

“‘Small Worlds’ as predictors of generalized political attitudes”

Regional and Federal Studies panel on *Small Worlds*

Ailsa Henderson, PhD
School of Social and Political Studies
University of Edinburgh
Ailsa.henderson@ed.ac.uk

First draft. All comments welcome.
Please do not quote without permission from the author.

“‘Small Worlds’ as predictors of generalized political attitudes”

Much research on political culture began initially, in an effort to explain variations in orientations, attitudes and beliefs across different polities (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965). Advances in survey methodology in the behavioural revolution made possible an examination of, for example, the attitudes of Britons and Americans, Germans and Italians and in so doing researchers hoped to identify the cultural factors that could account for different assessments of elites, or varying degrees of support for democracy. Data sources such as the World Values Survey have allowed students of political culture to expand the number of cases under investigation and compare types of polities, including those distinguished by different institutional or economic characteristics. Much of this work is comparative and it employs, almost exclusively, the nation-state as a unit of analysis, a feature that is consistent with the conceptual construction of political culture as understood by the likes of Almond, Verba and Pye. There is a growing literature that explores the existence of meaningful variation in attitudes and behaviour within states, and the capacity of regions to provide ‘small world’ political cultures (Elkins and Simeon 1980). The following paper identifies issues relevant to the operation of regional political cultures before demonstrating how and under what conditions certain forms of ‘regional’ political culture might influence general political attitudes.

Despite research comparing the differences between states, we know very little about how regions within or across states might differ in terms of political attitudes or behaviours. Political culture offers insight into the subjective dimensions of politics, summarizing the political norms of a polity, including dominant political goals, preferred political processes and the views citizens have of their polity (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965; Pye 1968). Political culture is a property of the aggregate (Hofstede 2001; Elkins and Simeon 1979), and so political attitudes and behaviours are merely indicators of a culture. I rely on an inclusive definition of political culture and focuses on two key sets of relationships within a polity:

The relationship between individuals and the state

The political relationship among citizens

I focus on subjective evaluations of the state (the way citizens feel about the state, the goals they hold for state action) and evaluations of relations among citizens (who we include in our definition of the citizenry, what rights we think they should access). Citizen attitudes and behaviours are therefore used as a way of tapping the political culture of an aggregate entity.

Within the political culture literature very little attention is dedicated to studying diversity within political culture (Linz and de Miguel 1966) and the methodologies for doing so are contested (Hofstede 2001; Formisano 2001; Wilson 2000; Lieske 1993; Lane 1992; Foster 1982; Savage 1981; Russett 1968). Even that small sub-set is divided between those who attribute diversity to multiple levels of government and those who attribute diversity to demographic variation caused by patterns of immigration. For the

former, sub-state units of government, such as provinces (Simon and Elkins 1974, 1980), länder (Assion 1987; Blancke and Tiemann 1993; Plasser and Ulram 2002; Ulram 1990, 1992; Yoder 1998) or other sub-state communities (Henderson 2007; Billiet, Maddens and Frogner 2006; Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 1996; Dickson 1996; Denmark and Sharman 1994) have the capacity to inculcate in their populations distinct political norms. Within a single state, then, we might find that the attitudes and behaviours of two neighbouring sub-state units appear dissimilar, even though they may share demographic or economic characteristics that might otherwise produce similar outlooks. Those emphasizing the impact of demographic identify two further sources of diversity. States with heterogeneous economies, with for example a thriving industrial heartland and a vibrant rural economy, might find that the individuals engaged in different economic activities have different policy needs, different expectations, and therefore different evaluations of state performance. This, in other words, might account for the varying attitudes and behaviours of farmers and steelworkers. If these two groups so dominate their local economies that they define the local political context, then variations in the state political culture can occur. The other source of such ‘contextual effects’ is migration, either historical or contemporary (Brons 2006; Moon, Pierce and Lovrich 2001; Alm, Burkhardt, Patton and Weatherby 2001, 2004). The arrival of distinct groups, particularly in large numbers and particularly when political institutions are in flux, has the capacity to shape the political norms within an area. Here the private cultures of different demographic groups – whether defined by religion or ethnicity – coexist with distinct cultural approaches to public life, including political goals and processes. The arrival of French *habitants* to present-day Quebec (Hartz 1964, Horowitz 1966), Puritans to Massachusetts (Fischer 1989), the migration of revolutionary-era United Empire Loyalists (Bell 1970; Bell and Tepperman 1979; Lipset 1968, 1990) or the colonisation of the North American west by distinct waves of migrants (Elazar 1966) have shaped the political cultures of regions within a state. Elazar’s description of the three political cultures in the United States is perhaps the best known, and has been subjected to rigorous quantitative investigation by political scientists (Sharkansky 1969; Schlitz and Rainey 1978; Miller, Barker and Carman 2005; Koven and Mausolkff 2002; Erikson, McIver and Wright 1987; Weakliem and Bigger 1999; Mead 2004). Although European research has focused at times on sub-state political cultures, there is very little on regional political cultures within European states, most of it surfacing in the German-language literature that explored the post-reunification interaction of eastern and western German political cultures (Blancke and Tiemann 1993; see also Yoder 1998). There is very little in the French, Spanish or Italian-language research on multiple political cultures of any sort, though some qualitative studies exist (Trigilia 1981; Padis 2004; Postic, Veillard, Donatien and Simon 2003). Processes of regionalisation within Europe, many of them facilitated by EU policies and directives, have ensured that regions are important agents of socialization for citizens (Caramani and Wagemann 2005; Mathias 2003; Blatter 2004; Wolczuk 2002; Kohli 2000; Keating 1997; Hooghe and Keating 1994; Guéhenno 1995; Paasi 1991; Leonardi and Nanetti 1990) and yet we know very little about the boundaries of such communities, or their capacity to shape political attitudes and behaviours.

