

The Pernicious Path: The Reactionary Nature of Nationalism and the Birth of the Sikh
Nationalist Movement in India

John Francis Cappucci, B.A. Hons. (Distinction), M.A.
Doctoral Candidate
Comparative Politics
Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
jcappucc@connect.carleton.ca

Panel N6(C): Nations and Nationalism: Ethnic, Civic and Spatial Identities

Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference

Thursday May 28, 2009, 9:00AM-10:45AM

The Pernicious Path: The Reactionary Nature of Nationalism and the Birth of the Sikh Nationalist Movement in India

In one of the earliest texts on nationalism published in the twentieth century, the Bengali humanist, Sir Rabindranath Tagore denounced nationalism as a “great menace” (111) to modernity. Tagore further echoed this distaste for nationalism by suggesting that it is hubristic and linked with conflict: “The naked passion of self-love of nations, in its drunken delirium of greed, is dancing to the clash of steel and the howling verses of vengeance” (133). Naturally, one may contend that Tagore’s comments are merely the words of a paranoid poet who takes pleasure in making ominous observations about current events. However, there is veracity in his words, as it seems that Tagore’s prophetic pronouncement began a trend of revulsion for nationalism.

I contend that nationalism is not a sporadic sentiment that suddenly appears, but rather is a reaction-based process, that arises when a nation’s survival becomes threatened by an external power and thus forces the nation to solidify its heritage through a variety of means. The responsive nature of nationalism is clearly exemplified in the Sikh nationalist movement in India and further can be divided into three stages of development: conflictual, creational, and confrontational. The conflictual stage begins when there is a direct threat on the nation from an external or foreign force. This stage of nationalism is demonstrated with the religious and ideological incursions made by Hinduism on Sikhism, through the Arya Samaj movement and the events leading up to the Gurdwara Reform movement. The creational stage is formulated when an overarching organization of elites either resurrects, constructs, or reconstructs a nationalist sentiment or myth that is used to galvanize the masses and to provide some form of opposition to the state’s policies. In the Sikh case, this stage of nationalism occurred when the Akali Dal personified itself as the contemporary Khalsa Brotherhood and began to equate piousness with voting. This phenomenon can

largely be explained by making use of Anthony Smith's argument that nationalism is a "political myth" ("Myth" 1) that is used to unify the masses by evoking emotions and images of past glories. Finally, the confrontational stage occurs when the nationalist movement has lost the ability to operate through traditional political channels and thus mutates into a militant opposition that employs violent forms of political action. This stage is exemplified during the 1980s when the Akali Dal lost power in the Punjabi legislature, largely as a result of immense Hindu immigration in the Punjab brought about by the labour demands of the Green Revolution. The fall of the Akali Dal caused a power vacuum that was filled by radical Sikh leaders, who employed non-traditional political tactics.

Nationalism is a cryptic concept that not only occupies and perplexes the minds of scholars (Anderson 3-4), but also produces a diverse array of definitions. In the most rudimentary sense of the word, Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1). In other words, the dominant nation within a specified geographical boundary should also wield the political power and operate governmental mechanisms in that predefined area. However, Eric Hobsbawm feels it necessary to append the characteristic of "political duty" (Hobsbawm 9) to Gellner's definition in order to distinguish nationalism from "other and less demanding forms of national or group identification" (Hobsbawm 9). This duty not only comprises notions of loyalty and patriotism, but also "overrides all other public obligations" (Hobsbawm 9) to the point that nationalists may be called upon to engage in combat with another national group or even the state in which they currently reside in (Hobsbawm 9). However, one must also recognize the point that any discussion of nationalism is intrinsically based on the entire concept of the nation.

One classical definition of the nation is provided by Joseph Stalin who argues that it is "a historically evolved stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common

language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (qtd. in Jha 194). Notice how Stalin omits the requirement of geographical sovereignty, whereby the nation wields political control and power over a specific geographical region. This missing characteristic gives rise to nationalism whose primary concern is to “obtain and use state power” (Newman 21); nonetheless, this primary function arouses the concern of some scholars who criticize nationalism for leading nations on a pernicious path that can result in degrees of conflict, especially in multi-ethnic states.

