

Harvesting Public Policy?  
Private Influence on Agricultural Trade Policy in Canada

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After a full day of unedifying debate on agricultural trade policy in November 2005, just before the Hong Kong ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Canadian House of Commons gave unanimous approval to a motion instructing negotiators to seek increased market access abroad for agricultural exporters while ensuring that the protection from imports offered the supply managed sectors did not change (Canada, 2005c: 9960, 10017). This schizophrenic instruction pursued at the behest of the producers of milk, eggs and poultry in eastern Canada who compete with imports, and modified at the behest of western export-oriented grain farmers, limited the ability of Canadian ministers to be full participants in the negotiations, and it did not serve the wider interests of Canadians. Private harvesting of public policy takes place in plain view, yet it is still mysterious. Knowing more about how private actors attempt to influence trade policy is consequential for global governance, where problematic domestic support and understanding may be the chief stumbling block to renovation and extension of an open liberal multilateral trading system, and for the operation of the trading system, where inadequate implementation of obligations can nullify the intent of an agreement.

Agriculture is a distinctive sub-set of trade policy. It is the issue that blocked first the Uruguay Round and now the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, yet it is a sector with a declining share of the economy and trade. In most places agricultural policy serves a minority—farmers in rich countries, non-farmers in poor ones. The privileged place of supply management in Canadian politics might, therefore, have two simple explanations. First, the protection matters a great deal to a small number of producers (who would lose billions of dollars invested in quotas if the system ended immediately), while costing little for a large number of consumers. Many Canadians might think the price worth paying to preserve the family farm or a pleasant rural landscape. Second, the nature of Canada's first-past-the-post Westminster parliamentary system, with rural ridings often at the lower end of the permitted population variance and urban ridings often at the upper end, allows a small number of ridings with relatively large farm populations to have disproportionate influence on national policy. These simple explanations do not go far enough, however. They explain why farmers' attempts to influence policy might succeed, without showing how it is done. They might also explain farmers' success in getting MPs to pass non-binding resolutions without predicting the prospects for implementation in Canada of any new obligations resulting from the Doha Round. More complex explanations of private influence are often based on the suspicion that agricultural trade policy is inordinately influenced by corporate interests, in the civil society literature (Murphy, 2006), or by lobbying, in the political economy literature (Gawande, 2005). In both cases the worry is that money buys trade policy. The first approach needs evidence of the presence of corporate actors in the process; the second infers influence from the presence of money or of particular policy outcomes. Except for one influential but now dated paper (Caves, 1976), nobody has done the empirical work in Canada to show that policy *is* what money would *buy*. Given the difficulties with a focus on policy outcomes, a common constructivist critique of positivist research, I look at the process.

The larger concern is with how private interests attempt to influence the evolution of the rules of the global trading system. I look only at the channels of private influence as exercised on

national governments.<sup>1</sup> Multilateral negotiations are not conducted among states as unitary actors. State “interests” emerge both in discussion with other states and in interaction with economic actors. States know what they want in part by talking to the actors affected by policy, just as those actors learn through talking to the state. I concentrate on farmers and processors, the way they organize themselves to make their views known, and the channels they use, notably consultations, appearing before parliamentary committees, and lobbying. I do it with a reciprocal interaction in mind: private actors try to influence policy; negotiators try to build support for an agreement. In the next section, I address some theoretical considerations about identifying private influence. After describing the policy domains in the second section, and the actors of interest in the third section of the paper, I describe the recent evolution of consultations on agricultural trade policy in the fourth section, and in the fifth provide some evidence on lobbying. After this description of who seems to be heard, in the conclusion I speculate on why groups choose one or another channel of influence, and discuss the institutional design implications.

### **Private influence in theory**

In the framing paper for this volume, private actors engaged in the kind of activities described in this paper would be said to have “instrumental power”. The term implies a direct causal relation between the action and the outcome. Such causality is always hard to show (Woll, 2007); indeed since influence cannot be directly measured, judgements about the effectiveness of any private actor are necessarily subjective (Kraft and Kamieniecki, 2007: 24). It is impossible in this case to see power as “control over outcomes” because a small country like Canada does not control the outcome of a global trade negotiation. Even limiting the focus to the position adopted by economic actors and government negotiators is problematic because of the potential for posturing. Knowing the preferences of an actor is hard, and deducing it from public statements is risky. An acceptable outcome may be more limited than initial demands might suggest, and satisfaction with an outcome is not necessarily evidence of a group’s influence (Dür and Bièvre, 2007: 7-8).

Rather than investigate the impact on policy, therefore, I look for evidence of all of the ways in which agri-food interests attempt to influence the design and operation of agricultural trade policy in Canada. Private actors can influence policy directly, or through proxies that can shape ideas, or provide information. The influence can be through open consultations and parliamentary hearings, or through closed lobbying by firms and associations. When farmers are less than 2% of the population, they cannot form their own political party, but they can offer campaign contributions, mobilize marginal voters in ridings where they form a large part of the electorate, demonstrate in the streets, or provide funds for think tanks. Campaign finance rules can increase the influence of groups that can supply the needed funds or it can limit the influence of groups if contributions are restricted. The electoral system can give a bigger voice to groups that can sway even a small group of marginal voters (first-past-the-post), or it can strengthen

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<sup>1</sup> Private actors may have indirect influence at the WTO in Geneva by helping to frame how the issues are understood, but description and analysis of such discursive power is outside the scope of this paper.

groups that appeal to the general interest (some variants of proportional representation). Other resources that groups can supply to politicians or officials include information on what their members want, and technical expertise (Dür and Bièvre, 2007: 5).

My framing device is that supply management is manifestly not the objective that industry as a whole would seek to defend as the first goal of Canadian trade policy, nor is it what one would argue analytically that consumers ought to pick. By tracing all the potential pathways we get some sense of how influence is exercised, and whether there is a countervailing influence of other sectors. The framing paper for this volume also suggests asking if private influence on agricultural trade policy promotes or hinders sustainable development. By sustainable development I mean the freedoms that allow individuals to pursue that which they value in a way that future generations' ability to achieve these freedoms is not compromised (Cosbey, 2004). This objective includes poverty alleviation, responsible stewardship of the environment and the capacity of citizens to lead self-directed lives. The premise is that transparency and participation are part of seeing "development as freedom" (Sen, 1999) and that participation can contribute to sustainable development by ensuring that the needs of growth, the environment and social cohesion are all considered by policy-makers (Cosbey, 2004). If trade policy is made in the light of day, then there is a chance that it will not merely serve the interests of a narrow elite. Does agricultural trade policy meet this test?

