Political Values and Individual Attitudes toward Ethnic Diversity in Canada

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Do political values shape attitudes about ethnic minority integration in Canada? It is often taken for granted that political values inform attitudes about ethnic diversity. Conservatives, it is commonly said, are more likely to take an individualistic approach to ethnic diversity issues and, so, will tend to demand that ethnic minority communities integrate into the Canadian whole. Conversely, liberals and social democrats are more likely to recognize group identities and the uneven political, social, and economic playing field that advantages some groups and disadvantages others. These people will be more likely to support the distinctiveness of ethnic minority communities and encourage cultural retention. But, what is it exactly about these ideologies that result in this attitudinal cleavage about ethnic minority issues? Which specific political values – the sub-units of ideology – drive individuals to think the way they do about Canada's diverse society? How durable is the influence of values? Attitudes about ethnic minorities have greatly changed over the past 40 years: do political values represent a bulwark against further change, or can values shift like any other attitudinal influence? Finally, are attitudes about ethnic minorities that appear to be driven by political values really driven by other, less seemly, factors, such as ethnic prejudice or material self-interest? That is, do people use political values to mask other motivators, or do people mean what they say when they cite principled positions?

Discovering the influence of political values on Canadian attitudes is important if we are to understand the complex motives behind individual responses to ethnic diversity issues. I argue that the stakes are high – failing to understand the motives that shape attitudes about ethnic diversity encourages misinterpretation of the public mood and misguided policies that are meant to manage ethnic group relations. The ultimate consequence of this failure is interethnic hostility, something that Canada has largely managed to avoid. However, the lack of obvious interethnic hostility, compared to the outbreaks in violence in Western Europe, does not mean that the political status quo is stable or even desirable. Given Canada's ethnically diverse population, a fact that will continue for the foreseeable future, understanding what factors lead to generative attitudes about ethnic diversity is key for a healthy and productive society.

This paper looks at the role of political values in driving attitudes relevant to the ethnic diversity debate in Canada, specifically the protection of ethnic minority cultures. In particular, two values are considered: 1) valuing the role that collective identities play in people's lives and 2) valuing the government's ability to intervene in the social realm. With public opinion data from the 1995 and 2003 Canadian portions of the International Social Survey Programme, I compare the influence of these values on attitudes toward ethnic minority culture with the more common explanations of ethnic prejudice and material self-interest. I find that political values have an independent influence on attitudes about ethnic diversity – that is, political values are not just a cover for other factors. Moreover, their influence appears to be stronger, but not necessarily more enduring, than other factors.

The paper develops this analysis in three sections. First, the literature on political values and ethnic diversity issues is explored. Second, summary statistics are employed to explore the main ideas in the paper. Since the current analysis is addressing a considerable research gap in the Canadian literature, it is appropriate to spend some time on preliminary empirical analysis. Finally, multivariate regression analysis is used to

look at the relationship between political values and attitudes about ethnic minority integration.

Political Values and Ethnic Diversity

What values are quintessentially Canadian and how might they influence attitudes about the protection (or integration) of ethnic minority cultures? The Canadian literature has dedicated considerable attention to the first question, but very little attention to the second. Decades of research have looked at broad, theoretical questions of Canadian values, especially in the search for the elusive "Canadian identity" (e.g. Horowitz 1966; Lipset 1990; Resnick 2005; Azjenstat 2007). The role of conservatism, liberalism, and socialism in shaping Canadian political culture has been debated endlessly.

But, how do Canadians actually incorporate these ideologies in their every day lives? The literature investigating Canada's political culture is largely silent on this question. It has been suggested that people tend not to be driven by complex, cohesive ideological systems (Converse 1964). Thus, the literature's focus on ideologies limits explanations of the role of values in shaping Canadians' attitudes. As such, I move away from abstract ideologies in this paper and instead look at their component parts: political values, or the principled positions people hold about political issues. Narrowing the lens from ideology to values makes more sense from a theoretical and empirical standpoint, putting this study in a better position to examine the relationship between values and attitudes about ethnic minority cultural protection.

