

**Republic to Empire**  
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The paper is titled “republic to empire” because the thesis is that modern republics always end up in empires. “Empire” is of course a broad category. It can connote classical territorial or modern colonial conquest; it can be interpreted as economic expansion; it can be employed as the pejorative cast on human rights interventions in failed states. In this paper, I understand empire loosely to mean any impetus that breaks the bonds of the self-contained republic, and reaches out for expansion (whether military, economic or rights-bearing) beyond the borders of the state. I am dealing in this paper only with modern conceptions of republicanism, beginning with Machiavelli. I have started with Machiavelli, because I accept the view that Machiavelli brackets a new age in thinking about politics as exempt from the judgments of a philosophical or religious foundation of virtue. Republics for Machiavelli are founded on and for freedom, and in that sense, Machiavellian republics are the first model for republicanism generally in the modern West. The essence of a republic, in the modern context, is this preoccupation with freedom, both for the individuals contained within the state, and for the state itself. The paper argues that a state cannot be sustained on such a founding, and eventually crumbles into empire. There is an older, ancient, notion of self-contained states in the political theory of Aristotle that I believe can hold out against the propensity to empire, but I have written about that elsewhere and will not be offering that as an alternative in this paper.<sup>1</sup>

I look at three variants of the modern republic, through Machiavelli, Locke and Kant, to try to show how in each case, despite the differing rationales for republican institutions, none of the three can provide the grounds to resist the spread of republic into empire. Subsequently, I look at the “positive” and “negative” spins on empire in the present context, the former couched in the language of globalization, international governance and cosmopolitanism (Habermas), and the latter in the language of power and multitude (Negri).

Republics and principalities, according to Machiavelli, are founded in violence and justified later by divine authority, law and the protection of liberty, all backed up by the readiness to make war. Hannah Arendt identifies Machiavelli as the true father of all modern revolutions, because we see in his work the central conundrum of power and legitimacy. The perplexity Machiavelli faces is “the task of foundation, the setting of a new beginning, which as such seemed to demand violence and violation, the repetition, as it were, of the old legendary crime (Romulus slew Reus, Cain slew Abel) at the beginning of all history. This task of foundation, moreover, was coupled with the task of lawgiving, of devising and imposing upon men a new authority, which, however, has to be designed in such a way that it would fit and step into the shoes of the old absolute that derived from a God-given authority.”<sup>1</sup> Republics may be founded in freedom, but without a foundation in some justification attached to *purpose* (whether that be a conception of virtue, or a participation in some transcendently guided order), freedom is not easily detached from violence and caprice.

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<sup>1</sup> Bradshaw, “Empire and the Eclipse of Politics”, David Tabachnik and Toivo Koivukoski, Empire: Ancient and Modern. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press) forthcoming

For this reason, Machiavelli's new republic actually requires recourse to a number of fortifying buttresses, including the appeal to divine sanction, the need for constant renewal of foundations, and the resolve to defend the republic aggressively by force against its natural erosion. With regard to the religious question, Machiavelli proclaims that "there is not a single founder of an exceptional constitution for a nation who has not had recourse to divine authority . . . for there are many fine principles that a wise man will acknowledge but that are not sufficiently self-evident to be accepted by ordinary people. . . . and just as religious worship is the foundation of the greatness of a republic, so the neglect of it will bring about its ruin." <sup>ii</sup> Importantly, of course, the appeal to religious authority is for Machiavelli an instrumental means to preserving the republic, not a formative feature of it. A second recommendation from Machiavelli in the preservation of republics is the need to mythologize the founding, and return repeatedly to this founding as an archetypal moment. "There is nothing more essential in any form of communal life, whether of a movement, a kingdom, or a republic, than to restore it to the reputation it had when it was first founded, and to strive to ensure that there are either good institutions or good men who can bring this about." (Discourses, 193). A third piece of advice concerns preparedness for war, and the vigilance over one's territory, though Machiavelli concedes that it is not an easy (perhaps an impossible) task to breed military spiritedness in a people that will voluntarily restrict itself to defense. "The way things work is this: When men are simply trying to avoid having reason to fear their opponents, they begin to give their opponents grounds to fear them. In defending themselves against attack, they attack others, and put them on the defensive, as if there were no choice to be either the attacker or the victim. So you can see one way in which republics fall apart; and also how men advance from one aspiration to another." (Discourses, 141)

