The Only Game in Town? Examining the Success and Failure of Dominant Parties

Paper for Presentation at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, June 4-6, 2008, University of British Columbia, Vancouver

Steffen G. Schneider
TranState Research Center
University of Bremen
P.B. 33 04 40
28334 Bremen
Germany

Phone: **+49-421-218 8715**
Fax: **+49-421-218 8721**

steffen.schneider@sfb597.uni-bremen.de

Amir Abedi
Department of Political Science
Western Washington University
516 High Street, MS-9082
Bellingham, WA 98225-9082
USA

+1-360-650 4143
+1-360-650 2800

amir.abedi@www.edu

Draft version – Please do not quote – Comments welcome

Introduction

Dominant party regimes – a frequent phenomenon in authoritarian and transitional systems (Bogaards 2000, 2004; Giliomee/Simkins 1999; Solinger 2001) – are 'not supposed to happen' (Pempel 1990b: 5-6) in the established democracies of the OECD world. Two-party or multi-party systems with regularly alternating single-party or coalition governments should be the rule where electoral competition is unrestricted and the political environment corresponds to Dahl's (1971) polyarchy model. The extant literature therefore views single-party dominance as an 'un-common' (Pempel 1990c), empirically puzzling, and normatively troubling anomaly.

Yet valid descriptive and explanatory inferences on the prevalence, causes, and impact of single-party dominance have been hampered by rather vague, convoluted, and arbitrary *definitions* of the phenomenon. As a consequence, the universe of pertinent cases remains somewhat nebulous, and some arguably relevant cases have not figured prominently in the literature on dominant party regimes. Moreover, this literature has so far largely privileged case studies and small-N comparisons of such regimes, thus largely 'selecting on the dependent variable.' It has not, to our best knowledge, made systematic use of research designs and methods that appear more suitable in a medium-N or large-N context, such as qualitative comparative (QCA) or fuzzy set analysis (Ragin 2000), and notably survival (event history) analysis (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 1997, 2004; Cleves et al. 2004).[1]

In this paper – part of an ongoing research project – we pursue a twofold objective. First, we review and criticize extant operationalizations of single-party dominance, present our own alternative, and illustrate its use with the help of a dataset comprising several hundred post-war electoral outcomes and instances of government formation in 16 parliamentary systems of the OECD world. We argue that the prevalence and extent of single-party dominance may be captured in two dimensions – a power and a temporal dimension – which are introduced and discussed in turn. Simple and plausible qualitative indicators of relative power – that is, of a party's dominant bargaining position vis-à-vis its parliamentary competitors – may be derived from the game theoretical dominant player concept or from power indices. By contrast, no obvious qualitative thresholds are readily available for the temporal dimension. Here cut-off points have to be developed in an empirical fashion.

Our indicators enable us to distinguish types of (non-)dominance but also enable us to consider *gradations* of long-term dominance. Which factors positively or negatively influence the length of government episodes defined by the identity of the major government party? For a very tentative exploration of the factors that are conducive to a party's long-term hold on power, including a more or less dominant bargaining position, we turn to the method of event history analysis. Our preliminary foray into the empirical material corroborates some of the descriptive and explana-

[1] However, survival analysis has been used to examine two closely related phenomena: the survival of leaders in office (Bienen/van de Walle 1989, 1992), and of government coalitions (see, for instance, Roozendaal 1992, 1997; Warwick 1994). Unlike the former, however, we are concerned with the survival of *parties* rather than individuals, and unlike the latter, quite voluminous body of work, we do not focus on the timing and causes of government break-ups during *single* legislative terms but rather on parties that establish and sustain a dominant role in government over extended periods of time, and hence over many *consecutive* legislative terms.

tory inferences of the extant literature but also highlights aspects that are clearly in need of further research.[2]

Defining, Measuring, and Explaining Single-Party Dominance: Conceptual Issues and a Few Tentative Empirical Inferences

Even if the purview is restricted to established democracies, it is fair to say that the concept of single-party dominance has been defined and operationalized in a rather bewildering variety of ways. The vagueness of some widely used definitions and their arbitrary or even tautological character have been rightly criticized (Bogaards 2004: 192; Caulier/Dumont 2005: 2; Dunleavy 2005: 3, 6). Just consider Maurice Duverger (1963: 308-9), according to whom

> [a] party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch. […]. Domination is a question of influence rather than of strength: it is also linked with belief. A dominant party is that which public opinion *believes* to be dominant.

Flawed definitions such as Duverger's not only defy operationalization; they also have a strong tendency to mix up *descriptive* indicators of single-party dominance with indicators of its presumed causes or effects, and hence largely preclude the testing of related hypotheses. To be sure, the more recent literature has converged on a 'generic' definition that seems plausible and uncontroversial: In a dominant party regime, one and the same party controls government over an extended period of time, whether alone or as the most powerful member of a coalition (for similar formulations, see, for instance, Boucek 1998: 103; Cox 1998: 238; Weaver/Rockman 1993: 20).

This definition contains one unproblematic definitional feature: government participation – opposition status is treated as a sufficient precondition of *non*-dominance. While some authors distinguish between electoral, parliamentary, and executive dominance (Boucek 1998: 105-8), the focus of the specialized literature on dominant party regimes is on a party's sustained ability to join and dominate *government*. Mere electoral dominance (the ability to gain a particularly high share of the vote) and parliamentary dominance (the ability to translate electoral success into a disproportionately high number of seats) may be prerequisites of executive dominance. However, the literature is neither primarily interested in the two former phenomena as such nor does it offer much value added beyond extant work on voting and the impact of electoral systems in this regard. Our own definitional approach neither breaks away from this entirely appropriate focus on executive dominance nor from the two-dimensional 'architecture' of the standard definition.

Yet even the largest government party may or may not be *dominant* – depending, first, on its relative bargaining power vis-à-vis coalition partners and other parliamentary competitors, and secondly, on the length of its government experience. Put differently, the point where mere relevance (as defined by Sartori 1976: 300-4) turns into dominance is not easily defined – much

[2] We have, in fact, begun to examine dominant party regimes in two different contexts: the 16 long-standing parliamentary democracies of the OECD world, as in this paper (Abedi/Schneider2007; Schneider/Abedi 2006), and the subnational jurisdictions (federal states, provinces, or *Länder*) of the four 'classical' parliamentary federations – Austria, Germany, Australia, and Canada (Abedi/Schneider 2006, 2008). The construction of the two datasets, as well as a first couple of descriptive and informal explanatory inferences, have so far taken up the bulk of our time.

unlike the two ends of the underlying scale, absolute irrelevance (a party's consistent lack of electoral success) and total dominance (permanent one-party rule). In any case, the indicators typically used to operationalize the power and temporal dimensions of single-party dominance appear to lack a strong theoretical justification or empirical grounding.

Moreover, it is often not quite clear to which universe of cases they apply. Although much of the literature supposedly refers to the world of established democracies, a couple of arguably relevant cases have so far not figured prominently in the literature on single-party dominance. Pempel, for instance, mentions Germany as a borderline case but ignores Austria or Canada. Potential omissions like this one not only shed doubt on the indicators of single-party dominance employed by this literature but also on the (theoretically or empirically grounded?) nature of some of its claims and inferences – Pempel's (1990a: 336-9) claim that PR electoral systems are a necessary precondition for the emergence of dominant party regimes is a characteristic example (but see Boucek 2001). In any case, the operational criteria of single-party dominance must not be developed or validated on the basis of what often appear to be ad hoc samples.

In this paper, we therefore consider postwar electoral outcomes and government experiences in those advanced industrial democracies that have fully parliamentary systems – the definition and operationalization of single-party dominance in presidential or semi-presidential systems has to take the separation of powers between executive and legislative branches into account, and hence raises a different set of issues (Bogaards 2004). By contrast, all the governments under study in this paper have been dependent on the support of their respective legislatures (the lower house in cases of bicameralism). A country was further deemed to be advanced industrial if it has been a long-standing member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

However, nations that have not been continuously democratic between the end of World War II and 2008, such as Spain or Greece, were excluded from the analysis. The rationale for choosing 1945 as the baseline year is straightforward: World War II signified an important break in world history, a 'critical juncture.' It notably led to the establishment of stable democracies in Austria, (West) Germany, Italy, and Japan. The period running from 1945 until 1972 was, moreover, characterized by the development of a postwar consensus that included Keynesian economic policies and the expansion of the welfare state, and resulted in increasing political and economic stability. The subsequent period, from 1973 (first oil crisis) to 1989 (fall of the Berlin Wall), saw the demise of that postwar economic order and social consensus, and ushered in increasing political and economic instability. Finally, the years following the end of the Cold War (1990-2008) have been characterized by the increasing globalization and internationalization of the economic and political spheres, and by a number of associated insecurities (e.g., growing flows of in-migration, job losses in certain industries, terrorism, etc.) that parties in government had to tackle, but also new opportunities to be capitalized on (e.g., increasing political and economic cooperation between countries that had previously belonged to two opposing blocs, job gains in innovative sectors of the economy, etc.).

