POLITICAL VIOLENCE, POLICY DISASTERS, AND DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT: THE IMPACT ON CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE

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(This presentation draws on a number of papers I have written or published in the past few years. It also draws extensively on the draft of one of the sections of the Report of the APSA Task Force on Political Violence and Terror)

Political analysis is increasingly essential if we are to

- Inhibit terrorism
- Promote political and economic development throughout the world
- Intervene internationally only where we will be saving lives and improving conditions—and NOT where we are likely to make matters worse
- Prevent the calamitous effects of natural disasters and terror and respond appropriately and quickly when they inevitably occur
- Reduce inequities created by discrimination
- Improve the quality and implementation of government services so that they truly serve the collective good

I am NOT advocating that we all become policy analysts. Nor am I arguing for us all to do research that is immediately relevant or accessible to those who make government policies. But I am arguing that we must begin to insist on the inclusion of political analysis in assessments of the contemporary world, how it got to be the way it is and how it could be changed. Economists have been very successful in inserting economic analysis and ideas into the public domain, but their approach continually confronts exigencies and circumstances caused by the stuff of political science: governments, conflicts, and political power. And they are not always informative or insightful about those questions. Journalists are no better unless well briefed in the literatures we political scientists have produced. And there's the rub! We don't always make our material accessible to the journalists and policy-makers who could use it to the best effect, that is, to ensure:

- A better informed citizenry
- A better designed and implemented set of policies

The US Presidential debacle of 2000, the impact of 9/11, the ill-conceived War in Iraq, Katrina at home and the tsunami abroad, the failure to engage in serious state-building in Afghanistan, the continuing humanitarian crises throughout the world have combined to generate a renewed interest by political scientists in engaging with the world around them.

So, what is there for us to do as political scientists eager to be of use? There are several possible strategies, some already encouraged by APSA and others in our profession:

- Creation of Perspectives on Politics
- Task Forces: Civic Engagement, Inequality in a) the US and b) the World; role of religion in American politics; Political Violence and Terror
- Provide access to information on major events: "APSA Newsroom" on its web page http://www.apsanet.org/section_77.cfm
- Briefs and experts on elections around the world, voting processes and technology, government handling of disasters
- Op Eds and popular books that rely on good evidence and well-reasoned, if controversial, arguments: What Bruce Ackerman and Ben Barber and Frances Fox Piven do so well
- Internationalization of the profession
- World Bank project
- Axelrod in China
- Toqueville in India
- Support for institutions of higher education decimated by

- natural disaster, as in New Orleans or the cities on the Danube a few years ago or those affected by tsunami
- political disaster, as in parts of Africa (Ira's project on this) or in the former Yugoslavia
- inequalities in resources and prestige—new Teaching and Learning initiative, which also reveals how much we at more prestigious universities have to learn from our compatriots at those schools devoted to teaching undergrads

There have, in fact, been numerous implications for the study and teaching of political science. The focus and concern on civic education and engagement has generated

- Service Learning initiatives
- Rewards for faculty who promote civic engagement—I got one, I'm proud to say
- Serious research on how to encourage citizenship at all levels of education

With the end of the Cold War, there has been a decreased emphasis and funding for languages and country specific knowledge. Recent international events are turning the clock back a bit. But we don't really want to go back to the kind of knowledge the State Department wanted then. Indeed, this circumstance is a metaphor for the state of the discipline. We don't want to be contract labor who provide translations, background and training for those on the ground. We want to be analysts who actually inform the work that is going on and make it better. Analytically—at least in my view—this means we must combine deep contextual knowledge of cases and places WITH rigorous analytics and quantitative methodologies where possible.
My real bugbears:

1) The ideological attack on government
2) The ignorance and indifference to state-building where they are fragile or non-existent and even where they seem to be relatively strong (our countries)

a. Importance of building infrastructure
b. Taxation as a good thing—give as well as get, basis for vesting in government and demanding real representation
c. Consent and quasi-voluntary compliance

