

Sovereignty, Security, and the Affect of the Political

Author: Michael N. Di Gregorio [digregmn@mcmaster.ca], Ph.D. Student, McMaster University, Dept. of Political Science

Canadian Political Science Association Conference, May 16-18 2011

Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON.

Panel Title: Critical Security Studies Network 2: Affect and Security

Abstract: Given the recent fascination with affect and the political emotions, this paper addresses the relationship between affect and theories of sovereignty. Specifically, this paper addresses the relationship between emotional or affective reactions to the political, and the response the institution of sovereignty represents to these reactions, as manifested in the very idea of the security state. The science and theory of sovereignty (first articulated in Hobbes's *Leviathan*) is built upon a specific *political* understanding of emotion, of one's affective reaction to what is "foreign" or "outside" of one's immediate experience. This link between sovereignty and affect has already made its way into security studies via the integration of political psychology into International Relations; however, this initial link between affect, psychology, and sovereignty is premised on the idea that affective responses represent a problem for which sovereignty is the solution, or that emotions are a problematic disturbance to the rational order of politics, and are a security threat as such. Consequently, the capacity for affect and the political emotions to be the site of a *critique* of sovereignty rather than a *threat* to sovereignty has yet to be fully developed. This paper treats affect as a site of critique by returning to the first systematic presentation of political psychology in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*—the source for Hobbes's theory of sovereignty as guarantor of security—arguing that sovereign power is itself better understood as an affect of the political rather than as an attempt to moderate, control, and manage political emotions.

Keywords: Affect – Sovereignty/Security – Hobbes – Aristotle – Script Theory

Introduction

In his brief work on the life of Thomas Hobbes, John Aubrey records the following set of remarks from Hobbes, on Aristotle: "I have heard him say that Aristotle was the worst teacher that ever was, the worst politician and ethick—a country-fellow that could live in the world would be as good: *but his Rhetorique...was rare*" (1898, p.357, my emphasis). The renown with which this remark is held is demonstrably less than Hobbes's more famous excoriation of Aristotle in his *Leviathan*: "I believe scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which is now called *Aristotle's Metaphysics*; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in his *Politics*; nor more ignorantly than a great part of his *Ethics*" (XLVI.11).¹ Hobbes spares Aristotle's *Rhetoric* from this famous tongue-lashing, but the question for us must be *why* this is so. What is it about Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* that allows Hobbes, the progenitor and founder of the concept of sovereignty, to rank it as "rare"? What sets Aristotle's rhetorical thought apart from his political and ethical works is that *On Rhetoric* is the only place within Aristotle's body of thought that treats the political passions in a systematic way, as the primary movers of political life (cf. Gross 2001, p.313-19). Moreover, despite all the dangers Hobbes identifies in pursuing the just or good society in the light of ancient political philosophy, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a work of such high quality that Hobbes can go on to reproduce Aristotle's thoughts on the passions almost verbatim in his *Whole Art of Rhetoric* under his own name.

These remarks seem a strange way to begin a discussion of security and affect, yet begin with Hobbes we must: it is Hobbes's revivification of Aristotle's account of the political passions from his rhetorical

¹ I will cite chapter and paragraph from the Curley edition.

treatise that provides the political psychology upon which our institution of sovereignty is built. The institution of sovereignty is also, from the very beginning, a *securitizing* institution: the Hobbesian understanding of the relationship between politics and emotion is the fundament of the strictly modern notions of sovereignty and security. Simply, even Hobbes's "harshest critics themselves admit that he was the first to develop the concept of *sovereignty* with full clarity; and since this concept is not just one concept among others by the foundation of modern politics, Hobbes is the founder of modern politics. An understanding of Hobbes's political science, then, is the elementary precondition for any radical understanding of modern politics" (Strauss 2011, p.25). Sovereignty and the security state are coeval with modernity making IR the paradigmatic and architectonic modern pursuit. By returning to the basis of Hobbesian sovereignty we avail ourselves of the full horizon of critique for this concept and institution.²

This paper attempts the preparation of such a critique by presenting the argument that the idea of security is the affect of the desire to have more than we need. The security problem, as it comes to light in philosophic picture that is the basis of sovereignty, is reducible to the problem of the gap in knowledge between our wants and our needs. We could say, therefore, that the security problem is a problem of knowledge, or of the reduction of ignorance regarding our condition. What Hobbes understood, and what he takes from Aristotle, is that we do not seek the security of the body so much as the security of the mind. We will see affect theorist Silvan Tomkins refer to this as the affect of affect, or the fear of affect itself.³ This frames the problem of sovereignty in a philosophical sense, but this philosophical problem leads to a political problem when the fact of the power of sovereignty comes into contact with the material reality of our political life.