June 4, 2008, will serve as the end point for the analysis conducted in this paper. Sixteen nations from four continents fulfilled all three criteria: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Operationalizing the power dimension: As documented by Bogaards (2004: 174-5), two sets of criteria have been advanced to capture this dimension, and most authors employ some combination of them to identify dominant parties.[3] Vote and seat shares – or thresholds derived from them – are the most prominent indicators of single-party dominance. According to Pempel (1990b: 3), a government party that has won a plurality of votes and seats in the previous election may be considered to have a dominant bargaining position vis-à-vis its coalition partners and other parliamentary competitors. Blondel (1968: 186) and Ware (1996: 165) suggest a minimal *vote* share of 40 percent and a minimal *seat* share of 45 percent (for 'dominant' parties), respectively. Stricter rules have also been proposed, with seat shares anywhere between 50 (Ware's 'predominant' parties) and 70 percent (Coleman 1960) as cut-off points.

These cut-off points are not entirely convincing for several reasons. First, they tend to be introduced in an ad hoc fashion without further justification or validation, even if our subsequent empirical material indicates that most of them are certainly not way off the mark (Bogaards 2004: 192). There is no *theoretical* rationale, though, for the implicit claim that there is a *qualitative* difference between the bargaining position of a party with 40.1 % of the vote and one with 39.9 %, or between parties with seat shares of 59.9 % and 60.1 %, respectively. The continuous nature of vote and seat shares promises a kind of 'accuracy' or informational 'value added,' as it were, that is simply not there. As suggested below, we need not even assume a strictly *linear* or some other monotonous relationship between vote and seat shares, on the one hand, and the strength of a party's bargaining position, on the other. From a conceptual point of view, and keeping in mind that the goal is to identify cases of *executive* dominance, it is also unclear why *vote* shares – or any other measure based on them – should play a role in the first place. Why should we, for instance, exclude parties from our purview that consistently gain a plurality or majority of seats with vote shares below 40 percent, or even without a plurality of votes? The presumptive *effects* of a party's dominance (long-term control of government), including the 'epoch-shaping' impact described by Duverger and others (Arian/Barnes 1974; Pempel 1990c), are obviously not a (direct) function of its vote shares.

In short, the link between a party's relative *power* and most of the thresholds enumerated above is somewhat tenuous at the conceptual level. Only criteria on the basis of *seat* shares appear worth considering, and only the plurality and majority criteria imply a relevant piece of qualitative information. Moreover, while a plurality or majority of seats may, in principle, be obtained with *any* vote share (depending on the number of competitors, the thresholds and disproportionality effects of voting systems, etc.), no a priori numerical value (i.e., seat share) can be attached to the plurality criterion. By contrast, and trivially, the value is 50 percent + x for the majority criterion. Finally, a party with a seat *majority* can be assumed to participate in government, and hence to satisfy the most basic precondition of dominance. Because they contain these elements of qualitative information, the plurality and majority criteria will be retained in our own definitional approach.[4]

[3] As suggested above, the third aspect mentioned by Bogaards – namely, whether definitions are applicable to presidential systems – is irrelevant for our purposes.

[4] A supermajority can be viewed as a non-arbitrary threshold, too, as it might enable a government to legislate constitutional reforms on its own. While our approach could, in principle, be adapted to supermajority criteria, we chose not to do so because they either seem irrelevant (in 'classical' Westminster systems) or overly restrictive for our purposes – after all, votes of investiture and motions of (non-)confidence in parliamentary systems, as well as the bulk of legislation, are based on the simple majority criterion (Bogaards 2004: 175).

A second group of criteria employed by many researchers aims to capture the *relative* size of dominant parties and their competitors, or the fractionalization of the opposition. Blondel (1968: 196), O'Leary (1994: 3), Sartori (1976: 197-9), and Ware (1996: 159-60, 165-6) all propose to include a divided opposition, or a minimal distance between the largest party and the runner-up, among the definitional criteria of single-party dominance. Blondel, for instance, suggests that the former should at least have double the vote share of the latter, O'Leary uses a vote gap of ten percent, and Sartori states that the dominant party 'outdistances all the others' (193). These criteria appear to make intuitive sense. There is undoubtedly a difference between a highly competitive two-party scenario in which one party manages to beat its main contender in several consecutive elections, if barely, and a multi-party scenario where the vote or seat margin between the strongest party and its opponents is pronounced. In the first scenario, relatively minor electoral shifts may quickly change the picture and bring single-party dominance to an end. In the second one, by contrast, a reversal of fortunes from one election to the other is a long shot, especially where the dominant party also has the status of a central player (Roozendaal 1992), and its opponents thus have to engage in an uphill battle to change the situation.

Yet here we already touch upon the temporal dimension examined below, and in any case, this group of indicators is plagued by technical and conceptual problems, too. To begin with, some of the proposed cut-off points are, once again, somewhat arbitrary – read: they do not imply relevant pieces of qualitative information. As for measures on the basis of *vote* shares (vote gaps or ratios between the strongest party and the runner-up, etc.), the same argument that was made above holds. And while it may seem plausible to expect that a party's bargaining position will be dominant if its *seat* share is, for instance, twice as large as the runner-up's, no theoretical rationale is in sight either. Would a ratio of 1.9 or a margin of ten percentage points *not* suffice under most circumstances? Worse, the idea that this kind of numerical dominance, however operationalized, *always* translates into a dominant bargaining position may be questioned. Consider three scenarios. First, a party that dominates in this sense may nevertheless be excluded from government (perhaps a coalition government made up of its many small competitors), thus failing our – and the bulk of the literature's – basic criterion of government participation. Empirically, this may be unlikely, and exceedingly strict criteria like Blondel's should distinguish between government and opposition parties reasonably well, but they are also likely to produce many 'false negatives.' The Italian Christian Democrats (DC) in the postwar era may serve as an illustrative example for this second objection. Given the low coalition potential of the Communists (PCI) and other factors, the DC could safely assume to be included in every government. Thus it undoubtedly had a dominant bargaining position without necessarily profiting from a large margin in terms of seat or vote shares, and definitely without meeting Blondel's vote ratio criterion. Conversely, the German Liberals (FDP) – a *minor* party in terms of vote and seat shares – may nevertheless be said to have enjoyed a rather privileged bargaining position, rewarded with a quasi-permanent role in government, throughout much of the postwar era.

What this boils down to is that the second group of criteria, including measures of party system or opposition fragmentation like the effective number of parties, does not fully capture the dimension of relative power either, however strong the *correlation* between these measures and genuine power indicators may be. Put differently, opposition or party system fragmentation as such does not necessarily determine a party's bargaining position. Does it make a difference for a government party holding two thirds of the seats whether the opposition consists of one, two, or ten parties? We argue that in this scenario its power exclusively depends on the majority of seats (and internal party discipline), and that the information contained in differential effective num-

bers of (opposition) parties is irrelevant, if not misleading, for our purposes. Once again, continuous measures of this kind may even be said to represent a *loss* of information over qualitative ones in the tradition of Sartori's relevance concept (Bogaards 2004: 174, 188).

For all these reasons, we suggest to draw on the dominant player concept or indices of voting power to operationalize single-party dominance.[5] The game-theoretical literature has modeled processes of decision-making and government formation in parliamentary systems – where the underlying unitary actor assumption is unproblematic – as weighted majority games with at most one so-called dominant player (van Deemen 1989: 316-25; Roozendaal 1992: 6-11). The power structures of dominated and non-dominated games differ qualitatively. Since dominant player status is merely an a priori indicator of power that neglects policy-based coalition formation and the effects of ideological polarization, a party enjoying this status may nevertheless be excluded from government. But a dominant player has strictly more options to form a winning coalition than any of her competitors. This comparative advantage in government formation processes turns into a particularly credible exit threat vis-à-vis less powerful coalition partners once a dominant player joins government, or into a credible 'disruption' potential where it is excluded.

Some minimal vote share or a plurality of votes, and hence *electoral* dominance, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondition of dominant player status, which may, in other words, be 'manufactured' or 'artificial.' A plurality of seats and a weight (seat share) of at least half the (50 percent + x) majority quota of parliamentary games are necessary preconditions but not sufficient. Among the members of a government coalition only the party with the largest weight may therefore be a dominant player. Yet the largest government party can satisfy these requirements, thus enjoying a modicum of *parliamentary* dominance, and still lack dominant player status. In this case, some or all other players in the game (the major government party's coalition partners or members of the opposition) match its bargaining power. Conversely, a dominant player with a majority of seats is a 'dictator' and turns his competitors into entirely powerless 'dummies.' In short, a party's relative power may be much lower or higher than suggested by its weight. The power differentials between dominated and non-dominated games, or between a dominant player and his competitors, are therefore not always captured by indicators of a party's *relative* size either and may even be obscured by them. A party can 'outdistance[…] all the others' in terms of its seat share without being a dominant player or a dictator, and vice versa. By the same token, and despite their intuitive plausibility, measures of opposition fractionalization need not appropriately convey the power structures of parliamentary games. As suggested above, a dictator is, for instance, not made any less powerful by a divided opposition than she is in a two-party scenario (and, moreover, some of the literature inappropriately uses opposition fractionalization both as a definitional criterion and as an explanatory variable, which obviously yields tautological findings).[6]

[5] We are grateful to Patrick Dunleavy and Jean-François Caulier, participants in the 2005 ECPR Workshop on Dominant Parties and Democracy, for bringing the dominant player concept and power indices to our attention.

