COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN ANGLOPHONE WEST AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION OF THE GHANAIAN AND NIGERIAN EXPERIENCES

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Abstract

Development administration is now over half a century old and it has exhibited paradigmatic shifts and epistemological crises. Yet, while global research on development administration remains dominated by western thoughts and ideas owing to the western origins of the sub-discipline, this dominance continues to hamper scholarship on development administration amongst African intellectuals and academics whose works are dwarfed by their western counterparts. To this end, this paper argues that there is a need to encourage collaboration amongst western and southern researchers. To do this, the paper comparatively reviews the research of African intellectuals and academics along certain discernable patterns of convergence, divergence and/or persistence in the paradigmatic shifts and crises exemplified through western modernization models and African responses and reactions.

Introduction

Development administration- now also referred to as development management- is now over half a century old and it has exhibited paradigmatic shifts and epistemological crises (Dwivedi et al 2007: ix). These shifts and crises discussed below while evident on a global scale, have particularly affected both the theory and practice of development administration on the African continent where western thoughts and ideas continue to dominate the direction of research as well as the implementation of programmes designed from outside the continent (Kasfir 1969: 94; Dwivedi and Nef 1982: 59). However, perhaps more problematic is the inadequacy of research and comparative studies/perspectives by resident researchers on the African continent whose intellectual contributions to the theory and practice of development administration remain dwarfed by the dominance of western academics. To this end, this paper seeks to search for answers in the literature by comparatively reviewing the research of African intellectuals and academics along certain discernable patterns of convergence, divergence and/or persistence in the paradigmatic shifts and crises exemplified through

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western modernization models and African responses and reactions. The paper focuses specifically on Anglophone West Africa, and particularly the experiences of Ghana and Nigeria where scholarship on the topic has remained active despite the aforementioned challenges.

The first section of the paper discusses the historical background and contextual framework of development administration in Anglophone West Africa where the practice of development administration- as opposed to its inchoation as a post-war II academic discipline- had always existed in one form or the other amongst societies that now form modern Ghana and Nigeria. Also, the section outlines the contextual framework in which the paper is situated. The second section examines how researchers in both countries have responded to the paradigmatic shifts and crises occasioned by modernization theorists and neo-liberal ideologues whose influence on the practice and study of development administration on the continent remains high, not least as expressed in the activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). In addition, ongoing calls by African academics for an active role of the state in the development process in the two countries through the creation of democratic and developmental states are examined. Following this, the third section explores the contributions of two Anglo-North American aid agencies- United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) - to foster governance values in line with the promotion of the democratic and developmental states model advanced by researchers on the continent. The paper then concludes that given the dominance of development administration research in African countries by western thoughts and ideas, a new frontier of discourse that promotes a cross fertilization of ideas and collaboration between both western and southern scholars is needed in order to ensure a better theorizing and possibly practice of development administration on the continent.

Development Administration in Ghana and Nigeria: Historical Background and Contextual Framework

Even though Development administration as a discipline originated in the West and has been dominated by Western thought (Dwivedi and Nef 1982:59), its practice in African societies as always existed in one form or the other. Despite the initial lack of studies in early African history which according to Rodney (1972: 82) were due to colonial considerations that “African history was of so little value to be reconstructed, and also because studies of Africa were mainly carried out by European bourgeois anthropologists, whose philosophical outlook on ‘primitive societies’ caused them to separate African history from its historical context” (ibid), scholarly study of African history, centred on Africa rather than as an extension of European history (Inikori 1981: v) has gone on for over 5 decades and therefore provide the basis for a historical review of development administration in present day Ghana and Nigeria. Thus, to understand the evolutionary dynamics of development administration in Africa, it is crucial to categorize the changes that occurred into the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial time periods. These periods can be streamlined into the pre-slave/slave trade, colonialism and independence eras.