There is a sentiment of concern among contemporary scholars, such as Will Kymlicka that “multi-ethnic states are in trouble” (Kymlicka 111) due to the failure of the state to “sustain any sense of solidarity across ethnic lines” (Kymlicka 111) and its inability to “develop effective means for accommodating ethnocultural diversity” (Kymlicka 112). It is evident that self-determination is the weapon-of-choice used by the secessionist as it represents a “legitimizing ideology” (Horowitz 166), considering “no nation imagines itself conterminous with mankind” (Anderson 7). In other words, because of the inherent differences, all nations have divergent and opposing destinies; moreover, in order to realize these deluded dreams, it is necessary that the nation has complete control over its own interests. In many cases, the nation perceives itself as a distinct entity that is legitimately entitled to some form of self-determination. Simon Caney believes that multinational states typically make use of “weak national self-determination” (152), where the state permits the nation to have some form of self-government, including “confederations, federations, consociational democracies, and unitary states with sub-national autonomy” (Caney 152) in order to secure stability and promote peace. However, when the state refuses to entertain these demands or is unable to meet these requirements, the nation may seek the “strong” (Caney 152) version of national self-determination, whereby the nation seeks to secede officially and legally from the state (Caney 152).

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, it has been argued that India is “too vast in its area and too diverse in its race” (Tagore 114) to prevent ethnic conflict from engulfing the entire state. Naturally, there is some legitimacy to this claim, considering that India has a population of over one-point-one billion, has fourteen official languages, and is comprised of a myriad of different religious groups, including Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, Zoroastrians, Bahá’is, Jews, and Sikhs (Zemek 36). In such a diverse and multi-ethnic state, it is only expected that each group will attempt to assert its own distinctiveness; moreover, these groups will become particularly sensitive, reactive, and possibly even hostile to other groups who attempt to influence, convert, or dominate them. There is little debate that the British colonial presence inhibited India’s natural development; however, from a minority group’s perspective the British realized the cultural, religious, and social differences and attempted to “recognize India’s diversity by incorporating many layers of state structures; from princely states to tribal regions, recognition of indigenous social customs through state’s legal and administrative directives” (Tatla 306). From a practical perspective, this task was difficult to accomplish due to the diverse composition of India. However, this difficulty did not dissuade the British as they felt a sense of “natural sympathy for minorities” (Tatla 306), which was not appreciated by the Hindu majority (Tatla 306). Once the British departed and rendered control over to the Hindu majority, this inclusive system was “dismantled” (Tatla 307) in favour of a Hindu “ethnocracy” (Tatla 307) that was exclusionary in nature, particularly towards the Sikhs. However, it is important to note that these exclusionary practices and policies against the Sikhs were popularized centuries before the partition; in fact, since its birth in the fifteenth century, Sikhism has been victim to these domineering practices, which have been largely orchestrated by the Hindu majority.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Punjabi-based Hinduism was undergoing an internal revolution, in order to defend itself against British influences, such as

Christianity, and cultural incursions (Mahmood 333) and return Hinduism to the *Ram Raj* or Golden Age (Mahmood 333). In 1875 a Hindu fundamentalist and ascetic, Swami Dayananda Saraswati founded the Arya Samaj [Society of Aryans], which was a religious “revivalist movement” (Bombwall 20) concerned with *sanghatan* or unification of all Hindus and the return to the Vedas (Bombwall 20; Jones 43; Kumar and Sieberer 101; Lubin 388; Mahmood 333; Pandey 15; Tan 660). The Arya Samaj movement was largely concerned with internal self-evaluation, whereby the various Hindu sects concerned themselves with “consolidation, unification, and organization” (Mahmood 333) and a vociferous purging of all exogenous practices that emerged from foreign forces, such as Islam, Christianity, and the British (Fox 123). However, aside from Saraswati’s religious rhetoric, he was also a staunch Indian nationalist who proudly proclaimed that “Aryan was the chosen people, Vedas the chosen gospel, India the chosen land” (qtd. in Pandey 15). In order to realize his goal of creating an all-Aryan and all-Hindu India, it was necessary to recapture lost elements of Indian society, in order to unify Indians and to make them more inclined to secure independence (Pandey 15). The most controversial task in the Arya Samaj movement was the process of *shuddhi* [conversion] or reincorporating lost members of other faiths, particularly those of the supposed the “Sikh cult” (Ashta 245), back into the respective folds of Hinduism (Mahmood 334). Max Weber refers to this process of reincorporating “lost” elements as “Hinduization” (14) and suggests that it was in Hinduism’s best interest to “define Hinduism as broadly as possible” (14) in order to ensure their survival at this difficult time and protect the “significance of their natural culture” (14). It was largely believed by Saraswati’s followers that Sikhism was a direct offspring of Hinduism (G. Singh, *Politics* 57) and thus should naturally return to Hinduism, as Sikhs are inescapably “part of the larger Hindu community” (G. Singh, *Politics* 57). The Arya Samaj movement was largely successful in converting hundreds of Sikhs “back” to Hinduism (Kumar and