We have here three ways in which republics can be preserved: appeal to divine sanction, returning to founding principles, and readiness for war against aggressors. These are *essential for the preservation of republics*, because republics are born in a free act of violence, and because they need both reasons for their continued existence, and the practical means for their continued survival. Religion, patriotic myth, and war: these are actually the core commitments of modern republicanism as set out by Machiavelli. Great will, fortune and astute leadership are required to sustain such a house of cards, as Machiavelli well knows. The erotic allusions in Machiavelli's political science are striking. As John Barnard points out in his recent book Why Machiavelli Matters, "for Machiavelli *virtu* [the quintessential quality of a leader] is a fundamental component of human nature . . . and *virtu* may have an erotic component."<sup>iii</sup> Furthermore "in the evolution from virtue to ruin, arms gradually gave way to letters, and captain to philosopher, in an ironic descent whose unspoken name is corruption". (Barnard, 68). For Barnard, "civic engagement" along Machiavellian lines, requires that we embrace Machiavelli's "effectual truths that have alienated so many Christians and humanist readers. The only alternative to [Machiavellian] realism is to abjure engagement altogether". (Barnard, 125)

Two objections to Barnard's reading of Machiavelli present themselves. First, are we prepared to seriously engage Machiavelli's prescriptions for a calculated religious piety, a reverence for mythical foundations, and a commitment to military aggression as the three essential features of modern republicanism? Second, by Machiavelli's own accounting, the project will probably fail. He admits the precariousness of the project of

republicanism, when set against greater forces of both history and human intention. At several points in The Discourses, Machiavelli tells us that he expects that republics are destined to expand into empires or decay into lassitude because there are just too many artificially imposed constraints required to sustain a republic against its natural corrosion.

“In life nothing stands still. Since things cannot stay in the same place, they must be either rising or falling. There are many things that you would choose not to do, but that you are obliged to do. So if you set up a republic that was well-equipped to defend itself without expanding its territory, and then circumstances forced expansion upon it, you would see the foundations of its strength undermined and it would be quickly destroyed. On the other hand, if heaven so smiled upon it that it was under no necessity to go to war, then idleness would lead either to internal divisions or to effeminacy; either of these, or both of them together, would bring about its collapse. So in my view it is impossible to find a middle way successfully. In drawing up the constitution of a republic, one should therefore aim high, and construct it in such a fashion that if circumstances force it to expand, it will be able to hold on to what it has acquired.” (Discourses, 101)

Maybe we will have better luck looking to the justification of modern republic in the natural rights tradition. John Locke, Michael Zuckert states in the opening of his Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, is arguably “the inspiration for the natural rights philosophy that informed American political thought.”<sup>iv</sup> Citing Locke’s pronouncement that “the production of the diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate is the first object of government”, Zuckert claims that Locke’s republicanism is new, because political economy and economic growth are at the centre of it.

Locke, unlike Machiavelli, bases his republicanism in appeal to both natural law and natural right, thus perhaps promising to rescue republicanism from its nihilistic foundations in violence and freedom, and forestalling its demise by anchoring it to permanent features and capacities of the human condition. Natural right for Locke, as is well known, is the right that human beings have to liberty and equality, and the natural state is one of “perfect freedom to order actions and possessions as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending on the will of any other man.”<sup>v</sup> Locke cautions us that natural liberty is not without constraint, though, as we also have the reasonable capacity to grasp natural law, and natural law teaches us that since we are all “the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker” we can extrapolate from our own self interest to the deduction that we ought not to harm others in their life, liberty or possessions, and that apart from striving to preserve ourselves we ought as much as we can to preserve the rest of mankind. Locke has lots of qualifiers for natural law. Despite the fact that reason instructs us to preserve the rest of mankind as far as possible, we are forgiven that obligation if it comes into competition with our own interests. We have the right of execution in the state of nature, should others invade us and our possessions.