Before the advent of slavery, many African societies had their own social organizations through which societal ideals of progress were managed. Traditional African social and political institutions in the words of Adejumobi (2000: 149) included ‘many different patterns of philosophy and culture’. These cultures Adejumobi stated evolved thousands of years and represent successful attempts of African societies to integrate themselves with their environment. African institutions he further stated were also marked by inter-related, yet diverse institutions, many of which suffered in the throes of the modernization process. Hence, as Ayittey (2006: 235) observed, Ghana was, by 1068, the
The largest, wealthiest, and most powerful state in West Africa. Situated in the vast savanna area between the Senegal and the Niger, its authority extended from the frontiers of Terkur to the western banks of the Niger, and from the Madingo area in the south to beyond the fringes of the desert in the North. While this confirms the level of political organization in Ghana, much can also be argued for the societies that now occupy Nigeria such as the Oyo Empire in the west and Igbo society in the east. The former was renowned for its advanced pre-colonial administrative organization that included institutions of checks and balances, and the latter despite been an acephalous society practiced development along a highly organized functional line in which everyone had a stake. Yet, as the numerous research works on these systems of administration continue to show, understanding the impact of slavery equally remains a continuous process regardless of the areas of convergence, divergence and persistence in the literature on slavery that at best still continues to polarize Western and African scholars. But as Patrick Manning (1990:8) rightly noted,

The story of slavery in the modern world is not a pretty one, nor an uplifting one. It is an unhappy chapter in our history which, one might think, is best forgotten, but scholars and readers continue to be fascinated with slavery, for slavery was not an ancient institution which carried forth inequalities of our earliest days, it was also an oppression important- and perhaps unavoidable- in the construction of our contemporary world.

While the full consequences of slavery on the development of African societies might never be known, what is however obvious is the enduring legacies of inequalities that it wrought on the continent. For instance, although there is not, and possibly will never be an agreement on how many slaves were taken in total during the 7th and 19th centuries when the Tran Atlantic, Trans Saharan, Indian Ocean and Red Sea slave trades took place in view of the various estimates that exist (see for instance Curtin 1969; Rodney 1972: 104; Wolf 1982: 195; Inikori 1982: 22; Davidson 1984: 147; Eltis 1987: 243-254; Oliver and Fage 1988: 103; Daget 1989: 64; Manning 1990: 84; Curtin 1995: 187; Iliffe 1995: 137; Isichei 1997: 326-327; Falola and Warnock 2007: xvi), recent estimates by Nunn (2008: 152) put the total number of slaves taken from present day Nigeria and Ghana at 2,021,859 and 1,614,793 respectively, making the two countries the second and third largest slave producers after Angola.

To be sure, the impact of such a large depletion in manpower can be better understood through Rodney’s (1972:105) explanations that ‘the massive loss to the African labour force was made more critical because it was composed of able-bodied men and women as slave buyers preferred their victims to be between the ages of 15 and 35, and preferably in the early twenties; the sex ratio being about two men to one woman.’ Moreover, with the exports went also their skills which could have been used for the development of the societies where they came from. As the American historian, Professor John Hope Franklin emphasized, ‘the captives who became slaves did not come to the New World empty handed’: in language, music, graphic arts, sophisticated patterns of agriculture and other economic pursuits, and an understanding of the functions of government, they early became a part of an evolving New World culture in the islands and the mainland (of the Americas) (cited in Davidson 1984: 148).

In addition, the institution of slavery also led to significant alterations in inter-communal relations on the continent. The impact of these institutions during the era of slave trade was indeed huge as this tradition of slavery helped to shape the involvement of African states and leaders in the Trans-Atlantic trade in particular. Wars raids, kidnappings, and the collection of tribute payments led to the enslavement and sale of millions of men, women and Children (Falola and Warnock 2007: xvi). According to Falola and Warnock (ibid), African
leaders, in turn, saw their power increase as they gained access to imported goods such as guns, allowing them to wage war against neighbouring states.

Finally worthy of note about the impact of slavery on development administration in Africa is the spread of corruption. As Manning (1990: 36) succinctly recognized, ‘slavery was corruption: it involved theft, bribery, and exercise of brute force as well as ruses. Slavery thus may be seen as one source of pre-colonial origins of modern corruption’. The whole story on corruption, according to Manning, involves weaving together flaws inherent in African society, the influence of the slave trade, the influence of colonial rule, and the pressures of the mid-twentieth century.

