evaluations of their own financial situation revealed a very similar pattern.

The Issues

The sponsorship scandal certainly mattered. The majority of our respondents were either very angry about the scandal (39 percent) or at least somewhat angry (38 percent). Over a third (36 percent) thought that there had been a lot of corruption when Jean Chrétien was Prime Minister and close to half (46 percent) thought that there had been some corruption. Three-quarters (75 percent) of those interviewed thought that Paul Martin had known about the scandal before becoming Prime Minister, and of those who thought he did not know, two-thirds (67 percent) thought that he *should* have known about it. Many people were unimpressed with his handling of the sponsorship scandal since becoming Prime Minister: barely one in 20 (5 percent) thought that he had done a very good job and only a quarter (25 percent) thought that he had done quite a good job. And one in two (52 percent) lacked confidence that he would prevent something like this happening in the future.

These are harsh judgments, and they hurt the Liberals. In order to assess their impact, we combined responses to the questions about anger over the sponsorship scandal, corruption under the Chrétien government, Martin's handling of the scandal, and confidence in his ability to prevent future scandals into a single composite measure. The probability of voting Liberal was 20 points lower for someone who had negative perceptions on all four counts (compared with someone who was neutral or ambivalent), while the probability of voting Conservative was 14 points higher. The sponsorship issue was clearly a major factor in helping the Conservatives to deny the Liberals another majority. It boosted the Conservative vote share by almost six points and cost the Liberals six and a half points.[10] The NDP, by

contrast, reaped little electoral benefit from the scandal: if the scandal had not mattered at all, the NDP vote share would only have dropped by a little over half a point.

The other issues that helped the Conservatives were defence spending and the gun registry. The party had pledged a significant increase in military spending. With half our respondents (53 percent) wanting to see increased spending on defence and only 14 percent wanting to see cuts, this issue boosted the Conservative vote share by close to one and a half points, mostly at the NDP's expense. Sixty percent of respondents wanted to scrap the gun registry, and the Conservatives' promise to do just that netted the party one and a half points at the expense of both the Liberals and the NDP. It bears emphasis, though, that a desire to scrap the gun registry did not necessarily entail opposition to the notion of gun control. Only 46 percent of people rejected the notion that "only the police and the military should be allowed to have guns," despite the fact that this implies much stricter control. The problem, it seems, is with the gun registry itself.

Interestingly, the same-sex marriage issue had no impact on the Conservative vote share. When respondents were asked whether they favoured or opposed same-sex marriage, 39 percent were opposed, while only 28 percent were in favour. However, fully a third of respondents (33 percent) said they did not know, and same-sex marriage was simply not a particularly salient issue for most voters. In fact, when asked to name "the most important issue to you personally in this election," less than one percent spontaneously mentioned same-sex marriage. To the extent that the issue mattered, it helped the NDP and hurt the Liberals. However, views about same-sex marriage made only a modest difference to the parties' vote shares: had the issue not mattered at all, the Liberals would have gained one point at the NDP's expense.[11]

The two other issues that had the potential to hurt the Conservatives were immigration and abortion. In 1997, opponents had tried to paint the Reform Party as anti-immigrant, if not downright racist. The tactic was repeated against the Alliance in 2000. However, views about immigration did not affect either party's vote (Nevitte et al. 1997; Blais et al. 2000). Immigration proved to be something of a non-issue in 2004, as well. It did not figure prominently in the campaign, and it was only a minor factor in people's choice of party.

It was not so obvious that abortion would be a non-issue. The Liberals' first attack ad, entitled "Harper and the Conservatives," which began airing on June 9, included a shot of two women waiting in what seemed to be an abortion clinic, while the voice-over told viewers that the Conservative leader "won't protect a woman's right to choose." The second attack ad, which began airing on June 24, repeated the charge: entitled "The Harper we know," it opened with the statement, "There's the Stephen Harper who wouldn't protect a woman's right to choose..." The Liberal message was helped by a news story that broke on day 16 of the campaign reporting that in an article published in a Catholic newspaper a month earlier a Conservative candidate had likened abortion to the recent beheading of American hostage Nicholas Berg. However, Stephen Harper firmly and consistently maintained his position that he would not re-open the abortion debate if his party got to form the government. On election day, abortion was simply not a salient factor in people's choice

of party. This conclusion is reinforced when we look at people's responses to a question asking them to name the issue that was "most important to you personally in this election": only nine people named abortion.