Very rarely do researchers pit the regional and sub-state explanations against each other. Curtice (1988, 1992), for example, argues constituent political cultures in the UK are

regional not sub-state. Previously I have argued that regional political cultures can account for variations in political attitudes better than sub-state political cultures (Henderson 2005). For the most part, however, these demographic and institutional approaches tend not to acknowledge each other and when they do, argue that the two forces work in tandem: demographic influences and sub-state units work together to create distinct political cultures in particular regions (Simeon and Elkins 1974, 1980). The two approaches rely, however, on different socialization processes to sustain their particular 'regional' cultures. Sub-state political cultures rely on sub-state political institutions to socialize successive generations, while regional political cultures require group-based socialization. Political culture literature has not yet acknowledged that both processes might be at work: that sub-state institutions are creating sub-state political cultures, and demographically distinct pockets are creating regional variants of the state political culture. In some cases these two might co-exist but in others they might not. Federations might house regional political cultures that are also sub-state political cultures, but in some cases the regional political cultures might exist within and across sub-state units. Some unitary states might contain multiple regional political cultures while others might operate as a single regional culture, or might comprise one along with geographic pockets of a neighbouring state. The remainder of the paper focuses on the capacity of sub-state political environments to generate distinct political cultures.

The state-centred focus of political culture research has influenced our understanding of the development of political attitudes and behaviours. This is presents itself in two ways:

- 1 Attitudes to the state are used as a proxy for general political attitudes
- 2 Attitudes to the state are used to explain general political attitudes

When researchers discuss general levels of political trust, efficacy, satisfaction or confidence they rely on trust in the state government, efficacy in state-level politics, satisfaction with state politicians, or confidence in state institutions. This does not help us to understand general levels of political trust or efficacy (ie our trust in politics in general, or politicians in general) but merely describes evaluations of state politics and state politicians. Here, state trust is seen as a proxy for general political trust. For those researchers who distinguish between state-focused and general attitudes, state views are used to explain general views. Thus trust in state government or satisfaction with state politicians is seen as a predictor of general trust. This view precludes the possibility that political evaluations and experiences derived at other levels of government have a capacity to shape general political attitudes and behaviours. And yet we know from the multi-level governance literature that sub-state and supra-state experiences have the capacity to affect institutional norms and behaviours (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Knodt 2004; Kersbergen and Verbeek 2004).

To determine whether sub-state political cultures exert an independent impact on general political attitudes we require first, the presence of a sub-state political culture, second data that allow us to compare state and sub-state political cultures and third, evidence of general political attitudes. It is worth noting that I am not hoping to distinguish the attitudes in one sub-state political culture from attitudes in another sub-state political culture. I am not hoping to demonstrate the Scots or Catalans or Quebecers are unique within their states. Instead I am seeking to demonstrate that sub-state units have the

capacity to generate distinct political cultures that serve as rival predictors of general attitudes.

The following analysis relies on data collected for the Canadian Election Studies from 1968 to 2004 and focuses in particular on the 1984 CES, which was the only version to pose questions about trust and efficacy with respect to two objects: the Canadian state and the provincial state. As a result, the questionnaire included the now familiar battery about MPs losing touch, and politics being too complicated, but also repeated nine of these questions, substituting provincial names and figures for references to the Canadian government or Canadian politics. Together the 1968 to 2004 datasets provide us with insight into two aspects of provincial political culture: first, the conventional measure employed of inter-provincial differences in political attitudes, and second, a direct comparison of indicators of Canadian and provincial political culture. The 1984 data are of course more than twenty years old, and we should acknowledge that they provide us with a snapshot vision of politics as the Mulroney Conservatives were elected. We cannot prove, at present, that the same indicators would produce similar results. We can be relatively confident, however, that if the 1968-2004 data are able to identify enduring features of political culture(s) in Canada then the 1984 dataset can also help us to understand contemporary political culture. Put another way, if we can argue that these attitudes are characterised by their stability, and if we can prove that the 1984 dataset does not contain results that are inconsistent with the other CES datasets, then we can be more confident that the 1984 provide a relatively reliable view of the ability of provincial political culture to affect generalised attitudes. But why might it be necessary for us to focus on the replicated questions in the 1984 dataset?

