

**“The Power and Effect(iveness) of ‘Projecting Canadian Values’  
in Foreign Policy: The Case of Afghanistan”**

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**INTRODUCTION**

*Countries with stable government, predictable methods of changing laws, secure property rights, and a strong judiciary saw higher investment and growth than countries lacking these institution.*  
-- World Bank, *World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World*, 1997: 23.

*Our principles and values – our culture – are rooted in a commitment to tolerance; to democracy, equity and human rights; to the peaceful resolution of disputes; to the opportunities and challenges of the marketplace; to social justice; to sustainable development; and to easing poverty. Canadians wish these values to be reflected and advanced internationally.*  
--Canada, *Canada in the World*, 1995: 8).

*Foreign policy should reflect the Canadian values of ‘peace, order, and good government’, dynamism, multiculturalism, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.*  
--Canada, *International Policy Statement*, 2005: 4.

Over the past decade, it has become intellectually fashionable in International Relations theory and foreign policy to discuss western Liberal democracies’ efforts to project or promote their neo/Liberal values to the “Global South.”<sup>1</sup> The projection of values (POV) project is characterized here as being global, highly optimistic, and ideationally powerful.<sup>2</sup> The quality of being global is gained by virtue of the POV project’s attainment of an all-encompassing consensus that spans from the states of the richer “Global North” (especially “the West”), to the developing countries and even the most desperately poor and encumbered failed and fragile states (FFS), such as Afghanistan. High optimism about the viability of disseminating neo/Liberal values and institutions is associated with the expectation of an impending New

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<sup>1</sup> Values is the preferred term in “values-based” foreign policy, such as that of Canada. In development thinking the same “values” of democracy, rule of law, market economy are termed “institutions.” Here, values will be used as an umbrella term referring to institutions, beliefs, ideologies or cultures as systems of ideas, worldviews, and the like. Specifically, Liberal values refer to those emphasizing individual freedoms gained through a participatory democracy. Neoliberal market values emphasize state minimalism in economic activity, which is the goal “good governance” institutional constraints such as an impersonal rule of law, deregulation, liberalization, and privatization, society’s democratic participation in policy-making.

<sup>2</sup> The term “project” is employed with reference development and governance scholar Anthony Payne’s (2005: 56) view that scholarly analyses and attendant development policy efforts to pressure all countries of the world to conduct domestic “good governance” institutional reforms represents none other than an “ideological project” whose purpose it is “not to analyze the world, but rather to change it.”

Neo/Liberal World Order that bestows prosperity, stability, and security on all its inhabitants, if only they become mirror images of the “successful” western Liberal democracies and neoliberal economies.

Finally, the POV project is ideationally powerful. Power in Political Science generally refers to the ability of actors or ideas to alter other actors’ behaviour, in word or deed. In this essay, this feature of ideational— ideological, rhetorical, discursive, normative – power of the POV project is vital, but it appears to be insufficiently understood in the prevailing literature on the projection of values. This literature is found primarily in international development policy and in the foreign policies of major western countries such as Canada. Missing in today’s discussions of the POV project is the fact that its ideational power engenders *external effect* on its targets in the Global South, but not *effectiveness*. That is, a breach exists between the external effect, referring primarily to rhetorical agreement of the Global South with the need to disseminate neo/Liberal values (and institutions) worldwide, on the one hand, and the effectiveness as measured by actual implementation of these values and the attainment of the promised outcomes of economic growth, political stability and security, on the other hand. The analytic conceit of assessing the “effect” and “effectiveness” of the global POV project is employed throughout the essay. Both concepts are under-explored in the literature.

### **Argument and Objectives**

The starting assumption of the essay is that the projection of values (POV) project is a global transformational project that aims to construct a New Neo/Liberal World Order enjoys a pervasive and persuasive consensus. Nothing new or surprising arises from this background assumption. Most would agree that a transformational project is afoot to fundamentally reform the values (and institutions) of the developing countries and failed and fragile states in the Global South. And, most would agree that this transformation is a good thing for both the western purveyors of the values and the developing country “targets” because of the promised gains in economic growth, political stability and security in the world order.

Opposition to these optimistic views exists, of course, but this disagreement with the POV project is relatively rare, muted, fragmented and on the whole does little to dent the robustness of the consensus surrounding the POV. Weakness in available critical evaluation or challenges to the POV efforts is the crux of the problem in current thinking. I advance the argument that the scholarly opposition to the POV project misses the mark for two main reasons. Principally, existing challenges to the POV project are empirically weak, and they completely misapprehend the nature of the ideational power driving the ideational POV project. Simply put, the POV transformation project is accepted as an idea – an emergent norm, discursive frame, rhetoric, optimistic hope for a better future. And this idea obviously exerts “external effect” on the non-western “Others” in the Global South who are persuaded or coerced into agreement on the need to domestically transplant neo/Liberal “good governance” values. But, none of this is to say that this external effect is anything more than ideational, or rhetorical. If the response to the POV is predominantly rhetorical, and not actuated in practice, then this would have resounding implications for how we conceive of the seemingly powerful and ineluctable POV process and plans. As it stands current scholarship simply does not tell us much about the nature or depth of the *external effect* of the massive values-promotion pressures on the Global South. Even less is said about the *effectiveness* of the POV project.

Given the extraordinary robustness of the optimistic consensus over global POV project, and the concomitant weakness of critical evaluations, the main purpose of the essay is to urge redirection of current thinking about the nature of the ideationally powerful values-promotion and -transformation project. Only more critical research can determine if the dissemination of neo/Liberal values to the Global

South is more persuasive as an idea than as a reality. As a starting point, the essay suggests ideas for an alternate empirical focus, and possibly an analytic framework. Focusing on two dimensions of the POV project—external effect and effectiveness – provides the beginnings of a missing analytic focus. Investigating the *external effect* of the POV project requires empirically assessing the extent to which the promotion of neo/Liberal values alters the behaviours (in word and action) of its targets in the Global South. While *effectiveness* of the values-projection requires moving beyond rhetorical compliance to measure by real-world outcomes, such as the level of actual implementation of these exported values by the South and the degree to which the West’s promises of prosperity, stability and security are attained.

### **Projection of Values and Canadian Foreign Policy**

This exploratory essay on the external effect and effectiveness of the global POV project looks for insights in two divergent literatures, international development and Canadian foreign policy (CFP). In its inaugural embrace of a values-oriented foreign policy, Canada’s 1995 foreign policy review, entitled *Canada in the World*, stated that international development assistance “...is one of the clearest expressions of Canadian values and culture—of Canadians’ desire to help the less fortunate and of their strong sense of social justice – and an effective means of sharing these values with the rest of the world” (Canada, 1995: 40).