The framework sketched here has obvious affinities with the approach variously called "policy communities", "iron triangles", "advocacy coalition", or network analysis (Howlett, 2002). While the agriculture policy community cannot necessarily control the results of negotiations in the WTO, it would be worthwhile to ask if Canada has an identifiable agricultural trade policy community. In his attempt to operationalize this approach in Canada, Howlett's (2002) evidence of who belongs to a network is based on appearances before a relevant Parliamentary committee. Accordingly in the sections that follow I develop lists of who participates in trade policy consultations, who appears before parliamentary committees, and who registers as a lobbyist in order first to provide a more fine-grained sense of who is engaged in the agricultural trade policy debate, and second to allow comparative analysis of where and how actors engage.

### **What are we talking about?**

In this paper the term "agriculture" should be understood to mean primary production and food processing, since both are exposed to trade. Primary agriculture in Canada is 1.3% of GDP and 1.9% of employment; when food, beverage and tobacco (FBT) processing is added, the agri-food sector is 3.4% of GDP and 3.8% of employment.<sup>2</sup> Some primary producers (e.g. oilseeds) export two thirds of their production, but others (e.g. dairy) export less than 10%. FBT processors compete with imports for domestic sales, since imports account for 20% of the domestic market. About three-quarters of FBT production is consumed in Canada, but some sub-sectors are more export-oriented than others. The implication is that interest representation will be fragmented since some producers and processors will resist liberalization in Canada, while others will be anxious to develop further export opportunities. The policy framework matters more to producers and processors than consumers: food consumption in Canada, including in restaurants,

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<sup>2</sup> Information on Canadian agriculture comes from (Canada, 2006a).

is barely 15% of household expenditure, but government support is close to 40% of agriculture GDP. Relative prices therefore matter much more to the actors in the sector than to consumers, who care much more about food safety and quality issues, and environmental sustainability.

The most significant farms for policy purposes would look very much like small businesses to most citizens. AAFC distinguishes among a number of different types of family farms, but only two are significant in commercial terms, the ones called Large Business-Focused farms, with revenues of \$100,000 to \$499,999; and Very Large Business-Focused farms, with revenues of \$500,000 and over. In 2004 the average Canadian farm's total net worth was \$898,000. Roughly 80 percent of production is from 20 percent or less of the farms, and these farms are the main beneficiaries of agricultural programs (Canada, 2002). Average herd size in dairy farming, for example, is still relatively small at under 50 cows, but because of supply management, the average value of the milk quota for those cows is \$1.5 million (Canada, 2006a). Agriculture policy tends to see farms as businesses rather than seeing farmers as individuals, with the result that politically-motivated policies designed to help struggling farmers provide even more help to large farm businesses. The farms with the biggest assets are the ones where policy distortions are the most significant.

Agricultural economists consider most commercial farms to be agribusinesses, but agribusiness as a domain is broader than the farm sector: it is the totality of interactions of the farm input, farm production, food processing, retailing and distribution processes.<sup>3</sup> Food processing is highly concentrated in Canada, with the top four firms in some sub-sectors (e.g. oilseeds and breakfast cereals) representing up to 80% of sales, but concentration indices in Canada decline when imports are considered (Canada, 2006a). Harrison and Rude (2004) conclude that market concentration is mitigated by trade openness; and concentration is not necessarily an indicator of market power (understood as pricing power). Vertical and horizontal linkages between various parts of the food supply chain—like contracts between farmers and processors—nullify any analytic value in artificial distinctions between farmers (good) and agribusiness (bad).

I would expect private actors to be interested in international negotiations and new regulations that affect agriculture at three points: upstream farm inputs (hormones, seeds, agro-chemicals), the downstream regulatory framework for processed food (food safety), and trade (market access, domestic support and export subsidies in Canada and abroad for commodities and processed food). I focus only on trade, since farm inputs are not part of “agriculture” in the WTO, and food safety, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures (SPS), is not part of the Doha negotiations.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to negotiations on new rules, the focus of the discussion below of *consultations*, I also expect private actors to be interested in how the trade regime shapes day to day food

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<sup>3</sup> James Rude, private communication.

<sup>4</sup> I also do not systematically consider whether actors have different preferences for NAFTA and the WTO. While NAFTA had a significant impact on the structure of North American agriculture, the focus of new negotiations now is in Geneva.

governance. The regime in operation is especially susceptible to influence at two points, discussed in the section on *lobbying*. First, private actors try to influence the details of tariff classifications, import permits and other technical or administrative issues, where consumers, and import-competitive sectors will have different interests. Second, private actors are interested in the operation of the dispute settlement system. Importers use the domestic trade remedy system to harass foreign competitors; exporters encourage the government to use the WTO dispute settlement system to force foreign governments to respect their obligations. Whether anything changes as a result of dispute settlement cases (always a debatable point), we have evidence that corporate interests are able to influence the choice of cases to pursue, more so in the USA than the EU (Sherman and Eliasson, 2006), and many cases are pursued because of business lobbying—indeed in many such cases, the legal bills are largely paid by industry, which is why big American and European law firms maintain Geneva offices staffed by trade lawyers. It is assumed, for example, that Brazilian industry lobbied for and helped fund the sophisticated challenges in the WTO to U.S. cotton and sugar subsidies.

The difficulty in isolating trade from the rest of agri-food policy is that all of the actors, from farmers to supermarkets, are increasingly affected by initiatives that lead to closer vertical co-ordination between players at different stages of the supply chain, and on initiatives that involve horizontal co-ordination. It is also costly to isolate agriculture analytically from the rest of trade policy since the WTO is ultimately a Single Undertaking (Wolfe, 2007), allowing other parts of the overall package to affect or be affected by the outcome on agriculture. It might follow that private actors trying to influence Canadian agricultural trade policy might face political competition from other actors pursuing a cosmopolitan interest (in favour of the trading system as a whole, the global environment, or global justice), a general Canadian interest, or other private interests. Evidence of such interaction effects might be especially notable when looking at public consultations and parliamentary hearings.

### **Who are we talking about?**

Before identifying all the private actors who try to influence Canadian agricultural trade policy, it is useful to identify the government actors they seek to influence, and the range of possible influences on government. Canada's constitution assigns authority for the regulation of trade and commerce to the federal (national) government. The federal government can sign international trade agreements, without seeking parliamentary approval, but Parliament must approve the legislation needed to implement trade agreements, and the national government also often needs the co-operation of provincial governments, especially in areas of shared federal-provincial responsibility, such as agriculture. Parliament is also a forum for opposition parties to question the Government, and standing committees in both the Senate and the House of Commons hold public hearings on international trade and agriculture. Trade policy touches many departments, including Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), but the central role is played by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Some regulatory action is taken by departmental officials, such as the issuance of import permits for certain agricultural products, but many implementation actions are the responsibility of autonomous administrative agencies, including the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT), which hears allegations of unfair trade practices, or trade remedy cases, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA).