Simeon and Elkins argue that the reason provinces exert a continued impact on political attitudes is the result of shared events and histories. Provincial boundaries are meaningful because of the cultures operating within them. In the generation of political attitudes, one of the most important institutions is the provincial government. Typically, though, when we test for the existence of provincial political cultures, we ask respondents about their attitudes towards the government in Ottawa. For Simeon and Elkins, differences at the provincial level will encourage individuals to view federal politics through provincial lenses. And yet if political cultures are present, one of the more useful tests for their existence would involve attitudes to those very institutions responsible for generating differences within the country. A brief example illustrates this point.

Measures of national identity in the Canadian Election Study employ thermometer scales, asking respondents to identify their attachment to the country, and then to their province of residence. Given the strength of nationalism in Quebec one might assume that Quebecers have a much higher attachment to their province than other Canadians. By examining both how respondents feel about the country and the province we learn, however, that Quebecers exhibit typical levels of attachment to their own province. The difference is in the much lower levels of attachment to the Canadian State. Only by examining attitudes to both levels do we have a comprehensive understanding of how national identity and attachment operates in Canada. The same could be said of political attitudes and behaviour. Only by examining how respondents feel about provincial

politics or provincial governments, and comparing this to evaluations of political attitudes towards the federal level, will we understand the operation of multiple political cultures in Canada. Part of this argument hinges on the assumption that individuals distinguish meaningfully between the two levels of government.

From 1964 to 1984 questionnaires for the CES contained a series of variables intended to probe attitudes to federal and provincial government. For most of these years respondents were asked which level of government – federal, provincial or local – affected them most.

Table 1 about here

The results in table 1 show that a majority of respondents do not believe that the provincial government is the most important, or think of it first. What they show, however, is that between a quarter and one third of respondents typically believe it is the most important. Such results, when compared with the figures for federal and local governments, confirm that the dominance of the federal government in people's minds should not be assumed. Such figures also vary by province. Although not a majority, a plurality of voters in Newfoundland thinks of the provincial government first. We can compare this to the figure for Ontario, where less than one fifth think of the provincial government first. We can put these figures into context, for the question has been asked since the advent of the CES in 1965.

Figure 1 about here

Figure 1 tracks responses to this question over the history of its inclusion in the Canadian Election Survey. The responses range from 0, province affects me most, to 8, federal government affects me most. Those indicating that both provincial and federal levels of government affected them equally were coded as four. For the purposes of this graph, responses concerning local government have been omitted. At the start of the period, in 1965, the mean rate for respondents in all provinces indicated that the federal government affected them most. Over the following twenty years, however, these attitudes underwent considerable change. Six provinces – Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta - still maintained that the federal government affects them most. Only for Ontario, however, had the mean score remained above four for the duration of the question. For other provinces, particularly Alberta, respondents reported widely varying mean scores. Provinces that in 1984 indicated that the provincial government affected them most include PEI, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. If in 1965 Quebec Francophones were the most likely to believe that the provincial government was the most important, by 1984 Quebec Anglophones also shared this view. There are a number of possible reasons for these changes and we must acknowledge both push and pull factors. The growth in the responsibility of provincial governments for service delivery in its area of jurisdiction, and the rise of provincial budgets might account for changes. The policies of the federal government also appear to have alienated voters. It is possible that voters not only punished Liberals at the polls for policies that were unpopular for Western voters or Quebecers, but turned away from the level of government that introduced the policies. Such figures provide us with preliminary data about the capacity of provinces to provide distinct sub-state political cultures.

For the constituent units of federations or decentralized states to inculcate specific attitudinal and behavioural norms, they must rival the socialising power of states. For this to be true, we must have some evidence that they are meaningful political communities for citizens. Regional identity data provides us with additional clues about the primary political communities of citizens: whether they feel a greater sense of attachment to the state or sub-state unit. The CES data has not provided consistent identity questions. We can turn briefly to the 2003 ISSP data, however, which asks respondents about their level of attachment to their city, region, state and continent. By subtracting state attachment from regional attachment we are able to devise relative attachment scores for each Canadian province. The scores range from -20 and -17 in Ontario and Manitoba respectively to .05 and .11 in Newfoundland and Quebec. Indeed Newfoundland and Quebec were the only two provinces for which there were positive scores, in other words, where the rate of regional attachment exceeded the rate of state attachment. This pattern is similar to that found in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, in that different regions exhibit wildly different levels of regional attachment. In Spain and Germany, for example, all but five of the autonomous communities and all but six of the länder report regional attachment scores greater than 0. Scotland reports regional attachment scores similar to Quebec and the score for Wales is the same as that for Newfoundland. The asymmetrical distribution of regional attachment suggests, therefore, that if sub-state polities have the capacity to generate their own political cultures, that this is not uniformly exercised by all such polities. It is important to note, however, that this speaks to the capacity of sub-state polities to serve as ‘small worlds’. It does little to confirm whether this is the case.