Perhaps most interesting and important about the discussions of Canada’s own POV variant is that they are much more skeptical and critical than one normally finds. Criticisms commonly levied against Canada’s decade-old POV project (and the Canadians who support it) hold that it is “flawed”, “arrogant” or “smug”, “hypocritical.”<sup>3</sup>

This critical approach is taken as a positive. Following from the argument that the current orthodoxy and pervasive consensus about the viability of exporting neo/Liberal values abroad and pressuring the South’s reformation, criticisms are hard come by. Praise of the critically assessment of Canada’s POV efforts, however, rests on one significant qualification. The criticisms directed at the Canadian values-promulgation endeavour are nearly exclusively focused on *domestic effects*. For instance, the most salient concern of critics is that overly “smug” attitudes in projecting “virtuous” or “unique” “or imperialistic” Canadian values might do “significant damage to the effectiveness of [Canadian] diplomacy both next door and overseas...” (Stairs 2003: 239). The consequence of the concentration on domestic concerns is that it is not overly helpful in instigating a new research agenda that seriously contemplates, and critically evaluates, the *external effect* of the POV efforts on its intended “targets” in the Global South. The domestic focus in CFP provides another example of how the external effect is under-explored. In fact, the criticisms directed at Canadian POV variant can be said to implicitly *dismiss* the need to investigate external effect. Such an inference can be made by the mere fact that little attention is paid in the relevant literature to any possibility of Canada’s POV having external effect on its targets. Moreover, accusations of “hypocrisy” (e.g. of illiberal Liberalism involved in spreading Liberal values of tolerance) or values approach “myths” (e.g. projecting values abroad with (according to the authors) insufficient funding) (un)intentionally foreclose the need to study external effect.

While not overtly denying the factual or subjective validity of these claims against the “flawed” Canadian POV project, I would suggest a few prominent shortcomings that give unfairly short shift to the possibility that this project has external effects meriting scholarly attention. First, it might be worth considering whether the domestic concerns, say about the “smug” attitudes associated with projecting

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<sup>3</sup> Most of the discussion herewith draws upon the articles by the following experts of Canadian Foreign Policy: Gotlieb (2002), Howell (2002), Ignatieff (2003, 2005), Lee (2002), Nossal (2003), Stairs (2003), Welsh (2005, 2006), as well as the past two governmental foreign policy reviews, *Canada in the World* (1995), and the *International Policy Statement* (2005).

values abroad, influence the views of the developing country state targets of the values exportation. I suspect very little influence is effectuated, particularly when the global context of western values dissemination is appreciated. Second, the potential for external effect of Canada's values-promulgation project cannot be fairly assessed unless it is considered within the broader, real-world global context in which it exists and has evolved. Prevailing tendency in CFP is to consider the country's values dissemination in isolation. The opportunity is missed, therefore, not only to better grasp the possible external effects when Canada's contribution to the global POV transformation endeavour, but also to understand the determinants of the country's values approach to foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> In short, a complete picture of the viability of Canada's POV efforts cannot be properly provided without consideration of the planetary POV, and the robust global consensus it continues to enjoy. It should also be noted that the debates over the "uniqueness" or "superiority" of supposedly "Canadian" values of democracy, rule of law, market economy and the like become moot when it is recognized that these same values are projected by all major western powers and their development agencies.

Third, in spite of the praiseworthy, and unfortunately rare, set of criticisms directed at the POV transformation project, it will be shown that these challenges to the Canadian and the general POV efforts have two major problems. These criticisms are empirically weak and they misapprehend the genuine nature of the POV as an *ideational or rhetorical project*. Ideationally, the global consensus that pervades the POV is buoyed by a global consensus in which optimistic agreement obtains from actors in both the Global North and Global South. Rhetorically, the it can be shown that the deeper essence of the globe-spanning agreement currently legitimating the POV project is rhetorical more than real because, for instance, of low levels of actual implementation of the neo/Liberal values in the target countries. Given this ideational and rhetorical power, therefore, the current strategy of critics to point out various rhetoric-reality gaps, such as the "hypocrisy" of to claiming to save the world through values but then not send peace-enforcers to Darfur, end up gaining very little purchase, and certainly have done very little damage to the vast global consensus sustaining the POV transformation project.

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## **PART I. THE 'EFFECT' OF THE GLOBAL VALUES PROJECT**

This section advances the argument that insufficient scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of the *external effect* wrought by the projection of values (POV) project on its principal targets, the developing countries and failed and fragile (FFS) states of the so-called Global South. In defense of this position, at this early stage I merely illuminate the existence and identify the supportive elements of a pervasive, globe-spanning and theory-crossing consensus over the decade-old POV project. *Prima facie*, the breadth and robust nature of this consensus evidence the need to commit more academic efforts into exploring and critically evaluating the POV venture. A place to start is to direct scholarly efforts at better understanding the external effect of this POV on the behaviour of its intended "targets" or "partners" (in current development thinking) in the South. Critical evaluation must go beyond the observation that the South is an active participant in the legitimating discourses of the hegemonic POV project, particularly if rhetoric alone sustains the consensus.

Organizationally, the discussion of the prevailing global consensus bolstering the POV project proceeds by delineating the main elements of this consensus. These elements respond the following four core questions: What is the nature of the global projection of values project and how did it evolve? Who are its

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, it is unlikely coincidental that the emergence in the post-Cold War era of the neo/Liberal values promotion project headed up by the World Bank occurred at the same time as Canada's first foray into a values-oriented foreign policy in 1995.

participants? What are its underlying – and essentially unchecked—assumptions? And, finally, What explains the dearth of dissent and disagreement over the POV?

### **Nature and Evolution of the Global POV Project**

The dawn of the post-Cold War period in the early 1990s inspired, in part, the emergence of a new international development model, called here the neoliberal Good Governance (NLGG) model.<sup>5</sup> Under this model, western donor governments and their bilateral and multilateral development agencies collectively exhort the states of the Global South -- developing countries of all income levels, transitional market economies, and failed and fragile states (FFS) – to install neoliberal “good governance” values. *Governance* is the fundamental term of the NLGG development model, and despite its ambiguity and multiple meanings there is a very commonly accepted trinity of NLGG institutions (or “values” as the preferred term in foreign policy).<sup>6</sup> These are:

- (i) A democratic regime: that ensures, at a minimum, the participation of civil society in economic policy making and allows citizen choice in competitive multi-party elections.
- (ii) A legal system: that implements and enforces capitalist economic laws (e.g. property rights, contract, company, bankruptcy, competition), mediated by a politically independent judiciary, and supporting a rule of law that is equally applicable to all actors, including the state itself;
- (iii) A market economy: that is based on laws and policies implemented and enforced by a streamlined public administration, a competent legal system, and a democratic polity.<sup>7</sup>

Since the mid-to late-1990s the NLGG development model has remain ensconced as the orthodoxy in development policy, in which the World Bank is the predominant leader and from which western donor governments take their cues. The overarching aim of the NLGG model is to constitute a New NeoLiberal World Order where all countries of the South are remade in the image of today’s western liberal democracies and neoliberal market economies. Notably, the sheer influence, pervasiveness and ideational persuasiveness of this model suggests that national values-based foreign policies cannot be fully examined outside of this global values-promotion context. Although this remains the case for studies of Canada’s version of the POV. The similarity between the global and the Canadian values-promotion projects can be noted by comparison of the NLGG development models publications by, say, the World Bank, and the past two Canadian foreign policy reviews (Malone 2001). (See epigraphs.)