Because this study moves from questions of ideology to questions of values, it is exploring largely uncharted territory in Canadian political science. The lack of research in this area is, in part, due to the fact that ethnic diversity issues do not dominate policy debates in Canada as they do in other countries. While the issue of race is an enduring controversy in the United States, for example, Canadian political movements with large racial policy components have either failed to catch on or have moderated their policy position over time. For example, the Reform party's early wariness of Canada's changing ethnic composition was stridently downplayed in their ultimately successful 2006 federal election campaign (Russo 2008). Moreover, while the public is ambivalent on certain questions about immigrants, it has exhibited consistently high levels of support for multiculturalism – a symbol of Canada's ethnically diverse society (Adams 2007).

The lack of public debate does not mean that Canadian voters ignore ethnic diversity issues. Controversies, such as the backlash against multiculturalism in the early 1990s and more recently, the debate around 'reasonable accommodation' demonstrate that Canadians can express strong opinions about their diverse society. But how much of this debate is shaped by political values? In a rare study, Sniderman et al. (1996) find predictable partisan differences in attitudes toward immigrant integration. But partisanship is only loosely – and sometimes spuriously – related to the principled stands that political values represent. Outside Canada, more research has been conducted on this issue (e.g., Citrin et al. 2001; Espendshade and Hempstead 1996; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Despite the increased attention, the field is considerably anemic.

The two values investigated here are common in discussions of Canada's political culture. The first value – horizontal collectivism – pertains to an individual's understanding of the basic unit of society (Singelis et al. 1995; Triandis 1995). Horizontal collectivists see individuals as fundamentally integrated into social groups,

and that these collectives provide important psychological grounding for the individual through a collective identity. These collectives, which are seen as different but equal, are critical for individuals to survive and thrive in society, providing common purpose and genuine freedom. This view can be contrasted with vertical collectivism and individualism. Vertical collectivists are similar to horizontal collectivists, except that the groups composing society are seen as legitimately hierarchical rather than equal. Individualists, on the other hand, see individuals, rather than groups, as the basic unit of society. People subscribing to this view value self-reliance and personal sovereignty and, consequently, devalue group identities in the struggle for individual liberty.

These distinct perspectives will result in different, but predictable, attitudes related to the ethnic diversity debate *if individuals hold these values in good faith*. That is, a horizontal collectivist should be sympathetic of ethnic minority grievances based on identity struggles if she is principled in her horizontal collectivist perspective. Since she generally feels that society is truly more than a sum of isolated individuals, she will recognize that ethnic minority collective identity is important for members of that community. Moreover, she will support proposals that are meant to right inequalities between different ethnic communities. Vertical collectivists and individualists, on the other hand, will be less sympathetic and perhaps outright disdainful of identity claims made by ethnic minorities. Vertical collectivists will likely view ethnic minority collective demands as infringing on the organic societal hierarchy, and individualists will likely view these demands as violating the core idea of individual equality.

The second value investigated here affects attitudes about the role of government. This value is practical, shaping preferences for what can be done about political challenges. Citizens in liberal democracies tend to have moderate attitudes about the role of government: few citizens want government involvement in all or none of their lives. Moreover, Canada is typically regarded as middling when compared to other liberal democracies, with countries like the United States tending toward less government involvement and Northern European countries tending toward more government involvement (Gwartney et al. 1998).

Similar to collectivism, there are different ways in which an individual can value government intervention. In other words, people can agree that the government should intervene, but disagree about the arena in which intervention should take place. For example, an individual who thinks the government should intervene in the economic realm to address economic disparities may be sympathetic to demands by ethnic minority groups for stronger employment equity legislation. The same person, however, may believe the government should not intervene in the social realm and, thus, be unsympathetic to demands by ethnic minority groups for religious accommodations. Individuals can also agree about the realm of intervention, but disagree about the particulars. Social conservatives, for example, tend to think the government should intervene with moral issues, but not with issues related to the stratification of society. Social liberals, on the other hand, tend to think the opposite: the government should leave moral issues alone and, instead, provide equality of social outcomes for all its citizens.