For analytic convenience I largely focus on AAFC, with a nod to DFAIT. In Canada as elsewhere, agriculture stands out: few other sectors of the economy have their own ministry. Such departments of government see their mission as the promotion of agriculture, and are more susceptible to lobbying (Grant, 2003). And few other industries are able to send their own senior officials and ministers as full participants in the multilateral negotiations—other departments are represented through the trade minister. Ministers are members of Cabinet and accountable for the policies of their departments. In their assessment of what is best for Canada, they are influenced by other countries, by advice from officials, by representations from Cabinet and caucus colleagues, by consultations, and by lobbying. The Chief Negotiator is also influenced by other countries. It is vital to distinguish, however, between the technical information he needs to do his job, which can come from economic actors, and pressures for a change of policy direction, which usually only has an impact on officials when it comes as political instructions from the minister.

Who then are the private actors? The focus of the framing paper for this project is Transnational Corporations (TNCs), but that focus is less helpful than one might expect in the case of Canadian agricultural trade policy. TNCs tend to support free trade, in public, but they also benefit from agricultural protectionism due to their ability to adjust to any policy framework (Scoppola, 1995: 18). We observe few TNCs in Canadian agriculture, and their observable interests are congruent with those of other actors. Cargill and the other grain distributors are large, but the grain companies tend to subsume their interests with other grain exporters. Multinational dairy processors (e.g. Parmalat and Danone) have large investments based on the current structure of dairy tariffs, but their influence is congruent with the large domestically-owned dairy processors (e.g. the Agropur cooperative) with whom they are allied in the Dairy Processors Association of Canada (DPAC).<sup>5</sup> My focus, therefore, is on private actors generally.

When policy is so significant, and the actors so numerous and diffuse, collective action is essential. In farming, the associational structure of interest aggregation depends in part on the rents created by policy (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis, 2002) and on other factors that differ between countries including political institutions, like federalism (Skogstad, 1990b; Skogstad, 1990a). Divided jurisdiction in Canada means some producers organize on provincial lines, while other sectors organize to lobby the federal government. The industrial organization of a sector also has a big impact on who will want what kind of influence. Large heavily capitalized farms will differ from small-holders, as will those who produce for local as opposed to export markets, or those who produce bulk commodities rather than processed products. Similarly firms that use food as an input for other services, like grocers and restaurants, will both have their own associations and make common cause with farm groups favouring liberalization. In consequence, in Canada at least, the associational structure of the agri-food industry remains fragmented.

The diversity of agriculture organizations in Canada is seen in the Annex. They organize by crop, by sector and by region. They associate with other groups based on their orientation to

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<sup>5</sup> DPAC has been at odds with the Dairy Farmers of Canada (DFC) over changes to the regulatory framework and pricing structure for certain industrial milk components. The agriculture minister created the Dairy Industry Working Group in 2006 with representatives of both groups. When that group was unable to come to a consensus, the minister acted on the basis of recommendations from the moderator; he announced his decision in a speech to the DFC. DPAC was disappointed.

government policy, or to producers in other countries. Some only participate in consultations on the agricultural policy framework negotiations between Ottawa and the provinces; some take every opportunity to engage in WTO consultations; some do not participate in consultations at all, seeing lobbying as the best way to pursue their interests. The list of agri-food groups in the Annex is a subset of a larger database of over 100 groups known to have participated in AAFC consultations in the last few years, including on the domestic Agriculture Policy Framework (APF) in 2002 and the Next Generation consultations in 2007. The Annex retains only those groups who participated in a WTO-related event, many of whom have clear family ties to smaller or regional groups who only participated in APF events.

Beginning at the top, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA) is a peak association that still has broad membership of farm associations, both provincial and sector-specific commodity groups—it has no direct members, unlike the National Farmers Union (NFU)—but the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association and the newer Grain Farmers of Canada do not belong.<sup>6</sup> The CFA was never the single voice of Canadian farmers, but since the 1980s it has struggled with newer groups. In the west, for example, changes to the transport subsidy regime alienated grain and livestock producers both from each other and from national bodies at the same time as new trade negotiations—the Uruguay Round and NAFTA—brought more of agribusiness into the consultation process. Most of the sectoral groups have national umbrella organizations with the exception of the grains and oilseeds sector. There are also regional umbrella groups that represent a number of sectoral interests. Agri-food firms also tend to try to influence policy through associations and umbrella organizations rather than acting alone. They act through national and/or sectoral associations for primary processors, further processors, importers, exporters, distributors, retail grocers and food services firms.

It is now harder and harder for government and farm organizations to reconcile the divergent interests of export-oriented producers in the west with the protectionist Supply Management 5 (SM5) in the east who depend on import protection and supply management. In the west there are divergences between farmers who support the CFA, and those who think it a hindrance. One result was the formation in 2001 of the Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance (CAFTA) to support trade liberalization. It includes producers, processors and others in the export sector, and branded consumer goods firms. Meanwhile, as is to be expected in this context, both CAFTA and the CFA forge links with organizations in other countries (Coleman, in press: 212; see also Coleman, 2002). The most important links for the CFA are through the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP). It describes itself as the world farmers’ organization representing over 600 million farm families grouped in 115 national organizations in 80 countries. IFAP members appear to be similar to CFA—national organizations representing relatively small scale farmers. Members in Europe are national, not the Brussels based EU-wide bodies.<sup>7</sup> IFAP and the CFA frequently organize sessions at the annual WTO public forum. CAFTA also has international links. In the U.S. firms and groups interested in liberalization formed the Food Trade Alliance in 2005. That group worked with CAFTA to create the Global Alliance for

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<sup>6</sup> This section draws heavily on (Skogstad, 2005: 194, 200, 209; and, Hedley and Gellner, 1995).

<sup>7</sup> In the EU, export-oriented organizations tend to lobby Brussels while protectionist farmers lobby their national governments. For a different take on EU groups, see (Wiggerthale, 2005).

Liberalized Trade in Food and Agriculture, an international peak association, although one that lacks the size or infrastructure of IFAP. CAFTA is a member of the Cairns Group Farm Leaders that sends observers to ministerial meetings of the Cairns Group.

This fragmented associational structure of Canadian agriculture is reflected in participation in trade policy consultations.