Sieberer 101), which not only alarmed Sikh aristocrats and political elites, but forced them to consolidate their power and attempt a counter-movement in order to ensure the survival of the Sikh faith.

In order to counteract forceful Hindu proselytizing and the subversive practices of the Arya Samaj, Sikh elites organized a countermovement, known as the Singh Sabha [Sikh Reformist Society] (G. Singh, *Politics* 46). Initially, the Singh Sabha was a single revivalist society that sought to promote the various tenets, traditions, and practices of the Sikh faith (Jordens 164); however, after a period of years, the single Singh Sabha society multiplied into hundreds of branches (Tan 660). In order to realize these goals, the Singh Sabha societies engaged in a variety of pursuits, including establishing religious schools, publishing materials, promoting cultural events, encouraging literacy, and attempting to revive interest in the Sikh faith in general (Kumar and Sieberer 101; Tan 660). The Singh Sabha movement was successful in establishing a “distinct and separate identity for Sikhs” (G. Singh, *Politics* 46; Tan 658), as the threat of the Arya Samaj forced Sikhs to regroup and reunify, which “strengthened their own subnational identity” (Malik 347). However, in addition to unifying the Sikh population in the Punjab, the Singh Sabha was also responsible for laying the political groundwork for the rise of the influential Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee (SGPC) and its contentious militant and political arm, the Akali Dal.

In the twentieth century, the Sikh gurdwaras [Temples] became corrupted by Hindu influences, practices, rituals, and prayers. Since its inception in the fifteenth century, Sikhism has been highly sensitive to the infusion of Hindu beliefs and practices within its own faith, let alone within its temple walls. Since the eighteenth century, Sikh gurdwaras were under the care of the Udasis, which was a Sikh sect founded by Guru Nanak’s eldest son, Sri Chand (G. Singh, *Politics* 47). Originally, the Udasis were respected for their piety,

minimalism, and theological aptitude (Kapur 43); however, after time, the Udasis and their piousness dissolved and they were replaced by a corrupt coterie of hereditary *mahants* [managers] whose sole concern was for the fruits of the physical world, including women, gambling, alcohol, deviance, and most importantly, the accumulation of wealth (Jeffrey 68; Kapur 44). This new prime directive led to one of the most blasphemous and impious actions known to the monotheistic and iconoclastic faith: the allowance of Hindu idols into the Golden Temple in order to attract the Hindu faithful and thus augment the amount of donations (G. Singh, *Politics* 48). Again, this Hindu incursion enraged orthodox Sikhs and initiated a general cry for help from the Sikh faithful. It was later resolved that the *mahants* needed to be removed from their sacred duties, in order to protect the gurdwaras from corruption and blasphemy (Malik 347). In 1920, the Central Gurdwara Management Committee or Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee (SGPC) was established in order to act as custodians to the Golden Temple in Amritsar and the other Sikh gurdwaras in the Punjab (Chaudhry 267; G. Singh, *Politics* 49). However, the SGPC was still required to enforce their ordinances and to recapture the various gurdwaras from the corrupt mahants; as a result, the “more radical elements” (Chaudhry 267) of the SGPC sanctioned the formation of its militant arm, the “Army of Immortals” (Chaudhry 267) or the Akali Dal. During the nascent period, members of the Akali Dal were not only described as a troupe of “turbulent, fanatical drug addicts” (Chaudhry 268) that struck fear in the hearts both their enemies and allies, but also, the more serious charge, was that they were interested in garnering political power (Chaudhry 268). As more and more gurdwaras conceded to SGPC power through various tactics of the Akali Dal, it was believed that the militant-wing was no longer necessary; nevertheless, the Akali Dal assumed another function in Sikh society: “The characteristic form of nation-building among the Sikh community has been

undertaken by the Akali Dal since the 1920s” (Tatla 208). The newly assumed function of the Akali Dal function greatly alarmed Indian nationals.