The two issues that did hurt the Conservatives were the war in Iraq and social spending. The first Liberal attack ad showed images of tanks and troops in desert gear as a voice-over tells viewers that the Conservative leader wanted to send Canadian soldiers to Iraq. The Chrétien government's decision not to participate in the war against Iraq met with widespread approval. Over three-quarters (78 percent) of our respondents endorsed the decision, and fewer than one in five (18 percent) deemed it a bad decision. Had the war in Iraq not been a salient issue, the Liberals would have lost two points and the Conservative vote share would have been over two points higher. The NDP barely derived any benefit from the anti-war sentiment.

From the beginning of the campaign, the Liberals sought to portray the new Conservative party as a threat to Canada's social programs. Their first television ad featured Paul Martin telling viewers, "Look, you can have a country like Canada or you can have a country like the U.S., but you can't have a country like Canada with the taxation levels of the U.S., not with without risking the very social programs, the institutions and values that make us us." Support for increased social spending outweighed any desire for tax cuts. Only 37 percent said that income taxes should be reduced. Meanwhile, 80 percent of our respondents wanted to see more spent on health care, 71 percent wanted increased spending on education and 44 percent favoured more spending on social housing, though only 22 percent thought that welfare spending should be increased.

In order to estimate the impact of these views, we created a scale comprising opinions about spending on health care, education, social housing and welfare. The results indicated that the Conservatives' fiscal conservatism ended up costing them almost three points. This loss was not offset by the votes they picked up from people who favoured tax cuts. This was a minority position, and it garnered the Conservatives only one point. The major beneficiary of support for increased spending was *not* the NDP, but the Liberals who picked up three and a half points. Views about spending had little impact on NDP voting. As in 2000 (Blais et al. 2002), what mattered when it came to voting NDP were more general views about the role of the government versus the market.

The number one issue in the campaign was health. When asked to name the most important issue from a list of five issues, one person in two (48 percent) named health care. Health received more than twice as many mentions as corruption in government (22 percent) and three times as many mentions as taxes (16 percent). Social welfare programmes (7 percent) and the environment (4 percent) lagged far behind. Another one in four (26 percent) gave health care as their next most important issue. And when asked at the beginning of the survey to name the most important issue "to you personally in this campaign," almost two-fifths (38 percent) of the sample spontaneously named health care. This concern is not surprising. Fully half the sample (51 percent) believed that hospital waiting lists had become longer over the past year. Moreover, the Liberals had campaigned hard on the health issue, and it featured prominently in their ads. The ad entitled "Health Care" is typical of the

Liberal rhetoric: "Canada's health care system is based on Canada's values," Paul Martin states, "Every Canadian, rich or poor, is entitled to the care they need when they need it ... Health care, not tax cuts, is our number one priority. Because taking care of each other, looking out for one another – that's what Canadians do."

Surprisingly, though, views about health spending had little independent effect on Liberal voting. When we estimated a model where spending on health was a separate variable, the coefficients failed to meet conventional levels of statistical significance. What mattered were views about public versus private health care. The balance of opinion in Canada still opposes a two-tier health system. Just over half (54 percent) of our sample were opposed to allowing private hospitals in Canada, while only 37 percent were in favour. And when asked whether "people who are willing to pay should be allowed to get medical treatment sooner," 41 percent strongly disagreed and another 16 percent somewhat disagreed. It was not the Liberals, though, who benefited from this sentiment, but the NDP. In the 2000 election, the NDP had campaigned hard on health, but it did nothing to attract votes to the party (Blais et al. 2002). In 2004, by contrast, the NDP picked up one point from those who oppose any privatization of health care. Meanwhile, the Conservatives lost over a point. The Liberal vote share was only minimally affected.

Overall, the net winner on the issues was the Conservative Party. Issue voting gave the Conservatives a boost of four points and cost the Liberals well over four points. Take away the sponsorship issue, though, and the advantage would have lain with the Liberals. Meanwhile, the net impact of issues on NDP voting was negligible.