However, as the changing economies, associated with the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century made the use of slaves less necessary, the alternative and profitable trade in raw materials and manufactured goods called for changes in demand (Falola 1999: 44). Thus, even before the famous 1885 Berlin Conference where the scramble and partition of Africa were finalized, the presence of the British in West Africa had already started taking roots as Lagos was declared a Crown Colony in 1861 before the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria was done in 1914. Similarly, in 1874 the British organized the coastal areas under their protection into the “Gold Coast Colony”. Ashanti (Asante) and the Northern Territories were seen as separate administrative units and after those provinces were brought under British rule in about 1900, “the colony of the Gold Coast” developed (Owusu-Ansah 2005: 78).

Nevertheless, what is important to note is the common administrative system adopted by the British in both Ghana and Nigeria that is popularly called ‘indirect rule’. Indirect rule according to (Falola 1999: 70) was a system of local government that enabled the British to govern Nigeria through indigenous rulers and institutions. Colonial officials would advise local rulers and minimize direct contacts with the majority of the population. New regulations and instructions to the people would be announced through their chiefs and kings. Indigenous institutions would be retained, after purging them of their so-called excesses and inhuman practices. Indigenous laws not conducive to colonialism were to be abandoned (ibid). This system was also adopted in order to facilitate the extraction of agricultural products from the colonies. As Lord Lugard, one of the British colonizing officials in Africa stated in his book, The Dual Mandate of the British in Tropical Africa, “the partition of Africa was, as we all recognize, due primarily to the economic necessity of increasing the supplies of raw materials and food to meet the needs of the industrialized nations of Europe” (Lugard 1965: 613).

In reality, according to Curtin (1995: 450) ‘that agriculture was the main activity for the most of Africa, and economic development meant agricultural development, which implied new crops and new techniques to increase yields’ confirms what development administration entailed in the sub-region.’ But as Curtin added, total yield meant one thing to African farmers and another to colonial administrators. Africans were likely to look at the part of the total production they were allowed to keep for their own use. Planners, Curtin noted, were likely to look only at the increased yields that could be channelled into exports, because exports alone built up the foreign trade balances needed to pay the external costs of running the colony. Foreign balances were also needed to pay for imports, and import duties were the easiest forms of taxation to collect (ibid). Table 1 below shows the intensification of agricultural production of two major cash crops: cocoa and palm oil that Ghana and Nigeria became major producers of at the end of the colonial era.
Table X: Exports of some commodities from Africa, 1908-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1924-28</th>
<th>1934-38</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palm Oil</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>188,700</td>
<td>243,500</td>
<td>303,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>48,429</td>
<td>325,901</td>
<td>469,352</td>
<td>854,060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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This emphasis on agricultural production to the detriment of the other sectors of the economy continued till Ghana gained independence in 1957 and Nigeria in 1960 under the leaderships of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Alhaji Tafawa Balewa respectively. To put all the above into the context of modern day development administration requires an understanding of the political and social context of the modernization processes under which slavery and colonial administration took place. The need to place development as the justification for colonialism as many colonial administrators suggested was to ensure a teleological modernization model of progress based on the European development processes that also found roots in claims of the ‘civilization mission’ made by many western colonizers. One major weakness of the teleological view of history as Hall (2006: 11) observed is that it tended to assume that there is only one path to social development— the one taken by western societies— and that this is a universal model which all societies must follow and which leads sooner or later, through a fixed series of stages, to the same end. Thus, tribal society would inevitably lead to the nation-state, feudalism to capitalism, rural society to industrialization, and so on. This reality unsurprisingly became the new trajectory for development administration in the new independent states of Ghana and Nigeria.

Although the formal occupation for colonial purposes ended in many African countries in the 1960s, the emergence of new structures of domination in the economic and political spheres started taken shapes on the continent. For instance, the quick turnaround of colonial European officers in Africa and Asia into their ‘new’ positions in places such as the United Nations development administration can be seen as a case in point (Dwivedi and Nef 1982: 63). As Dwivedi and Nef rightly pointed out, “this was hardly more than a relabeling of the old colonial bottles of law-and-order vintage with the ‘managerial’ sticker required to develop the former colony” (ibid). What is more, the context in which development had been guided in the past 50 years reminds one of the grim realities of what a teleological effort to ‘modernize’ the people of Africa can produce. As Sachs (1992:1) expressed it;

Like a towering lighthouse guiding sailors towards the coast, ‘development’ stood as the idea which oriented emerging nations in their journey through post war history. No matter whether democracies or dictatorships, the countries of the South proclaimed development as their primary aspiration, after they had been freed from colonial subordination. Four decades later, governments and citizens alike still have their eyes fixed on this light flashing just as far away as ever: every effort and every sacrifice is justified in reaching the goal, but the light keeps on receding into the dark.