While there has been a genuinely impressive evolution in the amount of attention devoted to the topic affect within the IR literature, this attention signals a return to a dormant debate rather than the discovery of a new disciplinary movement. The concentration on affect and emotion has grown up as a critique of orthodox rationalist methods within IR specifically and Political Science generally. Originating with René Descartes's *Passions of the Soul* a dichotomy has existed between rationality and emotion, such that emotions were assumed to be deviations or corruptions of rational thinking. This distinction parallels Descartes's distinction between body and mind, of which the literature on affect and emotion has made strategic use insofar as it uses these preconditions of rationalist human science for a critique of rationalism (Papoulias & Callard 2010, 33-6).

Rationalist or cognitivist approaches proceed with the assumption that emotions are visceral bodily reactions that corrupt the calm reasoning of the mind. However, beginning with William James's (1884) two-part study for the journal *Mind*, the body and the emotions begin to be thought of as connected. James's hypothesis is that bodily states follow perception, and that perception or emotion in the absence of

² The reader will notice some slippage in this opening paragraph in my use of the terms affect, passion, and emotion. These three concepts are not identical but they are related. Brian Massumi (2002, p.35) provides a terse though dense description of the difference between emotion and affect: emotion is "the most intense" capture of affect, though affect's autonomy is characterized by openness. Regarding the difference between passion and emotion, it was not until the Scottish Enlightenment of the 18th Century that the word emotion began to supplant the word passion for the descriptions of these sorts of *affects* on/of the body. On these differences see Thomas Dixon *From Passions to Emotions* (2003, p.62-97). Hobbes understands passions to be internal, voluntary, motions. Voluntary motions, in turn, are initiated in the imagination, which is based on one's memory. Recent treatments on memory and politics abound. For a sampling see especially Edkins (2003a), Bell (2006), and Lebow (2008).

³ I should note that when I use the term *affect* I understand it to mean the representation of inner feeling. For example, if someone declares that they have a feeling of extreme happiness, but does not exhibit the expected external signs associated with happiness, he or she can be said to have a flat affect, or no affect. Interestingly, affect then becomes the first form of communication, but through non-verbal bodily cues, in a sort of biopolitics that can grant a political "voice" to someone through the communication of bodily movements. For a fuller explanation of the theory of affect as a physical phenomenon, see our discussion of the Affect and Script theories of Silvan Tomkins.

the associated bodily reaction would be “purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth” (1884, p.190). Thus does a focus on the body, a materialist metaphysics, usher in the opportunity to reconsider the role of the emotions or the passions in politics. There is a strong case to be made that the *prima facie* interaction and political relation is not physical but affective, and scholars have increasingly emphasized the important role that immaterial and emotional relations play in the theatre of politics. At the risk of imposing disciplinary boundaries where there ought to be none, this cognitivist/psychological approach has spawned a body of critical literature that we can identify as the Affective (re)turn, or part of a critical political psychology that treats political questions while appealing to homologous scientific authority. As I intend to demonstrate, the construction of sovereignty and the security state is grafted onto an understanding of affect in an attempt to govern, control, and manage the political and unstable passions. IR has a privileged opportunity to engage this dialectical relationship between statecraft and affect precisely because the institution of sovereignty is the concept around which all approaches within IR gravitate for or against, and without which international relations would be an abstraction from nothing.