Party Leaders

Party leaders have aptly been called the "superstars of Canadian politics" (Clarke et al. 1991, 89). Voters' reactions to the leaders certainly influence their vote choice, but leaders do not necessarily matter that much to the outcome of the election. The 2000 election was a case in point, and so was 2004. This is surprising, given that all three men were contesting their first elections as party leaders. It is also surprising given the tenor of the campaign.

The Liberals' final attack ad—'the Harper we know'—was very personal. It was designed to persuade voters that the Conservative leader was a threat to Canadian values. Close to half of those we interviewed agreed that Stephen Harper was just too extreme. However, even more people bought the NDP line that "Paul Martin only cares about big business." There was no clear winner in the popularity stakes. In the final week of the campaign, among those with an opinion, Harper and Martin were tied with an average rating of 49 on a 0 to 100 scale, while Layton received a 46. In 2000, Stockwell Day had received an average rating of 46 in the final week of the campaign, while Chretien had received a 51, and Clark and McDonough had been nearly tied at 49 and 48, respectively.

Typically, the probability of voting for a party in 2004 increased by 20 to 30 points when people really liked the leader, controlling for prior causal factors.[12] This impact was quite similar for all three leaders, and given that all three leaders received fairly similar mean ratings, the overall impact on party vote shares was small. But for the leadership factor, the NDP would have gained a little over a point, while the Liberals would have lost less than a

point and the Conservatives even less. Another reason why the impact of party leaders is not as great as we might expect is that significant numbers of voters had problems coming up with their names. Even in the post-election survey, one respondent in five was unable to come up with Paul Martin's name as leader of the Liberal Party, while two respondents in five were unable to name his Conservative and NDP counterparts.

Discussion

The 2004 federal election brought the Liberal Party to the brink of defeat. This reversal of electoral fortunes begs the question: will the 2004 election go down as marking the end of Liberal dominance? True, the Liberals lost their partisan advantage and their support slipped among two key groups: Catholics and visible minorities. However, the Liberals suffered little net loss of partisans, and their partisan core remained intact. What really cost the Liberals was anger over the sponsorship scandal. Things still look quite good for the Liberals outside Quebec, *if* they can put the sponsorship scandal behind them.

This becomes clear when we look at voters' second choices. In 2000, the Alliance trailed the other parties when it came to the number of voters who named the Alliance as their second choice (Blais et al. 2002). The same was true of the Conservatives in 2004 (see Figure 8). This suggests that there may be very real limits to the Conservative Party's growth potential.

[Figure 8 about here]

In terms of its social base, the new party is clearly much closer to the former Alliance than it is to the former Progressive Conservative Party. The latter's appeal may have been limited after the electoral debâcle of 1993, but such support as the party enjoyed was broadly based. Alliance support, by contrast, was concentrated within particular social groups. The same was true of the new Conservative Party, and with two key exceptions, the groups were the same. In 2004, Conservative support was highest among Westerners, protestants, rural residents, and married couples. However, where people of Northern European ancestry had voted in large numbers for the Alliance (and before that, Reform), they were no more likely to vote Conservative in 2004 than other Canadians. The really striking difference in the support bases of the former Alliance and the new party was the disappearance of the gender gap. If the Alliance (or Reform) had done as well among women as they did among men, recent electoral politics in Canada would likely have taken a very different course. But in 2004, the gender gap disappeared. The fact that the Conservative Party was able to attract almost as much support from women as it did from men is one of the keys to explaining why the new party did almost as well as the Liberals outside Quebec. It also suggests that the Conservatives succeeded in establishing a more moderate image, despite the Liberals' best efforts to paint the party and its leader as just too extreme. It remains to be seen whether that image will endure.

The new party owed much of its success to anger over the sponsorship scandal. In 2004, that anger was enough to offset the party's two electoral liabilities: its social and fiscal conservatism. The party's long-term success will hinge very much on its ability to consolidate its partisan base. The Conservatives had more partisans than the former Alliance and Progressive Conservatives combined, and this was enough to wipe out the head start that

had carried the Liberals to victory in 2000. If these Conservative partisans prove to have a genuine attachment to their party, elections outside Quebec could well remain close.