It is within the context of the above that African intellectuals have attempted to make sense of development administration in the past 50 years of post-colonial independence. Yet, like many before them, while the convergence of opinion on the need for diverse paths to development remains a major rallying point, the divergence of their opinion with many, but not all of their western counterparts has persisted, even in the face of the obvious failures in the teleological contraption of development. It is these realities of existing convergences, divergences and persistence in African scholars’ theorizing of development administration on the continent that the next section explores within the framework of Donald Stone’s definition of Development administration as the blending of all elements and resources (human and
physical)….into a concerted effort to achieve agreed-upon goals (cited in Dwivedi 1994: 5). As Stone explained, it is the continuous cycle of formulating and reformulating, evaluating and implementing interrelated plans, policies, programs, projects, activities and other measures to reach establish development objectives in a scheduled time sequence (ibid).

**Development Administration Research in Ghana and Nigeria: Between Theory and Practice**

To begin with, although some progresses have been made in the approach to studying development administration in Africa in the past five decades, efforts to balance the influence of western thoughts and ideas in favour of divergent African perspectives remains an unfulfilled agenda. Hence, the observation by Kasfir (1969: 94) to some extent still holds sway in western approaches to African development administration theories and practices. As Kasfir stated in 1969;

> So little of value has been written about development administration in Africa that the main problem is to avoid uncritical reliance on theories formulated in other parts of the world......much of the writing about administration in Africa comes from expatriate civil servants and academic personnel involved in technical assistance to administrative training institutes......Rarely do these writers compare the performance of different national or local administrative structures, except to apply western techniques to African situations.

The above observation despite been made over four decades ago remains relevant today as the political and economic problems of many African states is continually used as justification for the intrusion of western ideas and solutions that are considered the ‘gods eye view’ to African issues. Nonetheless, the perspectives of African intellectuals are always available.

**Ghana: The Challenges of a Shining Black Star**

In his observation, Aiyittey (2006: 2) noted that when Ghana gained independence on March 6, 1957, it stood at the same level of development as South Korea. Both Countries had income per Capital of $200 and Ghana with its enormous potentials for rapid and sustainable development considering the abundant natural and human resources that the country possessed was believed to be in a situation to succeed. But fifty years later, South Korea’s income per capital was about thirty times that of Ghana: $12, 200 versus $420 (ibid).

In Aiyittey’s view, the problem of Ghana like those of many African countries can be explained through the analysis of two schools of thoughts-the externalists and the internalists. The former believes that Africa’s problems are from external factors as western colonialism and neo-imperialism, and the latter believes that, while the external factors have played a role, internal factors like bad leadership are far more significant in causing Africa’s crises (ibid: 4). The existence of these schools of thoughts show that indeed to understand development administration in Africa, both external and internal factors are to be considered.

Therefore, in researching the administration of development in Ghana in the post independence period, attention has often focused on the institutions of the state that are involved in the management of resources for the purposes of ‘development’ which when conceived in a broad sense beyond its teleological interpretation along dominant western views, can be seen as a long range process involving continuity and change on the one hand, and as the spread and consolidation of the material and natural, and spiritual wellbeing of
people and nations on the other hand (Dwivedi et al 2007:1). The spiritual angle to this definition is instructive given the wide ranging belief systems in Africa as a whole.

A major feature in the post-colonial development administration of Ghana is the role of the military which took over power on February 24, 1966 after a coup d’etat ousted the nationalist leader, Kwame Nkrumah from power. Thus, given the presence of the military in government in most of Ghana’s post independence history, the organization of resources in the administration of development has been largely under the military. Ghanaian academics focused more on how the military is organized for the purposes of delivering the promises of development. As such Ghanaian scholarly works such as those of Aygema-Badu and Osei-Hwedie (1982), Gyimah-Boadi (1993), Agyeman-Duah (1997), and Kandeh (2004) examined the role of the military in the administration of development of Ghana in the post independence period.