The Affective (Re)turn

The return to affect and emotion in IR and security studies is initially bound up with the integration of political psychology into the same. Jonathan Mercer and Rose McDermott provide popular attempts to integrate orthodox political psychology with orthodox IR. Mercer (2005) tries to incorporate psychological approaches into political methodology, combining psychological explanations of decision-making with rational choice theories, especially in relation to individual foreign policy elites.⁴ Addressing the relationship between political emotions and norms, Mercer (2006) appeals to the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio to assert that emotions are necessary for the adherence to norms and wants to use this insight to address the debate between realists and constructivists over the influence of international norms. If emotions are part of a third-image or system level analysis, and emotions are the foundation of norms, then one can find common ground between the assumed asociality of realism and the construction of norms, while implying a relationship between private emotion and the presence of norms (Mercer 2006, p.299). Rose McDermott's (2004b) efforts are aimed at using political psychology to understand the tools and insights in all manner of security phenomena within the state oriented tradition, prioritizing state actors and decision makers (2004, p.2). This attenuation of McDermott's political horizon is mirrored in her description of the origins of political psychology: only in the 1920's (after Woodrow Wilson invented Political Science!) did Charles Merriam attempt a unification of politics and psychology that “reached adulthood” fifty years later with the founding of the *International Society of Political Psychology* (2004b, pp.4-6). To this end, discussion of the relationship between political psychology and different theories of international relations—despite writing in 2004—covers Waltzian realism, Keohane's liberalism, Marxist theory, rational and functionalist approaches, and Wendtian constructivism, with a deep bow to the concern with the psychology of leaders at the individual level of analysis (2004b, pp.45-8). McDermott's description of theories of psychology is similarly limited to prospect theory and the advances in neuroscience popularized by Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux (2004b, pp.48ff.).⁵

⁴ Cf. David Welch (2005). Political psychology has always been a part of the traditional three level “System, State, Individual” analysis of IR. Now, however, the diminution of the role of the state has helped political psychology shift its focus from the decision-making of leaders to social psychology, or a psychology of identity and identity development. It suffices to mention Erik Erikson's work, specifically his *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. The *International Society for Political Psychology* has named an award for him, though his influence is a noticeable absence from the current Political Science literature.

⁵ McDermott celebrates the B.F. Skinner's turn to behaviourism against the psychoanalytic tradition because it studied what was material and visible, rather than unconscious and invisible motivations. It is quite the twist of fate that psychological and emotional interventions in IR are now being employed precisely because they move analysis in the opposite direction.

Mercer and McDermott represent the attempt to bridge social and cognitive Psychology with traditional approaches in IR (cf. Marcus 2000). A more helpful and scientifically sound (in the traditional sense) approach to affect has been outlined by Antonio Damasio (1994) in his presentation of the somatic-marker hypothesis, and Joseph LeDoux's (2000) research into the neuroscience of emotion and the role of the amygdala and subcortical—that is, not of the *higher* evolved processes of the brain—connections in cognition, emotion, and action. Damasio's research indicates that emotion and rationality are intrinsically linked, as emotional feelings help us make faster more efficient decisions (1994, pp.173-80). Emotional signals are “felt”—Damasio uses the phrase *gut feeling*—in a way that allows us to focus attention on a problem, enhancing the quality of our reasoning over it (2003, pp.147-50). These emotions/affects play the role of an intermediary between past experience and future decisions, as these emotional signals mark possible outcomes and options as positive or negative, narrowing the space for decision and increasing the possibility that actions will conform to past experiences (1994, pp.174-5; 2003, p.148).⁶ Damasio thus marries the body to the faculty of reason in decision-making through the phenomenon of affect. We are introduced to this “neurobiology of rationality” through the example of Phineas Gage and a patient Damasio refers to as Elliot, who have both suffered trauma to the parts of the brain necessary “for reasoning to culminate in decision making” causing them “*to know but not to feel*” (1994, pp.39-51). Emotions, Damasio implies, are necessary for making well reasoned *decisions*: the mind that no longer allows the body to *feel* prevents one from making generally advantageous decisions (1994, 165-70). Descartes's error is this “abysmal separation between body and mind” that has come down to us in the form of an authoritative tradition, giving Damasio's insights the air of a philosophic rebuttal for *how* we study emotion, psychology, biology, and so on.⁷