Much depends on the NDP. There is clear evidence that the party is rebuilding its traditional support base. In 1993, the NDP suffered a massive loss of support among women and men alike. In 1997, many more women than men moved back to the party, opening up a gender gap that re-appeared in the 2000 election (Gidengil 2003). This gender gap in NDP voting all but disappeared in 2004. Why did gender have so little effect on NDP voting in this election? One obvious candidate is the change in the party's leadership. This was the first election since 1988 when the party was led by a man rather than by a woman. If the NDP's ability to draw male voters back into the party is one of the keys to explaining the increase in its vote share, another is the doubling of the union vote. The defection of union voters had cost the NDP dearly in recent elections, as first Reform and then the Alliance proved much more attractive to union members. In 2004, many of these voters returned to the NDP.

The NDP is not just rebuilding its traditional support base; it is also attracting a new type of voter. The NDP's enhanced appeal to younger voters was a key factor in boosting the party's vote share in 2004. Age was simply not a factor in NDP voting in 2000, but in 2004 the party was very successful in attracting the youth vote. The question is: will it last? To the extent that young people are more open to diversity and alternative lifestyles (Gidengil et al. 2005), they form a growing pool of potential voters for the NDP. Looking only at a single election, though, there is no way to tell whether this is indeed a generational effect. It could simply reflect the particular circumstances of the 2004 election. But if it does reflect something more enduring, we could be seeing much more competitive elections as generational replacement takes its toll on support for the Liberal and Conservative parties.

With the Liberals reduced to minority government status and the right re-united, it would be tempting to assume that Canada has moved back to its traditional two-plus one party system, at least outside Quebec. It would be premature, though, to see the 2004 election as marking the return of brokerage-style electoral politics. One of the defining characteristics of the 1993, 1997 and 2000 elections was the extent to which the vote of the NDP on the left and Reform and then the Alliance on the right was structured along fundamental lines of ideological division, while the Liberals continued to occupy the vote-rich middle ground of Canadian politics. These same fault lines defined the NDP and Conservative votes in 2004. Particularly striking is the importance of the so-called "new" left-right dimension. The NDP did best among secular voters who take liberal positions on issues relating to sexual mores and lifestyles, while the Conservatives fared best with moral traditionalists. Given the importance of Christian fundamentalism in Conservative voting, the 2004 election could mark, not the return of brokerage politics but the emergence of the sorts of "culture wars" that are dividing voters in the United States. Which of the possible scenarios prevails will depend very much on the pull of brokerage politics. And that pull remains strong.

Figure 1


The Multi-Stage Explanatory Model
Social Background
Underlying Beliefs and Values
Party Identification
Economic Perspectives
Issue Opinions
Leader Evaluations
Vote Choice

Figure 2: The Visible Minority Vote



Figure 3: Religion and Vote Choice (outside Quebec)



Figure 4: Gender and Vote Choice





Figure 5: Union Membership and Vote Choice



Figure 6: Age and Vote Choice



Figure 7: The Distribution of Party Identification



Figure 8



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Appendix A: Description of Variables[1]

Values and Beliefs

Variables were coded on a scale from –1 to 1, unless specified otherwise.

1. QUEBEC FEELING is an index made up of two questions:

- How much do you think should be done for Quebec: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less? (cps_f9)
- How do you feel about Quebec? Use any number from zero to one hundred. Zero means you really dislike Quebec and one hundred means you really like Quebec. (pes_c5)

The index is the sum of the two scores divided by 2.

2. SOCIAL CONSERVATISM is an index made up of four questions:

- How much do you think should be done for women: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less? (cps_f7)
- Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children. (cps_p14)
- How do you feel about feminists? Use any number from zero to one hundred. Zero means you really dislike the group, and one hundred means you really like the group (pes_c7)
- How do you feel about gays and lesbians? Use any number from zero to one hundred. Zero means you really dislike the group, and one hundred means you really like the group (pes_c9)

The index is the sum of the four scores divided by 4.

3. FREE ENTERPRISE is an index made up of six questions:

- Here are some statements. For each one, please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.
  a) The government should leave it entirely to the private sector to create jobs. (cps_p11)
  b) If people can't find work in the region where they live, they should move to where the jobs are. (cps_p13)
- How much power do you think unions should have: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less? (pes_d8)
- And how much power do you think business should have: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less? (pes_d9)
- Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

[1] The parentheses refer to the question number in the survey; ‘cps’ refers to the campaign survey and ‘pes’ to the post-election survey.

a) When businesses make a lot of money, everyone benefits, including the poor. (pes_g2)
b) People who don't get ahead should blame themselves, not the system. (pes_g11)

The index is the sum of the six scores divided by 6.