In Canada, this value will be closely linked to attitudes toward ethnic minority cultural protection since matters of cultural protection (or integration) are largely the purview of the Canadian federal government. The federal department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada facilitates areas of integration ranging from skills accreditation,

language courses, becoming a citizen, and how to survive the Canadian winter. CIC also houses the Multiculturalism Program, the departmental branch responsible for federal multiculturalism policies, which draws its mandate from the 1988 Multiculturalism Act. The Multiculturalism Program funds various programs intended to support Canada's ethnic diversity. Thus, while the main branch of CIC funds integration, the Multiculturalism Program funds cultural differentiation, a key part of Canada's political response to its immigrant communities. Individual attitudes about the role of government in society, then, could determine specific attitudes toward publicly-funded programs directed toward immigrants, independent of other attitudinal determinants, such as prejudice or material self-interest.

Methods and Analysis

Data from the Canadian portion of the 1995 and 2003 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) are employed to look at the effects of these values on attitudes about ethnic minority cultural protection. Using data from two time periods provides a stronger test of the hypotheses. It also supports observations about the durability of values over time. The dependent variable is derived from a survey question inquiring about the role of government in the protection of ethnic minority culture. The respondent is asked if she agrees or disagrees that "Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions" (1=disagree strongly, 5=agree strongly). The question is a good measure of the issues at stake here. Not only does it reference ethnic minority group identity, it clearly links the role of government to a salient aspect of the ethnic diversity debate – whether ethnic minorities should fully integrate into Canada's society or if they should retain some cultural distance.

The first political value – horizontal collectivism – is measured by *identity*. The survey question asks how important it is for someone to feel Canadian to be truly Canadian (1=very important, 4=not at all important).[1] The question does not directly elicit opinions about ethnic minority collective identity. Instead, it is an indirect reference to the competing identity claims at play in the ethnic diversity debate. Attitudinal studies focusing on sensitive political issues, such as interethnic relations, are more robust when they use indirect survey items rather than items explicitly mentioning the sensitive issue. Direct items have been shown to underestimate negative attitudes since the respondent is aware the attitude in question is socially undesirable (McConahay et al. 1981).

I suspect that individuals who do not think it is important to feel Canadian to be truly Canadian will value collective identities in the mode of horizontal collectivism. Consequently, these individuals will be more likely to support government-funded preservation of ethnic minority cultures if they are not paying lip-service to horizontal collectivism and use the value in good faith to shape attitudes about a variety of political issues. Conversely, respondents who say it is important to feel Canadian to be considered truly Canadian may be motivated by the value of liberal individualism or vertical collectivism. Liberal individualists feel citizens should identify primarily with an individualistic pan-Canadian identity and not a differentiated, collective identity (ethnic or not). Vertical collectivists oppose identities that infringe on the perceived organic

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[1] The question is "Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Canadian. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is...[to feel Canadian]."

social hierarchy and insist on loyalty to the larger social group (in this case, Canada).[2] The data do not differentiate between these last two motivations. As such, *identity* should be empirically thought of as measuring horizontal collectivists and non-horizontal collectivists.

It is possible that respondents will interpret the meaning of *identity* differently. Given Canada's multicultural character, some respondents thinking about 'feeling Canadian' might think about the tenuous dual identity stressed at the heart of multiculturalism: identifying with one's group and with Canada simultaneously (Berry 1984). Thus, agreeing that feeling Canadian is important to be truly Canadian might include positive attitudes toward collective identities. This nuanced view of multiculturalism is likely more academic than real-world, so I suspect that the average respondent will interpret the idea of feeling Canadian exclusively. Thus, the relationship between *identity* and the dependent variable should be negative – the less important feeling Canadian is, the more likely a respondent will support ethnic minority cultural preservation.