### **Consultations**

Experienced trade negotiators know that their work begins at home in learning what matters for their constituents, and it ends at home in ensuring that any new obligations can be implemented in legislation. The term “consultations” can cover both efforts to build support for policies, and practices that help the government develop effective policies. Broad public involvement in the policy process, and narrow solicitation of information from economic actors should contribute to making democratic trade policy that will be both effective and legitimate.<sup>8</sup>

Mass demonstrations against the trading system did not begin with civil society organizations in the late 1990s. On February 21, 1992 after the publication in December 1991 of the draft Final Act of the Uruguay Round (the so-called Dunkel text), 30,000 farmers protested on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, believing that the potential outcome of the Round would destroy the institution of the family farm. Managing the end of the negotiations at home continued to prove difficult for the rest of the round. Canadian governments tried to balance conflicting interests by meeting with the leaders of farm organizations, but that strategy faced difficulties in such a diffuse sector. Agriculture negotiators discovered, painfully, that farmers did not have a great amount of knowledge at the end of the Uruguay Round, and that in consequence those most affected did not understand the deal.

With new negotiations scheduled for 2000 as part of the WTO’s “built-in agenda”, veteran negotiators were determined to keep the farm community informed throughout the process so that they would not be caught by surprise at the end. The government signaled as early as January 1997 that it would engage in extensive consultations.<sup>9</sup> The first step was a discussion paper distributed by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) that provided general background, and identified issues for negotiations. AAFC officials subsequently met with umbrella organizations at the regional and provincial as well as the national, level. Ahead of the 1999 Seattle ministerial of the WTO, AAFC organized a broader conference in Ottawa to allow the stakeholders to learn from and react to the representations of other players in the industry.

The public was not invited to most of these meetings, but the process was supplemented by hearings in the Parliamentary committees responsible for agriculture and for trade. Everybody involved understood that the purpose of the exercise was to ensure that the government’s

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<sup>8</sup> In another paper (Wolfe, forthcoming) I provide background on consultations in Canada, in general, and then on the institutional structure for and history of trade policy consultations. This section is an elaboration of one of the case studies begun in that earlier work.

<sup>9</sup> This history draws heavily on (Stairs, 2000: 21-2).

eventual negotiating position reflected the interests of all sectors of the industry, and that the purpose was not to challenge the underlying commitment to multilateral trade liberalization. This massive exercise involved thousands of people all across the country, yet while negotiators heard from everybody in the *industry*, including labour, they heard from few people outside the industry. The people who came to the meetings were the people with the most direct interest. AAFC subsequently prepared a report on the consultations that was posted to its website in the form of a public statement on Canada's initial negotiating position in the proposed new WTO round (Canada, 1999).

After the launch of the Doha round in 2001, large open consultations were not repeated, but detailed annual updates are posted to AAFC's website (Canada, 2005b, for example, was the fourth in a series), and a large range of associations has been encouraged to participate in WTO-related activities, including observation of ministerial meetings as well as the annual public forums in Geneva. These public events are open to anyone, but Table 1 shows that agriculture groups have taken far more advantage of these general opportunities than have other Canadians interested in trade policy. AAFC has also organized several roundtable discussions with industry representatives to discuss both specific issues and Canada's evolving strategy in the negotiations. In March 2006, for example, the agriculture and trade ministers jointly convened a roundtable discussion with industry stakeholders on Canada's approach to the WTO negotiations. Approximately 50 elected heads of national agri-food associations were invited to attend. Similar roundtable events were held in the summer and early fall of 2003, just prior to the Cancun ministerial, and again in October 2004 and May 2005. Parliamentary hearings have also continued—participation in these hearings is shown in Annex A.

These sorts of events are not sufficient for providing detailed information for both negotiators and economic actors, so Canada's Chief Agriculture Negotiator holds regular teleconference calls with industry stakeholders through the Agriculture Trade Negotiations Consultations Group (ATNCG).<sup>10</sup> Participants in that group represent the full range of agri-food stakeholders, including supply management, export-oriented, and agriculture and agri-food processing interests. Approximately 20 producer organizations, 15 processor/ transportation organizations, 4 producer/processor organizations, 3 individual firms, 7 government organizations, 3 non-governmental organizations and 3 food service/retail organizations have representation in this Group. Consultations with the ATNCG provide for confidential dialogue between industry stakeholders and the Government. The frequency of those calls is determined by developments in the negotiations. The calls tend to be initiated before a major meeting, and/or during the meeting and/or after the meeting.

The ATNCG includes stakeholders who have an interest, knowledge and technical expertise on agricultural trade policy and negotiations, have the ability to provide timely advice, and can serve as a contact point for their respective organizations. It is not easy, however, to find out who has been invited to these more restrictive meetings. The Annex shows who all the agriculture groups are. Table 2 shows who the frequent flyers are—the groups that participate most often are the ones with a particularly strong stake in the outcome of WTO negotiations. I presume that the frequent flyers in open consultations also participate in the confidential conference calls.

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<sup>10</sup> This descriptive information was provided by AAFC officials in October 2006.

After the massive exercise of the late 1990s was completed, AAFC commissioned a review by its internal audit unit. Two comments are noteworthy. First the auditors were critical of

the breadth of stakeholders with whom the Department consults. One of the implications resulting from the Seattle conference unrest was that it underlined growing public expectations that governments establish and nurture relationships with groups who represent non-traditional interests. In seeking to articulate government positions that are in the interests of Canada as a whole, the Department needs to consider how it can develop relationships with these groups, and, perhaps more importantly, encourage alliances between them and the sector (Canada, 2000: 2-3).

While some such groups are included in the current process, the critique would presumably be stronger today: both the confidential briefings provided by AAFC and the public hearings conducted by parliamentary committees tend to be dominated by private actors, with few voices attempting to articulate a general interest. (DFAIT has also not repeated large multi-stakeholder consultations, now preferring to use more targeted mechanisms to elicit the information negotiators need.) Table 1 does show, however, that both cosmopolitan and environmental groups have continued to engage with WTO consultations.

Second, the view from those who were heard:

Participants indicated that the process for obtaining their views was a considerable improvement over the previous round of WTO consultations. The approach was viewed as having been effective in building as much consensus as could have been expected given the divergent interests going into the negotiations. The “listening and learning” approach adopted by AAFC—whereby the views and positions of various stakeholders were gathered—enhanced the Department’s ability to inform stakeholders of one another’s views and to develop Canada’s negotiating position. However the “education” component was not achieved to as great an extent as might have been possible if AAFC had adopted an approach whereby different options, scenarios, and impact analyses were undertaken, shared and debated with participants (Canada, 2000).

In short, the consultations did not facilitate deliberation or learning as much as might be hoped. The subsequent consultation events listed in Table 1 may or may not be better in that sense for those involved, but they are certainly less engaging for the farm community as a whole. It remains to be seen whether farmers understand and are prepared to support an eventual Doha round package. A considerable amount of information is available, but does everyone have appropriate opportunities to use it? The ATNCG conference calls are excellent for providing information to selected stakeholders, if the leaders pass the information on to their members, but they are less useful as a channel for discussion, or for economic actors to pass information to negotiators. The stakeholders have views, of course, but they may need to find other less transparent or deliberative ways to pass them on.