The focus of these works have tended to be on how the military managed development, not least in its economic aspect which more often than not takes the central attention alongside the politics of development. For instance, in Gyimah-Boadi (ed. 1993), an analyses of the changes in Ghanaian society under Jerry Rawlings’s Provisional National Defence Council, the longest serving government in Ghanaian history was examined. As Gyimah-Boadi argued, ‘since 1981, Rawlings has become a favourite of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and his government’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) has been judged as the most thorough going and consistent in the world. What shaped this ‘revolution’ to ‘economic recovery’ take? What has been the effect of these policies on the Ghanaian economy, and more importantly, the Ghanaian people? These questions formed the basis of Gyimah-Boadi’s edited book, Ghana under PNDC Rule.

In a related sense, Aygema-Badu and Osei-Hwedie (1982) had earlier argued that Ghana is a particularly good case to examine when trying to answer questions about political stability in Africa and the developing world generally. For them, it is a case that condenses contradictions of the development (or rather, underdevelopment) process. However, it is crucial to note the links between political instability and development or rather underdevelopment as the authors above argue, with the prevalent western thoughts of the role of the military in the development of the state. For this reason, the writings of Samuel Huntington (1957; 1968) which promoted the role of the military as managers of the modernization processes that development administration was supposed to achieve and which W.W Rostow (1960) broke down into five stages, no doubt have shaped and continue to define the activities of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank as well as the support of Western governments and policy makers in the past and present for the use of the military as managers of development. As such, the other area of focus for Ghanaian scholars have therefore being on the economic reforms spear-headed in the name of Structural Adjustment Programmes which were introduced in many African states in the 1980s and early 1990s.

As the economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s snowballed into a series of debt crises, the role of the IMF and the World Bank in the management of many African economies became quite visible as their authoritarian tendencies were assumed to be matched by domestic military dictatorships that in Huntingtonian sense could combine to make the implementation of the neo-liberal market policies encapsulated in the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) designed in line with the modernization processes of Rostowian trickle-down economics a sine qua non for ‘economic recovery’. Therefore, reflecting on the effects of such thoughts and indeed actions of the IMF, The World Bank and their Ghana counterparts as they began the implementation of the Economic Recovery Plan under SAP in Ghana, scholarly works such as Ninsin (1991), Aryeetey et al (ed. 2000), Konadu-Agyemang (2001), Eboe Hutchful (2002) and Akonor (2006) have researched the interplay of the political-economy of Ghanaian economic reforms with some knocks and praises.
For instance, while Eboe Hutchful and Aryeetey et al acknowledged the short-term economic growth of the 1980s, they nevertheless questioned the sustainability of same in the long run in light of ongoing economic conundrums that Ghana and indeed many African countries that implemented SAP are experiencing today. This reality in Akonor’s opinion represents the unevenness of compliance between 1983-2000. Consequently, given the mixed bag of reactions to the way development administration as proceeded in Ghana in the past five decades with seemingly problematic results, the new focus by Ghanaian scholars has been for genuine democratic developmental reforms that acknowledges the specificities of Ghana in the administration of its development. A review of this is however offered as a synthesis with the Nigerian scholars agitations for same. But first a review of the Nigerian experience in the post independence era is necessary.

**Nigeria: The Clay Feet Giant**

To argue that the Nigerian state has failed, is to suggest that it was designed to succeed by the British. Nigeria’s false start on the development administration track field is unmistakable in the words of Harold Smith, a former British colonial officer;

> When I suggest that the British Government meddled with the democratic elections in Nigeria, I write as an authority. I was chosen by his Excellency the Governor General, Sir James Robertson, to spearhead a covert operation to interfere with the elections. The laws of Nigeria were a sham and largely window-dressing to conceal, not mirror, the reality of where power lay.....The new leaders and civil servants were for the most part Britishers with black faces. And they continued to rule as the British had ruled, espousing fine ideals and pragmatically wheeling and dealing and fixing to keep the show on the road. It must be remembered that British colonial power was autocratic, dictatorial power. The British did not practise democracy in Nigeria.