The second measure – *intervene* – taps attitudes about government intervention. The survey asks if Canadian television should give preference to Canadian films and programmes (1=disagree strongly, 5=agree strongly).[3] Similar to *identity*, this variable does not directly reference government intervention with regard to ethnic minorities. Thus, answers to this question should be primarily driven by the respondent's position on the value of government intervention in general, rather than any other politically sensitive issue. It should also be noted that *intervene* does not directly implicate the federal government as intervening into Canadian television programming. However, the issue of Canadian content on Canadian airwaves is, by default, an issue of government intervention. The government's attempts to protect Canadian culture by regulating Canadian media have been on Canadians' political radar for decades. It is expected that respondents will think of government intervention when asked about the issue of media and cultural protection. Specifically, respondents who agree that Canadian TV should give preference to Canadian content will likely be comfortable with government intervention in general. As such, they will be more likely to agree with government-funded ethnic minority cultural protection as compared to respondents who do not agree with Canadian content preferences if their stance on government intervention is a principled value.

Before exploring the relationship between political values and attitudes about ethnic minority cultural protection, I investigate some summary statistics to illustrate the main variables. The bar graph in figure 1 is a simple distribution of the dependent variable in 1995 and 2003. It shows that attitudes about ethnic minorities receiving government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions are similar at both time periods. In 1995, about 60% of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with the idea of publicly-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation, whereas about 19% agreed or

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[2] Vertical collectivism is a value, even though it can be closely linked to prejudiced attitudes. Vertical collectivism is associated with values such as preservation of tradition, deference to authority, and following the majority (Triandis 1995). These values can easily generate prejudice, which Allport (1954) defined as antipathy derived from flawed and inflexible generalizations. Variables added to the analysis (discussed in the next section) will help control for this secondary influence.

[3] The question is "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Canada's television should give preference to Canadian films and programmes.]"

agreed strongly; about 21% were neutral. Eight years later, 65% of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with the statement, whereas 17% agreed or agreed strongly; about 17% were neutral. Thus, a majority of respondents opposed the idea of ethnic minorities receiving government support for cultural preservation in both periods. This finding tempers (though does not disprove) claims that Canadians' attitudes toward various issues in the ethnic diversity debate are increasingly tolerant (Adams 2007).

[Figure 1 about here]

Might political values explain differences in attitudes about this particular aspect of ethnic integration? Tables 1 and 2 display crosstabulations to provide a sense of possible associations between the responses. Table 1 contains values for the dependent variable and *identity*; table 2 is for the dependent variable and *intervene*. I have collapsed the positive and negative categories for easier interpretation.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

Considerable divisions between respondents holding different values are immediately evident. In table 1, the gap between respondents that agree and disagree that minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their traditions is about 11 percentage points in 1995. In 2003, the gap is considerably smaller at about four percentage points. In table 2, the gap between positive and negative responses to government-funded minority cultural preservation is about 20 points for respondents who agree that Canadian television should give preference to Canadian programming in 1995. The gap is about 15 points for respondents who disagree. In 2003, the gap between positive and negative responses to government-funded minority cultural preservation is about 21 points for respondents who agree that Canadian television should give preference to Canadian programming and about 16 points for those that disagree.

The attitudinal gaps with *intervene* are considerably larger than with *identity*. Still, the differences for each value at each time point indicate that there may be an association between these values and attitudes. The tables also hint that the influence of values may change over time. In particular, the smaller gap in Table 1 may indicate the waning influence of horizontal collectivism on the question of government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation.