[6] Bogaards (2004: 184) correctly points to the fact that the effective number of parties is, by force of the underlying formula, 'driven' both by the number and the relative size of parties. One and the same index value may be obtained for scenarios that greatly differ in terms of power structures, and hence the best we can hope for in the empirical world is a strong correlation between the presence of a dominant party (as defined by us) and a specific (i.e., low) value of the effective number of parties. It should, however, be underlined that the problem with this indicator is not merely a technical but a conceptual one. It is not a genuine measure of dominance or power structures to begin with.

The dominant player concept may be linked with power indices, which are based on the related idea that power in parliamentary games 'rests on how often [a party] can add [its] votes to a losing coalition so that it wins' (Leech 2002: 5). The normalized Banzhaf index used here (in line with Caulier/Dumont 2005: 3, 9) takes values between 0 for dummies and 1 for dictators while the values for dominant and non-dominant players in games *without* a dictator vary with their number and relative weight. A government party, then, has a 'power surplus' if its own index value is larger than any other player's, and the power surplus of a dictator is, again, 1. If at least one other player has the same value, the power surplus is 0, indicating a non-dominated game. Finally, the government party with the largest weight – and a fortiori, any smaller coalition partner – has a 'power deficit' if the dominant player is in the opposition (the index value of the major government party and the highest remaining value will be used for these calculations).[7]

The sole or largest government party in each parliamentary game (instance of government formation) may thus belong to four groups of cases (and for our purposes, such a game occurs whenever government responsibility shifts from one party or group of parties to another, or when parties join or leave an existing government):

- The party is a *dictatorial dominant player*, with a majority of seats and a power surplus of 1 (D1).
- The party is a *non-dictatorial dominant player*, or alternatively (that is, somewhat less strictly), it has a power surplus of $0 < x < 1$ (D2).
- The party – which may or may not have a plurality of seats – has a power surplus of 0 (D3), and *no dominant player exists*.
- The party – which holds less than a plurality of seats – has a power deficit of $-1 < x < 0$ (D4), and *the dominant player*, or the one with a power surplus, *is in the opposition*.

Our operationalization of single-party dominance, then, combines the requirement of government membership with the necessary preconditions of dominant or 'most powerful' player status. The proposed ordinal ranking captures non-arbitrary, genuinely qualitative power differentials, the D1 and D2 scenarios represent types of single-party dominance, and although we are from now on going to use our continuous 'power surplus' measure (ranging from -1 to 1), the qualitative distinctions underlying the four different types are not lost: A player in the D1 category (which is equivalent to Sartori's and Ware's operationalizations of 'predominant' parties) may govern alone while players of the D2 type have to rely on coalition or minority governments; players of the D3 or D4 type are forced to govern in the presence of one or more competitors whose bargaining position is at least as favorable as their own.

[7] There is a complication that we had overlooked in earlier papers, and that prevents the full interchangeability of indicators based on the dominant player concept v. power indices: A party may have a power surplus while having a weight (seat share) below the q/2 (half the majority) criterion for dominant player status. Thus having a power surplus is a necessary but insufficient precondition of being a dominant player, and conversely, a power surplus value <= 0 is sufficient for *not* being a dominant player. But note that cases of 'incongruence' between the two suggested operationalizations are quite infrequent (and, in fact, inexistent in our second dataset of subnational jurisdictions): ten cases (that is, post-electoral and mid-term instances of government formation) in Belgium, four in Italy, and one each in Japan and the Netherlands.

Table 1 Types of dominance in parliamentary games, by 'family of nations,' 1945-2008

'Family'	Type	N	(%)	Average vote share (%)		Average seat share (%)		Average power surplus/deficit	
					(SD)		(SD)		(SD)
Anglo-Saxon	**D1**		57.1	45.2	4.4	56.9	6.0	1.00	0.00
	D2		23.8	40.7	3.6	45.3	3.7	0.43	0.29
	D3		14.3	37.5	2.2	42.7	4.0	0	0
	D4		4.8	29.5	7.1	30.6	6.9	-0.43	0.39
	Total	105	100.0	42.3	5.7	50.9	9.3	0.65	0.45
Cont. Europ.	**D1**		7.3	49.4	1.0	52.1	1.1	1.00	0.00
	D2		64.0	34.4	7.7	37.2	8.3	0.24	0.18
	D3		23.2	39.4	7.3	41.3	7.5	0	0
	D4		5.5	24.4	8.5	27.0	7.0	-.12	0.15
	Total	163	100.0	36.2	8.8	38.8	9.1	0.22	0.29
Nordic	**D1**		4.8	46.4	3.4	52.9	2.4	1.00	0.00
	D2		59.6	39.4	5.1	40.7	5.5	0.38	0.17
	D3		3.8	30.6	6.3	31.9	5.9	0	0
	D4		31.7	20.3	5.4	21.6	6.1	-0.34	0.13
	Total	104	100.0	33.4	10.5	34.9	11.1	0.17	0.41
Japan	**D1**		45.2	49.6	6.6	58.2	3.7	1.00	0.00
	D2		38.7	37.2	6.0	44.7	5.6	0.63	0.17
	D3		9.7	26.4	0.3	29.8	1.5	0.00	0.00
	D4		6.5	12.8	3.8	12.2	2.1	-0.71	0.00
	Total	31	100.0	40.2	12.1	47.3	13.7	0.65	0.48
Overall	**D1**		22.5	46.5	4.8	56.3	5.5	1.00	0.00
	D2		50.5	36.9	7.0	39.7	7.5	0.33	0.22
	D3		14.9	37.7	6.9	40.4	7.3	0	0
	D4		12.1	21.6	6.9	23.0	7.2	-0.33	0.21
	Total	403	100.0	37.3	9.5	41.6	11.9	0.35	0.44

Note: SD = standard deviation. Group differences in means are highly significant for each 'family of nations,' as well as overall.

Table 1 summarizes the first step of our empirical analysis – the identification and classification of the 403 individual parliamentary games (instances of post-election or mid-term government formation) since 1945. We arranged our cases in four groups or 'families of nations' – Anglo-Saxon (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 'special' case of Ireland), continental European (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), Nordic (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), and Japan – which appear to have at least some 'family resemblances' in terms of the indicators presented, and also with regard to shared characteristics like the prevalence of majoritarian or proportional electoral rules, single-party and majority v. coalition or minority governments – factors whose relevance for single-party dominance will be discussed below. The number of government formation instances ranges from a minimum of 15 (Luxembourg) to a maximum of 47 in Italy, where governments hardly ever survive a full legislative term.

Table 2 Dominance, our v. alternative operationalizations, by 'family of nations,' 1945-2008

'Family'	Pempel (%)	… of which (%)		
		D1	**D2**	**D3**
Anglo-Saxon	75.7	*67.9*	*28.2*	*3.8*
Cont. European	85.5	*9.9*	*71.8*	*17.6*
Nordic	67.3	*7.1*	*88.6*	*4.3*
Japan	79.3	*47.8*	*52.2*	*0*
Overall	77.9	*26.5*	*63.3*	*9.9*
	Blondel (%)			
Anglo-Saxon	1.0	*100.0*	*0*	*0*
Cont. European	0	*0*	*0*	*0*
Nordic	17.3	*27.8*	*72.2*	*0*
Japan	31.0	*66.7*	*33.3*	*0*
Overall	7.0	*42.9*	*57.1*	*0*
	Ware (%)			
Anglo-Saxon	35.0	*88.9*	*8.3*	*2.8*
Cont. European	18.7	*45.2*	*22.6*	*32.3*
Nordic	15.4	*25.0*	*75.0*	*0*
Japan	34.5	*90.0*	*10.0*	*0*
Overall	23.1	*63.4*	*24.7*	*11.8*
	O'Leary (%)			
Anglo-Saxon	36.9	*63.2*	*34.2*	*2.6*
Cont. European	30.1	*14.0*	*84.0*	*2.0*
Nordic	58.7	*8.2*	*91.8*	*0*
Japan	65.5	*52.6*	*47.4*	*0*
Overall	41.8	*27.4*	*71.4*	*1.2*

Most importantly, the figures underline the dominant player concept's empirical relevance as a measure of bargaining power, its a priori character notwithstanding. If the exclusion of dominant players from government were anything but rare and short-lived in the real world, one would have to reconsider the usefulness of this a priori concept for empirical research. Yet our data suggest that this is not the case. With a share of roughly 12 percent, the D4 scenario (there is a player with a power surplus > 0 but he is forced into the opposition) is the least frequent (and in six of our 16 countries it does not even appear once). It is somewhat more frequent in those continental European and Scandinavian countries where multi-party coalition and minority governments occur with some regularity (e.g., anti-SAP coalitions in Sweden and similar constellations in the other Nordic countries). In the vast majority (almost three fourths) of parliamentary games, the largest government party indeed has D1 or D2 (dictatorial or power surplus > 0) status; government formation *without* this status or even *against* an excluded dominant player is obviously difficult. Unsurprisingly, we find a vast majority of D1 cases in the Anglo-Saxon nations that use the single-member plurality (SMP) electoral system: Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (as of the 1996 election New Zealand has made the switch to PR). Only in Australia, Austria, and Germany are the D1 and D2 scenarios taken together not prevalent (however, in Australia, this is only so because the Liberal and Country/National parties were coded as separate entities, which does, of course, not do full justice to the political reality in that country).