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<sup>5</sup> The model is alternatively called the “Washington-Plus”, the post-Washington Consensus, and the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank (2001).

<sup>6</sup> Conceptual ambiguity of the concept of “governance” only adds to the ideational power of the NLGG model. For one, ambiguity allows the dominant development agencies – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)— to advocate for and place political conditions on the South’s political system reforms, against these agencies’ mandates to remain apolitical.

<sup>7</sup> Since 1996, as the World Bank, as the dominant leader in the currently orthodox Neoliberal Good Governance development model, has disaggregated these pillar institutions into six clusters of variables in order to collect and publish (now) 213 countries’ annual progress in “good governance” reforms. The six clusters of good governance variables found in the World Banks’ *Governance Matters* publications are: (1) Voice and Accountability; (2) Political Stability; (3) Government Effectiveness; (4) Regulatory Quality ; (5) Rule of Law ; (6) Control of Corruption. Estimates for the governance indicators are averages of various experts’ subjective opinions and range from a low of (-)2.5 to a high of (+)2.5. Indicators for the years 1996-2007 can be found online at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/appendix.htm>.

In the immediate post-Cold War years, the exultant hopes for “the Liberal Ideal” and the “end of history” (Fukayama 1992) along with buoyant feelings of neo/Liberal triumphalism encompassed not only western powers’ development policy, but also their security policy and diplomacy. In this way, projecting worldwide the values of democracy, rule of law, human rights, tolerance, good governance, and so on, moved from being elements of a development policy to become initially *securitized* and protected by military means if necessary. Gelb and Rosenthal (2003) discuss the emergence of a “New Morality” in international affairs that is associated with emergent global norms or concepts of humanitarian intervention, human security, and the responsibility to protect.<sup>8</sup> To these authors, “[t]he crucial point about humanitarian interventions is that they were not just about changing regimes but about changing the value systems governing the nations concerned. The banner was not actually “regime change”; it was “values change”” (Gelb and Rosenthal 2003:)

While the NLGG development model has remained a dominant dimension in the global POV project in the post-Cold War years, another seismic event in International Relations transpired in September 11, 2001, created a divergent approach to the West’s values-dissemination project. In a word, this divergent track concerns the full-scale *securitization* of the POV project. Securitization of the POV represents a paradigmatic shift that occurred in the wake of the terrorists attacks in the United States, and in light of subsequent terrorist outrages in other cities (e.g. London, Madrid, Bali, Mumbai), and by dint of continued efforts to root out terrorists and “extremists” in FFS such as Afghanistan in the so-called War on Terrorism. The security-focused framing of the POV project is not completely divorced from the original development framing associated with the previously described NLGG development model. But, securitization has shifted the focus of western efforts, for better or for worse, toward projecting values onto the most dire FFS for the sake of eliminating the newly perceived security threats to the West and to its values.

Projecting values to the Global South is now framed by some western leaders not as a development exercise but as a “battle of values” or a “battle over hearts and minds” (e.g. Blair 2007), or more (in)famously, as a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993). For instance, in various speeches and articles, former United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair explicitly linked the values promotion to security of the West and the world order. Blair’s final words in his July 2003 speech to the US Congress, averred that, in the War on Terrorism, “[o]ur ultimate weapon is not our guns, but our beliefs.” In a recent article Blair (2007) opined:

That is why I say this struggle [in Afghanistan and Iraq] is one about values. Our values are our guide. They represent humanity's progress throughout the ages. At each point we have had to fight for them and defend them. As a new age beckons, it is time to fight for them again.”

It is also generally well-known that the “centerpiece of the Bush administration's Liberal foreign policy was the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the construction of a democratic, multi-religious state in Iraq, which was to serve as the first step in the larger regional transformation of the Middle East (e.g. Desch 2007; Monten 2005).

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<sup>8</sup> Along with new morals or values imbuing the decision-makers’ approach to international relations were new institutions, such as the United Nations’ mandated war crimes tribunals to prosecute those who committed atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ratification of the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statue inaugurating the International Criminal Court. Some forty humanitarian interventions were conducted by UN- or NATO-led peace-enforcement forces in the 1990s and 2000s.

The global values transformation project, in either its NLGG development model or its securitized “battle of values” dimensions, has maintained its ascendance as an emergent global norm (i.e. requiring state behaviour) or as a Gramscian ideological hegemony in the world order for over a decade. Developing countries, and now FFS who have risen in the West’s sights in line with the War on Terrorism and transborder security threats, are all expected to conform to the global pillar values of democracy, rule of law and market economy, as well as abiding by an array of other good governance such as human rights, individual freedoms, tolerance, and peace. Acceptance of this “New Morality” (Gelb and Rosenthal 2003) in international relations on the part of the actors within the South and the North is enhanced by the core, underlying assumptions of the POV transformation project.

### **Underlying Assumptions**

The power of the POV project’s hegemonic appeal is supported by a set of three main assumptions:

1. the universality of good governance values
2. the facility of transplanting these values to the Global South, including the FFS
3. the virtue of goodness of the nature and outcomes of “good governance” values

Taken together, these three premises indicate that the POV project represents a completely benign approach to creating a better, more prosperous, stable and secure world order. While space precludes a more thorough discussion of these assumptions, it is important to note that there are very few challenges to these assumptions in either policy or theory. Criticisms do exist, of course, and they are discussed in a later section. But, these criticisms have done little to impugn the POV project or to dampen the strong consensus that supports it. This point can be confirmed in each assumption. First, challenges to the universal character of the good governance values of democracy, rule of law, are typically ascribed to the “enemies” of these universal values, while the “myth” of western neo-imperialist efforts to force democracy on places like Afghanistan is destroyed by the vast numbers of Afghani voters in presidential and parliamentary elections in that country (Blair 2007). In response to criticisms about assisting in Iraq’s democratization, US President Bush rebuffed critics by recalling similarly misinformed criticisms were directed earlier at Japan and Germany, and that “[t]he nation of Iraq—with its proud heritage, abundant resources, and skilled and educated people—is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom.”<sup>9</sup>

Second, the presumed falsity of installing the NLGG values wholesale and with haste has not been overtly challenged. Data from the World Bank’s own Governance Matters indicators show that implementation is far from easy and far from fast, but this real-world issue has not emerged, as far as I can see, as a potential criticism against the POV project. Instead, all developing countries are expected to be able to install and enforce the NLGG values, including the desperate and poverty- and conflict-ridden FFS. Where difficulties emerge in this values transplantation process, scholars and development policy makers consider this a problem of the FFS’s political will or state capacity (Patrick 2006; Eizenstat et al., 2005). It should be noted that in the NLGG development paradigm state *capacity* is virtually synonymous with “good governance.” That is, a FFS is presumed to possess state capacity to the extent that it successfully installs the good governance values, or overcomes its “governance gaps” (i.e. in the provision of human rights, basic services, and security) (Eizenstat et al., 2005). No one seems ready to point out the tautological flaw of this premise, nor to make the obvious point that the FFS do not possess the requisite prior state capacity to institute the complex NLGG values. One possible explanation for this, and many

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<sup>9</sup> Office of the Press Secretary (OPS). "President Discusses the Future of Iraq," Remarks by the president at the Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., February 26, 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030226-11.html>.]



other, begged question about the utility of the POV transformation project is this: The sheer ideational power driving the POV project and the sheer normative “goodness” of the NLGG values being projected simply defy criticisms or the desire to challenge the project on its face.