How might we know if sub-state political cultures exist? One popular way to determine whether provincial political cultures exist is to determine if there are significant variations in the attitudes and behaviours across jurisdictions. From 1968 to 2004 the CES asked a number of trust and efficacy questions of respondents. Although this allows us to speak to only one half of our definition of political culture – the relationship between individuals and the state – rather than the more expansive definition that includes the relationship among citizens, the consistent use of these questions help us to understand the extent to which provincial attitudes differ and whether there are trends over time.

Table 2 about here.

The results in table 2 show that there are consistent inter-provincial variations in attitudes over time. This suggests that the phenomenon Simeon and Elkins identified in 1980 was present not only in the data they were examining, but is an enduring characteristic of Canadian political life. This in itself is worth noting as the time period covered by the table spans both the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies of various federal governments since the 1960s. The table excludes data from several years. The 1965 CES has insufficient sample sizes to compare provincial responses, the 1972 CES did not include any of the items listed here, the 1974 survey included only the efficacy questions and the 2006 CES included only the variable about the government caring what people think.

Figure 2 about here

Perhaps more useful, we can use average scores created for the two sets of trust/deference variables and the two efficacy variables to create a 2 axis grid of ideological space.

Figure 2 identifies the locations of provinces according to average scores for trust and efficacy from 1968-1993. The variables are created by averaging the scores for the years in which all eight questions were asked (1968, 1979, 1984, 1993). We can see here a familiar pattern, with low efficacy Atlantic provinces, greater efficacy among Ontario and BC voters, and high trust among Quebecers. There are some minor deviations from how we tend to speak of various provinces. Despite the low efficacy scores among Atlantic provinces there is an obvious gap in the trust scores for New Brunswick and Newfoundland. Also noteworthy is the consistency of results for the three prairie provinces, even though we have come to think of Alberta as a separate and distinct political culture. Such findings might suggest therefore that we can see more diversity than usually assumed within one regional cluster (Atlantic Canada) and more uniformity than usually assumed within another (prairie provinces). The results tell us more about the way sub-state politics might operate as small worlds when we distinguish between attitudes to federal and provincial politics.

The 1984 CES provides the most comprehensive data for testing state and sub-state political cultures because it replicates the standard trust and efficacy battery at the state and sub-state level. The state level is typically assumed to provide measures of general political attitudes and so teasing apart the two possible sources of political views is important. Here too the results point to variations between federal and provincial political cultures.

It is worth noting that at a conceptual level it is not important for the federal and provincial figures to be different for only one level of government to matter. Indeed political culture researchers often assume that state and sub-state political cultures (if they are to be considered separate at all) are similar, but that it is attitudes towards the federal political context that matter. A *conceptual* shift – from state to sub-state – does not therefore require differing views at the state and sub-state level. Instead we are required merely to acknowledge that the sub-state political environment drives the attitudes of citizens. *Proving* that such a relationship exists empirically, however, requires us to distinguish easily between state and sub-state political cultures. Happily the data suggest that we can indeed distinguish empirically between state and sub-state political cultures.

Table 3 about here

Table 3 aggregates the responses of individuals by province and compares attitudes to federal and provincial politics. The table includes the percentage of respondents in each province who agree or agree strongly with each statement. The upper row indicates responses to the federal government while the lower row contains perceptions of the provincial government. In addition, the table contains analysis of variance results for the various indicators. The table provokes several interesting conclusions. First, for all questions, a larger proportion of respondents reported dissatisfaction with federal politics. This suggests that attempts to reform political institutions to improve political attitudes would do well to direct their attention to federal change. Second, there are interesting exceptions to this general rule. A larger proportion of Quebec respondents appear dissatisfied with provincial politics on all but two of the indicators. Thus more individuals in Quebec feel that their MNAs lose touch, that their provincial government doesn't care, that provincial politicians are dishonest and so on, than believe the same