In 1924, Mahatma Gandhi wrote a letter to the Secretary of the SGPC, which expressed his sincere interest in being “enlightened” (Chaudhry 275) on the purpose and functions of the Akali Dal (Chaudhry 275), as the violent actions, fierce ant-Hindu rhetoric, and the growing power of the Akali Dal distressed the national leader (Chaudhry 275). Even Jawaharlal Nehru wished to be informed on the functions of this new force in the Punjab; eventually, he studied the situation and proclaimed that the foundation of the SGPC and the Akali Dal was the beginning of “Sikh religious nationalism” (qtd. in A. Singh 226) in India. The late prime minister was correct in his prediction as the Akali Dal became the institutional embodiment of Sikh politicalization and agitation within the Indian state. However, at this time, the SGPC and the Akali Dal were still consolidating their influence and still did not reach political maturity until the passage of the Sikh Gurdwara Act by the Punjabi Government in 1925 (McLeod 56). In addition to placing direct guardianship of all Sikh gurdwaras and their coffers under the control of the SGPC and Akali Dal, the Sikh Gurdwara Act “provided an institutional structure for Sikh communal separatism” (Kapur 194), which would guarantee their political influence long into the future.

After the passage of the Gurdwara Act, the SGPC and the Akali Dal accumulated immense financial resources, access to sound platforms, influence with the faithful, and political capital that no other Sikh organization could even try to rival (McLeod 57). Once the SGPC and the Akali Dal resolved matters within the Sikh community and secured unlimited power over the Punjab gurdwaras through the passage of the Sikh Gurdwara Act, it was necessary to attempt to garner a sense of sovereignty from the approaching Indian independent state. After the gurdwaras issue was settled, the Akali Dal slowly dominated the now placated and somewhat neutralized SGPC (Kapur 199); moreover, the Akali Dal

now could move uninhibited in its quest for a *Khalsa Raj* [Sikh Rulership]. Before the Akali Dal could accomplish this task, it was necessary not only to employ a political tactic that could be used to unify the Sikhs in one political cause, but ensure that even disinterested Sikhs believed that such a course was in their best interest.

This creation of myths is central to all national, ethnic, and religious groups and varies. For example, Africans consider Ethiopia the “heartland of all civilization” (Cohen 37), Armenians claim to house Mount Ararat, where Noah docked after months in the relentless rain making them the children of a new generation (Cohen 43), and, Mussolini vociferously reminded Italians of their forgotten, yet glorious Roman past. These “myths of origins” (Smith, “Myth” 14) are not only necessary to provide a nation with their respective historical and cultural background, but also can effectively galvanize the masses in the pursuit of a goal that is specifically tailored to suit the desires of the elites: “The aim throughout is to present a vivid, archaeologically faithful and comprehensive record of the nation from the dawn of its existence until the present in a convincing and dramatic narrative form, which will inspire the members of the *ethnie* to return to ancestral ways and ideals, and mobilize them to create on its basis a modern nation” (Smith, “Myth” 13). Usually, the elites tend to create a “dramatic narrative” (Smith, “Myth” 13) by employing various “folk-tales, ballads, epics, customs and rituals” (Smith, “Myth” 13). Before these myths can be imposed on society and recognized by the masses, an elite organization must not only implement them, but temper them to fit their selfish needs. The American historian David Marr’s comment that “we are all imprisoned by myths” (qtd. in Jeffrey 71) seems to be true, considering that elites have utilized this form of deception in order to secure their own sense of power. For example, in the Sikh case, the Akali Dal is considered one of these elite organizations, not only because its leadership comes from the “well-to-do and highly educated segment of the

community” (Malik 348), rather than “traditionalist elements” (Malik 348), but also because they too employ deceitful myths in order to secure power.