The natural state in Locke’s story degenerated into a state of war because there are those who transgress natural law by attempting to “get another man into his absolute power” (Locke, 113). Where there is no common power to adjudicate dispute, there is no security, and this is of course Locke’s justification for human beings having quit the state of nature for the more secure peace of the commonwealth. Contract is the origin of the

republic, and a contract justified by the story of the failure of natural law. It is natural right to possession and liberty that justifies the contract and the mandate of the republic will be to uphold natural rights. A main part of Locke's story about the deterioration of the natural condition, is about property and the transition from a state of natural equality "wherein all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another" (Locke, 112) to one of state sanctioned inequality. The movement from equal possession to unequal possession of the earth is justified by Locke by the well-known "tacit" agreement in the natural condition to money as a medium of exchange. Locke's only curtailment on possession in the natural condition is spoilage (a man should not appropriate more than he can use), and money makes it possible to horde up as much as one can industriously produce, and trade. Locke not only justifies this transition, he champions it, because labour and industry improve the world and increase the bounty. Locke affirms that "the chief and great end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property". (Locke, 128-129) Since the "great end" of man's entering into political community is the securing of their properties in a state of peace, it follows that the principal task of the state is to devise laws toward that end. Legislative power is derived specifically for this end, and Locke advises the division of powers among legislative and executive branches of government. People agreeing to live under contract according to law, must give up their executive power that they held in the natural condition, to the force of the state, which will be able to summon this executive power (police and military might) against any property-threatening agents, either domestic or foreign.

How does Locke's republicanism measure up against Machiavelli's? We might assume that the founding problem is to some extent "solved" because the republic is theorized as an act of consent (rather than an originary act of violence), but actually, it is violence in the degeneration into the state of war that initiates the republic. Natural law is suspended in the act of covenant. The state will take over what natural law was supposed to effect in the state of nature, and by doing so, it will elevate natural right to its place of ascendancy in the story of the republic. As Zuckert puts this so well: "In the case of Locke, the building stands while the 'foundation' crumbles, because the apparent foundation was never the basis on which the building was actually constructed." (Zuckert, 288) Locke's republic does not need natural law (property and self-interest are enough to keep it going) and it does not need aggressive militaristic conquering male psyches (just busy entrepreneurs). Zuckert again: "The new republicanism honours labour and the work of the private sphere in general . . . labour, production and even consumption are no longer mere needs of the less-than-human in humanity, the merely animalic, but themselves expressive of human freedom". (Zuckert, 318)

But what keeps the new republicanism from sliding into "effeminate" laziness and luxury, on the one hand, or expanding beyond its borders into ever greater piling up of wealth? Machiavelli's third condition of a healthy republic, the invocation of founding myths, will not get much support from Locke's theory. If political union is merely the calculated contract among people anxious to protect their industry and property, loyalty to political institutions would seem to depend upon the ever-present possibilities of acquisition. Locke's republicanism is servant to Locke's nascent capitalism. As Hannah Arendt wrote in her Crises of the Republic, "only legal and political institutions that are independent of economic forces and their automatism can control and check the

inherently monstrous potentialities of this process [capitalism]. Such political controls seem to function best in the so-called ‘welfare states’, whether they call themselves ‘socialist’ or ‘capitalist’. What protects freedom is the division between governmental and economic power, or, to put it into Marxist language, the fact that the state and its constitution are not superstructures.”<sup>vi</sup> There is nothing in Locke’s conception of political contract that is intrinsically tied to the kind of moderation of appetite that is required to sustain an independent republic. Locke’s liberal theory is built on the praise of immoderate acquisition. Imperial expansion, in the form of economic empire, is the natural outgrowth of his political thought.

Now to the third variant on modern republicanism, in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s republicanism is built neither on violent and free founding (Machiavelli), nor on the contract among property holders (Locke), but on the premise that reasonable and free modern individuals have reached a point in history where they are capable of living under laws that they freely give themselves. There is an “ontological” basis to Kant’s republicanism, but it is far more ambitious than Locke’s appeal to natural right. Kant counts on the fact that there is progress in Western history, and that this progress leads toward a consensus among human beings that individual liberty is a great good, and that republican states are the best means of securing that end.