The third core assumption undergirding the global POV project speaks directly to the supposed goodness and, thus, unchecked normative power of purveyors of the NLGG values and their projection to the South. Meanings of “good” might vary, from the virtuous essence of the values of democracy, law, market-oriented growth, human rights, reduced corruption, and so on, to the good, beneficial outcomes promised to states that install these values. In the NLGG development policy literature, the implementation of the NLGG values produces the outcomes of growth, political stability and, security. This kind of virtue of the nature and outcomes of the NLGG values prompted development scholars Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2005: 201) to ask about these values: “Who could disagree?” Their question addresses the unspoken secret about the POV project’s efforts to dissemination worldwide the NLGG values: its unimpeachable normative power. This is but one component of the ideational power underwriting the POV project and the vast consensus—amongst states, non-state actors, scholars and policy makers -- that it sustains. There is a growing disagreement with the NLGG when it comes to the FFS and the increasing tendency of the West to distribute development assistance for security reasons, that is, security of the West. Problematically, although an emerging trend is to devote aid resources and policy efforts to counter-terrorism in the South, there is little evidence to support the link between anti-terror activities and development.<sup>10</sup>

### **Participants of the Global POV**

Participants of the global POV project comprise states and government leaders in both the so-called Global North and Global South overtly agree with the notion that the neo/Liberal good governance (NLGG) values recently (as opposed to historically) associated with the richer nation-states in the West should be promulgated and transplanted worldwide. Global North’s participants include all those involved in the international development community, including western donors, multilateral, regional and bilateral development agencies that range from the World Bank to Canada’s CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), as well as an increasing array of non-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and for-profit private companies such as law firms that train lawyers and judges, business consultancies that draft economic policies, or companies that provide “technical assistance”(advice).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> For a sample of the NGO concerns about the rising trend of western donors to pursue national security through aid, see, Audrey, Gaughran, “Shifting Goalposts: Aid and Terrorism”, British Overseas Network on Development (BOND). Available at [www.bond.org.uk](http://www.bond.org.uk). For the OECD DAC’s position on the need to use aid for counter terrorism, see, the April 2003 policy paper entitled, “A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action.” Available online at [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org). Counter-terrorism efforts are currently being established in the national aid programmes of major western donors (e.g. US, UK, EU, Denmark) and Japan.

<sup>11</sup> The organizations supporting the Good Governance “values” or institutions and their key publications are as follows: For the World Bank, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3106, online at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=405841>. For the International Monetary Fund, see “World Economy Outlook: Growth and Institutions”, in *World Economic and Financial Surveys*, (April 2003), especially, Chapter III, pp. 95-128, online at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2000/02/>. For the UNDP's "democratic governance" agenda, see online at <http://www.undp.org/governance/>, as well as the UNDP (1997) policy document entitled “Governance for Sustainable Human Development, online at: <http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm>; For the OECD DAC’s Governance and Capacity Development Department, see online at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance>, and for the OECD generally, see Wolfgang Michalski, Riel Miller and Barrie Stevens, 2001, *Governance in the 21st Century*:



Beyond the members of the international development community, the Western front in the values-promotion and (more recently) protection also includes the values-oriented foreign policies of the powerful western nation-states including most prominently in the literature, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. These three are principals in the NLGG-based approach to the post-conflict reconstruction efforts underway in Afghanistan, one of the key planks in each one's failed and fragile state (FFS) initiatives.<sup>12</sup>

Leaders of the Global South are also fundamental contributors to the consensus surrounding the POV project. Clues about the pervasiveness of the acceptance of the need for NLGG values reformation can be found with reference to specific countries. In China, leaders of this authoritarian self-claimed "socialist market economy" have openly supported the need for democracy, rule of law, and marketized economy.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, government officials in socialist Vietnam claim to be making efforts to improve their governance institutions in exchange for development assistance, and entry to the World Trade Organization (Peerenboon 2004: 450). Interesting about the inclusion of China in the global consensus over the POV project is twofold. First, the country's political, economic and legal cultures are so divergent from those found in Western Liberal democracies. Second, as a powerful, emerging high-growth economy China is the top destination for private capital flows, and with over a trillion US dollars in reserves, the country cannot be said to be dependent on western aid.

On the other end of the economic development spectrum, one finds that failed and fragile states (FSS) such as Afghanistan, are equal partakers in the NLGG ideational hegemony. For instance, Canada's development commitment to Afghanistan, which involves both military- and CIDA-led development efforts, is generally geared toward assisting the government to fulfill the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) in such issues as good governance and state-building. CIDA's operations in Afghanistan (roughly \$100-million per year) focus on the three NLGG pillar values of promoting democracy, expanding the rule of law, and enhancing private sector development. The case of Afghanistan is interesting not only because it suggests that the POV project is all-inclusive even to the poorest of the poor countries, but also because by the current standards of "aid effectiveness" the country would not be selected as an aid recipient. Nor would many of the other 50-odd FFS currently in existence. Launched by the World Bank in 1998, the aid effectiveness approach argues that aid is most effective in, and therefore should be selectively allocated to countries where a "good governance" type of policy environment exists. If not for the initial military intervention by the US and NATO troops, Canada and

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*Power in the Global Knowledge Economy and Society*. OECD, Paris. For the WTO see the "Joint WTO/OECD Report on Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building" (December 2004). Regional development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank, or the Asian Development Bank support the NLGG development model, as do western bilateral agencies such as the United Kingdom Department for International Development, stating that "Our new approach [to development] will cover a number of strands—democratic accountability, fundamental freedoms, corruption, service delivery for all, due process rights and security," and the US Agency for International Development (2003) asserting the "process of governing is most legitimate when it is infused with democratic principles such as transparency, pluralism, citizen involvement in decision-making, representation, and accountability" (cited in Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2005): p. 200-01).

<sup>12</sup> Discussing the universal goals of democracy, rule of law, human rights, among others, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair said in a July 2003 speech to the US Congress: "Our most potent weapon is the manifest goodness of freedom, the concept of government that guarantees individual liberty has defeated despots time and again—history is now" And, "Our ultimate weapon is not our guns, but our beliefs." Also, spreading democracy and tolerant multi-religious state to Iraq is well-know to be the centerpiece of the US President Bush administration's Liberal foreign policy agenda.