Thus, as the Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie once expressed it, ‘Nigeria was set up to fail. The only thing we as Nigerians should take responsibility for, in my opinion, is the extent of that failure’ (cited in Peel 2010: 44). Again, like the case of Ghana which heralded African independence three years before Nigeria gained independence, the responsibilities for the present state of development administration in line with the externalists and internalists explanations for the current development impasse must be a shared one. Interestingly, the Nigerian experience shares striking similarities with those of Ghana in terms of the role of the military and the international financial institutions in the management of development. But given the fact that Nigeria is the most populous African country with over 150 million people and due to the multicultural and ethnic composition of more than 350 groups combined with over 700 languages and dialects, the complexities of nation building as should be expected has indeed been huge.

The first republic in Nigeria was truncated through a military coup d’etat in January 1966 followed by a counter coup in May of the same year and subsequently the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 after the eastern part of the country comprising mainly of the Igbo ethnic group attempted to secede. This refocused attention from development administration to the management of war and its discontents such as the needless killings of Nigerians by Nigerians. At the end, the military government now led by General Yakubu Gowon declared a ‘no victor- no vanguish’ dictum and launched the three ‘R’s policy- Reconciliation,

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2Harold Smith had made this known severally over the years but the facts are now contained in his autobiography available at [http://www.biafraland.com/harold_smith/harold_smith_frm.htm](http://www.biafraland.com/harold_smith/harold_smith_frm.htm). Accessed 2/2/2011.
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction- in an attempt to rebuild the country. Thus, within the first ten years of independence, rather than properly administer development, Nigeria was engaged in crises management.

Consequently, in writing about development administration in Nigeria, scholars have been challenged to offer quite extensive explanations of Nigeria’s historical socio-economic cum political complexities, not only about the military, but also its formation and role as development administrator. As Onimode (1982), Ohiorhenuan (1989), ( Falola 1996 and 1999), Umez (1999) and Aka (2000) all posited in their expositions of development administration issues in Nigeria, the military has been a major player in the design and implementations of the various post- independence development plans.

In relation to economic management and particularly the collaboration with international financial institutions, the military in 1986 under General Ibrahim Babangida defied the rejections of many Nigerian scholars and people of the SAP package for Nigeria and went on to implement the policies as prescribed by the Bretton Woods institutions.. Perhaps to illustrate the disrespect for public opinion, Forest (1993: 209) noted that, against the backdrop of the anti-IMF rhetoric that was loud under the previous administration of General Mohammadu Buhari, Babangida’s solution was to set up a committee on the IMF loan to organise a public debate on the issue and to take memoranda from the public. As Forest further noted;

If some thought, that the debate would provide an opportunity to educate the public on the merits of the IMF loan, they had a rude shock. Once the debate got on the way, it was apparent that opposition to the loan was widespread and vocal. Among the groups who opposed a deal were the Nigerian Labour Congress, which threatened a general strike, student bodies, university lecturers (emphasis mine), market women3, and religious leaders.

To be sure, the introduction of these policies at a time the country was dependent on oil as a major export earner meant that if changes did not occur in the rest of the economy as expected-most of which had become subject to privatization-the effects would be monumental and monumental they have been. The collapse of public services such as education and health and the gradual disappearance of almost all government enterprises under the new privatization mantra of SAP equally meant that the reforms would have very few elite beneficiaries and many casualties amongst the populace. What is worse, the 1993 Presidential elections which was to climax the promise of a return to democracy in Nigeria and which was won by Chief M.K.O Abiola was annulled by the Babangida regime. As such, Nigeria unlike Ghana which returned to civilian rule on January 7, 1993 was not to see any democracy until May, 29, 1999 when retired General Obasanjo was sworn in as president.

Given the realities of having to study and write about development administration under the military and the role of the IFIs in it, the dissatisfaction with developmental outcomes as the dismal present state of affairs attests to, has produced increased calls for developmental and democratic states which respond to the needs of the people rather than to those of local elites and international unaccountable organizations. Thus, this section closes with a review of what Ghanaian and Nigerian writers are advocating for as the new trajectory for development administration theory and practice on the continent.