The comparison of average vote and seat shares in Table 1 also reveals that many of the thresholds proposed in the literature fail to distinguish between cases that differ *qualitatively* in the power dimension. This is less true for the dictatorial type, as well as for most of the D4 cases, but readily apparent when the figures for the D2 and D3 scenarios are examined. Hence it may be

that the largest government party enjoys a power surplus (D2) with considerably less than 40 percent of the vote (continental Europe and, e.g., Belgium and the Netherlands), or that the D2 and D3 scenarios cannot really be distinguished on the basis of vote and seat shares (see overall values and, e.g., Germany and the Netherlands). In other words, if one accepts that the D1 to D4 groups indeed describe qualitatively different scenarios, then it may well be true that most of the criteria suggested in the extant literature can be shown to be relatively plausible in empirical terms, as well as correlating with each other and with the alternative indicators proposed by us (Table 3). Yet their use also produces a considerable number of 'false positives' and 'false negatives.' Table 2, moreover, indicates that Pempel's double-plurality criterion is quite lax, covering almost 80 percent of all cases overall and a considerable number of D3 scenarios. Blondel's thresholds (at least 40 percent of the vote and twice as much as the next largest party) turns out to be exceedingly strict. Ware's criterion of a 45 percent seat share and O'Leary's of a ten-percent vote gap between the largest government party and the runner-up lie in between those two. The upshot of this discussion is, however, that there is no real point in employing these kinds of indicators if power structures can be directly read off the number and weights of players in a given parliamentary game. And a look at the temporal dimension will provide further evidence for the relevance of power differentials.

Table 3 Bivariate correlations (largest government party, vote and seat shares, power surplus), by 'family of nations,' 1945-2008

	Vote share (%)	**Seat share (%)**	**Power surplus**
Anglo-Saxon			
Vote share (%)	1	0.774**	0.708**
Seat share (%)		1	0.810**
Power surplus			1
Cont. European			
Vote share (%)	1	0.980**	0.540**
Seat share (%)		1	0.579**
Power surplus			1
Nordic			
Vote share (%)	1	0.974**	0.892**
Seat share (%)		1	0.911**
Power surplus			1
Japan			
Vote share (%)	1	0.920**	0.885**
Seat share (%)		1	0.959**
Power surplus			1
Overall			
Vote share (%)	1	0.924**	0.732**
Seat share (%)		1	0.829**
Power surplus			1

** = significant at the one-percent level.

Operationalizing the temporal dimension: There is much agreement in the literature that single-party dominance has a temporal dimension. As suggested by Coleman (1960: 294), 'one can make valid judgements regarding the character of a party system only on the basis of an analysis of the structure and interaction of political parties within that order over a reasonable period of time.' Few authors would therefore qualify a party as dominant that regularly participates in government, often or always crossing one or another of the thresholds outlined above, but never holds office for more than a term or two. In other words, one can imagine a fully competitive scenario in which the major government party always falls into the D1 or D2 category but its *identity* changes from election to election (Bogaards 2004: 187). Conversely, the largest member of a coalition or minority government could defend its rule for a long time without ever achieving a dominant position vis-à-vis its parliamentary competitors. Thus a party must win several consecutive elections and instances of government formation and, moreover, has to *control* government over a 'substantial period' (Pempel 1990b: 4) to be considered dominant.

Unfortunately, temporal criteria that are equally plausible as the ones used in the power dimension are hard to come by. The ad hoc nature of temporal cut-off points ranging from O'Leary's (1994: 4) ten and Blondel's (1968) twenty years to Pempel's (1990b: 1-2) 'three to five decades' with 'as many as ten, twelve, or more successive governments' is particularly obvious (Dunleavy 2005: 7). Bogaards (2004: 175) and Sartori (1976: 196, 199) opt for a minimum of three consecutive terms.[8] Ware (1996: 159, 165) expects 'dominant' parties to win 'usually' and 'predominant' ones to 'regularly' gain a majority. The requirement of a disproportional tenure of governmental office within a specific period of observation – the postwar decades, for instance (O'Leary 1994: 3) – also leaves the question of an appropriate threshold open. A further complication is created by the fact that episodes of dominance are often considered to end with a party's electoral defeat, as suggested by Sartori (1976: 196), while Pempel (1990: 15-20, 335) and others allow for occasional and short absences from power that are followed by the party's rejuvenation and another long period of dominance, as in the case of Sweden's Social Democrats.

Thus we are not only faced with seemingly arbitrary criteria in the temporal dimension. Worse, the proposed thresholds are also very controversial. Thresholds like O'Leary's seem motivated by nothing but the pronounced desire to consider specific cases like the British Conservatives after 1979 as dominant. But not much of a theoretical rationale or empirical grounding is provided for any of the other cut-off points either. Moreover, not much attention is paid to the fact that criteria formulated in terms of years or decades, on the one hand, and of elections won, on the other, may not be fully equivalent. Where legislative terms are fixed to five years, Blondel's criterion amounts to winning 'only' five elections in a row as opposed to at least seven in systems with three-year terms like New Zealand's. Where governments are free to choose electoral dates, a party's decision and ability to call and win several consecutive early elections may either signal a dominant position and considerable strategic capacity, as exemplified by Chrétien's Liberals in Canada after 1993, or indicate a rather precarious hold on power.

All this being said, it may be difficult or even impossible to establish and justify non-arbitrary, genuinely qualitative cut-off points in the temporal dimension – unless, of course, one uses the

[8] Sartori initially advocates at least four consecutive terms (196), acknowledging the arbitrary nature of such a temporal measure. Later (199) he contends that '[t]hree consecutive absolute majorities can be a sufficient indication, provided that the electorate appears stabilized, that the absolute majority threshold [of seats] is clearly surpassed, and/or that the interval [between the largest party and the runner-up] is wide.'

criterion of a permanent hold on power, which appears overly restrictive (Bogaards 2004: 194). We can, however, do better than using completely ad hoc thresholds. If a theoretical justification of qualitative and 'one-size-fits-all' temporal cut-off points is impossible, and perhaps not even desirable, they should at least be grounded in the systematic consideration of pertinent empirical data. Instead of a mere ad hoc sample, a large number of relevant cases from a clearly delimited population should thus be considered. One may, then, employ the average duration of government episodes (defined with reference to the identity of the sole or major government party) or similar cut-off points based on the actual distribution of years in office as thresholds.

This is where the method of survival analysis comes in handy. Most of the statistical literature highlights the problem of right censoring (the fact that some observed cases have usually not yet experienced a failure by the end of the observation period) when contrasting survival analysis with 'standard' techniques like OLS and logistic regression. As Cleves et al. (2004: 2) point out, one cannot assume that survival times are normally distributed either. In earlier presentations of our empirical material, we had developed thresholds on the basis of means and standard deviations (using the 'truncated' length of right censored episodes) – an approach that is likely to result in biased estimates and that we now replace with one grounded in Kaplan-Meier survival estimates. The median and the 90^{th} percentile of the survivor function will be identified, and the duration associated with the latter (that is, with a ten-percent probability of survival) will be used as our temporal cut-off point.

In order to gauge a party's relative bargaining position during its hold on power, we also examine its 'cumulative power surplus' – adding up the surplus or deficit values for each consecutive instance of post-electoral or mid-term government formation during the respective episode – and its 'mean surplus' (the cumulative surplus divided by the number of government formation instances). In the power dimension, we are going to use a threshold of one standard deviation above the average cumulative power surplus in the sample.

The duration of episodes and the cumulative power surplus associated with them are, of course, likely to be correlated with each other, and with the number of government formation instances during the episode. But a relatively high cumulative power surplus could be achieved *without* crossing the duration threshold – for example, in a situation of great political instability where several instances of government formation in a short period return one and the same dominant player to power with changing sets of coalition partners. Conversely, the major government party could defend its role for a long time without always or ever being a dominant player, and hence even without achieving a power surplus. In short, government episodes may also be divided into four groups:

- *Unequivocal long-term dominance*: Both the length of the episode and the cumulative power surplus are above the respective threshold (L1).
- *Marginal long-term dominance*: The length of the episode is above the temporal cut-off point while the cumulative power surplus is below the threshold (L2).
- *Ineffective use of power advantages*: The length of the episode is below the temporal cut-off point while the cumulative power surplus is above the threshold (L3).
- *No long-term dominance*: Neither the length of the episode nor the cumulative power surplus is above its respective threshold (L4).

The requisite number or share of D1 and D2 cases for each of these four episode types is not fixed a priori, and the cumulative power surplus has no absolute maximum or minimum. A *mean* surplus of 1, however, indicates that the party in question has held dictatorial status throughout the respective episode, a surplus > 0 that it has dominated other players at least once, and one of <= 0 that it has held on to its role as major government party without, on average, enjoying the advantages of the 'most powerful' player status.

129 postwar government episodes, including 16 ongoing or right censored ones, were identified in the next step of our empirical analysis (Table 4). As Figures 1 and 2 show, the normality assumption does clearly not hold for survival times but is approximated reasonably well for the cumulative power surplus. What, then, do our data tell us about the median duration of government episodes in our 16 parliamentary democracies? A glance at Figure 3 and the underlying values of the survivor function indicates that the median duration – that is, the one corresponding to a survival probability of 0.5 – is between 1,977 and 2,071 days, that is, less than six years. The duration associated with a survival probability of 0.25 is roughly twelve years, and the one for a 0.10 probability is between 18 and 20 years. This temporal cut-off point (like the duration of twelve years associated with the 75th percentile) exceeds O'Leary's ten-years and is lower than Pempel's three-decades threshold but confirms Blondel's 20-years criterion. We are therefore going to use a threshold of 18 years for the classification of long-term episodes along the lines described above.