<sup>13</sup> China legal scholar Randall Peerenboon (2004: 450) avers that Chinese leaders increasingly believe that the legal reforms and a strengthened rule of law are necessary for economic development.

CIDA would not likely have pre-selected Afghanistan as one of the 25 “strategically” chosen to be “development partners.”<sup>14</sup>

Instead, Canada has promised Afghanistan a total of \$1 billion in development assistance for 2001-11.

Shoring up the consensus over the POV in the post-Cold War years is the increasing coherency and agreement between former adversaries in Liberal (Internationalist) and Realist camps (e.g. Gelb and Rosenthal 2003). This agreement is evident in both the theory and policy of international relations. In International Relations theory Realists are now promoters of values and the New Morality of humanitarian interventions (Ibid). In policy and domestic government the values-promotion element of foreign policy has attained a non-partisan status. For instance, in Canada, the call for values-promotion “pillar” in foreign policy articulated in the two most recent foreign policy review documents (1995, 2005) by the Liberal Party has been completely endorsed by the later Conservative Party. Likewise, in the US the Republicans (or “neo-conservatives”) under the administration of President Bush (2000-2008) have not diverged from, but rather expanded—through empire – the earlier Democratic notions of “engagement” in the recent vigorous efforts to promote the spread of democracy, rule of law, and market economy in the Middle East and elsewhere.<sup>15</sup>

### **Dearth of Dissent and Disagreement Over the Global POV**

A final element of the global POV consensus is that its strength is shored up to a large degree by a rather meagre level of disagreement. This is not to say that there is no theoretical or real-world opposition to the efforts by foreign policies and international development policy to promulgate neo/Liberal values the world over. Rather, the sum total of these efforts are insufficiently influential to put much of a dent in the formidable consensus, or to proffer a coherent ideational alternative. This is the case for both activist dissent and scholarly disagreement. In the realm of activism, for instance, one finds high-profile but merely symbolic defections from the POV such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s lending of tens of millions of dollars to developing countries on the basis of solidarity and socialist values as a form of opposition to Anglo-American free-market capitalism.<sup>16</sup>

Similarly, no revolutionary potential is provided by anti-capitalist, anti-west global civil society activists (Webb 2006), which could take the form of a Polanyian-styled “counter-movement” or a Gramscian-styled “counter-hegemony.” What helps the consensus side of the POV project in the post-911 years, for better or worse, is the discursive framing of opponents to the West’s values as intolerant “enemies” or violent “extremists” who are engaging in a to-the-death “battle over values.”<sup>17</sup> Discursive strategies such

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<sup>14</sup> The International Policy Statement (2005: 23) states: "By refocusing our development strategy and moving away from an extremely broad but often thinly spread presence, Canada will strive to make a greater difference in fewer places."

<sup>15</sup> This neo-Wilsonianism discourse by the Republicans is far removed from the disdain directed at similar democracy and human rights talk associated with the Carter and Clinton administration, according to Deush (2007).

<sup>16</sup> Since 2004, the Chavez government has used its massive oil reserves and earnings to assist aid-dependent developing countries through loans, trade and investment agreement (18 signed in 2007 alone) and debt cancellation. , aluminum plants, and others. Latin America, Iran, China and the UK have been recipients.

<sup>17</sup> US President Bush has expressed that the United States's enemies "want to destroy what we stand for and how we live." Office of the Press Secretary, "President Discusses War on Terror at Naval Academy Commencement," Annapolis, Maryland, May 27, 2005. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050527.html>.

While, Tony Blair (2007) states: “We will not win the battle against global extremism unless we win it at the level of values as much as that of force. We can win only by showing that our values are stronger, better, and more just than the alternative.”

as this serve to narrow the potential for opposition and healthy discussion by delegitimizing the “grey areas” between white and black, or us and them.<sup>18</sup>

In theory and scholarship, there is little poignant disagreement with the POV project.<sup>19</sup> This reality is a function of the previously mentioned reconciliation of views between the Liberals and the Realists who were formerly highly skeptical of “epiphenomenal” (secondary) values and morality providing inadequate explanations of state actions. Desch (2007) suggests that the Realists’ awakening to the new values agenda in US foreign policy has resulted in a problematic decline in skepticism that has opened the way to Liberal excesses, such as those manifested in imperialism internationally, and the retreat of civil liberties domestically. It would appear that Canadian foreign policy experts retain a healthy skepticism (not unrelated to desiring a unique “Canadian” approach to foreign policy) about the values approach, and lament that “by focusing on the importance of *values* in Canadian foreign policy, the government in Ottawa encourages Canadians to ignore the importance of *interests* in the making of foreign policy (Nossal 2003: 13; See also Stairs 2003: 247).<sup>20</sup>

All this said, there is no blanket amnesty for the POV project. Criticism does exist. But the accusations directed at the POV project, either its global or national forms, have proved unable to shake the consensual and ideational foundation of the values-transformation efforts. More specifically, I perceive that the totality of criticisms against the POV are problematic due to their unconvincing form of illuminating certain contradictions—hypocrisies, inconsistencies, myths, or paradoxes (hereafter contradictions)-- inherent to the values approach. Two problems arise with this strategy. First, this enumeration of these forms of contradictions is empirically weak, and secondly, skeptics completely misapprehend the nature and source of the *ideational power* driving the orthodoxy of the values-dissemination enterprise. Ideational power refers to the ideas ranging from normative, discursive rhetorical beliefs, positions, discussions surrounding the POV project

### *Empirical Weaknesses*

Empirical weakness is the first main shortcoming associated with the current criticisms levied against the POV, both its global and Canadian foreign policy variant. At issue is the skeptics’ common practice of raising a single or select few cases of inaction or non-compliance to a value in a failed effort to impugn the POV project, and one might say even to disconfirm the POV and its potential for external effects worthy of study in the case of CFP. Single or even multiple cases of inaction, or of “failed” action in the

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<sup>18</sup> Former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s (2007) comments are exemplary: “This is not a clash between civilizations; it is a clash about civilization. It is the age-old battle between progress and reaction, between those who embrace the modern world and those who reject its existence--between optimism and hope, on the one hand, and pessimism and fear, on the other.”

<sup>19</sup> An exception in scholarship here would be the post-development thinkers, but they are not discussed here for two reasons. First, the post-development thinking remains outside the mainstream by dint of its rejection of the “development” project, which they have by no means succeeded in derailing. Secondly, they suffer from the same empirical weakness that will be noted here, namely, the lack of evidence that the South’s states and citizens are allied with post-development’s anti-west, anti-modernity, anti-technology approach to anti-development.