Multivariate Analysis

The cross-tabulations are only intended to provide a first glance at the data. Multivariate statistics are now employed for a more detailed analysis of the effect of different values on attitudes about government support for minority cultures. As a reminder, the dependent variable references attitudes about government assistance given to ethnic minorities for cultural preservation. Because the dependent variable is limited and ordered (five possible responses with a natural order), I employ ordered logit regression estimated with maximum likelihood. The maximum likelihood estimates (the log of the odds) have been converted to odds ratios for easier interpretation.

The main independent variables in the models are the items included in the crosstabular analysis: attitudes about feeling Canadian to be truly Canadian (*identity*), a proxy for horizontal collectivism, and attitudes about regulating Canadian content on Canadian television (*intervene*), a proxy for views on the role of government.

Several sets of controls are added to the analysis. The first set of controls measure two typical explanations about attitudes towards ethnic minorities. The first rival explanation, arguably the most common, focuses on ethnic prejudice. The most influential theory of ethnic prejudice is derived from the social psychological idea of social identity (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979). An individual's cognitive need to simplify the complex social world results in the perceptual formulation of *ingroups* and *outgroups*. The individual defines her ingroup parameters with identities salient to herself. Others who do not fit within her parameters are placed in outgroups and are often regarded with greater or lesser degrees of suspicion. While most social identity research suggests that ingroup bias results in prejudice against outgroups (Turner and Reynolds 1999), it has been compellingly argued that ingroup bias is independent from outgroup prejudice (Brewer 2002). As such, the current view of social identity is that it is composed of the related, but distinct, aspects of ingroup identification and outgroup resentment.

For the current analysis, I add three variables, interacting two of them, to tap this two-pronged idea of social identity. The first two variables measure ingroup identification. The respondent's self-reported ethnic heritage – *ethnic* – is a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not her heritage is "white". The respondent is coded as white if she identifies with a typically Caucasian heritage; all other responses are coded as "non-white" (see appendix for variable construction). *Ethnic* is interacted with *salience*, which is the reported salience of the respondent's ethnic identity. The surveys do not include the same measure of ethnic identity salience, so the time periods are not directly comparable in this case. In 1995, respondents are asked how close they feel to their ethnicity. In 2003, respondents are asked to identify their top three important identities from a list of identities, which includes "race/ethnic background" (see appendix). I interact *ethnic* and *salience* since the influence of *salience* should depend on the ethnicity of the respondent. For instance, white respondents with high ethnic salience should be more resistant to government programs intended to preserve ethnic minority cultures, since the high identification with the white ingroup should result in wariness of stronger non-white outgroup identities. Conversely, non-white respondents with high ethnic salience should be more supportive of these government programs, since the programs tend to target visible minorities.[4]

The third variable – *crime* – measures outgroup resentment. The question asks if the respondent agrees or disagrees that immigrants increase crime rates (1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly). This variable is another indirect measure of the concept: while it references immigrants, it is not eliciting an attitude *per se* (a like or dislike), but an assessment of a proposed fact. Agreeing with the statement suggests a prejudiced attitude. It may be true that a respondent has experienced rising crime rates due to immigrants. However, to generalize this anecdotal evidence to all immigrants would fit part of Allport's classic definition of a prejudiced attitude, which is an antipathy derived from a faulty and inflexible generalization (Allport 1954). As such, *crime* can act as a suitable proxy for immigrant-targeted outgroup resentment.

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[4] Canadian multiculturalism policy originated, in part, due to advocacy from ethnic minority, yet white, communities. However, as Canada's immigration patterns have changed over the past thirty years, multiculturalism has evolved to focus more on Canada's visible minority communities. Moreover, popular understanding of multiculturalism is now about the integration or distinctiveness of visible minorities.