about federal politics and politicians. In some cases these differences are small. For others, however, the difference is larger. In addition, certain questions tend to elicit larger proportions of provincial dissatisfaction than others. The perception that politics is too complicated and that politicians are dishonest prompts larger proportions of voters to express dissatisfaction with provincial politics. The belief that voters have no say, however, universally reflected greater dissatisfaction with federal politics. Third, there are varying differences among provinces. Some provinces indicate very small differences in the proportions of disaffected voters at the provincial and federal level. Newfoundland, for example, reports similar proportions for most of the nine indicators. The pattern also reflects attitudes in Quebec. Other provinces report widely varying differences in the proportion who are dissatisfied with either the provincial or federal government. In Saskatchewan, well over sixty percent of voters believe the federal government doesn't care or that people like me have no say in federal politics. The proportion that believes the same of provincial politics, however, is in the low to mid forties. Indeed the indicator probing whether people feel they have a say tended to produce the largest variations in provincial and federal responses. In Nova Scotia, almost three quarters of respondents believe that federal politicians can't be trusted or that the federal government isn't run by smart people. When probing attitudes to provincial government, however, the number of people who believe this dropped to one quarter or less. If we remember that Simeon and Elkin suggested provincial political cultures were driving the variations in attitudes to federal governments, it appears in this case that more Nova Scotians trust provincial politics than trust federal politics.

If we recall the original formulation by Simeon and Elkins, a 2 by 2 table with cells for high and low trust and efficacy, we can explore the 1984 in a similar vein. From the indicators discussed in table 3 we can create four sets of variables: federal trust, federal efficacy, provincial trust and provincial efficacy.

Figure 3 about here

The results in figure 3 report the provincial scores for federal trust and efficacy. We find that the provinces have moved slightly from their original placements. PEI distinguishes itself as a high trust, high efficacy province while only New Brunswick is occupying the low trust, low efficacy position we might expect of Atlantic provinces. Seven of the provinces cluster along similar efficacy scores but are spread out across different levels of federal trust. What differences we can discern from the original Small Worlds analysis can be attributed to the decade-long gap between the data employed by Simeon and Elkins and the 1984 CES. For the most part the provinces are in similar, if not identical positions. We can compare these results to those for the provincial trust provincial efficacy variables.

Figure 4 about here

Figure 4 locates the ten provinces in the same ideological space, but employs the provincial variables as axis. Here we find that the provinces are not in the same location. Or, to return to the formulation of Simeon and Elkins, provinces are not in the same 'cells' for both federal and provincial political culture. The figures for PEI indicate a consistent high trust, high efficacy political culture at both the federal and provincial level, and New Brunswick occupies a similar low trust, low efficacy position. But where the federal results produced a clustering of provinces around middling efficacy scores and

greater diversity along federal trust, the provincial variables produce two general groupings of provinces – those with high trust and efficacy, and those with low trust and low efficacy. The fact that the majority of provinces find themselves in different ideal types when using federal and provincial variables suggests that sub-state political cultures are distinct and therefore capable of exerting an independent impact on general attitudes.

To test whether sub-state political cultures exert an independent impact on general political attitudes we must identify appropriate dependent variables. The 1984 CES contains variables on economic disparity, government intervention and moral questions such as abortion or homosexuality. From these it is possible to identify through factor analysis a dependent variable on government intervention. The variables are general, probing attitudes to the role of the state in terms of regulation of the economy, reducing the various income and opportunity gaps that exist for citizens. As a result, they provide us with the best approximation of ‘general’ political attitude. To determine whether sub-state political cultures exert an independent impact on such attitudes we can develop a four stage model, pitting variables on socio-economic status and attitudinal controls against variables for federal and provincial political culture. Model 1 tests the impact of socio-economic variables such as age, gender and income, variables we know to typically affect political attitudes. Models 2 and 3 include the variables that provide symptoms of federal and provincial political culture respectively and Model 4, the fully-specified model includes a number of controls that might affect the importance of the provincial political culture variables, namely political interest, engagement and the perceived importance of the provincial government, along with a standard left-right variable. It is worth emphasizing that the federal and provincial variables are not highly correlated with across levels of government. Indeed federal trust and provincial trust display weaker correlations than do federal trust and federal efficacy.

Table 4 about here

The model statistics for the results in table 4 are obviously low. The fully-specified model, for example, explains only 17 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. This would certainly be of concern if the main purpose of the paper was to explain support for state intervention, but the paper concerns itself with the distinction between indicators of federal and provincial political cultures and as a result the overall ability of variables to explain attitudes to state intervention is less relevant than the independence of our two types of independent variables.

The results show that socio-economic variables by themselves account for very little of the variation in the dependent variable, although it is worth noting that gender, university education and income are all significant predictors. Women are more likely to support an active government, while those with higher incomes and those with university degrees are more likely to support a minimalist state, all other things being equal. There are two key findings. First, the indicators of provincial and federal political culture exert an independent impact on generalised political attitudes, measured here as support for government or state intervention. Second, the variables probing provincial political culture do a far better job of explaining general attitudes than do the variables probing federal political culture.

When we focus on trust and efficacy with respect to federal politics – the variables we typically use to understand general political attitudes - we find that a greater degree of trust is positively associated with support for interventionism. Once we include the variables for trust and efficacy at the provincial level, however, we find that that they exert an independent impact on support for intervention and that they operate in the opposite direction. Increases in provincial trust are negatively associated with support in an interventionist state. Research on political attitudes typically includes the standard trust and efficacy battery as a way to understand how political culture affects attitudes. What we see here is that such measures, tied as they are to the federal political context, might be underestimating the general impact of political culture because they are focussing on the incorrect locus.