<sup>20</sup> On this issue, the past realization that states frequently must make trade-offs between their interests and their values (Huntington 1981: 258), has altered under the securitization of values-promotion in the War on Terrorism and the current focus on failed and fragile states as security threats. An exemplary comments comes from Tony Blair (2007: pp) who asserts that: “In my nine years as prime minister.. I have simply become more persuaded that the distinction between a foreign policy driven by values and one driven by interests is wrong. Globalization begets interdependence, and interdependence begets the necessity of a common value system to make it work. Idealism thus becomes realpolitik.”

promotion of values are not only grounded on subjective opinions of the experts (--What is a “failure”?--) but more importantly they disconfirm nothing by ordinary evidentiary standards of Social Science.

A few examples are helpful. First, critics of Canada’s values-oriented foreign policy all seem to rely on a single case of the country’s breach of international law-- a 1995 illegal boarding of a Spanish fishing trawler, the *Estai*, off Canadian waters ordered by the Canadian government— as evidence of two things. It appears that the lessons drawn are that Canadians can lay no claim to abiding their rule-of-law values, and/or that strategic interests can trump the supposed values at the government’s pleasure (e.g. Nossal 2003: 11; Stairs 2003 ; Gottlieb 2004). This single, dated, and oft-cited example (are there no others?) is representative of the type of contradiction, or hypocrisy, within the values approach showing a gap between the rhetoric and reality (for rationalists), or between the discourse and practice (for reflectivists). Presumably, the intention in drawing on this example of a Canadian breach of law is to deflate excessive Canadian pride in their values, and to dismiss the values approach as flawed. This former issue, is of no interest here due to its domestic focus, although the concern with Canadian arrogance is strange one. (Maybe it is itself a Canadian value?).

The notion of dismissing the values approach is highly unpersuasive for the methodological reason that a single case disconfirms nothing. And, if breaching international law were a precondition to dampening the values approach, then the United States would be the go-to example. As it stands, the Bush administration’s strong, unflinching emphasis on projecting the values of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and so on, has coincided with many recent violations of international law, suggesting that the values approach is open to contradictions of this sort.<sup>21</sup> There is a further conceptual reality that law is continuously contested, reconstructed, and open to interpretation, therefore, any violations of it might reinforce the law just as much as they might indicate change. The same conceptual point applies to “values,” which are notoriously ambiguous concepts.

Skeptics of the global and Canadian POV also employ the strategy of illuminating several, and not just single, cases of failed actions or inaction in an effort to impeach the value or the processes of values exportation. Frequently, failures on the part of western governments or the United Nations to conduct of humanitarian interventions in, most infamously, Rwanda in 1994, Darfur since 2003, are raised as contradictions to a purported New Morality (Gelb and Rosenthal 2003) and general hypocrisy or hollow commitment in demonstrating the value of altruism and human rights protection. Similar types of contradictions are used to suggest that values of tolerance and peace are “obscured” in cases where Canadian peacekeepers run amok (e.g. Howell 2002), or where the western powers claim to be committed to the value humanitarian assistance while “we let 30,000 children a day die when those deaths could be prevented?” (Blair 2007). While all these and many examples of contradictions and of failed commitments should be-- must be—constantly be raised by scholars to remind citizens and leaders of the international community (and not just Canada) of their hollow commitments and “addiction” to “ear candy”(Nossal 2005), these claims suffer methodologically.

First of all, the POV project in its various modes -- development, security in the War on Terrorism, humanitarian intervention and post-conflict reconstruction – possess the ideational and consensual power that has not been scathed by these counter-examples. In fact, the inherent ambiguity and complexity of the values approach could be said to be intrinsically endowed with the ability to absorb these contradictions with ease. Several cases of inaction or failed actions do no more to challenge the strength

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<sup>21</sup> A short list of violations would include: A short list of examples of international law violations would include: questionably legal interventions in Iraq, conducting torture, covert renditions, and illegal incarceration of “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay, not signing onto the International Criminal Court, Landmines Treaty, and Kyoto Protocol.

of the POV project's transformational influence than does a single case. Second, from a methodological standpoint these criticisms are overtly subjective, which does little to bolster their persuasiveness. One wonders why, for instance, the few cases where peace-enforcers were not sent on humanitarian interventions are able to dismiss values or "disrupt" values discourses (Howell 2002) when the 40-odd successful humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War period-- including for Canada, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Zaire -- are ignored and are not, therefore, used to *bolster* the validity of the values approach. It would seem that a quantitative measure of the number of launched and stymied humanitarian missions would be more objective, and fair. This approach would certainly relieve the problem of cherry-picking examples to conform to pre-conceived normative or subjective views about the shortcomings of the values approach.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, of all the contradictions, hypocrisies, or paradoxes highlighted in the critical evaluations of the POV, in its Canadian or global versions, is the observation of the "illiberal Liberalism" inherent to the neo-imperialistic (viz. non-territorial) efforts to export values abroad. Paradoxes of "Illiberal Liberalism" or "Altruistic Imperialism" (Desch 2007) are the most potent of all contradictions observed so far. This is because beyond mention of a single or a few cases of inaction used to impugn values, the illiberal Liberalism paradox conveys how the West's purveyors of values are guilty of systematically violating them. To force Liberal values of democracy and tolerance on non-Liberal "Others" is anathema to being democratic and tolerant. This is a vital point, but the salience is lost in the elicitation of this paradox in Canadian foreign policy scholarship because it is applied to concerns over domestic effect, rather than to the study of external effects on the targets of said neo-imperialism. Domestic effects concern such issues as the harm to the Canadian identity or "Canadian way" of dealing with the world through "un-Canadian" and no longer "unique" (read: un-American) exportation of values.<sup>23</sup> Two points derive from this approach. First, this is an unfortunate, and surprising, missed opportunity to link the Canadian POV to its external effect. Second, I cannot bypass the chance to opine that nostalgia for Canada's truly "Liberal" and tolerant "live and let live" approach to foreign policy during the Cold War era, when development assistance enriched brutal dictators, kleptocrats, and human rights abusers, is misplaced. Although Canada's contribution today to the POV today via development policy or coercive humanitarian invasion might be construed as "un-Canadian" and illiberal, these qualities are, I think, a lesser evil.

The accounts of illiberal liberalism miss an opportunity to get beyond Canadian domestic effect to focus on more closely on discussion of external effect. Surely accusations of imperialism should also be studied with a view to assessing its effects on the targets in the South. No empirical examination of the external

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<sup>22</sup> Subjectivity and cherry-picking can be charges laid on a strategy that tries to indict Canadian values on the basis of telling biased and incomplete stories. For instance, to suggest, as does Howell (2002), that the torture and murder of a Somali teenager by a few rogue Canadian Force soldiers "obscures" in practice the discourses of virtuous values is an incomplete story without the follow-up factors, including disbanding of the regiment, a massive government-mandated inquiry, and nationally felt disgrace. Given the contestation involved in the continuous reconstruction of values, these follow-up event might have strengthened Liberal values rather than merely "obscure" or "disrupt" their articulation.