Damasio and LeDoux have built their understanding of emotion on the foundation of William James's hypotheses, commonly referred to as the James-Lange Theory.⁸ James's argument is that a total reconsideration of the relationship between passion and action must take place in order to understand all the phenomenon of affect. The usual way of thinking about emotions is that “the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion” giving rise to bodily experience (James 1884). James suggests that the *reverse* of this relationship is more accurately the case: the bodily experience of emotion follows from our excitement, and “*our feeling as the same changes as they occur is the emotion*” (1884, p.190). In his famous example, we do not see a bear, become frightened and run; rather, the “bodily manifestations must first be interposed between”, and so we are afraid because we tremble, and run. James asks us to consider what grief would be like without tears, rage without a flushed face, and so on: “emotion disassociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable”, it would be nothing but “feelingless cognition that certain circumstances were deplorable.”⁹

⁶ This suggests that the construction of memory plays a very important, indeed biological, role in the affective make-up of human beings. It also suggests that memory is a part of the somatic-marking of feelings that result from experience and learning, influencing our prediction of future outcomes. If so, memory begins to take on the role usually associated with ancestral authority or heritage (*i.e.*, religion, inheritance, etc.), and we can speak of memory as sort of political authority that acts (indirectly) on the bodies of individuals and the body politic. Memory's influence on affect suggests that, *pace* Giorgio Agamben, eschewing the concerns in politics of *material* life, of the body, denies individuals part of the necessary apparatus for making effective and advantageous decisions. Thinking politics without *bios* lets us *know* politics without *reasoning* about it. Cf. Edkins (2003).

⁷ It is with this in mind that Damasio turns to Spinoza for the philosophical justification of his position, highlighting Spinoza's argument that mind and body are parallel, mutually correlated processes constantly imitating each other (2003, pp.211-17).

⁸ The William James —Carl Lange theory has seen two further developments, and is usually understood to also include the subsequent research of Walter Cannon and Philip Bard in the 1920's, and Stanley Schacter and Jerome Singer's Two-Factor Theory of Emotion from the 1960's. Here, however, I will speak only of William James and the response his work elicited from John Dewey.

⁹ James opposes those “ancient sages” who preferred this “apathetic life,” but this life is surely no longer choice-worthy for “those

John Dewey (1894) responds to James's theory of emotion by taking issue with the idea that emotions can *express* something. For Dewey, James is wrong to say that emotions involve expression because expression as a concept implies an observer, that they are social (Dewey 1894, p.555). To an onlooker, one's affects and movements appear to be expressions, but this commits the "psychologist's fallacy" of confusing "that standpoint of the observer with that of the fact observed." While throwing doubt on the expressive ability of affect, Dewey revives its intellectual content: emotion is defined as a purposive "mode of behaviour" that is reflected affectively, and is a "subjective valuation" of the idea or purpose it expresses (Dewey 1895, p.15).¹⁰ Human political agency maintains a place in Dewey's theory of the emotions that it was denied by James.

At this point, it should be clear that the variety of different approaches to studying affect and emotion are attempts to account for social and political phenomena writ large. There is a tendency, however, within the Affective (re)turn to rely on a specific set of scientific literature, risking the assemblage of disciplinary practices in the effort to escape such boundaries. Papoulias and Callard (2010) discuss the dangers and mistakes inherent in the effort to turn to affect to compensate for the neglect of the body—that "non-reflective bodily space before thought"—in the social sciences (Papoulias & Callard, p.34). These mistakes result from the desire to make affect accord with a specific political project. The new materiality of the body is supposed to open up space for critique, especially of *nature* and natural law, that prefers a biology that is an open system with no fixed or determined order. The authority of nature cannot be used, in this scheme, to strengthen political or religious rule, but instead provides a "paradoxical foundation" acting as a "prototype for a certain progressive politics" (Papoulias & Callard, p.36). There is a certain dishonesty, however, in that this *political* use of neuroscience goes unstated, and the specific evidence that is summoned is only a "helpmeet for a distinctly political project" (ibid.) The prototype of this use of affect, according to these critics, is William Connolly's *Neuropolitics*, in whom they locate a systemic contradiction in the *grammar* of his approach: affect shows how a biology of "afoundational foundations" can be imagined the language in which these findings of neuroscience are invoked is the language of the experimental method, it is "through the old foundational language ... that the afoundational biology is appropriated" (Papoulias & Callard 2010, p.37).