Irrespective of the various opinions on this contentious subject, one must agree that the Akali Dal has acted as the political lynchpin of Sikh society and has “played a pivotal role in both the religious and political mobilization of the Sikh community” (Malik 348). However, one is left to ask how the Akali Dal has been able to secure support and mobilize the masses to their cause. The Akali Dal took notice of this religio-historical period in Sikhism and began to conjure fancifully the wonders that could be achieved if the charisma of Guru Gobind Singh and the political elements of his reign could be harnessed and adopted to contemporary India. Anthony Smith describes these actions as the process of “instrumentalism” (Smith, “Myth” 2), whereby “cultural attributes and cleavages are infinitely malleable and subject to manipulation by elites and vested interests” (Smith, “Myth” 2). This fusion of myth and politics is considered a rather typical tactic among political institutions and elites: “Elective institutions make it necessary to rally voters. To do so, a politician has to speak to them, and often, to talk to them about their past. By using familiar stories—Popular History—and dressing them in the garb of Academic History, the politician may prove an argument to an audience about past injustice and the need for future change” (Jeffrey 66-67). In order to garner power, the Akali Dal became “inextricably linked with the Khalsa itself” (Mahmood 334). The Akali Dal has now encroached into a position of power, considering they now have the ability to make use of religious rhetoric in order to secure the political causes; particularly, the Akali Dal has made use of Gobind Singh’s concept of *Khalsa Raj* [Sikh Rulership], which is clearly a rallying point for oppressed Sikhs (Chima 850). From this high religious ground, the Akali Dal was able to denounce non-supporters as heretic and “traitors of the *panth* [Sikh community]” (Kapur 197). This maneuver has not only been relied upon by the Akali Dal, but has been a major point of contention among the

Indian electorate who has frequently consulted the various election tribunals on the contentious actions of the Akali Dal (Kapur 198). For example, in the 1962 Punjabi provincial election, one Akali Dal candidate promulgated a myriad of religio-political slogans that made it a religious duty to vote for the Akali Dal and a sin not to: "You must all vote for me, because I alone am the true representative of the Sikh religion while my opponent [Congress Party], being a non-Akali candidate, is an enemy of the Sikh Panth" (qtd. in Kapur 198). This form of virulent rhetoric incurred the contempt of the Punjabi High Court who overturned his election, claiming that he intentionally suggested that the Akali Dal was for Sikhs and the Congress was for Hindus (Kapur 198). Granted, the unnamed politician's decree represents how Indian society now has become polarized based on religious lines, which although may be considered a negative aspect, still is a relatively common trend in many multi-ethnic states. However, Sikh nationalists would no longer remain confined to a peaceful politico-religious party, but rather mutated into a militant movement for independence that was replete with violence and destruction.

Upon independence in 1947, the Indians not only inherited a vast and diverse territory, but also a state that was consumed with poverty, not to mention utilized outmoded techniques of agriculture that significantly contributed to this problem (Parayil 740). Eventually, the Indian government refocused its priorities and began to concentrate its efforts on reforming the agricultural industry. This historical period, known as the Green Revolution, witnessed many changes in Indian agriculture, including the shift from a subsistence-based to market-based agricultural system, improved irrigation, introduction of high-yielding varieties (HYV) of seeds and grains, utilization of vociferous pesticides and concentrated fertilizers, obtaining funding from international organizations, and the creation of agricultural universities (Frankel 6; Jayakar 461; Parayil 742-749). It is evident that the Green Revolution produced the best results in the Punjab region of India (Day and Singh 9;

Frankel 12; Parayil 753). Punjabi farmers not only acquired the most profits, but also had the resources to guarantee constant work and high wages, which were attractive to Indians living outside the Punjab (Gill and Saini 62).

In order to assist in the massive economic boom transpiring in the Punjab, Sikh landowners and farmers required a large and inexpensive workforce; as a result, they sought cheap and unorganized labour from outside the Punjab, particularly from other Hindu-dominated Indian states that were somewhat inhospitable to agriculture, including Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan (G. Singh, *Green* 220; Randhawa 180). Although the migrant Hindu workers entered the Punjab with little resources and lived with even less, they still retained one inalienable right: enfranchisement (G. Singh, *Green* 220), which would mean problems for the Sikh's Akali Dal. This conundrum was translated into a reality in 1980, when the Congress party garnered twelve out of the thirteen federal seats in the Punjab and received fifty-four percent of the provincial seats (Kapur 218). Due to the Congress party's victory, the Akali Dal was unable to form a coalition government and was forced to rely on other non-traditional power techniques, in order to prevent the 'dangers' of *Hindutva* [Hinduness] from infecting the Sikh *panth*.