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3As used in Nigerian parlance, market women refer to people who buy and sell all kinds of commodities in designated open markets around the country.
Democratic and Developmental States in Ghana and Nigeria: The Academic Input

The debate over whether or not democracy is necessary for development is a one without a definite answer, even as the examples of the Asian tigers- Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore- and China have shown that democracy is not the main ingredient for development. Nonetheless, as the discussion above shows, the African experience with the military as development administrators when compared to those of their East Asian counterparts has been a disaster. Hence, as democracy returned to most parts of the continent in the 1990s, the calls for a more inclusive approach to development administration has been made by scholars of African origin from within and outside the continent.

As Mkandawire (2001: 290) explained, in the literature, the ‘developmental state’ has two components: one ideological, one structural (same as original). It is this ideological-structure nexus that distinguishes developmental states from the other forms of states. As Mkandawire observed, in terms of ideology, a developmental state is essentially one whose ideological underpinnings is ‘developmentalist’ in that it conceives its ‘mission’ as that of ensuring economic development, usually interpreted as to mean high rates of accumulation and industrialization. The state-structure side of the definition of the developmental state emphasises capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and effectively. Such a capacity is determined by various factors- institutional, technical, administrative and political.

But Mkandawire countered the above definition and argued that, as formulated, the definition of the ‘developmental state’ runs the risk of being tautological, since evidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the performance of the economy. This produces a definition of a state as developmental if the economy is developing, and equates economic success to the state’s strength while measuring the latter by the presumed outcomes of its policies. For Mkandawire therefore, this definition changes whenever there is problems in the economy and the state changes along lines which might alter the character of its developmentalist claims. Thus he maintains that recognition of episodes and possibilities of failures leads us to a definition of a developmental state as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development.

Considering Mkandawire’s exposition, and recalling the definition of ‘development’ provided by Dwivedi (2007 et al) cited above, it is important to stress that in advocating a democratic developmental state in both Ghana and Nigeria, academics in these countries have recognized the need to look beyond the economy as the singular focus for development. As such Edigheji (2005) and Aiyede (2009) have pointed out that socio-economic justice while been at the heart of democracy requires a developmental state which promotes the progress of its citizens in different aspects, and not just the economic. Nevertheless, what are crucial therefore are the instruments and methods of governance which recognizes the need to provide access to citizens in order for them to participation in the daily determination of their own destiny by taking part in the socio-economic development of the society in which they live. For this purpose, Tettey et al (2003) advocated for a new understanding of how to manage the complexities of politics and socio-economic development in Ghana. Similarly, Gana and Egwu (2003) argued for the imperative of democratic development in Nigeria.

Although, these are by no means exhaustive of the emerging works on the democratic developmental imperatives in both Ghana and Nigeria, the burgeoning idea of the need to have sustainable development in which the people contribute is one that requires constant reflections on development administration, if necessary in partnership with willing agencies that recognize the need for the people to have a stake in their own affairs. As such, the next and final section of this paper summarizes recent efforts by two Anglo-North American aid agencies to contribute to this renewal of hope in development administration. These agencies
are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

**Governing Development Administration in Ghana and Nigeria: Between Academics and Foreign Aid Agencies**

Collaborations between academics and international aid agencies is a very common feature in development administration, as research endeavours by academics are sponsored and/or funded by these agencies. However, in light of the pervasive influence of donor preferences in research, independent academic work is sometimes threatened by the inability of the researcher to present his or views without fear or favour. To be sure, it is necessary to emphasize that the reversal of such trend while not feasible in the present context, is not immune either to changes or perhaps convergences around shared meanings. In this wise, one can state that while scholars in Ghana and Nigeria might not be in direct control of what the aid agencies discussed below are doing to improve governance on the continent, the former’s advocacy for the recognition of peoples agencies in the determination of their destinies is not going entirely unheard.