This new "materialistic metaphysics" denies that it is either materialistic or metaphysical (cf. Strauss 1939, p.170). Yet, the (re)turn to affect and emotion necessitates the admission that the body is at the centre and foundation of the political. The blindness to affect results from the failure to recognize "nature as having its own dynamism" (Massumi 2002, p.39). To use Massumi's phrase, affect's "matter-of-factness" needs to be taken seriously by political theory (2002, p.46). Just as we look to Hobbesian philosophic antecedents regarding sovereignty, Massumi looks to Benedict de Spinoza as the philosophical antecedent of affect. Identifying Spinoza's *Ethics* as a project for "thinking affect" (Massumi 2002, p.28) Spinoza defines the body in terms of "relations of movement and rest", demonstrating his awareness of the body's power to affect and be affected (Massumi 2002, p.15). This affective politics is by definition relational: "affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality...it is" (Massumi 2002, p.35). But Spinoza shares Hobbes's care to view affect, passion, and politics in light of the problem of political theology. The autonomy of affect is in a constant competition with the obedience of theology for

born after the revival of the worship of sensibility." Just as there was a politics around memory and the appeal to ancestral authority within Damasio's presentation, we can see here a definite value judgment from James that the apathetic life is not worth living. Whether he is correct in his judgment of the "ancient sages" is a discussion that will take much more space than a footnote. In both cases, though, the role of memory and the authority of the ancestral is a mask for issues of political theology.

¹⁰ Dewey says that the source of his arguments are Plato and Aristotle. Regarding James, Dewey says he finds a rudimentary version of his thesis in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Dewey appears, therefore, to be taking up the mantle for the ancient approach to emotion (being guided by the intellect) against James's modern view and emotion's materialism.

human attention, offering competing explanations for human behaviour.

This conversation is somewhat related to an exchange between Michael Williams and Simon Dalby, later recounted by Mark Neocleous (2008) in his closing thoughts to *Critique of Security*. In a personal correspondence to Simon Dalby (1997), Williams asks, “if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind?” For both Dalby and Neocleous, the response is “maybe there is no hole.” Dalby takes the opportunity to doubt Hobbes's influence on the creation of the security state, given that it was only in the twentieth century that “security became the architectonic impulse of the American polity” (1997, p.21). For his part, Neocleous warns against filling the hole with another vision of security, and instead we must “return the gift” of the protective arms of the state and the current language used to discuss security (Neocleous 2008, p.186). We cannot agree with Neocleous. Refusing to “think” security does not simply “return the gift” of the state handling all questions of security so politics can avoid them. Refusing to think security requires a new political *theology*. Exercising some hyperbole, the hole that is left when we remove security is the whole of political theology. This last assertion is utterly incomprehensible absent a discussion of the centrality of the contest between affect and political theology to Hobbes's account of sovereignty his understanding of the security state.

On Our Hobbesian Inheritance

Hobbes's presentation of sovereignty and security is put forward with the assisting rhetorical strength a materialist metaphysics. Hobbes's materialistic metaphysics takes the body in politics as its starting point, as a sort of precursor to biopolitics, thus orienting politics around the experience and fate of the body. These experiences are the emotions, passions, or affect, while the fate of the body is simply its orientation towards the ever-present Hobbesian fear of violent death. Hobbes's depiction of a violent and anarchic set of relations in his image of the natural condition is the *locus classicus* of the Realist understanding of relations between states. This interpretation, however, over simplifies Hobbes's understanding of the source of the violence in the metaphorical natural condition. It is understood traditionally that faced with violent death, the emotion of fear becomes the primary motivator for all actions in these conditions (*Lev.* XIII.9). Hobbes, however, identifies a certain set of emotions and imaginations apart from fear that are at the heart of the violence in the natural condition, of which the central one is *thumos*, or the seeking of self-esteem:

“...Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them all. *For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate that he sets upon himself*, and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (*which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other*), to extort a greater value from his contemnners, by damage, and from others, by the example.” (*Lev.* XIII.5, my emphasis)

The feeling that we have not been valued by our companions at the same rate that we value ourselves is, for Hobbes, the source of violence in the anarchic state of nature. That this passion *governs* behaviour is proof that the word *anarchy* has been continuously misapplied. It is this affront to one's self-esteem, and the assumption that one has been treated unjustly that leads people to destroy each other.¹¹ Humans have a