4. REGIONAL ALIENATION

- In general, does the federal government treat your Province: better, worse, or about the same as other provinces? (cps_p5)

If the respondent said 'better', the variable equals –1; respondents who said 'worse' were given a value of 1; individuals who responded 'about the same as other provinces' or 'don't know' were given a score of 0.

5. CYNICISM is an index made up of seven questions:

- How do you feel about politicians in general? Use a scale from zero to one hundred. Zero means you really dislike them and one hundred means you really like them (cps_g6)
- Do political parties keep their election promises: most of the time, some of the time, or hardly ever? (cps_p6)
- On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at all with the way democracy works in Canada? (pes_a11)
- How do you feel about political parties in general? (pes_c2d)
- I don't think the government cares much what people like me think. (pes_g3)
- All federal parties are basically the same; there isn't really a choice. (pes_g7)
- Politicians are ready to lie to get elected. (pes_g8)

The index is the sum of the seven scores divided by 7.

6. CANADA - US is an index made up of three questions:

- Do you think Canada's ties with the United States should be much closer, somewhat closer, about the same as now, more distant or much more distant? (cps_f10)
- How do you feel about the United States? (pes_c3b)
- Overall, free trade with the U.S. has been good for the Canadian economy. (pes_g4)

The index is the sum of the three scores divided by 3.

Party Identification

- In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a: Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P, or none of these? (cps_q1a/pes_k1a)
- In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a: Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P, another party, or no party? (cps_q1b/pes_k1b)

Four variables were created, one for each party. Each variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent declared a very strong or fairly strong party identification with the same party in both the campaign and post-election survey and 0 otherwise. The two versions were

adminstered to random half samples. Respondents received the same version in both the campaign and post-election surveys.

Issues

Variables were coded on a scale from –1 to 1, unless specified otherwise.

1. TAXES

- And now taxes. Keep in mind that cutting taxes means spending less in some areas. Should personal income taxes be increased, decreased or kept about the same as now? (pes_d1k)

If the respondent said 'increased', the variable equals –1; respondents who said 'decreased' were given a value of 1; individuals who responded 'kept about the same as now' or 'don't know' were given a score of 0.

2. IMMIGRATION

- Do you think Canada should admit: more immigrants, fewer immigrants, or about the same as now? (cps_p9)

If the respondent said 'fewer', the variable equals –1; respondents who said 'more' were given a value of 1; individuals who responded 'about the same as now' or 'don't know' were given a score of 0.

3. GUN CONTROL

- Here are some statements. For each one, please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. The gun registry should be scrapped entirely. (cps_p15)

4. SPENDING is an index made up of four questions:

- Should the Federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now? ... Welfare? (pes_d1b)
- Should the Federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now? ... Health Care? (pes_d1c)
- Should the Federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now? ... Education? (pes_d1d)
- Should the Federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now? ... Social Housing? (pes_d1g)

If the respondent said 'less', the variable equals –1; respondents who said 'more' were given a value of 1; individuals who responded 'about the same as now' or 'don't know' were given a score of 0. The index is the sum of the four scores divided by 4.

5. DEFENSE

- Should the Federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now on the following areas? / Keep in mind that spending more ... Defence / Military spending? (pes_d1a)

If the respondent said 'less', the variable equals –1; respondents who said 'more' were given a value of 1; individuals who responded 'about the same as now' or 'don't know' were given a score of 0.

6. WAR

- As you may know, Canada decided NOT to participate in the war against Iraq. Do you think this was a good decision or a bad decision? (pes_d10)

If the respondent said 'bad decision', the variable equals –1; respondents who said 'good decision' were given a value of 1; individuals who responded 'don't know' were given a score of 0.

7. HEALTH CARE is an index made up of two questions:

- Do you favour or oppose having some private hospitals in Canada? (cps_i5)
- Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? People who are willing to pay should be allowed to get medical treatment sooner. (pes_g10)

The index is the sum of the two scores divided by 2.