## Lobbying

The modern political economy of protection literature that Kindleberger (1951) founded sees restrictions on trade as a privilege for the few gained by interest groups at the expense of the broad national interest. Agriculture is the archetypical example, since farming is heavily protected from foreign competition in so many countries. It is reasonable to ask if this triumph of a particular over the general interest is due to lobbying. In a utilitarian framework, the incentive for private (small group) collective action increases to the extent that the policy process creates private goods. Policy that benefits all equally (the general interest) generates few incentives to lobby (Gowa, 1988: 31). The more specific or individual the issue, the more firms would be expected to lobby directly; the more general the issue, the more firms would be expected to work through associations. These expectations are consistent with general Canadian experience. A small number of CEOs of larger firms, for example, joined their colleagues in the International Chamber of Commerce in a public letter urging progress in the Doha round (Fourtou, Fung and Wallenberg, 2007). At the other extreme, we know that the Big Three auto makers lobbied the government intensively to ensure a vigorous response to a WTO dispute over the Auto Pact (Krikorian, 2005: 148). In this section I consider whether those expectations are consistent with what can be observed of the Canadian agricultural trade policy process.

The considerable civil society literature on the supposed influence of corporations on agricultural trade policy tends to focus on the policy process in Washington, D.C. and to a lesser extent on Brussels (Deckwirth, 2005). Some of its claims (for example about a revolving door for officials moving from firms to government and back again) may be relevant in those cities, but they have less relevance in Ottawa (where many lobbyists were once in government, but few go the other way.) In an excellent survey of the literature on the connection between lobbying and the U.S. political process, Gawande (2005) distinguishes between lobbying designed to provide information in the utilitarian sense of signaling voter preferences to politicians (he cites Ainsworth and Sened, 1993), and Quid Pro Quo lobbying in which political contributions effectively buy the desired policy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). These models depend on empirical information about campaign contributions that is not available in Canada. U.S. authors look at Political Action Committees, and where the money goes (Gawande and Hoekman, 2006; Fordham and McKeown, 2003). Previous research on Canadian interest groups found that few used political contributions as a form of influence (Landry, Amara and Lamari, 1999: 486), so it is not surprising that a recent search of the Elections Canada database of political contributions showed that agri-food associations do not make political contributions to individual MPs, perhaps because of their limited ability to influence policy. It may also be that Canadian election law limits the utility of this kind of lobbying. Rather than Quid Pro Quo lobbying, however, farm groups no doubt engage in intensive information lobbying. Members of Parliament are subject to lobbying, in Ottawa and their constituencies, and they hear from their voters directly.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The next version of this paper will have statistics on agri-food jobs (producers and processors) as a share of total employment in each riding in order to estimate how many ridings might be disproportionately responsive to farm interests. I will then look more closely at campaign contributions in those ridings, and membership on key House committees.

The usual lobbying models assume that the key policy decisions are made by individual legislators, since the United States does not have a “Government” in the Westminster sense; the models are less helpful on how to analyze interactions between lobbies and ministers or officials, which seems to be where the action is in Canada.<sup>12</sup> Lobbying in Canada is regulated under the *Lobbying Act*, which requires everyone to register who engages in any form of communication that involves verbal or written contact with a public office holder—an explicit intent to exert influence is not required (Canada, 2005a).<sup>13</sup> The Act distinguishes between consultants who lobby on behalf of others, and officers of organizations or firms who lobby on their own behalf. Registration is not required in order to participate in stakeholder consultations on policy proposals in cases where the communications take place in an open forum in which the subject matters, the names of participants and the name of the government organizations represented are a matter of public record. Preparation and presentation of briefings to parliamentary committees also does not require registration. Participation in the ATNCG, and any other private attempt to exert influence, requires registration. Until changes in the Act are implemented, however, lobbyists need indicate no more than the departments and the subjects on which they lobby.<sup>14</sup> The Annex indicates which associations have registered to lobby on agricultural trade issues.

Trade negotiators are lobbied by many private interests, from sophisticated NGOs through farm groups to large firms.<sup>15</sup> All the firms, organizations and NGOs want to make sure their message is heard and understood. They will ask to see anyone from the desk officer all the way up to the minister depending on the access their designated lobbyists can arrange. Firms usually request meetings more through associations, but individual firms do lobby directly, usually to deliver a detailed and specific message within a negotiation or a dispute settlement case. One frequent reason for lobbying is to ask for what a group considers to be a fair share of tariff rate quota (TRQ) allocations.<sup>16</sup> Canada maintains a number of agricultural TRQs but it seems that firms mostly lobby through their associations. Of the firms on the AAFC list of egg processors, for example, only one has a registered lobbyist.<sup>17</sup> TRQ allocations apparently are hard fought battles, but this fighting over the rents created by a policy meant to serve other purposes does not necessarily drive the policy in the first place.

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<sup>12</sup> On the constitutional differences between Canada and the U.S. with respect to agriculture, see (Baylis and Rausser, 2001).

<sup>13</sup> For a survey of the issues in Canada and other countries, see (Wilson, 2006b).

<sup>14</sup> The act was revised in 2006. On February 22, 2007, the Government announced consultations on new regulations to give effect to new provisions in the Act, including the apparent requirement for lobbyists to report once a month on which designated officials they met and what they talked about (Canada, 2007b).

<sup>15</sup> Confidential telephone interview, November 2006.

<sup>16</sup> On TRQ administration, see (Canada, 1995).

<sup>17</sup> The registered firm is probably the largest, however—MFI Food Canada Ltd. / Inovatech Egg Products. The full list of egg processors is at [http://www.agr.gc.ca/poultry/esta-entr\\_ep\\_e.htm](http://www.agr.gc.ca/poultry/esta-entr_ep_e.htm) accessed February 19, 2007.

The lobbying process may be hard to observe, but we can learn something of how it works by looking at a current attempt to use trade remedy laws to influence the operation of the trading system. Canadian corn producers sought relief from supposed U.S. subsidization and dumping in cases brought before the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) in 1986 and 2000. Canada's average annual production of 8.7 million metric tons (MMT), all from southern parts of Ontario and Quebec, is markedly smaller than U.S. average annual production of nearly 262 MMT. Under NAFTA, corn trade is duty free. Strong demand in Canada for animal feed, ethanol production and some other food uses resulted in imports from the U.S. of 2.8 MMT per year (Schnepf, 2007). Importers were pleased to benefit from the lower U.S. price, but corn producers unhappy about competing with U.S. subsidies launched another case before the CITT in 2005. Corn users heavily opposed the petition, of course, and the CITT ultimately ruled against imposing new duties in 2006. Table 3 shows the companies and organizations who appeared before the CITT as proponents of the case and as opponents. Many of the firms and groups were represented in these legal proceedings by registered lobbyists. Of the 14 associations on the list, only 3 appear in Annex A as a participant in WTO consultations, and only 1 appears on Table 2 as a frequent participant.