Kant’s political philosophy includes three “tiers” of obligation: one to the categorical imperative that we ought to respect individual autonomy as the highest good (the “universal law of right” tells us to “let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law”);<sup>vii</sup> one to *public right* (“the sum total of those laws which require to be made universally public in order to produce a state of right. It is therefore a system of laws for a people” (Kant, Met. 136) ; and finally, one to *international right* or *cosmopolitan right* (“within the general concept of public right we must include not only *political right* but also *international right*. And since the earth’s surface is not infinite but limited by its own configuration, these two concepts taken together necessarily lead to an *international political right*.” (Kant, Met. 137) If one starts, as Kant does, with the assertion that individual autonomy and right is the rational end for every human being, we can see that his political prescriptions fan out into a defense of states that can protect these ends, and eventually to a whole world that can uphold them. “The rights of man must be held sacred”, says Kant. “All politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance”.<sup>viii</sup>t

Kant is not a natural rights theorist. Rights are things that are historically realized, through much error, blood shed, and the strict imposition of duty over desire. Only advanced peoples can embrace the principles of right on a voluntary basis. Kant’s hope is that all people will eventually come to internalize the norms that underscore the principles of right, but his more pragmatic expectation is that *states* will embrace republican institutions that will enforce the conditions of right, thus encompassing both those who are moral beings, and those who have to be coerced by laws. What this means, in practice, is that Kant puts state before right in some fashion. The task of modern politics is to set up republican states with appropriate checks and balances, which will then *habituate* their citizens into the morality of autonomy and respect for right in others. As Kant famously remarked: “It only remains for men to create a good organization for the state, a task that is well within their capability, and to arrange it in such a way that

their self-seeking energies are opposed to one another, each thereby neutralizing or eliminating the destructive effects of the rest. As far as reason is concerned, the result is the same as if men's selfish tendencies were non-existent, so that man, even if not morally good himself, is nevertheless compelled to be a good citizen. As hard as it may sound, the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils." (Kant, *Per. Peace*, 112) Kant's recommendation is that all states in the world should become republican ones, with division of powers, rule of law, and grounded in the principles of public right.

How does Kant's advocacy of a world of republican states fit with his commitment to international right and cosmopolitanism? Kant is emphatic that we should not aspire to political associations that go beyond the borders of distinct and discrete nation-states. Kant restricts cosmopolitanism to the idea of *hospitality*, that is, that individuals travelling around the globe should be shielded from aggression in stranger states. He rejects any proposition for a trans-state kind of governance, even though he concedes that the idea of cosmopolitan right would seem to lead beyond the defense of the state toward a more universal political association. Kant's reasons for rejecting international governance are entirely pragmatic. Even though a world of separate republican states "is essentially a state of war, unless there is a federal union to prevent hostilities breaking out", Kant says that this state of affairs is "still to be preferred to an amalgamation of separate nations under a single power", because "laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy", (Kant, *Per. Peace*, 113) International government is unwieldy, and likely to end in despotism.

Kant counts on religious and linguistic differences (and people's loyalties to these differences) to prohibit any master plan for international governance. "Nature", he says, has in its proliferation of diversity among peoples, "wisely separate[d] the nations, though the will of each individual state, even basing its arguments on international right, would gladly unite them under its own sway by force or by cunning." (*Per. Peace*, 114) And Kant relies on international commerce to construct a web of interconnectedness that will counter the tendencies of separate nation states to war with each other. By embedding themselves in international trade and monetary markets, "states find themselves compelled to promote the noble cause of peace, though not exactly from motives of morality." (Kant, *Per. Peace*, 114)

To sum up Kant: there is one moral maxim for all human beings, and it is the maxim of right and autonomy. Republican states are the best vehicles for promoting this maxim, and therefore all states should eventually become republican. There is no *rational* defense within Kant's theory for why discrete republican states should not collapse into one universal, global, cosmopolitan state, since political structures are merely the vehicle for the promotion of an independent end (right). There are only practical impediments, based on Kant's understanding that law and right spread too thin over too great a ground dissipates into power. Linguistic and ethnic diversity are applauded, not because these are worthy things in themselves (Kant is no post-colonialist), but because they act as preventive measures against any grand design of world governance.<sup>ix</sup>

Kant has been a powerful voice in contemporary international relations theory, on the side of "globalization" and international governance. Most contemporary post-Kantian theorists have rejected Kant's practical arguments for the restriction of political