Figure 1 Histogram, survival times (in days)



Figure 2 Histogram, cumulative power surplus



Figure 3



Note: Analysis time in days.

We might also have used different thresholds for each of the 'families of nations.' Another Kaplan-Meier estimate, stratified by 'family of nation,' shows that there are, in fact, considerable differences in terms of the median duration of government episodes (Figure 4): The median is above 5.8 years for the Anglo-Saxon countries, above 7.1 years for the continental European, and a mere 3.1 years for the Nordic countries, with corresponding differences for the 90th percentile.

For the power dimension, a threshold of 3.23 was derived from the average value (1.12) and standard deviation (2.09) of the cumulative power surplus. Taken together, the temporal and the power criterion enable us to classify episodes as instances of long-term dominance (L1, L2) or not (L3, L4).

Figure 4



1 = Anglo-Saxon, 2 = continental European, 3 = Nordic, 4 = Japan. p = 0.0070** (logrank test).

Table 4 Overview, types of government episodes, 1945-2007

'Family'	Type	N	Average cumulative power surplus	Average vote share	Average seat share
Anglo-Saxon	**L1**	0	-	-	-
	L2	1	0	39.2	44.2
	L3	5	4.09	44.0	54.6
	L4	37	1.31	42.1	50.0
	Total	43	1.60	42.3	50.4
Cont. European	**L1**	3	7.85	43.6	46.6
	L2	4	2.39	36.9	39.9
	L3	0	-	-	-
	L4	24	0.26	32.0	34.0
	Total	31	1.27	33.8	35.9
Nordic	**L1**	1	5.81	46.2	48.0
	L2	0	-	-	-
	L3	1	4.70	45.7	52.0
	L4	44	0.17	29.1	29.9
	Total	46	0.39	29.8	30.8
Japan	**L1**	1	10.35	49.2	56.8
	L2	0	-	-	-
	L3	1	4.45	35.9	50.0
	L4	6	0.42	25.3	28.3
	Total	8	2.17	29.6	34.5
Overall	**L1**	5	7.94	45.2	48.9
	L2	5	1.91	37.3	40.8
	L3	7	4.23	43.1	53.6
	L4	111	0.58	33.9	37.4
	Total	128	1.12	34.9	38.9

Table 4 summarizes the second step of our analysis – the identification and classification of government episodes. Once again, we see quite a bit of variation in terms of the number of government episodes. The number of episodes ranges from a mere three (in Luxembourg) to 15 (in

Norway). The *average* number of consecutive governments with the same major party is 3.1 with a standard deviation of 4.3 – so an unusually high number of consecutive governments is much closer to Pempel's threshold of ten or more than to Sartori's of three or four.

No more than five cases are in our L1 category, which satisfies both the temporal and the power criterion, and another five in the L2 group, with a party holding on to power for an unusually long period but without a particularly dominant bargaining position. On average, even the cumulative power surplus of the latter is, however, markedly above the overall value (1.12) or the one of the 112 L4 cases (a mere 0.59). Table 5 enumerates the individual (unequivocal and marginal) long-term episodes thus identified, with rounded years in office (post-1945) and power indicators. The cases are sorted by type of long-term dominance (L1 or L2) and cumulative power surplus. As suggested above, the mean surplus provides additional information on these cases. There are few, if any, surprises among the four cases of unequivocal dominance: Italy, Japan, and Sweden are counted among the prime examples of single-party dominance in the literature (Pempel 1991c). The outstanding role of the Japanese LDP and the SAP in Sweden would become even clearer if all of their post-1945 government episodes were combined, an approach not pursued here. And while Italy stands out in terms of duration, Japan and Italy together lead in terms of cumulative power surplus. A glance at the mean surplus values, however, indicates that Italy's high cumulative surplus is more due to the many instances of government formation than to an especially pronounced dominant player status of the DC in each individual parliamentary game; its mean power surplus is, in fact, close to the overall mean of 0.26.

Table 5 Episodes of long-term dominance, 1945-2008

Country	Party	Start	End	Consecutive years in office	Cumulative power surplus	Mean power surplus
Italy	DC	1946	1994	48	15.30	0.40
Japan	LDP	1955	1993	38	10.35	0.94
Sweden	SAP	1948 (1936)	1976	28	5.81	0.53
Austria	ÖVP	1945	1970	25	4.33	0.48
Germany	CDU	1949	1969	20	3.91	0.33
Belgium	CD & V	1981	1999	18	3.09	0.13
Austria	SPÖ	1970	1999	29	3.00	0.33
Luxembourg	CSV	1945	1974	29	2.70	0.26
Luxembourg	CSV	1979	…	29	0.78	0.13
Australia	LIB	1949	1972	23	0.00	0.00

Note: DC = Christian Democracy; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; SAP = Social Democratic Workers' Party; ÖVP = Austrian People's Party; CDU = Christian Democratic Union; CD & V = Christian Democratic and Flemish; SPÖ = Social-Democratic Party of Austria; CSV = Christian Social People's Party; LIB = Liberal Party of Australia.

The German CDU is mentioned as a marginal case in Pempel (1991c). The case of ÖVP dominance in Austria, by contrast, does not figure prominently in the literature. And, to be sure, it is a special case because of the specific nature of the postwar Austrian political system. In order to prevent a recurrence of the brief 1934 civil war, the representatives of the two main political camps (*Lager*), the Catholic-conservative (ÖVP) and the socialist (SPÖ), decided to share power in a grand coalition government. This was also institutionalized in the *Proporz* system according to which jobs, housing, and government contracts in the vast state-controlled sector (which extended from public administration, education, and housing into substantial state-controlled parts

of the economy) were divided proportionally between the two parties. Thus, from 1945 until 1966 (when the ÖVP managed to win a majority of seats and formed a brief single-party government) it might be equally appropriate to speak of a dual ÖVP-SPÖ dominance.

Among the five cases of marginal dominance, we also find cases that are not prominent in the extant literature (the sometimes considered borderline case of the German CDU between 1949 and 1969 barely missed our temporal criterion and might otherwise be added to the L1 cases): the CD & V in Belgium, the SPÖ in Austria, the CSV in Luxembourg (two episodes), as well as the Australian Liberals. While the SPÖ in Austria and the CSV episodes in Luxembourg stand out in terms of duration, the CD & V, SPÖ, and CSV (I) are closest to our power threshold. The case of Australia is something of an 'artefact,' given the peculiar arrangement between the Liberal and Country/National parties (one might thus want to code the two parties as one, in which case Liberal/National rule from 1949 to 1972 would shift into the L1 category). Finally, another glance at Table 4 illustrates that average vote and seat shares are no more than weak indicators of a party's success in establishing long-term dominance. They do, in other words, not differentiate the L1 to L4 scenarios well in many instances.

Explaining the rise and fall of dominant party regimes: Which factors, then, are conducive to the emergence and stabilization of dominant party regimes, influence their duration, and play a role in their erosion and demise? These are precisely the kinds of question that call for survival analysis. The literature has conceptualized single-party dominance in terms of an evolutionary model, as the outcome of a virtuous cycle in which self-enforcing processes (Baumgartner/Jones 2002) enable a party to achieve and secure dominance (Boucek 1998: 194-9; Pempel 1990a: 334-5, 352). Conversely, the fall of dominant party regimes is linked with the onset of negative feedback processes. Unlike more conventional approaches like OLS, the method of survival analysis could ultimately be used to model these processes, and hence to estimate the impact of time-dependent covariates at different moments in a party's life cycle. The testing of more elaborate models of this sort has to wait for another day, though.

Here we restrict ourselves to a brief review and very cursory test of some of the explanatory variables and hypotheses put forward in the literature. The number of these variables is considerable, many of them are not easily operationalized and measured, and some of the related hypotheses prove ambivalent upon closer inspection. For our convenience, the factors that might influence the duration of government episodes, or the risk (hazard) of their failure, may be grouped in four categories, as in Table 6.

Table 6 Explanatory factors

	'External'	'Internal'
'Structure'	Institutional arrangements Cleavage and party system structures Critical historical junctures	Organizational structures and resources Prior government experience
'Agency'	Effective strategic interaction with collateral organizations, coalition partners, and competitors	Leadership skills

The qualitative literature often highlights factors in the 'agency' row. A party's outstanding success is, then, explained with reference to its effective strategic interaction with or manipulation of its collateral organizations, coalition partners, and competitors ('external' dimension), with reference to its leadership's skills in tackling the challenges of party organization and development ('internal' dimension), and so on. The examination of such agency-related factors may well require the use of case studies or the small-N comparative approach. Like Bienen and van de Walle in their work on leadership duration (1989, 1992), though, we are going to leave such factors aside for the time being because their operationalization and measurement raise problems for which we have not yet found adequate solutions.