<sup>23</sup> Stairs (2003: 251) argues that the projection of values aboard "is actually very American, and it constitutes a significant abandonment of traditional Canadian diplomatic practice (at least in the period since World War II)." And Nossal (2003) similarly asserts that: "Among the many values the government in Ottawa claims to be championing abroad are the values of liberalism. But the government trumpets this without the hint of irony, ignoring the fact that presuming to tell others how to live their lives is deeply *illiberal* ... since it involves Western governments and international financial institutions telling others how they must... organize their communities... The irony, of course, is that Canadians themselves tend to despise such paternalistic and imperialistic practices when they observe [them] in others."

effect is provided. The closest approximation of concern for external effect comes from discursive analysis, which exposes how values-exportation discourses frame Canada (or the West) as modern, civilized, and guarders of “good” values in opposition to, say, the failed and fragile states and their citizens who lack these qualities and need to be taught them. As Howell (2002: 61) observe, “what is perhaps most remarkable about discourses of Canadian values is the rather obvious relation that they share with the inverse construction of what have been termed developing, failed or failing states.” Undeniably important though such discursive depictions are, the analysis part returns us immediately to the domestic effect, such as the arrogant, “feel-good” attitude Canadians fallaciously enjoy about their efforts to do something to assist the FFS (Howell 2002).

Extending the mere descriptions discursive framings to an explanation or analysis of actual, real-world effect on the FFS targets, would be useful. Included in this analysis should be a more in-depth interrogation of the POV project’s neo-imperialism and “mission civilizatrice”, particularly in light of the fact that the South’s “Others” are active participants in the POV and are, at least, rhetorical aspirants to the universal values of democracy, rule of law, human rights and the like. If the non-western, non-Liberal Other is playing a major part in the rhetorical game then there is something more to the POV than the post-modern view of West coercively impressing its “superior” Liberal values on the Rest. This requires serious academic attention. Globally, or externally, the paradox of illiberal liberalism might be conceptually correct, but it is unable to do damage to the vast and robust consensus that obtains with today’s POV transformation project. It might be that this paradox has been deliberated for hundreds of years since Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace” and now the current-day “democratic peace” has legitimated expanding the “zones of peace” in the world for the sake of the West’s, and the world’s security and survival. In the post-911 era of transborder security threats and fears, and the efforts to stamp them out as far away as Afghanistan, the paradox has lost its logic and rational edge.<sup>24</sup>

In summation, enumerating the various contradictions, hypocrisies, myths inherent to the projection of values project is an important, but ultimately myopic, analytic exercise. This exercise has not on the whole been able to challenge the legitimacy of the project or to curb the all-encompassing global consensus confirming the project’s stated utility to state participants in the Global North and Global South. The above discussion suggested that one reason for the weaknesses of the criticisms levied against the values approach involves the empirical limitations. These limitations, however, are only part of the reason why dissent against the POV has proved meagre. More significantly is the misapprehension of the ideational power that sustains the POV project.

#### *Misapprehension of the Ideational Power of the Global POV Project*

Most striking about the projection of values (POV), in both its post-Cold War development modality and its post-911 security modality, is the pervasive and persuasive consensus it enjoys. Vital to understanding this North-South-spanning consensus, and to challenging its legitimacy at some future time, is the recognition of the ideational power upon which it rests. Components of the POV’s ideational power to have “effect”— to alter the behaviour of the Global South – include the normative imputability of “good” values, and discursive framing in such a way that no aspect of international policy or even national foreign policy experts the orthodox paradigm of NLGG values reformation. A third all-important element of ideational power is rhetoric. Understanding the breadth of rhetoric is vital to understanding both what sustains the POV consensus, and also explains why illuminating contradictions – or rhetoric-reality gaps –

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<sup>24</sup> Desch (2007, fn44) lists some of the more recent scholarly discussions on the paradox of illiberal or imperialistic Liberalism, including more recently: Bhikhu Parekh, "Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism from Mills to Rawls," *Times Literary Supplement*, February 25, 1994, pp. 11–13; and David Glenn, "Liberalism: The Fuel of Empires?" *Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 2, 2005.

featured in the POV are unhelpful. In a word, a consensus founded on a rhetoric-reality gap is unlikely to be challenged by critics' efforts to point out rhetoric-reality gaps in the form of hypocrisies and myths.

The next section discusses the nature of the ideational and rhetorical sources of power of the POV project, while also introducing the concept of "effectiveness." The consensus over the viability of globally spreading the NLGG values is argued to be sustained and unchallenged because scholars and policy analysts have yet to expose the little known secret (?) that the POV transformation effort is essentially all rhetoric, little reality.

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## **PART II. THE 'EFFECTIVENESS' OF THE GLOBAL VALUES PROJECT**

Prevalence of the rhetorical power supporting the global projection of values (POV) leads to the second main concept of this essay, "effectiveness." I argue that effectiveness is under-explored by students interested in the values projection in development and foreign policy. Likewise, the discussion so far has fleshed out the idea that another proposed concept of "external effect" (i.e. behavioural changes) on the targets of the POV has also been insufficiently investigated. One reason for the not examining in-depth the effect and effectiveness is because much of the scholarly and policy attention is taken up by the robust ideational consensus about the viability and "goodness" of efforts to promulgate and transplant the neoliberal good governance (NLGG) values toward the construction of a wealth, stable and secure New NeoLiberal World Order.

To begin, consideration of the issue of effectiveness of the POV requires a preliminary operationalization. This could be, simply, a measure of the degree to which the participants of the POV – its purveyors and targets-- attained given outcomes. Thus, the effectiveness on the part of the western-led international development community would focus on determining to which extent the promised outcomes of the NLGG values reforms, namely, improvements in economic growth, political stability, and security, have been attained by the developing countries in the Global South over the past decade (or in given years). Effectiveness could also be measured another way, with a more directed focus on the targets of the POV, meaning the states in the Global South who are under constant coercive and persuasive pressures to transplant the NLGG values and institutions. For them, effectiveness could be measured in terms of the attainment of their promises to actually implement the NLGG values. While these two measures of effectiveness might appear obvious on their face, the current scholarship presents a different picture. As it has been noted in the essay so far, the overriding reality garnering the most attention in the POV project is a vast North-South spanning consensus. It was suggested above that the foremost critical challenge to the POV and its stalwart consensus is the set of contradictions and hypocrisies showing that values are not perfectly upheld absolutes. Weighted against this robust consensus these contradictions have proved unable to produce many fissures in the consensus.

As a possible way forward, I suggest here that the study of effectiveness provides the grounds for an improved way to critically assess the POV, and perhaps a more resolute challenge to its pervasive ideational power. Key to this critical analysis is the existence of two empirical realities, or empirical lacunae, that have not been adequately addressed. As intimated above, these are the imperceptible advances in the implementation of the NLGG values by the South, and the yet unfulfilled outcomes of increased growth, political stability and security for those countries that reform their values. These two lacunae are briefly discussed in what follows.