8. SAME SEX MARRIAGE

- Do you favour or oppose same-sex marriage, or do you have no opinion on this? (cps_i13)

If the respondent said 'oppose', the variable equals –1; respondents who said 'favour' were given a value of 1; individuals who responded 'have no opinion' were given a score of 0.

9. SPONSORSHIP SCANDAL is an index made up of four questions:

- When Jean Chretien was Prime Minister, do you think there was a lot of corruption in government, some, a little, or none? (cps_l1@3)
- Now some questions about the sponsorship scandal. Does it make you very angry, somewhat angry, not very angry, or not angry at all? (cps_l2)
- Since becoming Prime Minister, how good a job has Paul Martin done in dealing with the sponsorship scandal? (cps_l5)
- If re-elected, how confident are you that Paul Martin will prevent this type of scandal from happening again? (cps_l6)

The index is the sum of the four scores divided by 4.

Leaders

Variables were coded on a scale from –1 to 1.

- And now, how do you feel about the party leaders? Use a scale from zero to one hundred. Zero means you really dislike the leader and one hundred means you really like the leader.
  a) How do you feel about Stephen Harper? (cps_g1)
  b) How do you feel about Paul Martin? (cps_g2)
  c) How do you feel about Jack Layton? (cps_g3)

Appendix B: Multinomial Estimations of Vote Choice

1. Conservative versus Liberal

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5
1. Social Background					
Atlantic Resident	-0.73**	-0.68*	-0.66*	-0.55	-0.47
Western Resident	0.89**	0.71**	0.72**	0.73**	0.75**
Catholic	-0.60**	-0.64**	-0.26	-0.18	-0.24
Fundamentalist Christian	0.59**	0.42*	0.39	0.57*	0.54*
Other Religion	-0.94**	-0.98**	-0.98**	-0.81	-0.62
No religion	-0.22	-0.01	0.20	0.17	0.27
Visible Minority	-1.06**	-1.09**	-0.73*	-0.88*	-0.68
French-speaking	-0.71*	-0.53	-0.66	-0.77	-0.48
Married / Common-law	0.37*	0.11	0.06	-0.34	-0.18
Union Member	-0.31*	-0.07	-0.05	0.19	0.17
Over 54 Years of age	-0.01	-0.28	-0.19	-0.35	-0.18
Renter	0.35	0.31	0.57*	0.54	0.69*
Home Owner	0.23	0.29	0.34	0.27	0.21
Low Income	-0.43*	-0.45*	-0.39	-0.42	-0.48
High Income	-0.35*	-0.36*	-0.30	-0.37	-0.34
Below High School	-0.23	-0.38	-0.35	-0.18	-0.31
Rural Resident	0.50**	0.45**	0.64**	0.52*	0.41
2. Values and Beliefs					
Free Enterprise		0.49*	-0.04	-0.46	-0.42
Canada - US		1.47**	1.25**	0.68*	0.33
Social Conservatism		0.79**	0.86**	0.68*	0.73*
Cynicism		1.65**	1.15**	0.22	0.34
Regional Alienation		0.38**	0.34*	0.10	-0.01
Quebec		-0.62**	-0.53*	-0.15	-0.31
3. Party Identification					
Conservative			2.96**	2.66**	2.05**
Liberal			-2.99**	-2.73**	-2.04**
N.D.P			-2.69**	-2.86**	-2.89**
4. Issues					
Sponsorship Scandal				1.93**	1.11**
Defense				0.22	0.26
Scrap Gun Registry				0.43**	0.44**
Same-sex Marriage				0.09	0.09
War				-0.43**	-0.31*
Immigration				-0.15	-0.03
Social Program Spending				-0.87**	-0.88**
Taxes				0.46*	0.48*
Health Care				-0.53**	-0.50**
5. Leaders					
Harper					2.70**
Martin					-2.22**
Layton					0.16
Constant	-0.25	-0.39	-0.47	-0.26	-0.21
McFadden's Pseudo R^2	0.10	0.24	0.44	0.50	0.56
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1689.18	-1389.37	-1021.24	-903.71	-759.10
Number of cases	1767	1709	1709	1688	1637