The upper left-hand cell points us to variables that describe the 'external' context and 'opportunity structures' of (would-be) dominant parties and their competitors. These are factors (institutional arrangements, cleavages, the nature of the party system, and so on) that tend to be relatively stable over long periods of time. Thus, even the most skillful leader will not be able to (fully) manipulate them to her party's advantage, at least not in the short term (in the long run, on the other hand, a government party may be able to 'endogenize' such context factors to its advantage). Three groups of such 'external' factors are highlighted in the literature. Each of them should primarily help us identify differences between the 16 examined countries in terms of the more or less favorable context they provide for dominant party regimes (as opposed to differences between individual parties in each country).

We have, in fact, already seen that there appear to be differences between our three 'families of nations' in this respect and will, once again, include a set of dummy variables for the 'families of nations' in the analyses below. So which institutional features might be responsible for the already described differences in survival times and in the occurrence of dominant party regimes? One plausible set of hypotheses may be derived from Arend Lijphart's (1999) salient distinction between Westminster and consensus democracies, and with a view on the role played by exclusive access to state resources as a key advantage of government parties vis-à-vis their competitors in the opposition. These resources can notably be used for patronage and for the maintenance of clientelistic networks, and besides the distribution of pork, control over instruments of political socialization and the policy agenda is also crucial for a party's attempts to defend and increase its dominance (Boucek 1998: 105-8). We have not yet figured out how to adequately operationalize and measure government capacity and patronage potential but, ceteris paribus, the power of executives and their control over the distribution of resources should be greatest in Westminster systems – where a single player has control over the distribution of perks and the use of state resources – and lower in consensus democracies with their multitude of institutional, partisan, and social veto players (Tsebelis 2000).

The Westminster v. consensus dichotomy is, of course, linked with the distinction between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. The theoretical relationship between electoral systems and dominant party regimes is not straightforward, though, and competing hypotheses have been formulated. On the one hand, an environment characterized by proportional representation (PR), and by the multi-party system that is likely to ensue, may foster a party's chances to lead a series of coalition governments, especially if it has dominant player status or an otherwise favorable bargaining position (Pempel 1990a: 336-9). By contrast, the prevalence of two-party systems and single-party governments in the majoritarian context implies that even minor electoral swings often threaten a party's hold on power. On the other hand, the mechanical disproportionality ef-

fect of single-member plurality (SMP) systems alone is usually enough to give one of the competing parties a manufactured or artificial seat majority, and hence a dominant position of the dictatorial type. The psychological effect of SMP systems is very much a function of experiences made by voters in previous elections and should therefore not only discourage them from supporting third parties but also give an advantage to past winners. The more elections a party has already won impressively, the more of a waste it might appear to vote for any of its competitors. And while incentives for such a party's opponents to coordinate or merge are weakened by PR systems (Nyblade 2005: 18), factional exits are more risky, and electoral coordination is more difficult, in the majoritarian context (Dunleavy 2005: 17). In short, dominant party regimes may emerge under both sets of electoral rules, although dominance of the dictatorial type should be more easily achieved and sustained in SMP systems (Bogaards 2000: 164, 167-71; Dunleavy 2005: 6; Weaver 2004: 228-32). We use variables based on Lijphart's (1999: 312-3) indicators of his 'parties and executives' and 'federal-unitary' dimensions, a range of dummy variables for institutional features like executive dominance, federalism, bicameralism, and electoral system types, as well as variables measuring corporatism based on Siaroff's (1999) widely used indicators, to capture the 'external structural' dimension.

Another important group of variables relates to cleavages and the nature of the party system. The literature suggests that social cleavages and their intensity are positively correlated with the number of relevant parties (Lipset/Rokkan 1967). In a climate of intense polarization, moreover, there may be no viable exit options for any party's core voters and support groups. Hence a party could gain and secure a dominant position simply because the groups whose interests it primarily defends are strongly over-represented in the electorate (Dunleavy 2005: 13). With Smith (2005: 1), one may speak of 'hard' dominance where salient cleavages are few, pronounced, and lopsided. As social homogeneity tends to be negatively correlated with population size, this basis of dominance might also be more frequent in smaller than in bigger jurisdictions.

The nature of the party system is obviously linked with both electoral rules and cleavages. Somewhat competing hypotheses on the relationship between single-party dominance and party system or opposition fragmentation, as measured by way of effective numbers of parties, can be found in the literature. On the one hand, there is supposed to be a negative relationship: 'It is assumed that with increases in the number of parties, particularly in the legislature, the more vulnerable dominant-party rule becomes. In other words, the greater the number of competitors, the less monopolistic the party system. […]. With more actors vying for a share of the electoral market, the dominant player's share not only diminishes but the possibilities for inter-party collusion against the ruling party also increase' (Boucek 1998: 108, 114). On the other hand, this very fragmentation of the electoral and parliamentary landscape – with one party nevertheless 'standing out from the pack' – is sometimes raised to the level of a definitional criterion or treated as a factor that is *conducive* to single-party dominance (Pempel 1990a, 1990b). In this line of reasoning, fragmentation is tied to lopsided competition: The dominant party is faced with a number of competitors whose failure to coordinate hurts them electorally and in terms of government participation. Yet we have already seen that one and the same effective number of parties may be attached to very different power structures, including dominated and non-dominated games, and it cannot tell us anything about the *nature* of party system fragmentation. At a conceptual level and in the temporal dimension, too, there is no reason to expect that the emergence, stabilization, or demise of single-party and long-term dominance is clearly associated either with non-fragmented two-party or with fragmented multi-party scenarios. Once again, we draw in part on indi-

cators provided by Lijphart (1999: 80-1) to gauge the role of this group of variables, as well as effective numbers of parties, our power indicators, and population size.

In contrast with the 'hard' form of dominance, the 'soft' one identified by Smith (2005: 1) relies more strongly on agency and strategic capacity (Raschke 2002). A party's success in establishing this type of dominance, then, is grounded in its ability to transcend social boundaries, to forge broad alliances, and to negotiate compromises between parts of the electorate and their representatives – for instance, between classes, ethno-cultural groups, or religious denominations (Lijphart 1975, 1980; Pempel 1990b: 14). It is therefore entirely conceivable that 'soft' dominance emerges against a backdrop of numerous and 'balanced' rather than lopsided cleavages, especially if they have lost their salience, polarization is low, and overall social integration high. While this brings us back to the difficult-to-capture agency-related variables, and hence will be ignored for now, the literature often suggests that 'agency' comes to the fore most strongly in critical historical junctures. Given that cleavages tend to be 'frozen' over long periods of time, the literature suggests that the foundations of electoral alliances are often laid – and agency comes into play most strongly – during critical junctures, 'when preexisting patterns of politics [are] drastically shattered' (Pempel 1990a: 341-2). The party that uses these windows of opportunity and moves first in securing its electoral base is likely to gain a considerable long-term advantage in the ensuing phase of 'normal politics,' especially where it is credited with the successful establishment of a new political order, reconstruction, and modernization (Arian/Barnes 1974: 594-5). By shaping institutional arrangements in its own favor, capturing important traditions and symbols, and placing loyalists in key positions, the party associated with a critical juncture may itself become a defining element of its political community's identity and gain an 'aura of legitimacy and automaticity' (Pempel 1990b: 29). Not the least, enduring dominance may foster the co-optation of initially hostile groups, thus further solidifying the dominant party's hold in power (Pempel 1990b: 7).

Since the late 1960s, electoral volatility has grown, though, which should lead us to expect that long-term dominance has, ceteris paribus, become more difficult to achieve and sustain, and hence less frequent. Moreover, the left has been particularly challenged by economic developments that have reduced, and by the emergence of a postmaterialist cleavage that has threatened to split, its traditional electoral base (Kitschelt 1994). Yet while dominant party regimes of the left have arguably come under greater pressure than their right-wing equivalents, one should expect more or less effective responses to these challenges on both sides of the ideological spectrum, and in general, instances of 'hard' dominance should be jeopardized more by social change than the 'soft' variant. The influence of critical junctures, and effects related to calendar time or historical epoch in general, will therefore be considered as another set of 'external structural' variables. The existence of positive or negative feedback processes in the life cycle of government episodes and dominant party regimes will be probed as an issue of time dependence, with a view on the shape of the hazard function.

Finally, we turn to 'internal structural' factors. Organizational capacity, abundant resources, and a solid membership base are obvious assets for a party. We may subsume these and related factors under the heading of institutionalization and take a party's age as an (admittedly rough and preliminary) proxy for this variable. The external and internal dimensions are closely linked here, for a party's capacity and resources may be greatly advanced by its access to the perquisites of government office. Incumbent parties should thus have an advantage vis-à-vis the opposition, and likewise, prior government experience might help a party establish and sustain its hold on power.

Moreover, leaving aside outright personality effects, we might consider the tenure of party leaders as another 'structural' feature. There is often a tension between steps required to ensure the loyalty of a party's rank-and-file members, on the one hand, and measures dictated by efforts to broaden and renew its electoral base, on the other. A long-serving, popular, and experienced party leader represents a comparative advantage if she increases a party's electoral fortunes, helps to avoid or master scandals and other crisis situations (Nyblade 2005: 20), ensures cohesion, or solves conflicts between internal factions (Boucek 2001). Yet each stage of a party's life cycle requires specific leadership skills (Harmel/Janda 1994). Hence the long tenure of party leaders may be an advantage (or a proxy of leadership skills) but it, too, can be a double-edged sword. A leader who stays on for too long or is associated with scandals may become a liability and hinder a party's organizational adaptation. Whether the examined parties have prior government experience, as well as the number and average tenure of party leaders during government episodes, will therefore be considered as variables in this category, together with the ideological orientation (left or non-left) of parties.