The CITT may be in the wrong business—agricultural economists are dubious that antidumping is an appropriate policy tool since farmers as price takers may often be forced to sell abroad at prices below their cost of production—but the transparency of its processes means that all private interests can be heard. The CITT procedures include solicitation of the views of representative consumer organizations in trade remedy cases since it may consider the views of “other” interested parties in all of the various hearings it conducts. As in the corn case, associations representing a *specific* consumer interest are no doubt often heard—firms that use a particular imported good as an input will want to counter producers seeking trade restrictions. But I found only three CITT cases in the first decade after the creation of the WTO where a *general* consumer interest was represented.

The corn producers did not give up after losing in the CITT, continuing to lobby the Canadian government about the unfairness of U.S. corn subsidies. On January 8, 2007, Canada initiated a WTO dispute settlement case (DS357) against certain aspects of U.S. commodity programs in general, and the U.S. corn program in particular (Canada, 2007a). The WTO case seems not to have attracted any lobbying in opposition, which may not be surprising: bringing the WTO complaint served the general objectives of Canadian negotiators as well as the private interests of corn producers. First, officials believe they have a good case: since the U.S. price is effectively the North American price, given their disproportionate share of North American production, U.S. subsidies by lowering the market price of corn drive down the price received by Canadian producers. Second, the issues in contention affect all of the U.S. commodity support programs. By bringing the case now, Canada was able to get the attention of U.S. politicians drafting their new Farm Bill. There is a big difference between lobbying for protection from imports, which generates counter-lobbying from the interests that would be hurt by such protection (Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga, 2004), and lobbying for reductions in protection received by producers in other places, which would only generate counter-lobbying if other groups thought that the negotiator's political capital was being expended on an inappropriate objective. In the corn case, therefore, corn users lobbied against the producers' demands for restrictions on imports, but nobody appears to oppose the government's attempt to reduce U.S. subsidies through the WTO

challenge.

This observation is consistent with an expectation that multilateral trade *negotiations* concluded as package deals, even within agriculture, promote the engagement of peak and cross-sectoral associations, but *judicialized trade remedy* cases, by de-linking issues promote action by intra-sectoral associations, or even individual firms (De Bièvre, 2003). A specific trade remedy case brings out a different pattern of interest representation than does broad negotiations. Individual actors can have multiple overlapping memberships, using a particular organizational form depending on the type of issue.

### **Conclusion: private interests and institutional design**

My interest in this topic was first stimulated at a briefing for Canadian participants at a WTO public forum in Geneva where two thirds of the participants represented agriculture groups while representatives of the civil society organizations I had expected to see were a small minority. As Table 1 shows, it turns out that farm groups dominate recent public consultations on WTO negotiations. This new engagement was evident in July 2004 when some Ministers and many senior officials joined WTO ambassadors in a regular General Council meeting to hammer out the new framework for the Doha Round that had eluded them in Cancún in September 2003. Agriculture was the most contentious issue, and thirty-seven Canadian agriculture stakeholders were in Geneva while the framework was negotiated. Canadian Ministers and officials provided these stakeholders with daily updates, and met with them individually. The same thing happened in June 2006 when ministers of about 30 Members representing all the negotiating groupings were in Geneva in a last ditch effort to craft “modalities” for the agriculture negotiations. Canadian agri-food groups were there too, and many more participated in daily conference calls with ministers—agri-food groups represented half the participants in these calls.

Such transparency can be good and bad for negotiations, and public policy. Negotiators who operate under such close scrutiny may not be able to make the trade-offs that are needed in the final bargaining. U.S., European and Canadian agricultural groups know exactly what is going on in Geneva at any moment, and publicly instruct the negotiators on what is or is not acceptable, especially on matters as clear cut as a formula for setting tariffs. If constituents perceive a negotiation as purely distributive, they will be critical of a negotiator who pursues the possibility of an integrative outcome. Given the natural desire to save face “Negotiators who are accountable to constituents are more likely to maintain a tough bargaining stance, make fewer concessions, and hold out for more favorable agreements compared to those who are not accountable (Thompson, 1998: 159).” The transparency that modern governance demands undermines the privacy essential for negotiations (Stasavage, 2004). It may also undermine liberalization, or force protection into less transparent forms (Kono, 2006). Nevertheless, transparency is essential for deliberation, and deliberation is especially important whenever collective decisions allow burdens to be imposed on others, which demands “public deliberative processes through which reasons can be scrutinized, debated and either revised or rejected in light of the available evidence and argument (King, 2003: 39).” Is the Canadian process best understood as a deliberative process that helps those affected feel that they have helped shape the Canadian position, even if that position cannot determine the final outcome of the Doha round?

The challenge of open, transparent engagement is finding the right match between process and the nature of the interests. When interests are concentrated and specific, keeping the process transparent can be hard, but input legitimacy can be critical. When interests are diffuse and general, it is hard for anybody to speak for them, which might make output legitimacy matter more. WTO output is mostly legitimate for most Canadians most of the time—which might be the message of low civil society organization participation in consultations. Most Canadians may truly not care about supply management, which has little cost for them and does not affect developing country farmers. Groups with a cosmopolitan interest are minimally represented in the ATNCG. It could be that they articulate a concern for those aspects of the Doha agriculture negotiations that do matter for developing countries and for sustainable development. Their understanding of and reaction to an eventual deal may help shape the broader acceptability in Canada of the package. For the agriculture industry, however, input legitimacy also matters.

The disproportionate presence of agri-food groups in the consultative process may be less significant than it seems. The participation of many of the groups may be more about learning what is at stake than attempting to exert influence. Some groups have more at stake than others, but even for them, consultations are not always the best use of their time. Both very specific and very diffuse interests do not bother, or bother much, with consultations, especially when considerable resources are needed to prepare for or to travel to an event. Corn groups, as we saw, have a very specific interest in U.S. subsidies, so they lobby to ensure that their concerns are addressed, but they do not engage in broad trade policy consultations. The proposed changes to the lobbying regulations may make it easier to observe which other specific interests are lobbying for trade policy changes.<sup>18</sup> Diffuse interests also do not engage in consultations. In the late 1990s, NGOs tried to increase the salience of citizens' diffuse interests in trade and globalization, without great success, despite the battles in Seattle, which may be why consultations are increasingly dominated by representatives of more concentrated interests. These interests as we have seen tend to be represented by countervailing peak associations. The trade policy analysis of any of the producer associations, or of campaigning NGOs, is not necessarily any more robust, or any more legitimate, or any more sustainable than that of firms.