The second rival explanation of attitudes about ethnic minorities is material self-interest. What may appear to be attitudes targeting ethnic minorities may actually be a concern about the impact of increased economic competition and increased material uncertainty (Kluegel and Smith 1983; Mayda 2006; Palmer 1996). Thus, resistance to the government assisting ethnic minority cultural preservation may be a concern about the zero-sum allocation of public resources. It is not obvious, however, how resistance to this issue might be shaped. One line of argument is that upper class individuals tend to be more economically conservative, viewing their ability to maintain and build their wealth as negatively related to the size and activity of government (Corneo and Gruner 2001). As such, they should tend to resist government intervention. However, upper class individuals may be less resistant to government intervention relative to other classes, since their economic security means they will be the least affected by redistribution. On the lower end of the economic scale, hypotheses are also mixed. For example, opposition to redistribution might be strongest amongst the working class because they are the least economically secure (Wellman 1993), or it might be the strongest amongst the middle class because their privileged economic status is the most tenuous (Rieder 1985).

Status of employment (*job*) is controlled here as an objective indicator of economic concern. It measures if the respondent is employed full-time (1) or not (0). I also include a measure for household income, measured in thousands (*income*). These measures of material self-interest are interacted as well. Looking at employment status or household income on their own could obscure scenarios of lesser-employed individuals who feel economically secure because their household income is high or individuals with lower household income who feel financially secure because of full employed.

The model also controls for the respondent's age, education, and gender. Older and better-educated respondents typically hold more tolerant attitudes because of the more diverse life experiences these individuals tend to have. Moreover, women have recently been associated with more socially progressive attitudes (Gidengil et al. 2005).

Table 3 presents the odds ratios of the ordered logit regression. As hinted at in the crosstabulations, both political values tend to be associated with the dependent variable at statistically significant levels. In 1995, respondents who say that it is not important to feel Canadian to be truly Canadian (*identity*) have a higher probability of agreeing that ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions. This value shapes the probability of agreeing with publicly funded cultural preservation above and beyond common rival explanations for attitudes about ethnic minorities. In other words, these respondents do not appear to be paying lip-service to the value of horizontal collectivism or using it as a cover for less principled attitudes. They appear to genuinely value collective identities and this value influences their attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Opposition to the dependent variable by respondents who are not horizontal collectivists (i.e., those who assert that feeling Canadian is important to be truly Canadian) does not appear to be solely driven by ethnic prejudice or material self-interest. At least part of their opposition is motivated by their individualistic or vertical collectivist values.

Notably, the influence of horizontal collectivism disappears in 2003. This result suggests that political values should not be necessarily viewed as enduring and transcendent determinants of citizens' attitudes. Indeed, past work in Canada has shown

societal-level value change for other important social issues over relatively short periods of time (Matthews 2005). It would be premature to speculate why the influence horizontal collectivism disappears. It certainly deserves further study.

Supporting the idea of government intervention in the economic realm (*intervene*) is associated with the dependent variable in both years. Specifically, respondents who agree that Canadian television should give preference to Canadian films and programmes have a higher probability of agreeing that the government should assist ethnic minorities to preserve their customs and traditions, regardless of the respondents' social identity and material self-interest. In other words, when respondents indicate that they value government intervention as a principle, they mean it. Alternatively, when respondents indicate that they value government restraint in the economic realm, they tend to apply that value to the realm of ethnic minority integration, as well.

[Table 3 about here]

As demonstrated, the political values estimated here are typically associated with changes in the dependent variable. However, the rival explanations also exert some influence. The social identity variables can only be plausibly interpreted in 1995. As expected, the interaction term suggests that the effect of ethnic salience depends on the respondent's ethnicity. Predicted probabilities facilitate the interpretation of the ingroup identification and interaction variables.[5] For instance, the predicted probability of a white respondent with a highly salient ethnic identity and average scores on all other variables strongly disagreeing with government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation is about 16 per cent (se=.015). The probability decreases to about eight per cent (se=.018) if the respondent is non-white. This result conforms to the social identity supposition that groups with stronger ingroup identity will be more hesitant to support the bolstering of outgroup identities. Given that ethnic minority cultural preservation will tend to directly help non-whites more than whites, whites that have a strong collective identification with other whites should be more hesitant to support this type of government program.