right to the sovereign state, and have sought to use his work to back up claims for cosmopolitan citizenship and trans-state governing bodies. We see this in the work of Jurgen Habermas, and David Held, among others. In an interview with Giovanna Borradori shortly after the crashing of the World Trade Centre in New York City, Borradori asked Habermas whether cosmopolitanism, one of the central ideas of the Enlightenment, could still play a useful role in today's circumstances. Habermas replied that we have found ourselves "in the transition from classical international law to what Kant anticipated as a state of world citizenry. That is a fact and furthermore, normatively speaking, I do not see any meaningful alternative to such a development." <sup>x</sup> I do not agree with Habermas that Kant anticipated anything like "world citizenry", but the important point here is that Habermas attributes this to Kant, and he advocates for it. Habermas calls for "the cosmopolitan transformation of the state of nature among states into a legal order." <sup>xi</sup> Habermas holds onto the Kantian commitment of "state before right"; that is, he understands with Kant that "human rights belong within an order of positive and coercive law in which claims to individual rights are enforceable", but Habermas sees no reason *not* to expand that order beyond the republican nation-state into a global or international order. A web of globally enforced rights is not a free and self-governing republican state. It is a bureaucratic policing of autonomous individuals. David Held, one of the most prominent of contemporary globalization theorists, goes even further than Habermas. "Democracy can only be sustained in and through the organics and organizations that form an element of, and yet cut across, the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. The possibility of democracy today must, in short, be linked to an expanding framework of democratic states and committed to democratic public law." <sup>xii</sup>

It was probably inevitable that Kant's theoretical imperatives for the link among individual, political and cosmopolitan right would win out over his practical suggestions for resisting the inclination to collapse these imperatives in the world of real politics. Habermas seems to be right when he says that republic expands into universal rights governance, *according to Kant's own logic*. "Because Kant believed that the barriers of national sovereignty were insurmountable, he conceived of the cosmopolitan community as a federation of states, not of world citizens. This assumption proved inconsistent, insofar as Kant derived every legal order, including that within the state, from a more original law, which gives rights to every human being "qua human being". Every individual has the right to equal freedom under universal laws (since "everyone decides for everyone, and each decides for himself"). This founding of law in human rights designates individuals as the bearers of rights and gives to all modern legal orders an inviolable individualistic character. If Kant holds that his guarantee of freedom – "that which human beings ought to do in accordance with the law of freedom" – is precisely the essential purpose of perpetual peace, "indeed for all three variants of public law, civil, international and cosmopolitan law", then he ought not allow the autonomy of citizens to be mediated through the sovereignty of their states". (Habermas, 128) In the cosmopolitan dream of Habermas (and Held), the protection of the autonomy of individuals is the only justification for law and coercion, and there is no reason why this protection should necessarily be afforded by the independent republic if trans-state organizations can do it better. There is no room in the Kantian or post-Kantian universe for the patriotism, piety and warmongering of the Machiavellian sovereign republic. And

I would suppose that the dream holds out the promise that Kantian morality will trump Lockean greed as the motor of international right.

We have looked at three of the most powerful accounts of modern republicanism, in the work of Machiavelli, Locke and Kant, and I hope I have shown that the modern defense of the republic is weak in every account. Because the modern republic is justified (albeit in differing ways) on the grounds of freedom, it cannot contain itself politically. It always expands outward. Does it always become empire though? Empire is a pejorative term, and certainly people like Habermas and Held do not see cosmopolitanism, global governance and universal law as imperialistic. They see these phenomena as progressive politics for a new globalized world. “The future ought to be conceived in cosmopolitan terms”, says David Held, with “a new institutional complex with global scope, given shape and form by reference to basic democratic law” (Held, 250).

I will end the discussion with Antonio Negri. Negri’s view of globalization is that it is “dominated precariously by neo-liberal ideologies”.<sup>xiii</sup> Negri prefers the terms “empire” and “multitude” to describe contemporary international politics. Ten years ago, Negri metaphorically categorized contemporary empire as “a new kind of mixed government, which is a combination of monarchy, aristocracy and a form of democracy which lies below us and which we call multitude”. (Negri, 140) The United States was the monarch. The world aristocracy was made up of “nation-states and their intermediaries, but above all made of the great movements of the multinationals, which were not co-terminus with those of the American global empire and which occasionally tried to re-balance the system in their own interests”. And the multitude he targeted as “no longer a mass, but a new ensemble of singularities . . . no longer massified and undifferentiated, but with a maximum of differences.” (Negri, 140) Now, Negri sees a shift in empire, or what he calls a “constitutional recomposition” of it. He predicts an alliance among America and the formerly second-tier nation-states and multinationals, and he sees these allies coming together increasingly to transform what were formerly state armies into policing networks for unstable parts of the world. “The world’s armed forces have become mobile, dynamic, more or less mercenary (as the police are also mercenary), available to intervene promptly when required in order to impose order, organized in networks and around mobile units, and providing simultaneously both a capacity for intervention and a capacity for assistance, organization, nation-building and ‘democratic constitutions’. Soldiers and missionaries at the same time.” (Negri, 142) From Negri’s perspective, the cooperation among global actors to bring basic democratic law through international institutions to supposedly “failed states” is the most current, and most pervasive form of empire.