Bibliography

- Alm, Leslie R., Ross E. Burkhart, W. David Patton and James B. Weatherby (2001) "Intrastate Regional Differences in Political Culture: A Case Study of Idaho" *State and Local Government Review* 33(2): 109-19
- Alm, Leslie R., Ross E. Burkhart, W. David Patton and James B. Weatherby (2004) "Political culture and ideology in the Mountain West: regionalism in the state of Idaho" *Social Science Journal* 41: 163-78
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1963) *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Assion, Peter (1987) "Zum Kontext des neuen regionalkulturellen Historismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kulturmusealisierung als Kompensatorik?" *Informationen zur Raumentwicklung* 7/8: 475-484
- Bell, David V.J. (1970) "The Loyalist Tradition in Canada" *Journal of Canadian Studies* 5: 22-33
- Bell, David and Lorne Tepperman (1979) *The Roots of Disunity: a look at Canadian political culture*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart
- Billiet, Jaak, Bart Maddens, Andre Paul Frogner (2006) "Does Belgium (still) exist? Differences in political culture between Flemings and Walloons" *West European Politics* 29(5): 912-32
- Blancke, Susanne, Heinrich Tiemann (1993) "Regionale Kulturen in den neuen Bundesländern" *Neue Gesellschaft* 40(6): 537-43
- Blatter, Joachim (2004) "From 'spaces of places' to 'spaces of flows'? Territorial and functional governance in cross-border regions in Europe and North America" *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 28 (3): 530-48
- Brons, Lajos L (2006) "Indirect measurement of regional culture in the Netherlands" *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* 97(5): 547-66
- Caramani, Daniele and Claudius Wagemann (2005) "A Transnational Political Culture? The Alpine Region and its Relationships to European Integration" *German Politics* 14(1): 74-94
- Curtice, John (1988) "One Nation?" Jowell, Witherspoon and Brooks (eds) *British Social Attitudes: the 5th report*: 127-54
- Curtice, John (1992) "The North-South divide" R. Jowell et al (eds) *British Social Attitudes the 9th report*
- Denemark, David and Campbell Sharman (1994) "Political Efficacy, Involvement and Trust: Testing for Regional Political Culture in Australia" *Austrian Journal of Political Science* 29: 81-102
- Dickson, Malcolm B (1996) "Scottish Political Culture: Is Scotland Different?" Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics.
- Elazar Daniel J (1966) *American Federalism, A View from the States*. New York: T.Y. Crowell
- Elkins, David J and Richard Simeon (eds) (1980) *Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life*. Toronto: Methuen
- Elkins, David J. and Richard E.B. Simeon (1979) "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics* 11: 127-45

- Erikson, Robert S., John P. McIver and Gerald C. Wright Jr (1987) "State Political Culture and Public Opinion" *American Political Science Review* 81(3): 797-814
- Formisano, Ronald P (2001) "The Concept of Political Culture" *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 31(3): 393-426
- Foster, Charles R. (1982) "Political Culture and Regional Ethnic Minorities" *Journal of Politics* 44(2): 560-69.
- Guéhenno, Jean Marie. 1995. *The End of the Nation State*. Minneapolis: U of M Press
- Hartz, Louis (1964) *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World)
- Henderson, Ailsa (2005) "Regional political cultures in Canada" *Canadian Journal of Political Science*
- Henderson, Ailsa (2007) *Hierarchies of Belonging: National Identity and Political Culture in Scotland and Quebec* Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press
- Hofstede Geert (2001) *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations*. 2nd ed London: Sage
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Michael Keating (1994) "The politics of EU regional policy" *Journal of European Public Policy* 1: 368-93
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2003) "Unravelling the Central State, but How?: types of multi-level governance" *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 233-43
- Horowitz, Gad (1966) "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: an interpretation" *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 32: 143-70
- Keating, M (1997) "The invention of regions: political restructuring and territorial government in Western Europe" *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 15: 383-98
- Kersbergen, Kees van and Bertjan Verbeek (2004) "Subsidiarity as a principle of governance in the EU" *Comparative European politics* 2(2) 142-62
- Kohli, M (2000) "The battlegrounds of European identity" *European Societies* 2(2): 113-37
- Knodt, Michele (2004) "International embeddedness of European multi-level governance" *Journal of European Public Policy* 11(4): 701-19
- Koven, Steven G. and Christopher Mausolf (2002) "The Influence of Political Culture on State Budgets" *American Review of Public Administration* 32(1): 66-77
- Lane, Ruth (1992) "Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory" *Comparative Political Studies* 25 (3): 362-87
- Lieske, Joel (1993) "Regional subcultures of the United States" *Journal of Politics* 55: 888-913
- Linz, Juan J and Amando de Miguel (1966) "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains" in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds, *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 267-319
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1968) *Revolution and counterrevolution*. New York: Basic books
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1990) *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada*. New York: Routledge
- Mathias, Jorg (2003) *Regional interests and regional actors: Wales and Saxony as modern regions in Europe*. Portland: Frank Cass.