Outgroup prejudice is also associated with attitudes about ethnic minorities: the third variable in the social identity slate – *crime* – is significantly associated with attitudes about government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation at both time periods. Not surprising, faulty generalizations about immigrants increasing crime rates decreases the odds of agreeing with the dependent variable.

The second rival explanation – material self-interest – exerts some influence in both years. Specifically, household income is negatively associated with attitudes about government-funded ethnic minority cultural protection: the odds of agreeing with government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation decreases with higher household income. Thus, the hypothesis about increasing economic conservative preferences as income increases is supported. Employment status and the interaction are not significant.

Other socio-demographic variables – age, education, and gender – have no relationship with the dependent variable.

Since odds ratios do not easily demonstrate the shape of associations, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the association between the main independent variables (*identity* and *intervene*) and the dependent variable with predicted probabilities. Probabilities are

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[5] All predicted probabilities in this paper are simulated with CLARIFY software (Tomz et al. 2003).

generated to simulate a fully employed, self-identified white female with average scores on all other variables. In 1995, for example, the predicted probability of this respondent strongly disagreeing with government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation decreases from 22 per cent if she feels it is very important to feel Canadian to be truly Canadian to 18 per cent if she feels it is fairly important to feel Canadian (or, moving one point on the dependent variable's four-point scale). The effect of *identity* is modest, but Figure 2 confirms that it does have a role to play in shaping attitudes toward ethnic minority cultural protection.

The effect of *intervene* on the dependent variable is larger, but follows a pattern similar to *identity*. In 1995, for example, the probability of the same respondent strongly disagreeing with government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation decreases from 34 per cent if she strongly disagrees that Canadian tv should give preference to Canadian content to 27 per cent if she only disagrees (moving one point on the five-point scale). In 2003, the probability decreases from 44 per cent to 36 percent. The simulations further illustrate the fluctuating influence of values, as illustrated with the greater over-all influence of *intervene* on attitudes toward the dependent variable in 2003 than in 1995.

[Figure 2 and 3 about here]

Discussion

Ethnic prejudice and material self-interest are often cited as the common sense reasons for people's wariness of ethnic minority communities exerting themselves. This study shows that principled political values – and not just abstract references to ideology – should be added to the list of attitudinal determinants. In fact, the analysis here demonstrates that political values exert influence that is stronger and more consistent than rival explanations, at least in the area of ethnic minority integration. Specifically, political values focusing on horizontal collectivism and government intervention shape attitudes about government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation. The influence of these values generally withstands the inclusion of popular rival explanations, suggesting that individuals claiming to hold these political values are being honest. They are not using them to mask negative or self-serving attitudes.

These findings have theoretical importance, since the way in which attitudes about ethnic diversity are formulated is sorely under-researched. Discovering that political values shape attitudes about ethnic diversity, and more importantly, which political values shape which attitudes, should prompt much-needed discussion about this link. This study has only investigated a minute portion of the possible political values and issues in the ethnic diversity debate. Much more research needs to be done to determine how generalizable these findings are.

These findings also have practical importance for policy-makers and opinion leaders. Ethnically diversifying societies is a political challenge in many Western democratic societies. Knowing that political values influence attitudes about ethnic diversity could offer more fruitful political solutions to the tensions that can arise –and have arisen – in these societies. It also may point to reasons why Canada has largely avoided these ethnic tensions and how durable this relative ethnic harmony is.

Because the dependent variable names a specific issue with ethnic minority integration – the place of government to facilitate the retention of cultural distinctiveness of ethnic minority communities – this study should be of importance to Canadian policy-makers, in particular. Figure 1 illustrates that Canadians are generally wary about

government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation. If government, however, believes that its legislative commitment to multiculturalism requires its intervention to protect ethnic minority culture, it could appeal to the political values outlined here as a way of generating public support. The multivariate analysis suggests that values are not necessarily a durable, unchanging attitudinal influence. Thus, a public campaign targeting values as a way of arguing in favour of government intervention could be a success.