Negri believes the days of rescuing the republic from the encroachment of empire are over. (Negri, 5) If Hannah Arendt was right, that only legal and political institutions that are independent of economic forces and their “automatism” can preserve a republic from being swallowed up in economic empire, then the republic is not merely in crisis, it is dead. Negri might be regarded as on the “left”, but he clearly also has abandoned any Marxist notions of the solidarity of the proletariat, national or international. There is no such thing for Negri in the contemporary world as “the people”, or the “working class”. Sitting underneath the “monarchical” and “aristocratic” forms of power that Negri has identified, is an ever shifting and realigning plurality of voices and interests that have the potential to disrupt power. “The political body of the multitude is invested by the

mobility of populations, by emigrations, by the metamorphoses of desires and by aspirations to formal rights.” And the multitude sits boiling under the ethos of a dominant global capitalism.

For Negri, “the entry into the age of Empire implies processes which are irreversible. These irreversible processes are not to be interpreted within a traditional vision of cyclical development [Machiavelli], nor should they be viewed in the light of theories of stages [Kant, Hegel, Marx]. There no longer exists a possibility of reversing these global dynamics.”(Negri, 5) Negri envisages a world beyond the dyad of republic and empire, beyond the polarity between sovereignty and cosmopolitanism, and he sees this innovation as “monstrous” (Negri, 66) It is monstrous because of “its absence of measure” (Negri, 66) “Monstrous” is precisely the term that Arendt used to describe the unchecked potentialities of process-capitalism. (Arendt, *Crises*, 213) but a major difference between Arendt and Negri is that Arendt continued to believe that the republic could be salvaged by the reinvigoration of a “public sphere”. (Negri dismisses Arendt’s enthusiasm for the American republic, accusing her of “falling into the game of constitutional mystification”, Negri, 204)

In this paper, we have seen that the seeds of the “monstrous” may have been sown in the West as far back as Machiavelli, and while they may have been staved off by the heroic efforts to justify freedom within the confines of republican politics, the cumulative effects of empire may have permanently broken the dam walls.

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<sup>i</sup> Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Penguin, 1964) 38-39

<sup>ii</sup> Machiavelli, “The Discourses”, Book One: Chapter Eleven, David Wootton, ed, *Machiavelli: Selected Writings* (Hackett, 1994) 115.

<sup>iii</sup> John Barnard, *Why Machiavelli Matters* (Praeger, Westport Connecticut and London, 2009) 65

<sup>iv</sup> Michael Zuckert, *Natural Rights and the New Republicanism* (Princeton University Press, 1994) xv

<sup>v</sup> John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, Andréa Veltman, ed, *Social and Political Philosophy: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 2008) 112

<sup>vi</sup> Hannah Arendt, “Thoughts on Politics and Revolution”, *Crises of the Republic* (New York and London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969) 213

<sup>vii</sup> Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, H.S. Reiss, ed. *Kant’s Political Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 1970, 1991) 133

<sup>viii</sup> Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, Reiss, ed, *Kant’s Political Writings*, 125

<sup>ix</sup> In a footnote to perpetual Peace, Kant writes: “Religious differences – an odd expression! As if we were to speak of different *moralities*. They may certainly be different historical *confessions*, although these have nothing to do with religion itself but only with changes in the means to further religion, and are thus the

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province of historical research. And there may be just as many different religious *books* (the Zend-Avesta, the Vedas, the Koran, etc.). But there can be only *one religion* which is valid for all men in all times. Thus the different confessions can scarcely be more than the vehicles of religion. These are fortuitous and may vary with differences in time or place.” (114)

<sup>x</sup> Jurgen Habermas, Giovanna Borradori, ed, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (University of Chicago Press, 2003) 38

<sup>xi</sup> Jurgen Habermas, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace With the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight”, James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1997) 149

<sup>xii</sup> David Held, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order”, Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, Perpetual Peace,

<sup>xiii</sup> Antonio Negri, Empire and Beyond, trans. Ed Emery (Polity Press, 2008) 34