The state of our knowledge on state-building
All we know from social science and from history suggests that Iraq, Afghanistan, the Sudan, and many other countries in the world have a long and difficult process in front of them with no certainty that they can succeed. Nor can policy-makers turn to social scientists for recipes for success. Theories of the state abound but reveal insufficient understanding of how to build states where they do not exist or where they have failed. Although we have put together large chunks of the puzzle, we lack critical missing pieces. Yet, we are closer than we have ever been before; the long-term investment in analytics, in-depth case research, and theory construction is beginning to pay off.
We now know that modernization theory and other approaches that produced grand evolutionary typologies may help us categorize countries and eras (and I even wonder about that), but they do little to help us understand the future. What we need instead are systematic and contextualized comparisons of solutions to real and often very nitty-gritty problems state-builders face. This means something closer to Weber's extraordinary essay on "Bureaucracy" than Marx's universalizing Capital, much as I learned from and continue to rely on his argument. And we are beginning to get just that, or at least the necessary building blocks. From historians and area experts, we have the detailed knowledge of cases necessary for both in depth understanding of key processes and comparisons across time and place. From economists, political economists, and formal theorists, most importantly Mancur Olson, Michael Taylor, Robert Axelrod, and Elinor Ostrom, we now comprehend when cooperation is possible and when it is not. From a range of social scientists, notably Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly, and Douglass North and those they have influenced, we have increased sensitivity to the role of social structure, institutions (market, governmental, informal), and history, while acquiring knowledge about the role of class structure, demography, revolution, war-making and economics in state-building. Thanks to Adam Przeworski and his collaborators we now are on our way to solve the chicken and egg problem of the links among democracy, government stability, and economic growth. Taken together, this large body of work gives us some important pathways for the future. We now have some confidence about necessary preconditions for state formation and democracy. Moreover, we know that Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Sudan are far from meeting these baseline requirements and are, therefore, likely to be fragile at best and, at worst, to succumb to chaos and internal strife. We know that formal institutions are essential but not enough. Thus, it is no surprise—and was, in fact, foreseeable to political scientists, if not

macro-economists—that the formulaic approach of the IMF did not produce desired results. Most importantly, we have a large body of experiences that give us some indication of the mechanisms, processes, and arrangements that might lead to effective government and which will block progress towards that end. We gain that knowledge by parsing the history of both former successes and failures. Such a project demands both detail and theory, and we now posses the rudiments of both.

We have understood since Adam Smith that the "wealth of nations" depends on well-functioning markets. We have much more recently acknowledged that well-functioning markets require stable government. But government does not just happen, even when there are well-designed constitutions and especially when there are not. We think of France as a highly centralized state, but it was not easy to make it so. Forging a national identity required the conquest of provinces and their lords. Gaining compliance with laws required the loss of lives, including those of tax collectors and census takers. Britain and the U.S. might now have nearly zero levels of official corruption, but it took centuries to achieve. How France centralized, how Britain and the U.S. eradicated most government corruption, and how all three gained relatively high compliance with its laws offers lessons for countries tying to build states today. It is not a question of following a particular grand path but of learning how to solve specific problems. These are the real lessons of Tilly's work on war-making and state-making, or my own work on revenue production and on military service.

We are ever more conscious that well-ordered institutions and the bases for cooperation require small steps that allow people to learn what institutions and which people are reliable and in what settings. They can then take increasing risks and broaden the range of those with whom they can productively interact and under what conditions. Many of the networks, organizations, and institutions that offer protection of property rights and lives can be emulated in other situations and places, as exemplified in Ostrom's work on common pool resources. But there are also real dangers that tight local networks, effective bilateral exchanges, or even some of the more sophisticated and long-distance multilateral arrangements can become more constraint than facilitator. Recent political science and political economy offer some hints about how to build productive and secure interactions across villages, ethnic groups, and regional divides. As I see it, the next great project is to build on what we already know about governance and institutional arrangements. We need to decipher how to make them work at the large-scale as well as at the small and in very different contexts. We know quite a lot about how to govern communities; we need to learn considerably more about how to build states.

Possible prescriptions

Infrastructure and public goods may as important in the creation of an effective government as security. Without significant perceived benefits to citizens that not only enhance stability but also improve well-being, citizens are less likely to comply with or support the government (Levi 2006).