Appendix

Construction of Independent Variables

Ethnic

"To which ethnic or cultural groups did your ancestors belong? (Select two if applicable)"
[Only one option recorded in data]

1995
Categories classified as 'white' are English and Welsh, Irish, Scottish, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish.
Categories classified as 'non-white' are Black, Chinese, South East Asian, Latin and South American, North American Indian, and Métis.

2003
Categories classified as 'white' are English, Scottish, French, German, Eastern European, Western European, and Jewish.
Categories classified as 'non-white' are Black, Chinese, East Indian, Latin or South American, Middle Eastern, African, North American Indian, Inuit, or Métis.

Salience

1995
"How close do you feel to your ethnic group?"

2003 [The variable measures if the respondent chose "race/ethnic background" as either of her three options.]

"We are all part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing who you are? and the second most important? and the third most important?"
a) Your current or previous occupation (or being a homemaker).
b) Your race/ethnic background.
c) Your gender (that is, being a man/woman).
d) Your age group (that is, Young, Middle Age, Old).
e) Your religion (or being agnostic or atheist).
f) Your preferred political party, group, or movement.
g) Your nationality.
h) Your family or marital status (that is, son/daughter, mother/father, grandfather/grandmother, husband/wife, widower/widow, not married, or other similar)
i) Your social class (that is upper, middle, lower, working, or similar categories)
j) The part of Canada that you live in

Figure 1: Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.


Table 1: The importance of feeling Canadian to be truly Canadian and attitudes about government assistance for ethnic minority cultural preservation.

	Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.		
	Disagree	Neither	Agree
It is important to feel Canadian to be truly Canadian.			
1995 (n=1432)			
Not important	9.6	14.2	20.7
Important	90.4	85.9	79.3
2003 (n=1003)			
Not important	6.7	10.8	10.9
Important	93.3	89.2	89.1

Table 2: Canadian TV should give preference to Canadian films and programmes and attitudes about government assistance for ethnic minority cultural preservation.

	Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.		
	Disagree	Neither	Agree
Canadian TV should give preference to Canadian films and programmes.			
1995 (n=1446)			
Disagree	33.79	16.94	18.71
Neither	23.3	33.89	18.35
Agree	42.91	49.17	62.95
2003 (n=1159)			
Disagree	39.48	17.41	23.32
Neither	23.27	32.34	18.13
Agree	37.25	50.25	58.55

Table 3: Attitudes toward government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation.

	Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions	
	1995	**2003**
Feel	1.287***	1.135
	(0.091)	(0.112)
Intervene	1.391***	1.394***
	(0.074)	(0.083)
Ethnic	1.531	–
	(0.834)	
Salient	1.874***	–
	(0.317)	
*Ethnic*Salient*	0.732*	–
	(0.132)	
Ethnic	–	1.008
		(0.271)
Salient	–	1.881
		(0.918)
*Ethnic*Salient*	–	0.622
		(0.337)
Crime	0.683***	0.765***
	(0.038)	(0.048)
Employ	1.039	0.586
	(0.282)	(0.238)
Income	0.940*	0.918**
	(0.033)	(0.038)
*Employ*Income*	0.971	1.064
	(0.049)	(0.068)
Age	0.997	0.999
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Education	1.011	1.072
	(0.051)	(0.067)
Gender	1.052	1.079
	(0.121)	(0.146)
Observations	1075	826

Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.
*** $p<.001$; ** $p<.05$; * $p<.1$

Figure 2: Importance of feeling Canadian while strongly disagreeing with government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation


Figure 3: Canadian TV should give preference to Canadian film and programmes while strongly disagreeing with government-funded ethnic minority cultural preservation

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