In 1978, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, an orthodox and parochial Sikh cleric, entered Punjabi politics. Initially, Bhindranwale and associates engaged in violent confrontations with Nirankari Sikhs, whose faith in a living guru incurred the wrath of orthodox Sikhs (Kapur 226); moreover, Bhindranwale went so far as to order the assassination of the Nirankari guru in 1980 (Kapur 226). In reference to the "old guard" of the Akali Dal, the majority of its leaders were "dazzled" (Malhotra 258) by this charismatic leader, considering he had the ability to gather "unprecedented support" (Malhotra 258) for Khalistan: "His supremacy in Sikh politics was now complete and unshakeable. He moved into the Golden Temple complex where, surrounded by his armed acolytes he held court,

spewed venom again the government and Hindus, contemptuously called Indira ‘that Brahmin woman’ and ordered murder squads where and when to strike next” (Malhotra 258). However, Bhindranwale’s attacks became more randomize, with numerous violent attacks on Punjabi Hindus (Kapur 227). By October 1983, matters escalated beyond control, forcing Indira Gandhi to invoke presidential rule over the Punjab (Kapur 226). Gandhi’s legal action not only supplied vehement rhetorical fuel for Bhindranwale, but also provided a sense of legitimacy for his violent actions, by suggesting that it was his intention to protect Sikhism from Hindu incursions (Kapur 228).

Once a politico-religious organization can no longer effectively operate through traditional political channels established by the state and feels “alienated” (Smith, *National* 137), the organization can mutate into a militant movement with secessionist aims: “Where disaffected *ethnies* become alienated enough to resort to terror and revolt, their ethnic nationalism may become the vehicle for a new national identity that draws many members of the community involved in the conflict into a new type of politicized vernacular culture and creates a different kind of participant society” (Smith, *National* 137). In other words, a new national identity and political culture emerges in an environment plagued by estrangement or hostility towards the *ethnie*. This change occurred when the Akali Dal fell from power, which gave rise to Sikh fundamentalists like Bhindranwale to fill the power vacuum. However, this change in leadership not only revolutionized Sikh ideology, but also reorientated the trajectory of the Sikh Khalistan movement from a peaceful protest movement to a militant and terrorist-based insurrection.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, while the Western powers were engulfed in national wars, Tagore respectfully suggested that the West can learn from India’s example of peaceful coexistence with other nations, even within her own boundaries: “If India can offer to the world her solution, it will be a contribution to humanity. There is only one

history—the history of man. All national histories are merely chapters in the larger one” (Tagore 99). Unfortunately, Tagore’s India no longer exists. Instead, it has become riddled with ethnic and national conflict based on religious, cultural, and class, and political lines. One must realize that nationalist movements are largely responsorial and the product of a previous action that nationalists find intolerable. In order to ensure that violent conflict does not arise from this pernicious principle, it would be in the best interest of political actors to concern themselves with producing right actions in order to prevent deadly reactions.

Works Cited

- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1992.
- Ashta, Dharam Pal. "Sikhism as an Off-Shoot of Traditional Hinduism and a Response to the Challenge of Islam." *Transactions of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study Volume 4: Sikhism and Indian Society*. Calcutta: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1967. 230-246.
- Bombwall, K. R. *Indian Politics and Government since 1885: A Study of the Nationalist Movement and Constitutional Development in India since 1885*. Delhi: Atma Ram, 1951.
- Caney, Simon. "National Self-Determination and National Secession: Individualist and Communitarian Approaches." *Theories of Secession*. Ed. Percy B. Lehning. New York: Routledge, 1998. 151-181.
- Chaudhry, K.C. *Role of Religion in Indian Politics (1900-1925)*. Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 1978.
- Chima, Jugdep S. "The Punjab Crisis: Governmental Centralization and Akali-Center Relations." *Asian Survey* 34.10 (1994): 847-862.
- Cohen, Robin. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. Seattle: U of Washington P, 1997.
- Day, Richard H. and Inderjit Singh. *Economic Development as an Adaptive Process*. London and New York: Cambridge UP, 1977.
- Fox, Richard G. *Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making*. Berkeley and London: U of California P, 1985.
- Frankel, Francine R. *India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1983.
- Gill, D.K. and S.K. Saini. "Social Implications of Green Revolution." *Social, Economic and Political Implications of Green Revolution in India*. Eds. B.S. Hansra and A.N. Shukla. New Delhi: Classical, 1991. 60-67.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.
- Horowitz, Donald L. "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23.2 (1981): 165-195.
- Jayakar, Papul. *Indira Gandhi: A Biography*. Delhi: Penguin, 1993.