In a first step of our exploratory analysis, we performed another set of Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, stratified by each of the dummy and categorical variables alluded to above. While this non-parametric approach makes 'no assumption about the functional form of the survivor function […] and the effects of covariates are not modeled either – the comparison of the survival experience is done at a qualitative level across the values of the covariates' (Cleves et al. 91), it is a useful starting point for the specification of more elaborate (semi-)parametric models. Here we present graphs of the survivor function for the few variables that yielded significant results.

As for the 'external structural' context factors, most of the institutional or cleavage and party system variables do not seem to be highly relevant, including the executive dominance, corporatism, and electoral system variables yet leaving aside the significant distinction between 'family of nations' already presented. The continental European and the Nordic countries, of course, tend to be similar with respect to these variables (Katzenstein 1985) but quite different in terms of the survival of government episodes. The variables capturing the federalism dimension work somewhat better (Figure 5), and remarkably, FED-D1 – a simple dummy variable for the four 'classical' federations in the sample (Austria, Australia, Canada, and Germany) plus Belgium since the 1990s v. all other countries – produces a more significant result than the ones based on Lijphart's ordinal or interval-scale measures of federalism and his federal-unitary dimension. However, the survivor functions for the two groups of countries do not really confirm the hypothesis that a greater concentration of power in unitary systems facilitates a long hold on power: Up to the duration of 8,000 days or so, the decrease of the function is, in fact, steeper for unitary than for federal systems.[9]

[9] Only the Anglo-Saxon group of countries has variation with regard to the electoral system variables (PR v. all others, SMP v. all others), and in a logrank test stratified by 'family of nations,' $p = 0.1007$ for the PR dummy.

Figure 5



Note: 0 = federal; 1 = unitary. p = 0.0303*.

Likewise, most of the cleavage and party system variables do not seem to matter a whole lot. This only underlines what we said above, namely, that one might imagine scenarios of 'hard' v. 'soft' dominance that coincide with many v. few salient cleavages, a high or a low number of effective parties, and so on. Our present indicators are, of course, crude, and hence this group of factors certainly deserves another look. Our POP_D1 dummy – with the median population in the sample (7.7 million) as cut-off point – is significant at the ten-percent level (Figure 6). Thus the variable's use as a proxy for social homogeneity which, in turn, might facilitate single-party dominance receives at least modest support. Among the calendar time variables, only the dummy for the 1965-74 period was equally close to being significant (Figure 7), and hence we may surmise, with the requisite caution, that the heyday of the Keynesian welfare state was a comparatively favorable moment to establish long-term dominance. By contrast, there is no confirmation for qualifying the immediate postwar years or any other decade as a critical juncture throughout the sample (it certainly was one for Germany, Italy, and Japan), or to suggest that establishing dominance has become more difficult since the 1970s on the basis of these data.

Figure 6



Note: 0 > 7.7 million; 1 else. p = 0.0846.

Figure 7



Note: 1 = episode starts between 1965 and 1974; 0 = else. p = 0.0802.

Considering variables in the 'internal structural' group, the empirical relevance of our power indicators (we experimented with different versions) is amply confirmed (Figure 8). The survival probability rises with the mean surplus, and only the D1 scenario – that is, episodes in which the largest government party had a seat majority *throughout* (a typical scenario in the Anglo-Saxon countries but not elsewhere) – represents an exception to this pattern. Ideological orientation does not turn out to be significant.[10]

[10] The difference between cases satisfying Pempel's double-plurality criterion and all others is also significant, while the one between cases satisfying O'Leary's criterion (a ten-percent vote gap between the largest party and the runner-up) and the others is not.

Figure 8



Note: pow_ord is an ordinal variable, representing our D1-D4 scenarios, and based on the mean power surplus of government episodes. p = 0.0000***.

Moving on to (semi-)parametric approaches, the first issue we have to raise, however briefly, is the time dependence of the examined survival processes. Are we willing to assume that analysis time itself has a kind of causal influence on the hazard or not? And do we have a theoretically grounded idea on the *nature* of time dependence – that is, on the shape of the hazard function? There are different 'philosophies' on this issue in the statistical literature, and we hasten to say that we are not yet in a position to take a firm stand (by the same token, the subsequent presentation of models will be rather 'quick and dirty,' and a more systematic discussion of various model specifications, diagnostics, and so on, will have to wait for another day).

On the one hand, many authors suggest that assigning explanatory power to time 'is absurd' (Cleves et al. 2004: 24): 'If we fully understand the process and had sufficient data, there would be no role for time in our model, […].' If time dependence is considered to be no more than a nuisance – if, in other words, a specific time function is chosen to account for the influence of covariates that are not explicitly modeled for one reason or another (such as leadership skills and agency-related factors in general), then the ultimate goal would have to be the specification of an exponential model – that is, a model with a constant hazard function, and hence 'lacking memory.' All other models give a role to time 'to proxy […] effects that we do not fully understand, cannot measure, […], or [that] are unknown' (Cleves et al. 2004: 25).

On the other hand, the literature on single-party dominance and similar phenomena abounds with 'concepts such as grace periods, honeymoons, thresholds, and [life] cycles, all of which assume that the passage of time is relevant for political outcomes' (Bienen/van de Walle 1992: 688), and so 'time dependence may well reflect faulty specification of explanatory variables affecting a process. But in situations where key causal variables are difficult to measure, a strategy can be employed that attaches substantive interpretation to the effects of various measures of time' (688-9). In short, 'true behavioral (or structural) time dependence seems meaningful in certain classes of situations' which 'involve causal variables that are either functions of time or closely related to

time: age, duration, cohort, and experience' (689). Where this is the case, and one aims to impose a theoretically grounded notion of time dependence on the data, the use of parametric models other than the exponential is appropriate and might be more efficient. Otherwise, the semi-parametric Cox model is more flexible in that it enables the specification of multivariate models with 'no assumptions about the shape of the hazard over time' (Cleves et al. 2004: 121).

But which shape(s) of the time function appear plausible in light of the phenomenon under consideration, long-term dominance? One plausible assumption could be that the hazard (the risk of losing power at a given point in time, conditional upon having survived up to that point) simply rises with the length of government episodes: The longer they endure, the more likely it becomes that negative feedback processes (growing dissatisfaction in the electorate, incentives for the coordination or merger of opposition forces, and so on) kick in, and more and more threaten to undermine a party's hold on power (Nyblade 2005: 3-4). The so-called Weibull specification is able to capture monotonically increasing (or decreasing) effects of this kind. Yet, on the other hand, if a dominant party is indeed able to 'lock in' positive feedback processes, the hazard may first increase and then decrease once a party has survived beyond some threshold. A lognormal specification is, for instance, able to capture such processes. A smoothed hazard estimate based on our Kaplan-Meier survivor function indicates that reality may be even more complex, though, with a trough after of roughly twelve years and another rise (Figure 9).

Figure 9



A variety of (semi-)parametric models were estimated, including an 'institutional features model,' a 'cleavages and party system model,' a 'calendar time effects' model, and an 'individual party characteristics' model. Here we jump right to our tentative conclusions and present a number of such models that appear to work out reasonably well (Table 7). First (I) is a Cox model into which we entered covariates that were found to be individually significant; a number of those covariates lose their significance when considered jointly: the 1960s effect, prior government experience in years, the institutional variables (federalism, bicameralism), the cleavage and party system variables, as well as T_N_REG, a variable that indicates the average time from one government formation instance to the next *within* government episodes – based on the hypothesis

that the overall length of episodes is also a function of the frequency with which voter or parliamentary support for a government has to be renewed.

Next (II) is a Cox model that only keeps five significant covariates. We see confirmed what we already know: The hazard is greatly reduced (by roughly 76 percent) in the continental European as opposed to the other countries in the sample (EURO dummy variable). A party's mean power surplus – its advantage in terms of relative power – also has a strong and highly significant effect. The effects for the EXP_YEAR and T_N_PM variables are smaller: Each additional year of prior government experience reduces the hazard by about two percent, and each additional year of the average tenure of the major government party's leader (usually also the prime minister) during the episode by 34 percent; prior governement experience also turns out to have a more significant impact than party age as a proxy of institutionalization.

Table 8 (Semi-)parametric models

Variable	**Cox (I)**	**Cox (II)**	**Weibull PH (IIIa)**	**Weibull AFT (IIIb)**	**Lognormal AFT (IV)**
EURO	0.24***	0.23***	0.21***	2.69***	2.08***
FED_D1	0.69				
BIC_D	1.34				
POP_D1	1.22				
MEANENPS	0.94				
START65	1.19				
EXP_YEAR	0.98	0.98*	0.99	1.01	1.01
PAR1LEFT	3.30***	3.39***	3.48***	0.45***	0.67**
MSURPLUS	0.31***	0.28***	0.28***	2.27***	2.00***
T_N_REG	1.00				
T_N_PM	0.66***	0.68***	0.71***	1.19***	1.20***
Log likelihood	-362.01	-363.76	-126.80	-126.80	-123.01
AIC			265.6	265.6	260.02

Note: The table shows hazard ratios (Cox and Weibull PH specification) and time ratios (Weibull and lognormal AFT specifications) rather than coefficients. * = significant at 0.05 level, ** = significant at 0.01 level, *** = significant at 0.001 level. PH = proportional hazards specification; AFT = accelerated failure time specification. AIC = Akaike information criterion.