2. NDP versus Liberal

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5
1. Social Background					
Atlantic Resident	0.00	-0.07	-0.17	-0.19	-0.01
Western Resident	0.72**	0.74**	0.61*	0.60*	0.80**
Catholic	-0.34	-0.41	-0.10	-0.07	-0.08
Fundamentalist Christian	-0.31	-0.08	0.09	0.45	0.30
Other Religion	-0.27	-0.55	-0.78	-0.61	-0.62
No religion	0.43*	0.28	0.33	0.17	0.17
Visible Minority	-0.46	-0.25	-0.16	-0.09	0.10
French-speaking	-1.20*	-0.94	-1.37*	-1.55*	-1.53
Married / Common-law	-0.19	-0.22	-0.28	-0.37	-0.19
Union Member	0.49**	0.27	0.25	0.39	0.41
Over 54 Years of age	-0.51*	-0.51*	-0.34	-0.33	-0.19
Renter	0.75**	0.63*	0.69*	0.71*	0.64
Home Owner	0.42*	0.23	0.40	0.27	0.09
Low Income	-0.01	-0.20	-0.05	0.12	-0.01
High Income	-0.38	-0.17	-0.11	-0.07	-0.13
Below High School	0.65**	0.76**	0.61*	0.87**	0.69
Rural Resident	-0.10	-0.25	-0.18	-0.18	-0.19
2. Values and Beliefs					
Free Enterprise		-1.49**	-1.05**	-0.99*	-0.98*
Canada - US		-0.48*	-0.46	-0.46	-0.45
Social Conservatism		-0.85**	-0.84**	-0.15	-0.10
Cynicism		1.74**	1.10**	0.85*	0.78*
Regional Alienation		-0.12	-0.16	-0.13	-0.22
Quebec		-0.27	-0.18	-0.01	-0.33
3. Party Identification					
Conservative			-1.11	-1.23	-1.33
Liberal			-2.26**	-2.11**	-1.64**
N.D.P			2.26**	2.33**	1.78**
4. Issues					
Sponsorship Scandal				1.16**	0.10
Defense				-0.17	-0.11
Scrap Gun Registry				-0.08	-0.05
Same-sex Marriage				0.76**	0.75**
War				-0.13	0.01
Immigration				0.25	0.31
Social Program Spending				-0.49	-0.76*
Taxes				0.40	0.41
Health Care				0.15	0.07
5. Leaders					
Harper					0.42
Martin					-2.62**
Layton					1.92**
Constant	-0.83**	-1.05**	-0.93*	-0.95*	-0.56
McFadden's Pseudo R^2	0.10	0.24	0.44	0.50	0.56
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1689.18	-1389.37	-1021.24	-903.71	-759.10
Number of cases	1767	1709	1709	1688	1637

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

3. Conservative versus NDP

	1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5
1. Social Background					
Atlantic Resident	-0.72**	-0.62	-0.50	-0.36	-0.46
Western Resident	0.17	-0.02	0.11	0.14	-0.05
Catholic	-0.26	-0.23	-0.16	-0.12	-0.16
Fundamentalist Christian	0.91**	0.50	0.30	0.13	0.24
Other Religion	-0.67	-0.43	-0.20	-0.19	0.00
No religion	-0.65**	-0.29	-0.13	0.00	0.10
Visible Minority	-0.60	-0.84*	-0.58	-0.79	-0.79
French-speaking	0.49	0.41	0.71	0.79	1.06
Married / Common-law	0.56**	0.33	0.34	0.02	0.01
Union Member	-0.79**	-0.34	-0.30	-0.20	-0.23
Over 54 Years of age	0.50**	0.23	0.15	-0.03	0.01
Renter	-0.40	-0.32	-0.12	-0.17	0.05
Home Owner	-0.19	0.06	-0.06	0.00	0.12
Low Income	-0.42	-0.25	-0.33	-0.54	-0.47
High Income	0.03	-0.19	-0.18	-0.30	-0.21
Below High School	-0.88**	-1.14**	-0.96**	-1.06**	-0.99*
Rural Resident	0.60**	0.70**	0.82**	0.70**	0.60*
2. Values and Beliefs					
Free Enterprise		1.97**	1.01**	0.53	0.57
Canada - US		1.96**	1.71**	1.14**	0.78*
Social Conservatism		1.64**	1.70**	0.83*	0.83*
Cynicism		-0.09	0.05	-0.63	-0.43
Regional Alienation		0.49**	0.50**	0.23	0.21
Quebec		-0.36	-0.35	-0.14	0.01
3. Party Identification					
Conservative			4.07**	3.90**	3.39**
Liberal			-0.73	-0.61	-0.40
N.D.P			-4.95**	-5.19**	-4.66**
4. Issues					
Sponsorship Scandal				0.77*	1.01**
Defense				0.39*	0.37*
Scrap Gun Registry				0.51**	0.48**
Same-sex Marriage				-0.68**	-0.66**
War				-0.30	-0.32
Immigration				-0.40*	-0.34
Social Program Spending				-0.39	-0.12
Taxes				0.06	0.07
Health Care				-0.68**	-0.57**
5. Leaders					
Harper					2.28**
Martin					0.40
Layton					-1.75**
Constant	0.58*	0.66	0.47	0.69	0.35
McFadden's Pseudo R^2	0.10	0.24	0.44	0.50	0.56
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1689.18	-1389.37	-1021.24	-903.71	-759.10
Number of cases	1767	1709	1709	1688	1637