The appropriate question, therefore, is not whether “agribusiness” should have access, as posed by ActionAid (Hilary, 2004; Eagleton, 2006), but whether *any* private interests should have privileged access, which is an institutional design question. I am therefore less concerned than some civil society critics about the access of TNCs to the trade policy process in capitals and in Geneva (Murphy, 2006: 30), since they are far from being the most numerous frequent flyers, as we saw in Table 2, a good approximation of the relevant “policy community”. Indeed as that table suggests, the policy community is dominated by two opposed peak associations, CFA and

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<sup>18</sup> I did not look for evidence of lobbying by groups in other sectors, but the U.S. pattern may be indicative. In October 2006, Inside U.S. Trade reported that “U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab ... told members of the services industry that they are leaving too much of the lobbying for approval of trade agreements to agriculture groups, which are taking on that effort to an extent that is disproportionate to the importance of agriculture for the U.S. economy. She pointed out that Federal Express in Tennessee and the Principal Financial Group in Iowa have more employees in those two states than there are farmers, but said the relative importance of services jobs to the U.S. economy is not reflected in services industry lobbying.” (Inside US Trade, 2006)

CAFTA, which may well off-set each other. If only concentrated interests know that they have an interest, and have the capacity and resources to be heard, then the general interest can only be served by an open, transparent process that allows counter-lobbying. The general transparency of the Canadian process, with balanced representation in the ATNCG from producer and processor interests, ought to dampen the ability of any one private interest to distort policy.

If successful trade negotiations depend on domestic resonance, what are the possibilities for public understanding and deliberation? A multilateral trade negotiation is not a single event that must be monitored, but a continuous process. Trade policy is so detailed and complicated, and has such a diffuse effect, that most interests have to be organized to be effective. AAFC is working hard to ensure that actors in the agri-food sector will not be caught by surprise at the end, but it is much harder to ensure that the effect of these negotiations on the 96% of Canadians who work outside the sector is reflected in the Canadian position. And it is harder in other areas of trade policy because the issues can seem even more diffuse, and less consequential for any one individual or firm. Does the differential knowledge of citizens and farmers provide flexibility or overly constrain negotiators?

When trade minister David Emerson said the obvious in an interview, that supply management would not last forever (Wilson, 2006a), he was pilloried in public. He and the agriculture minister issued a hurried assertion of faith (Canada, 2006b). He was subsequently hauled before a parliamentary committee, where he professed undying support for supply management, but then made it clear that if an eventual Doha agreement would require changes to supply management, Canada would not stand in its way (Wilson, 2007). Given all the channels of influence, it is not surprising that politicians are acutely aware of the trade policy views of the supply managed sectors. But as participants in multilateral negotiations based on reciprocity, they also know that achieving the export enhancement objective of the 2005 Commons resolution will require compromises on the import protection objective. Perhaps the minister's message to the SM5, then, was that their views were understood, but could not be determinative of Canadian policy.

This conclusion suggests two tests of the contribution that the Canadian agricultural trade policy process makes to sustainable development. The plausible scenarios for a successful conclusion to the Doha Round of WTO negotiations will require Canada to allow more access to its market than the supply managed producers would like. First, will the producers accept such an outcome, and will negotiators have the flexibility to seek trade offs within agriculture and with other sectors in the broader Canadian interest? Second, will Canadians, especially farmers and processors, have sufficient understanding of its elements to accept the obligations the new agreement entails?

*Table 1 Canadian non-governmental participation in WTO-related public events\**

	<b>Total</b>	<b>Agriculture</b>	Development	Environment	Academics	Individual	Business	Other
1996 Ministerial, Singapore	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	0	0	0	0	4	0
1998 Ministerial, Geneva	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	0	0	0	0	3	0
1999 Ministerial, Seattle	<b>64</b>	<b>22</b>	3	4	3	0	18	14
2001 public forum (Geneva)	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	4	2	2	0	0	0
2001 Ministerial, Doha	<b>21</b>	<b>8</b>	4	1	1	0	4	3
2002 public forum (Geneva)	<b>20</b>	<b>2</b>	6	5	5	2	0	0
2003 public forum (Geneva)	<b>28</b>	<b>14</b>	8	3	3	0	0	0
2003 Ministerial, Cancun	<b>83</b>	<b>32</b>	10	10	3	0	18	10
2004 July General Council	unknown							
2004 public forum (Geneva)	<b>34</b>	<b>26</b>	4	2	1	6	1	0
2005 public forum (Geneva)	<b>90</b>	<b>66</b>	7	5	8	2	2	0
2005 DFAIT Roundtable on Trade and Development			30?		5?			
2005 Ministerial, Hong Kong	<b>69</b>	<b>43</b>	11	0	3	0	6	6
2006 mini-ministerial teleconference	<b>33</b>	<b>17</b>	8		1		7	
2006 public forum (Geneva)	<b>64</b>	<b>33</b>	8	7	6	6	6	0

\*This table was compiled from lists of NGO participation on the WTO website and then correlated with a summary provided by Canadian officials. WTO Forum refers to the annual symposium on WTO issues organized by the secretariat for civil society. The number in each cell is the count of individuals, not organizations. The categorization is based on the institutional affiliation each individual supplied. The numbers do not include the separate media briefings or government participants—the June 2006 telephone debriefings, for example, included over 30 officials.

*Table 2 Leading agricultural participants in WTO events\**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Umbrella Affiliation</b>	<b>WTO Events</b>	<b>Hearings</b>	<b>Lobbyist with AAFC</b>
Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance	CAFTA	4	7	Self
Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg Marketing Agency	CFA/SM5	6		Self, Osler Hoskin & Harcourt
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency	SM5	7		Fleishman-Hillard; Avant Strategic Communications
Canadian Federation of Agriculture	CFA	8	6	Self
Canadian Foodgrains Bank		4	2	Self
Canadian Pork Council	CFA	5	1	Grey, Clark, Shih Associates
Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency (CTMA)	CFA/SM5	5		Self
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB)	CFA	6	2	Global Public Affairs
Chicken Farmers of Canada (CFC)	CFA/SM5	6	1	Self
Dairy Farmers of Canada (DFC)	CFA/SM5	9	2	Self, Grey, Clark, Shih Associates
Union des producteurs agricoles (UPA)	CFA	6	2	Self

\* All of these organizations have lobbyists, and all mention international trade negotiations in general, or in specific bodies. Note that they must be registered as lobbyists in order to participate in confidential consultations such as the ATNCG. The source for WTO events is the Annex. The source for lobbying information is (Canada, 2005d).