As enunciated in its programme of activities in Ghana, USAID proclaims that the USAID/Ghana’s Democracy and Governance program will consolidate democracy by increasing civic involvement in public policy at the local and national levels. The program includes activities to strengthen civil society capacity; increase opportunities for civil society to engage local government, particularly in regards to education; strengthen parliament; increase parliament’s access to information; and promote free and fair elections. Hence in the 2006 financial year programme, a sum of $234,648 was allocated to strengthen democratic national governance institutions by providing technical assistance to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of legislative processes and procedures; support open forums as a means to increase parliament’s access and receptivity to civic input; provide training and equipment to strengthen parliament’s capacity to review and analyze the national budget; and maintain the system for measuring parliamentary performance.4

In similar vein, USAID’s programme in Nigeria aims to strengthen foundations for democratic governance by working with civil society and selected government institutions to improve the environment for accountable governance and conflict management in Nigeria. The program will strengthen the capacity of civil society to advocate for targeted reforms; introduce policy and legislative reforms within selected government institutions; strengthen the capacity of both civil society and government to mitigate and manage conflict; significantly reduce the incidence and potential of trafficking in persons; and help to support transparent and credible elections in Nigeria.5

Similarly, despite having a somewhat different focus CIDA’s activities aim for the same objectives as those of USAID. In Ghana, the CIDA sponsored Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) program 2010-2015 worth $ 5,821,304 includes Ghana in 11 countries of target with Canada having 3.8% and Ghana 8.3% of the entire project. It aims to encourage democratic governance through public sector policy and administrative management. The program seeks to improve the well-being of citizens in developing countries and countries in transition by enhancing individual and institutional capacity of selected government ministries, departments, agencies (MDAs) and public sector associations and training institutes and civil society organizations by partnership, technical assistance and knowledge sharing with Canadian and international partners. The institutional linkages are typically between officials of a Canadian provincial or federal government department and a

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developing country government. The program utilizes three main mechanisms for program implementation: partnership building/enhancement, technical assistance and knowledge sharing. The general theme is public management and administration reform.\(^6\)

Likewise, in Nigeria, CIDA supports the Nigeria Governance Reform Facility, a E-Procurement Initiative with $100,000. The aim again is to strengthen democratic governance through public sector policy and administrative management with 60% component of the project and Public finance management with 40%. The purpose of the Nigeria Governance Reform Facility was to contribute to the implementation of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) by building the capacity of government departments and other institutions with a strong commitment to reform to more effectively respond, implement, manage, and account for citizens' demands for improved social services and poverty reduction.\(^7\)

Conclusion
In concluding this paper, it is important to reiterate that it had been an attempt to review development administration research in Ghana and Nigeria. The findings as discussed above indicate a pattern of convergence between scholars on the need for indigenous development plans while focus in recent past has also been on the role of the military and international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank as development administrators. Also, the new horizon for research amongst scholars in both countries appears to be emerging calls for democratic and developmental States. A brief examination of what two Anglo-North America aid agencies-USAID and CIDA are doing to support governance was also provided. The divergence of opinion between western thoughts and ideas and those of African scholars however persists.

In all, it is necessary to emphasis that even as Dwivedi and Mau (2009) reported that the study of public administration in Canada despite been a western country is still in the face of defining itself as a discipline, the same can be stated about development administration as a sub-discipline in many African countries as the research on public administration still needs to be strengthened. Moreover, the problems of the bureaucracies in many African countries remain even as Olowu (2010) advocates reforms in the civil service pay structure, and Kauzya and Robertson (2011) recommend more professionalization of the public service in Africa. Nonetheless, the questions of Bureaucratic Morality that Dwivedi and Olowu (1988) drew our attention to still exists and remains problematic till date. Perhaps the push for collaborative governance by Ansell and Gash (2007) and the demand for new democratic developmental states in countries like Ghana and Nigeria might resolve some of these problems.

In closing, given the dominance of development administration research in African countries by western thoughts and ideas, a new frontier of discourse that promotes a cross fertilization of ideas and collaboration between both western and southern scholars is recommended to ensure a better theorizing and practice of development administration on the continent. The future therefore demands collaborative studies in development and public administration between scholars all over the world in view of the links between both areas of research as Braibanti (1996) and Balogun (2002) pointed out.

\(^6\)http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/cpo.nsf/vWebCSAZEn/B6689763FB71ABCF852576BD003CB722
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