The past provides only partial lessons for the present. In a wonderful little book, Prosperity and Violence, Robert Bates elaborates the crucial difference: shielded by the great powers and the aid agencies, the newer governments did not have to confront either the military threats or revenue demands that gave earlier generations of rulers incentives to "persuade those who earned private incomes to pay the costs of government…(Bates 2001)" Even so, the same question that plagued historical states infects today's: how to ensure that government has sufficient power to tax and to provide security while inhibiting government from predation on the population it is supposed to be serving. Mancur Olson framed the issue as transforming "roving bandits" into "stationary bandits (Olson 1993)." Banditry is not the only possibility here although it may be one of the most common. It and its variants are points on a continuum of government types. While all governments extract resources, some are kleptocrats, some are Robin Hoods, and some, albeit too few, are partners in the production of prosperity and equity. It is this last kind of government we hope to achieve. Leviathans and/or bandits simply will not do.

Governments are more effective when they achieve quasi-voluntary compliance, that is, compliance motivated by a willingness to cooperate but backed by coercion. This requires that subjects and citizens receive something from government in return for the extractions government takes from them. It also means that compliance is always conditional. It will vary as governments vary in their performance, honesty, attention to due process, and other determinants of government reliability. When government officials become venal, lose their monopoly over force, or prove incapable of extracting needed resources to produce collective goods, non-compliance, resistance, and even state failure are far more likely. A vicious spiral ensues. Governments unable to collect sufficient taxes to pay public officials create incentives for those officials to expropriate "salaries" from citizens and often with force. This in turn leads to the rise of armed gangs as the populace tries to protect itself from their own government. We experience bandits fighting bandits.

Because so many governments engage in venality and corruption or actually harm the personal and professional lives of citizens, there are good reasons to distrust government. Such distrust is in fact a healthy

reaction when it produces legal frameworks, checks and balances, and vigilant citizens. Indeed, distrust often generates institutional change and creation (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005): "Good defenses make good neighbors" (Levi 2000). Essential are assurances that officials will do their duty and be caught and punished if they do not.

Increasing resources and capabilities are needed to build infrastructure and provide public goods, but the process by which allocation decisions are made and how they are perceived also matter. Seldom, especially in the modern and democratic world, is confidence in a government officialdom based solely on the extent to which it secures property rights and refrains from predation. Confidence also depends on the extent to which each citizen is assured that all others are being held to the same legal obligations; and the extent to which citizens generally believe they are getting something in return for their compliance. People are more likely to comply with government requirements when they have confidence that there is something approaching a quid pro quo. Their confidence increases when they believe that officials are honest, that what is collected in revenues will actually find its way to the public till, that all eligible young men face the same probability of being drafted, etc. Confidence further increases with the actual production and distribution of valued public goods (Levi 1988; Levi 1997).

Underlying confidence in government and the willingness to comply are assessments of the fairness in the implementation of law and the distribution of public goods. What constitutes fairness and what are deemed desired public goods vary across societies and time. Any government that does not meet widely-held expectations on these matters is likely to suffer resistance and dissent, passive and active (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005; Levi 1997; Tyler 2006).

New or restored institutions will be effective to the degree that they meet the tough challenges of resource allocation, coordination and communication, the institutionalization of reciprocity among groups, and legitimacy. To achieve these goals, institutions need to be viewed as fair, efficient and inclusive—no small test in any society—and especially daunting in one coming out of conflict. It is also critical to recognize that maximization of one of these criteria, such as fairness, can be at odds with another, such as efficiency (Shively, 2006) so that achieving an optimal outcome requires balancing and subjective assessment. In post-conflict societies while up-front inclusive gestures can offer reassurance to skeptical groups, it is plausible to hypothesize that the effects of these gestures only endure when there is significant capability to allocate services and material resources and integrate previously excluded groups.

While these challenges can seem particularly difficult, success does not necessarily require that they all be accomplished fully or immediately. Rather, we need to see success and failure on a continuum. Criteria of success can be minimal or maximal ranging from simply the degree to which there is no return to violence to the extent to which citizens believe that their lives are better than they were prior to, and during, the period of violence, and to citizen satisfaction with governmental institutions and services. Partial success may be "good enough" (Ross 2000) to promote the conditions for continued improvement and the understanding that peace building is an on-going, not a one-shot, process (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 779).