- Jeffrey, Robin. "Grappling with History: Sikh Politicians and the Past." *Pacific Affairs* 60.1 (1987): 59-72.
- Jha, Hetukar. "Stages of Nationalism: Some Hypothetical Considerations." *National and Ethnic Movements*. Eds. Jacques Dofny and Akinsola Akiwowo. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980. 193-200.
- Jones, Kenneth W. "Communalism in the Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contribution." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 28.1 (1968): 39-54.
- Jordens, J.T.F. *Dayananda Sarasvati: His Life and Ideas*. Delhi: Oxford UP, 1978.
- Kapur, Rajiv A. *Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986.
- Kumar, Ram Narayan and Georg Sieberer. *The Sikh Struggle: Origin, Evolution, and Present Phase*. Delhi: Chanakya, 1991.
- Kymlicka, Will. "Is Federalism a Viable Alternative to Secession." *Theories of Secession*. Ed. Percy B. Lehning. New York: Routledge, 1998. 111-150.
- Lubin, Timothy. "Veda on Parade: Revivalist Ritual as Civic Spectacle." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 69.2 (2001): 377-408.
- Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley. "Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order." *Asian Survey* 29.3 (1989): 326-340.
- Malhotra, Inder. *Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989.
- Malik, Yogendra K. "The Akali Party and Sikh Militancy: Move for Greater Autonomy or Secessionism in Punjab?" *Asian Survey* 26.3 (1986): 345-362.
- McLeod, W.H. *The Evolution of the Sikh Community*. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1976.
- Newman, Saul. "Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why States Still Matter." *Comparative Politics* 33.1 (2000): 21-41.
- Pandey, Dhanpati. *The Arya Samaj and Indian Nationalism: (1875-1920)*. Ram Nagar, New Delhi: S. Chand, 1972.
- Parayil, Govindan. "The Green Revolution in India: A Case Study of Technological Change." *Technology and Culture* 33.4 (1992): 737-756.
- Randhawa, M.S. *Green Revolution: A Case Study of Punjab*. Delhi: Vikas, 1974.
- Singh, Attar. "The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee and the Politicisation of the Sikhs." *Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century*. Eds. Joseph T. O'Connell, Milton Israel, Willard G. Oxtoby. Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 1990. 226-232.

Singh, Gopal. *Politics of Sikh Homeland (1940-1990)*. Delhi: Ajanta, 1994.

---. "Green Revolution, Punjab Economy and Punjab Crisis." *Social, Economic and Political Implications of Green Revolution in India*. Eds. B.S. Hansra and A.N. Shukla. New Delhi: Classical, 1991. 201-229.

Smith, Anthony D. "The Myth of the 'Modern Nation' and the Myths of Nations." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 11.1 (1988): 1-26.

---. *National Identity*. Reno and London: U of Nevada P, 1991.

Tagore, Rabindranath. *Nationalism*. London: Macmillan, 1917.

Tan, Tai Yong. "Assuaging the Sikhs: Government Responses to the Akali Movement, 1920-1925." *Modern Asian Studies* 29.3 (1995): 655-703.

Tatla, Darshan. "A Race Apart." *Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World*. Ed. Paul Spickard. New York and London: Routledge, 2005. 299-317.

Weber, Max. *The Religions of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism*. Trans. and eds. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale. Glencoe, IL: Free P, 1958.

Zemek, Karol. "India by Numbers." *New Statesman* 135.4777 (2006): 36.