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Endnotes

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[1] The Green Party received 4.7 percent of the vote outside Quebec. Unfortunately, though, this translates into too few survey respondents for reliable analysis.

[2] As in the previous three elections, voting in Quebec still revolved to a remarkable degree around the issue of sovereignty. Indeed, the 2004 federal election in Quebec might aptly be characterized as a case of "plus ça change ..." The best predictor of vote choice in Quebec in 2004 was whether one was for or against sovereignty. Everything else being equal, the probability of voting Bloc increased by 31 points when one was very favourable to sovereignty (compared to being neutral), while the probability of a Liberal vote decreased by 21 points.

[3] The field work was conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University. The campaign survey response rate was 53 percent. The study was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, with additional funding from Elections Canada. Copies of the questionnaires are available at: http://www.ces-eec.umontreal.ca/

[4] The complete results for each bloc of variables for each pair of parties are provided in Appendix B.

[5] It should be noted, though, that the Liberals had done particularly well among visible minority voters in 2000. In the previous election, the visible minority vote was 13 points lower at 62 percent.

[6] This question has not been asked in previous Canadian Election Studies, so we cannot tell if this is something new.

[7] See the appendix for details of scale construction and reliabilities for all of the composite measures used in this paper.

[8] The concept of party identification has been highly contested in Canada (Gidengil 1992). In the original Michigan model, a person's vote was the outcome of the interaction between their longstanding predisposition to support a particular party and the short-term forces peculiar to a given election (Campbell et al. 1960). The latter might induce people to vote for a party other than the one with which they identify, but their party identification remains unchanged; otherwise, vote choice and party identification would be indistinguishable. The problem in Canada was that party identification seemed to be "as volatile ... as the vote itself" (Meisel 1975, 67; see also LeDuc et al.1984). Much of this apparent instability, though, seems to have stemmed from the fact that the traditional party identification question did not explicitly offer the option of not identifying with *any* political party (Johnston 1992). This may have encouraged some people to name the party they were voting for even though they lacked any meaningful sense of psychological attachment to that party. The other problem with the traditional approach to determining party identification was the inclusion of people who did not identify very strongly with their chosen party (Blais et al. 2001). Accordingly, we have adopted a conservative strategy here: we only count people who think of themselves as very strong or fairly strong partisans as having a genuine party identification and we exclude people who claim a different party identification in the campaign and post-election surveys. The figures for the 2000 election differ from those in Blais et al. (2002) because the criteria for being considered a party identifier were less strict.

[9] The NDP attracted 23 percent of the vote among non-partisans.

[10] The model on which this estimate is based includes a control for political cynicism. Dropping the cynicism variable barely changes the estimated impact of the sponsorship issue on the Conservative vote share and has only a modest effect on the estimates for the Liberals

and the NDP. If voters' general sense of political disaffection is not factored in, the estimated negative impact of the sponsorship scandal on the Liberal vote share increases by less than three-quarters of a point and the estimated positive impact on the NDP vote share increases by the same amount.

[11] This conclusion holds if we remove the control for social conservatism. The estimates barely change.

[12] These estimates are based on campaign evaluations. Post-election measures are subject to "honeymoon effects" that lead to inflated evaluations of both the winning party and its leader. Average evaluations of Martin were fully four points higher after the election than they were in the final week of the campaign.