Not all public goods are equally important politically or equally hard to provide. Some such as clean water, improved sanitation services, child immunization programs, and roads are relatively inexpensive while others such as an expanded and accessible educational system, economic and opportunities, and quality health care require a great deal of infrastructure that may require decades to construct.

Distribution of public goods can be problematic when they are seen in group-based terms. In societies that had previously experienced significant variation in the provision of public goods such as South Africa, new patterns of distributions aimed at increasing equality can increase the resentment of formerly privileged groups while only partially meeting the needs and demands of those who had been most deprived in the past. Where opposing groups are distributed unevenly across regions, decisions such as those to build roads, construct schools, or provide health services are readily viewed through a distrustful eye and easily engender the belief that other groups are getting more benefits than one's own. A challenge therefore is how to best promote the belief that the provision of public goods is mutually beneficial not a particularistic payoff.

Good governance in post-conflict societies, indeed in any society, refers to the creation of institutions and practices that increase a government's legitimacy and its ability to provide goods and services. In divided societies majoritarian political rules are generally insufficient for minorities who fear this offers them little more than permanent minority status. This problem is particularly acute when electoral competition produces strong ethnic or regional parties since as Horowitz (1985) points out, elections become akin to census taking. Both formal and informal constitutional arrangements for power sharing are often needed to reassure minorities and these can take a number of forms (Horowitz 1991; Sisk 2003).

In Northern Ireland, for example, selection of the First and Deputy First Ministers as well as the passage of significant legislation requires significant support from both the Protestant and Catholic members of the Assembly. Other arrangements that have been used include election procedures that require candidates to get a minimum percentage of votes in a certain number of regions to win an election; requirements that high offices be divided among different groups, e.g. if the President comes from one community, the Prime Minister must come from another, and the head of the Legislature from a third (Lijphart 1977; 1985; McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Nordlinger 1972; O'Leary 2001); and arrangements that leave control over domains such as family law, including marriage and divorce, to each cultural or religious community and not a state function.
Constitutional and informal arrangements that guarantee minority participation and rights must ultimately be tested through practice. In Northern Ireland, for example, the institutions established in the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement have been suspended more time than they have been in force as the two communities have failed to agree on the First Minister and Deputy First Minister for long periods. In other societies, despite constitutional guarantees to protect religious, linguistic or other cultural rights, one or more groups sometimes comes to feel that this is not happening. For example, in the mid 1990's ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia felt at risk from the government's militant nationalist policies that threatened to control history teaching, street signs and other cultural expressions in regions with large numbers of Hungarians.
Establishing—or reestablishing—order in a society that has experienced severe disruption is an essential part of the consolidation of peace. Civil order is more than just providing security however; it is also the restoration and/or development of direct or indirect government services such as education, health care, transportation, and markets that can provide tangible benefits to people and these successes become evidence to citizens of a new regime's efficiency and legitimacy. Of course in societies where groups have been fighting, the distribution of these services is easily politicized and conflict around group differences in judgments about the fairness, equity, and efficiency of resource allocation can arise quickly given a history of mutual suspiciousness and concerns with group-based political favoritism.
A key aspect of peace building and civil order following conflict concerns who can participate in political life. One contentious issue here is the competing pressures that on the one hand seek to exclude those who endorsed or perpetrated violence in the past from holding public office and engaging in politics, while on the other hand the recognition that excluding these same people is unacceptable and counterproductive to achieving long run consolidation. Evidence from recent decades suggests that exclusion is rarely effective and a stable agreement requires broad inclusion in the post-conflict political process as in the cases of South Africa, Northern Ireland, and even Israel-Palestine, where former enemies in varying degrees have found ways to enlarge civic space and develop more inclusive, and mutually acceptable, political institutions and practices (Gibson 2004).
Good governance is generally associated with some meaningful form of representation and voice which is often associated with democratization and entails a wide range of processes including citizen participation, the minimization of corruption, the existence of a strong and independent judiciary, and governmental responsiveness. While each of these can be measured independently and consist of both objective and subjective dimensions, the evidence suggests that they tend to be highly intercorrelated.
In settings in which violence has hardened the bases for distrust, individuals may turn to the families, networks, and groups they know, increasing the obstacles to trade and cooperation with those outside the familiar (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005). There are a range of hypotheses that political scientists have developed concerning the paths for developing of effective institutions. There is some difference about the sequencing and the relative of institution building and the need for the developing of a shared, perhaps new, national identity. Some research have argued that imposing political institutional arrangements, such as power sharing or federalism in deeply divided societies in the absence of a common national identity have almost always failed (Roder and Rothchild, 2005; Bermeo, 2002). Post-war electoral processes can also introduce uncertainties that reinforce rather than attenuate social cleavages and provoke a relapse into civil conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Snyder, 2000). Confronted with these challenges, many scholars argue that a much more measured and discriminatory approach has to be taken in exporting democracy to those cultures and societies where there is no previous tradition of liberal democracy (Carothers and Ottaway, 2005). Democratization is a process of cultural, social, and political development that does not simply revolve around the exercise of the franchise and the holding of free elections. It also involves the establishment of a civic culture where citizens learn to become active and intelligent participants in the society and political life of their country. Most critically, democracy can only develop in a society with a strong, well-functioning administrative state apparatus that is responsive to the needs and welfare of the general public (Fukuyama, 2004 and 2005). The provision of essential services and "public goods" is a critical element of good governance, as is a proper understanding of