- Mead, Lawrence M (2004) "State Political Culture and Welfare Reform" *Policy Studies Journal* 3(2): 271-96
- Miller, David Y, David C. Barker and Christopher J. Carman (2005) "Mapping the Genome of American Political Subcultures" *Publius* 36(2): 303-315
- Miller, William, Annis May Timpson, and Michael Lessnoff (1996) *Political Culture in Contemporary Britain: people and politicians, principles and practice*. Oxford: Clarendon
- Moon, C. David, John C. Pierce and Nicholas P. Lovrich (2001) "Political Culture in the Urban West: Is It Really Different?" *State and Local Government Review* 33(3): 195-201
- Paasi, A 1991 "Deconstructing regions: notes on the scales of spatial life" *Environment and Planning A* 23(2): 239-56
- Padis, Marc Olivier (2004) "La culture politique americaine, au singulier et au pluriel" *Esprit* (307): 114-28
- Plasser, Fritz and Peter A Ulram (2002) *Das osterreichische Politikverstandnis: von der Konsens- zur Konfliktkultur*. Vienna: WUV Universitatsverlag
- Postic, Fanch, Jean Yves Veillard, Larent Donatien, Jean-François Simon (2003) "Reconnaissance d'une culture regionale; la Bretagne depuis la revolution" *Ethnologie française* 33(3): 381-89
- Pye, Lucian and Sidney Verba, eds (1965) *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Pye, Lucian (1968) "Political Culture" in David L Sills, ed *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol 12. New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 218-225
- Russert, Bruce M. (1968) Delineating International Regions" in J. David Singer (ed) *Quantitative International Politics*. New York: Free Press. 317-52
- Savage, Robert L (1981) "Looking for Political Subcultures: A critique of the rmmage-sale approach" *Western Political Quarterly* 34(2): 331-36
- Schlitz, Timothy D and R. Lee Rainey (1978) "The Geographic Distribution of Elazar's Political Subcultures among the Mass Population: A research note" *Western Political Quarterly* 31(3): 410-15
- Sharkansky, Ira (1969) "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: a research note" *Polity* 2(1): 66-83
- Simeon, Richard and David J. Elkins (1980) "Provincial Political Cultures in Canada" in David J. Elkins and Richard Simeon (eds) *Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life*. Toronto: Methuen
- Simeon and Elkins (1974) "Regional Political Cultures in Canada" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 7(3): 397-437
- Trigilia, C (1981) *Le subculture politiche territoriali*. Milan: Quaderni della Fondazione Feltrinelli
- Ulram, Peter A 1990 *Hegemonie und Erosion: politische Kultur und politischer Wandel in Österreich*. Wien: Böhlau
- Weakliem, David L and Robert Biggart (1999) "Region and Political Opinion in the Contemporary United States" *Social Forces* 77(3): 863-86
- Wolczuk, Kataryna (2002) "Identities, regions and Europe" *Regional and Federal Studies* 12(2): 203-17


- Yoder, Jennifer A (1998) "The regionalization of political culture and identity in post-communist Eastern Germany" *East European Quarterly* 32(2): 197-219
- Ullram, Peter A, ed 1992 *Regimewechsel: Demokratisierung und politische Kultur in Ost-Mitteleuropa* Wien: Böhlau

Table 1: The impact of provinces

	Provincial gov't affects me most	Provincial gov't comes to mind first
NF	23.9	49.3
PEI	31.3	36.6
NS	23.5	22.7
NB	20.6	27.2
Q	32.5	43.3
ON	17.5	17.1
MB	27.5	20.3
SK	34.9	40.5
AB	32.3	27.8
BC	47.6	29.6

Source: 1984 CES

FIGURE 1: CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT IMPORTANCE, 1965-1984



Question: Which level of government affects you most? Responses have been recoded to conform to earlier scales (0=provincial government, 8 = federal government, 4= both equally)

Table 2: Significant variations in provincial attitudes, 1968-2004

	1968	1979	1984	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004
Deference								
You can trust the government to do what is right	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	n/a	n/a	n/a
Government is run by smart ones (know what they're doing)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	n/a	n/a	n/a
Trust								
People in government are crooked	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓	✓	✓
People in government waste tax money	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
Internal efficacy								
People like me have no say	✓	✓	✓	n/a	✓	✓	✓	✓
The government doesn't care what people like me think	✓	x	✓	n/a	x	✓	✓	✓
External efficacy								
MPs lose touch	✓	x	✓	n/a	x	✓	✓	✓
Politics and government is too complicated	✓	x	✓	n/a	x	x	✓	✓

Source: CES 1968-2004, Results indicate significant (.1) F scores for ANOVA.