Table 3 Organizations involved in the CITT corn case

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Lobbyist</b>
<b>Proponents</b>	
Canadian Corn Producers	McMillian Binch Mendelsohn**
Fédération des producteurs de cultures commerciales du Québec	
<i>Manitoba Corn Growers Association</i>	
Ontario Corn Producers' Association	
<b>Opponents</b>	
Ach Food Companies, Inc.	--
Animal Industry Corn Users	--
Animal Nutrition Association of Canada	Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates
Alberta Division	
British Columbia Division	
Manitoba Division	
<i>Canadian Cattlemen's Association</i>	Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates
<i>Canadian Pork Council</i>	Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates
Association of Canadian Distillers	The Trade Group*
Alberta Distillers Limited	
Diaego Canada Inc.	
Schenley Distilleries Inc.	Lang Michener LLP
Brar Natural Flour Milling Inc.	
Brewers of Canada	Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates
Canadian Pasta Manufacturers Association	Don Jarvis Consultants
Casco Inc.-Canada Starch Operating Company	Self, Borden Ladner Gervais**
Canadian Snack Food Association	--
Commercial Alcohols Inc.	The Wellington Strategy Group Inc
Corn Products International	--
Food Processors of Canada	Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates
General Mills Canada Corporation	Global Public Affairs
HYTEK Limited	--
Nature's Path Foods Inc.	--
Newco Commodities Limited	--
Ontario Agri Business Association	--
Maple Leaf Foods Inc.	Self, Hill and Knowlton Canada**
QTG Canada Inc.	Global Public Affairs
Que Pasa Mexican Foods	--
U.S. Corn Coalition	--

\* also represented by other firms

\*\* previously represented by Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates

Italics: participant in WTO consultations

NOTE: Association of Canadian Distillers is also represented by Lang Michener LLP, for this case they seem to have lobbied through The Trade Group; Kristen Goodwin of the Trade Group is the registered lobbyist and the representative before CITT

**Annex: Agriculture-related participants in WTO events\***

Organization	Umbrella Affiliation	WTO Events	Hearings	Lobbyist
Agricultural Producers Association of Sask.	CFA	2	1	Self
Agriculture Institute of Canada		1		Self
Agri-Industry Trade Group		1		--
Alberta Chicken Producers		1		--
Alberta Egg Producers Board		1		--
Alberta Milk		2		--
BC Egg Marketing Board		1		--
BC Milk Producers Association		1		Self
Canada Beef Export Federation	CAFTA	2	1	Self
Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance	CAFTA	4	7	Self
Canadian Alliance of Agri-Food Exporters		2		--
Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg Marketing Agency	CFA/SM5	6		Self, Osler Hoskin & Harcourt
Canadian Canola Growers Association	CAFTA	2	1	Self
Canadian Cattlemen's Association	CAFTA	2	1	Grey, Clark, Shih Assoc
Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters		2		Sjma Consultants
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency	SM5	7		Fleishman-Hillard Canada
Canadian Federation of Agriculture	CFA	8	6	Asnong, Edouard
Canadian Foodgrains Bank		4	2	Self
Canadian Horticultural Council	CFA	3		Dentelback, Chuck
Canadian Oilseed Processors Association	CAFTA	2		Self
Canadian Pork Council	CFA	5	1	Grey, Clark, Shih Assoc
Canadian Pork International		1	1	Self
Canadian Poultry and Egg Processors Council		1		Self
Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Assoc		3	1	Self
Canadian Sugar Beets Producers' Association		1	2	--
Canadian Sugar Institute (CSI)	CAFTA	2	2	Self
Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency	CFA/SM5	5		Self
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB)	CFA	6	2	Global Public Affairs
Canola Council of Canada	CAFTA	1		Self
Chicken Farmers of Canada (CFC)	CFA/SM5	6	1	Temple Scott Associates Inc.
Chicken Farmers of Nova Scotia (ns)		2		--
Chicken Farmers of Ontario		2	1	Temple Scott Associates Inc.
Chicken Farmers of Saskatchewan		1		--

Coop Conseil		1		--
Dairy Farmers of Canada (DFC)	CFA/SM5	9	2	Self
Dairy Farmers of Manitoba		1		--
Dairy Farmers of New Brunswick		1		--
Dairy Farmers of Ontario (DFO)		2		Hill And Knowlton Canada
Dairy Farmers of Prince Edward Island		1		--
Dairy Farmers of Saskatchewan		2		--
Egg Farmers of Canada		1		--
Egg Farmers of Ontario		1		Hill And Knowlton Canada
Egg Producers of Newfoundland and Labrador		1		--
Fédération des producteurs de lait du Québec		3	1	--
Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec		2		--
Federation des producteurs d'oeufs de consommation du Quebec		2		--
Grain Growers of Canada	CAFTA	1		Self
International Federation of Agricultural Producers	[CFA]	1		--
ISEAL Alliance		1		--
Les Producteurs de poulet du Canada		1		--
Manitoba Corn Growers Association, Inc.		1		Mcmillan Binch Mendelsohn
National Dairy Council of Canada		1		Grey, Clark, Shih Assoc
National Farmer's Union		2	1	--
New Brunswick Egg Producers		1		--
Ontario Egg Producers		1		National Public Relations
Ontario Federation of Agriculture	CFA	1		Self
Ontario Pork		1		--
Ontario Soybean Growers		1		Self
Ontario Turkey Producers' Marketing Board		1		--
Potato Growers of Alberta		1		--
Prince Edward Island Milk Marketing Board / Dairy Farmers of Prince Edward Island		1		--
Saskatchewan Egg Producers		1		--
The Quebec Egg Board		1		--
Union des producteurs agricoles (UPA)	CFA	6	2	Self
Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association		3		Self
World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fishworkers		1		--

\* Source: DFAIT; WTO; Parliamentary website. “Umbrella Affiliation” refers to the organization’s affiliation with the two leading umbrella groups for agricultural trade policy, and whether the group is a member of the Supply Management 5. “WTO Events” refers to the number of times a group participated in one of the WTO events listed in Table 1. “Hearings” refers to number of appearances since 2001 before a committee of the Senate or the House of Commons. (Note a small number of associations and firms that made single appearances are not listed here because they did not participate in any WTO events.) Lobbyist refers to whether the organization lobbies AAFC itself, through a firm, or not at all (--). The information is obtained from the Public Register of Lobbyists (Canada, 2005d).

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