the requirements for governance at both the national and local levels. As Diamond asserts, “a country must first have a state before it can become a democracy” (Diamond, 2004). Mansfield and Snyder offer a similar assessment: “Without a coherent state grounded in a consensus on which citizens will exercise self-determination, unfettered electoral politics often gives rise to nationalism and violence at home and abroad. Absent these preconditions, democracy is deformed, and transitions towards democracy revert to autocracy or “generate chaos” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005 and 2005-06). Others contend that a higher priority needs to be placed on the development of social and economic institutions that rapidly provide needed goods and services to people and that the development of democratic political institutions is most effective later in the sequence.

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My primary interest is to understand what makes for effective governments and how to build them. Effective government is one that not only protects its citizens from violence but also promotes economic growth, supplies the public goods the populace needs and desires, develops mechanisms of popular accountability, and ensures relative political and economic equity. The most effective governments are probably in democracies, but not all democracies have effective governments, and there are relatively effective governments in non-democratic states.

We have made considerable progress as social scientists in identifying the key components of both effective and ineffective government. We have excellent descriptions and even good equilibrium theories to account for stability. We know quite a lot about why states fail and about the conditions that cause them to unravel. We are increasingly expert at explaining post hoc why some governments, performing so well on so many dimensions, suddenly fall apart. Think Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, or even the Soviet Union. But how do we build them back up? How do we improve those (nearly all) that need improvement?

What we lack is a dynamic theory, one that demonstrates how to go from ineffective to effective government, how we move from a problematic equilibrium to one we prefer. How do we generate governments that promote economic growth, relative equality, and political equity? How do we go from low participation to high? How do we change an inequitable society to one that is just and fair? How do we end corruption and institute impartial but compassionate bureaucrats? How can we transform governments that have failed their citizens abysmally into governments that protect their citizens, provide them with health, education, infrastructure and other public goods? And how can we transform democratic governments with advanced economies that serve some of their citizens very well and most of their citizens very poorly into democratic governments with advanced economies that serve all of their citizens equally well?

We have made considerable progress as social scientists in identifying the key components of both effective and ineffective government. We have excellent descriptions and even good equilibrium theories to account for stability. We know quite a lot about why states fail and about the conditions that cause them to unravel. We are increasingly expert at explaining post hoc why some governments, performing so well on so many dimensions, suddenly fall apart. Think Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, or even the Soviet Union. But how do we build them back up? How do we improve those (nearly all) that need improvement?

If the story is all in structure, geography, demography, initial conditions, path dependence and exogenous shocks, then perhaps we should simply sit back and let history take its course. But to say that there are constraints and that some of those constraints are quite rigid is comparable to describing human mentality as only hard wiring. Humans learn, and so do societies. When a combination of individuals with the incentives and imagination to figure out how to operate better within or even to overcome the status quo, we observe institutional transformation and creation. Trade cartels, bureaucracies, universities, and courts are just a few of the myriad examples of the institutions human beings build.