The comparison of non-nested (semi-)parametric models is somewhat 'tricky.' However, the fact that the hazard-ratio and time-ratio values and the significance levels of the models are quite consistent may give as at least some confidence in the robustness of these preliminary findings. Both parametric specifications essentially confirm the findings from the Cox (II) model, and the Weibull model is preferable to an exponential one with the same five covariates (not shown). So at least for the time being, the inclusion of a function of time improves the models. The table includes the PH and AFT versions of the Weibull model so as to enable the comparison of time ratios with the lognormal model. Again, the findings are very consistent. On the basis of the AIC, the latter would appear to be preferable, though, and hence there might indeed be something of a 'lock-in' effect (with a decreasing hazard) at work once a party has survived in its role as major government party past some threshold.

Conclusion

This paper had a twofold objective: First, we introduced a reconceptualization of single-party dominance that we consider more intuitive and less dependent on ad hoc criteria than standard operationalizations of the phenomenon. Illustrating our approach with data from 16 parliamentary systems, we could draw a couple of descriptive inferences on the scope and nature of dominant party regimes in the OECD world. Our operationalization *does* largely confirm the examples of dominance that the extant literature has predominantly dwelled on but also yields a few arguably neglected cases that may be worth considering in future research. In any case, our approach provides somewhat firmer conceptual and empirical foundations for the classification of regimes as dominant or not.

For a tentative exploration of the factors that are conducive to the long-term survival of dominant party regimes, we turned to the method of event history analysis. Our preliminary foray into the empirical material corroborates some of the hypotheses advanced in the extant literature but also highlights aspects that are clearly in need of further research. Thus, the variation between countries and 'families of nations' in terms of the frequency, types, and gradations of dominant party regimes encountered may be partly linked to institutional and other context variables, and partly to characteristics of the more or less dominant parties themselves. However, it is quite apparent that single-party dominance may develop and unravel under a range of different circumstances. There do not seem to be any individually necessary or sufficient preconditions for the rise or fall of dominant party regimes. And unlike some of the extant literature, our data suggest that there are not just two (European at large v. Anglo-Saxon) types of democracies in this respect but rather three: The Nordic countries are clearly a world apart from the continental European ones, with the all the more remarkable exception of Sweden. A more sophisticated explanatory framework than could be present here will, of course, have to examine more, and more fine-grained, covariates, as well as the interaction of structure- and agency-related, systematic and contingent factors, to shed further light on the emergence, stabilization, and demise of single-party dominance in different political contexts.

A combination of statistical and qualitative methods may ultimately be the most promising research strategy (Lieberman 2005). While event history analysis is undoubtedly better suited to the modeling of temporal dynamics than standard techniques, research into dominant party regimes should not rely on statistical methods alone; interaction effects, positive and negative feedback processes, and the agency-related factors that are likely to play a crucial role in sustaining or eroding dominance remain difficult to model, and statistical techniques do not easily handle multiple conjunctural causation (Ragin 2000). Qualitative methods, then, may be expected to have a genuine value added. A final task of future work in the area will be to expand on, and further substantiate, normative assessments of single-party dominance: Does it hollow out democracy, or is it an innocuous, perhaps even desirable element of stability?

Literature

Abedi, Amir/Schneider, Steffen 2006: 'Federalism, Parliamentary Government, and Single-Party Dominance: An Examination of Dominant Party Regimes in Canada, Australia, Germany, and Austria,' paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Philadelphia, PA, August 30-September 3.

Abedi/Schneider 2007: 'Perpetual Winners? A Reconceptualization of Single-Party Dominance in Established Parliamentary Democracies,' paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association in Las Vegas, Nevada, March 7-11.

Abedi, Amir/Schneider, Steffen 2008 (forthcoming): 'Big Fish in Small Ponds: Dominant Party Regimes in the Canadian Provinces and German *Länder*,' in: Matthijs Bogaards/Françoise Boucek (eds.), *Dominant Parties and Democracy*, London: Routledge.

Arian, Alan/Barnes, Samuel H. 1974: 'The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability,' *Journal of Politics* 36, 3, 592-614.

Bienen, Henry/van de Walle, Nicolas 1992: 'A Proportional Hazards Model of Leadership Duration,' *Journal of Politics* 54, 3, 685-717.

Bienen, Henry/van de Walle, Nicolas 1989: 'Time and Power in Africa,' *American Political Science Review* 83, 1, 19-34.

Blondel, Jean 1968: 'Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1, 2, 180-203.

Bogaards, Matthijs 2000: 'Crafting Competitive Party Systems: Electoral Laws and the Opposition in Africa,' *Democratization* 7, 4, 163-90.

Bogaards, Matthijs 2004: 'Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa,' *European Journal of Political Research* 43, 2, 173-97.

Boucek, Françoise 1998: 'Electoral and Parliamentary Aspects of Dominant Party Systems,' in P. Pennings/J.-E. Lane (eds.), *Comparing Party System Change*, London: Routledge.

Boucek, Françoise 2001: *The Growth and Management of Factionalism in Long-Lived Dominant Parties. Comparing Britain, Italy, Canada and Japan*, London: London School of Economics, PhD Thesis.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M./Jones, Bradford S. 1997: 'Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science,' *American Journal of Political Science* 41, 1414-61.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M./Jones, Bradford S. 2004: *Event History Modeling. A Guide for Social Scientists*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Caulier, Jean-François/Dumont, Patrick 2005: 'Fragmentation as a Measure of Dominance: A Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Test of Four Indices,' paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Granada, Spain, April 14-19.

Cleves, Mario A. et al. 2004: *An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata*, College Station: Stata Press.

Coleman, J.S. (1960). 'The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa,' in Gabriel A. Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cox, Gary W. 1998: *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971: *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

Deemen, A.M.A. van 1989: 'Dominant Players and Minimum Size Coalitions,' *European Journal of Political Research* 17, 313-32.

Dunleavy, Patrick 2005: 'Rethinking Dominant Party Systems,' paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Granada, Spain, April 14-19.

Duverger, Maurice 1963: *Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, New York: Wiley.
Giliomee, H./Simkins, C. (eds.) 1999: *The Awkward Embrace. One-Party Domination and Democracy*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Katzenstein, Peter 1985: *Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert 1994: *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leech, Dennis 2002: 'Computation of Power Indices,' Coventry: University of Warwick, Warwick Economic Research Papers 644.
Lieberman, Evan S. 2005: 'Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,' *American Political Science Review* 99, 3, 435-52.
Lijphart, Arend 1999: *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
Mackie, Thomas T./Rose, Richard Rose 1991: *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, 3rd rev. edition, London: Macmillan.
Mackie, Thomas T./Rose, Richard 1997: *Updating the International Almanac*, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.
Müller, Wolfgang C./Strøm, Kaare (eds.) 2003: *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Nyblade, Benjamin 2005: 'The Challenges of Dominance,' paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Granada, Spain, April 14-19.
O'Leary, Brendan 1994: 'Britain's Japanese Question: "Is There a Dominant Party"?' In Helen Margetts/Gareth Smyth (eds.), *Turning Japanese: Britain with a Permanent Party of Government*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Pempel, T.J. 1990a: 'Conclusion. One-Party Dominance and the Creation of Regimes,' in T.J. Pempel (ed.), *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Pempel, T.J. 1990b: 'Introduction. Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes,' in T.J. Pempel (ed.), *Uncommon Democracies. The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Pempel, T.J. (ed.) 1990c: *Uncommon Democracies. The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Ragin, Charles C. 2000: *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*, Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
Raschke, Joachim: 'Politische Strategie. Überlegungen zu einem politischen und politologischen Konzept", in Frank Nullmeier and Thomas Saretzki (eds.), *Jenseits des Regierungsalltags. Strategiefähigkeit politischer Parteien*, Frankfurt/M.: Campus.
Roozendaal, Peter van 1992: 'The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability,' *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17, 1, 5-36.
Roozendaal, Peter van 1997: 'Government Survival in Western Multi-Party Democracies,' *European Journal of Political Research* 32, 71-92.
Sartori, Giovanni 1976: *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schneider, Steffen/Abedi, Amir 2006: 'Winning is Not Enough: A Reconceptualization of Single-Party Dominance in Established Democracies,' paper presented at the annual meeting of the CPSA, Toronto, ON, June 1-3.
Siaroff, Alan 1999: 'Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and Measurement,' *European Journal of Political Research* 36, 175-205.

Smith, Gordon A. 2005: 'Hard and Soft Dominance: Assessing the Case of the Bavarian CSU,' paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Budapest, Hungary, September 8-11.
Solinger, D.J. 2001: 'Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico,' *Journal of Democracy* 12, 1, 30-42.
Ware, Alan 1996: *Political Parties and Party Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Warwick, Paul W. 1994: *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weaver, R. Kent/Rockman, Bert A. 1993: 'Assessing the Effects of Institutions,' in R. Kent Weaver/Bert A. Rockman (eds.), *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

In addition, various national government and parliamentary websites were used to collect electoral and other data used for this study, as well as

http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/home.htm
http://www.parties-and-elections.de/index.html
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Electionworld/Electionworld