*Lacuna 1: Unattained Outcomes*



One striking feature that inheres in the global values-promotion consensus that has garnered very little scholarly and policy attention is the empirical reality that this decade-long consensus has been associated with no convincing improvements in the economic growth, political stability of the general population of the developing countries. Nor, for that matter, can the NLGG values reforms be significantly associated with the enhanced security of the 50-odd FFS, who have become core concerns of the West's own security situation in the post-911 War on Terrorism era (Patrick 2006).

To clarify, the leading proponent of the NLGG development model, the World Bank over the 1990s has consistently held that the pillar values of democracy, rule of law, market economy, are vital preconditions to economic growth, investment, stability and all manner of economic performance gains (See the epigraph at the top of the essay). State leaders and society members of the FFS are (tautologically) told that growth, stability and security are attainable if their "governance gaps" are filled (Eizenstat et. al., 2005). To me, the problematic gap is the one that exists between the rhetorical promises of growth and stability outcomes and the reality on the ground.

How is this gap possible? A study of effectiveness of the POV could look at the rhetorical strategy being used to support the POV project. One element of this strategy is that the promoters of the NLGG development model exhort the promises of future beneficial outcomes, and pay little attention to the here and real-world now. For instance, the World Bank relies heavily on a rhetorical strategy that defers to a plethora of statistical correlations that strenuously confirm the link between NLGG values and positive outcomes.<sup>25</sup>

Notably, so far few scholars have taken issue with these studies, which for the most part confirm the correlation between the installation of the NLGG values and positive economic growth and political stability outcomes. Of course, one can off-hand come up with many bases on which to challenge this impressive list of correlations, the most important of which is that a reverse causality is completely plausible. That is to say, it is just as likely that increased growth, stability and security are the preconditions for successful transplantation of NLGG values, and not the reverse position set forth by the World Bank (viz., that NLGG values are the preconditions for growth, stability and security). As yet, no real-world data confirm that growth and stability are conferred only to those developing countries that install the NLGG. Rather, quite the opposite. In one of the rare efforts to critically examine the NLGG development model, Mukand and Rodrik (2002) argue that the fastest-growing and most political stable

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<sup>25</sup> A short list of recent scholarly works linking enhanced economic performance with a range of "good governance" institutions is as follows. For a general review of evidence linking governance institutional reform with development indicators, see S.J. Burki and G.E. Perry (1998). *Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter*. Washington D.C.: World Bank, Latin American and Caribbean Studies, esp. Chapter 1. See Daniel Kaufmann, and Aart Kraay (2002). "Growth without Governance," *Economia*, 3(1): 169-229; Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, Francesco Trebbi (October 2002). "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development" online at: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik.academic.ksg/papers.html>; Aymo Brunetti, Gregory Kisunko, and Beatrice Weder (1997). "Institutional Obstacles to Doing Business: Region-by-Region Results from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1759*, Alberto Chong and Cesar Calderon (2000). "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures." *Economics and Politics*, 7(3): 207-227; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1997). "Institutions and the Convergence Hypothesis: The Cross-National Evidence." *Public Choice*, 87: 207-228; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1997) "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation." *Economic Inquiry*, 35:590-602.

countries like China have low and unchanged scores on NLGG reforms, while Latin American countries have suffered with economic downfall and political instability in line with strong efforts at NLGG reform. The rarity of this type of critical evaluation of the POV project under the NLGG development model, while puzzling, is a vital contributing factor to the prevailing consensus over the values orthodoxy.

There is a second element to the rhetorical strategy that does not address the here and now as much as the expected future outcomes of prosperity and stability. The World Bank is not alone in constructing annual indexes, like the *Governance Matters*, that measure only the developing countries' progress in NLGG reformation. Missing here is a direct link between the NLGG reforms and the promised outcomes of growth, stability and security. One could infer from these indexes that the quintessential objective is the creation of developing countries and FFS that emulate the neo/Liberal western market democracies, and only to a lesser extent the outcomes of growth.

### *Lacuna 2: Lack of Implementation*

Recent data from the World Bank's *Governance Matters* indicators reveal that NLGG values or institutions have not been implemented to any significant degree by the developing countries and especially the FFS of the Global South. Implementation of the NLGG values is presumed to come down to political will and state capacity of the target states. This is the case in recent scholarship on the FFS accept this simplistic analytic framework of examining the political will and capacity of these fractured, insecure nation-states to install good governance (Eizenstat et al., 2005; Patrick 2006). Some scholars have suggested that the emphasis on the FFS to implement and enforce the NLGG values is problematic and unrealistic because of the fact that most "failed" states, such as Afghanistan, were never "successful" states in the first place (Brooks 2005). Proponents of the NLGG values transplantation model all concur that a strong, capable state is requisite for successfully closing "governance gaps" and installing the NLGG values of democracy, rule of law and marketized economy, security, human rights protection, etcetera. Yet, the attainment of state capacity is essentially equated with the implementation of the NLGG values. Otherwise said, good governance is tautologically defined in this model as the capacity to formulate, implement and enforce good governance. Finally, it should be noted that narrowing the analytic focus to political will and capacity of the FFS to implement the complex "good governance" values and institutions ends up placing the blame for unattained growth and stability gains on the FFS themselves. The NLGG development model and its proponents escapes with impunity, a fact manifested in the currently ideationally hegemonic POV project.

### TABLES

[Afghanistan data]

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### CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This essay's starting assumption holds that today's projection of values (POV) project enjoys a globally pervasive and ideationally influential consensus amongst its purveyors in the powerful West and it "targets" in the Global South, as well as amongst formerly rivalrous (Internationalist) Liberal and Realist thinkers in International Relations theory and policy.

Existence of this all-encompassing consensus surrounding the POV coincides, problematically, with a rather weak sphere of critical evaluation. Criticisms that are levied against the POV project, typically in the form of contradictions, hypocrisies or other rhetoric-reality gaps, have been unable to make a suitable challenge to the decade-long viability of projecting or exporting neo/Liberal "good governance" (NLGG) values-- institutions, beliefs and worldviews. The pillar NLGG values of democracy, rule of law, and a

rules-based market economy are ideationally, normatively, and discursively beyond reproach, or so it would seem.

Two themes, or concepts, of “external effect” and “effectiveness” are suggested as an analytic starting point for an improved, deeper and future critical analysis of the global POV consensus that is sorely needed. Probing the external effect of the POV project requires assessing the ability and success of the western powers and their development agencies to alter the behaviour of the states in the South. While the effectiveness concept induces reflection on the extent to which the stated promises of the POV consensus participants are attained in real-world reality. As it stands, attainment of two outcomes has not been convincing: the South’s promised implementation of the NLGG values and the West’s promised linkage between NLGG values and the gains of growth, stability. This lack of success should serve as the basis to ground a much more fruitful critical appraisal of the ringing POV endorsement. New analytic concepts and empirical approaches are required to confront the global POV transformational project aiming to create a far-off New Neo/Liberal World Order. Enjoying a robust global consensus has enabled this ideational project to impede the construction of critical analytic tools.

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