My emphasis is decidedly on the construction of government that performs well for the polity as a whole. I draw on a wide range of analyses of institutions and organizational governance as well as on significant research on protest and resistance. Others whose work I avidly consume focus on social capital, civic engagement, and social norms—claimed as essential elements for enhancing cooperation within civil society and for producing better government. Although I argue that the causal arrow is more likely to go from government to civic engagement than vice versa, the question of the relationship between civil society actors and government remains intellectually fruitful. Indeed, I believe a theory of consent—or at least compliance—is a necessary element of any reasonable theory of effective government. If the populace—or at least enough of the populace—cannot minimally express support, the government is likely to flounder. But I also want to stress the importance of the combination of governmental institutions and leadership and the role they play in inducing the preferences that help create and sustain the kind of polity we seek.

Government, and especially effective government, does not just happen, even when there are well-designed constitutions and particularly when there are not. Most countries experience stops and starts in their efforts to build states and better functioning governments. We think of France and Japan as highly centralized, but it was not easy to make them so. Forging a national identity required the conquest of provinces and their lords. Britain, Canada, and the U.S. might now have nearly zero levels of low-level official corruption, but it took centuries to attain that goal. And high level corruption—which we read about daily—seems still to abound, certainly in our two countries.

The path of past and relatively successful state builders provides but one possible route—and one filled with byways and diversions even among them. Early modern European states arose in response to wars with each other and within their boundaries. Wars drove the search for means to produce revenues and conscripts. Other states emerged as settler colonies of those original modern states and adopted their institutions and constitutions—albeit with significant variation in terms of how well they took root or contributed to democratization and economic growth. And many of the current state- and government-building efforts are in response to decolonization and former state break-ups.

We are ever more conscious that the development of effective government is seldom immediate. There is a long learning process during which publics and public officials discover what institutions and which people are reliable and in what settings. The more one develops confidence about others, the more one can then take risks and broaden the range of those productive interactions. Often, the response to insecurity is to develop networks of trust and obligation. However, network-based governance and trade can become more constraint on than facilitator of wide-spread cooperation. Recent political science and political economy offer some hints about how to build productive and secure interactions across villages, ethnic groups, and regional divides. We now need to take these findings and make them work in very different contexts.

We have learned how fragile many states and governments are. This is not just an issue of shifting coalitions in parliamentary systems. The deeper problem has to do with factors that undermine the capacity to govern. It seems all too easy to revert to the "war of all against all," and a growing body of work on state failure explains why. The causes are complex, not easily reduced to racial and religious cleavages, diamond mines, or wide-spread poverty, but scholars are successfully sorting out this complexity. Increasingly, we are also coming to recognize how devastating health and other catastrophes can be, especially when they deplete the revenues and staff of government.

Even the economically developed and stable democracies have difficulty sustaining effective governments. In the 1970s there was a lot of concern about the "fiscal crisis of the state," that is, that the demand for services by business as well as citizens would far outrun the revenues government could raise. The fiscal crisis is a reality. The poorest among us depend on government services, but so do the rich. Yet, throughout the developed democracies, there is increasing objection to taxes and lobbying effort devoted to passing corporations' expenses onto government. The reduction in revenues is accompanied by rising costs of and need for health, unemployment, and other forms of social insurance.

People are more likely to pay and vote for taxes and otherwise comply with government requirements when they have confidence that there is something approaching a quid pro quo. Their confidence increases when they have beliefs that officials are not corrupt, that what is collected in revenues will actually find its way to the public till, that all eligible young men face the same probability of being drafted, etc. Confidence further increases with the actual production and distribution of valued public goods.

Underlying confidence in government and the willingness to comply are assessments of the fairness in the implementation of law and the distribution of public goods. What constitutes fairness and what are deemed desired public goods vary across societies and time. Nonetheless, any government that does not meet widely-held expectations on these matters is likely to suffer resistance and dissent, passive and active.

We know quite a lot about what effective government entails and why states fail. There are instances of relatively effective and just governments, but we still need the blueprint for how to create and recreate them. Our next step must be to figure out how to keep them from failing, how to rebuild them when they have, and how to ensure that they are responsive and responsible to those they should be serving. We should no longer be satisfied with the Hobbesian solution, a government that provides only security against violence. Our goal is not social order alone but an equitable, just, and democratic government that elicits well-earned support and loyalty from its citizens—in the United States, in Canada, and throughout the world.

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