Figure 2: Provincial variations in trust and efficacy, 1968-1993




Table 3: Measures of federal and provincial political culture, 1984

		PROVINCES											Canada
		F	NF	PEI	NS	NB	Q	O	MB	SK	AB	BC	
Politicians lose touch	Fed	3.07**	80.2	61.8	75.4	86.7	78.8	77.6	77.4	71.5	75.9	79.8	77.3
	Prov	7.80**	76.6	65.0	64.8	78.1	79.4	69.2	68.3	64.6	67.1	74.5	71.8
Government doesn't care	Fed	2.01**	70.4	54.9	62.7	79.0	65.1	62.9	60.6	67.8	61.6	64.5	64.3
	Prov	11.85**	65.1	45.6	56.3	74.0	69.3	56.2	53.9	45.5	53.7	67.5	59.9
Politics too complicated	Fed	1.77	74.0	69.3	64.8	78.2	63.6	65.7	66.7	71.5	72.5	62.6	66.9
	Prov	4.08**	71.6	64.2	65.4	81.3	63.9	65.3	63	63.4	66.7	62.0	65.3
People like me no say	Fed	3.53**	73.6	55.2	62.0	82.9	69.7	60.3	63.6	63.9	61.1	61.8	64.5
	Prov	11.28**	70.4	51.9	49.2	73.5	69.5	54.5	51.5	41.8	49.4	57.0	57.7
Vote doesn't matter	Fed	1.47	21.4	22.1	14.7	27.3	20.3	16.0	17.6	19.0	16.7	17.4	18.3
	Prov	3.22**	20.8	13.7	10.9	25.4	19.9	16.4	16.5	12.3	13.5	12.8	16.5
Politicians dishonest	Fed	3.30**	52.9	34.1	42.5	69.7	40.9	45.8	48.5	44.1	45.2	45.6	45.4
	Prov	13.33**	53.3	30.5	33.0	70.2	53.5	36.7	30.1	29.1	36.2	41.8	41.4
Government wastes money	Fed	6.67**	88.4	81.1	90.3	95.9	76.7	88.3	88.6	90.2	87.3	90.6	86.3
	Prov	5.14**	89.6	72.6	81.4	92.7	80.1	85.8	81.7	79.4	81.1	82.2	82.8
Trust politicians†	Fed	2.39*	30.5	29.6	68.9	32.5	35.7	36.1	43.1	39.4	41.9	41.1	37.0
	Prov	17.04**	21.3	21.9	19.2	32.7	45.7	25.4	30.3	22.6	24.8	48.6	32.2
Government run by smart ones†	Fed	8.343	29.6	24.7	71.1	18.0	20.4	34.0	46.7	25.1	39.2	44.9	32.3
	Prov	8.56**	26.6	16.0	25.0	23.4	28.0	24.7	34.1	22.8	29.2	51.0	28.8
Wilks Lambda	Fed	.885											
	Prov	.805											
F	Fed	2.94**											
	Prov	5.605**											
N			134	112	132	136	779	967	251	252	263	351	3377

% indicating agree somewhat or agree strongly, unless otherwise stated. † % indicating disagree somewhat, disagree strongly, *=p<.05, **=p<.05

Figure 3: Federal trust and efficacy




Figure 4: Provincial trust and efficacy




Table 4: Sub-state political cultures as predictors of general political attitudes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SES				
Age	.034 (.17)	-.042 (.17)	-.049 (.16)	-.040 (.16)
Female	.283 (.07)***	.252 (.07)***	.236 (.07)***	.184 (.06)***
University	-.268 (.08)***	-.125 (.08)	-.108 (.08)	-.177 (.08)**
Income	-.033 (.01)**	-.033 (.01)**	-.039 (.01)***	-.033 (.012)***
Religiosity	-.226 (.10)**	-.207 (.10)**	-.207 (.09)**	-.107 (.09)
Married	-.113 (.08)	-.144 (.25)*	-.143 (.07)*	-.080 (.07)
Federal political culture				
Trust		.098 (.25)	.430 (.27)	.461 (.26)*
Efficacy		-1.277 (.21)***	-.599 (.26)**	-.525 (.25)**
Provincial political culture				
Trust			-.589 (.26)**	-.519 (.26)**
Efficacy			-1.006 (.26)***	-1.087 (.25)***
Political controls				
Left-right placement				-1.209 (.14)***
Political interest				.162 (.11)
Political engagement				-.037 (.03)
Role of provincial gov't				.101 (.07)
Adj R ²	.04	.07	.11	.17

DV=government interventionism. Results are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for OLS regression.