¹¹ We should add that one, presumably, might always overvalue self-worth in one's own eyes, resulting in a situation where we must always receive more than we are due in order to avoid this affront to our self-esteem. One solution is self-knowledge, and awareness of one's limitations. But this is the Platonic-Socrates's advice, and it is by no means practical. The general idea, however, that security problems can be framed fundamentally as problems of knowledge and ignorance will be taken up in due

propensity to pursue these sorts of actions “farther than their security requires” because some people simply take “pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest” (*Lev.* XIII.4).¹² It is not so much that our equal fear of violent death results in the quest “for power after power that ceaseth only in death” but that this quest for power is fueled by the “equality of hope in the attaining of our ends” (*Lev.* XI.2, XIII.3). We can say that the political *affect* of pursuing security farther than is necessary is the institution of sovereignty. What is more, Hobbes qualifies this desire for power after power by saying that the cause of this is “not always” hope, but that sometimes one “cannot assure the power and means to live well ... without the acquisition” of more power; the qualifying “not always” indicates that hope is the default cause of violence, *unless* this situation of unease, fear, and anxiety for the future obtains (*Lev.* XI.2). The fear of violent death, important though it is to the rhetoric of Hobbes's project, is not the primary motivator of violent behaviour—nor the source of insecurity—in the natural condition.

What we see in Hobbes's initial depiction of realpolitik is the operation of *thumos*: the desire to be treated justly, the willingness to act in order to seek out this justice and to remedy injustice, and the desire to rule over others without being ruled over oneself. These concepts have been more recently put to use by Hans J. Morgenthau (1971), who provides a tripartite understanding of human motivation in the harmony of reason, will, and action. On Morgenthau's understanding it is in the *will* where we feel emotions, but it is also the will that mediates the relationship between political theory and political practice, or we could say the dispute between “scientific man” and “power politics” (1945: 617-8). For Morgenthau, the will is that aspect of human nature that urges one to act in defence of the status quo, or seek change for the better.¹³ *Thumos* is the part of the human *psyche*, our affective makeup, where the desire for justice lies: it is the part of the soul (*hē psychē*) that seeks to avenge injustice against oneself or others close to one, as well as the part of the soul that wants recognition, esteem, and honour (cf. *Lev.* XIII.3-5). *Thumos* seeks to dominate over others, but also to free others from unjust domination.

A recent student of these propositions is Richard Ned Lebow (2005, 2009a), who has suggested that IR needs to take seriously once again the concept of *thumos* from ancient Greek political philosophy.¹⁴ Lebow sees a benefit in returning to this idea of *thumos* or spiritedness because it “embodies the insight that all human beings value and seek esteem” while making manifest the tensions between power, freedom, and obedience. That is, while appetite (*epithumia*) can move someone to accept domination because it can ensure material survival, spirit (*thumos*) cannot accept this rule because of its resistance to domination in the name of self-esteem (2005: 7, 27). There is, therefore, a tension between the material desire for security and the immaterial desire to be treated justly, to be esteemed. To use the language currently in fashion, material life is being interpreted in the light of immaterial life, *bios* (material life-as-such) is interpreted in the light of *zoe* (politically qualified life).

The most immediate objection to this presentation of the problem of security is that it repeats the contestable realist trope that all political behaviour is reducible to the quest for survival, and all actions are

course.

¹² This statement begins to bring out the larger theme of the relationship between knowledge and security, and how a lack of knowledge or an ignorance about oneself and one's condition can increase feelings of insecurity.

¹³ This is the classical understanding of *thumos*, as identified by Socrates in *Republic* as one of the three parts of the soul, along with *logos* (reason) and *epithumia* (appetite). This presentation of *thumos* takes place in *Republic* under the auspices of the discussion of political theology (cf. 439e-441c).

¹⁴ Lebow's *Cultural Theory of International Relations* (2009a) is an attempt to build a new understanding of IR on a sustained reflection of the problem of *thumos*, or spirit. The discussion of *thumos* or that part of the soul where the passion for justice is felt occurs under the umbrella of Plato's discussion of political theology, or the relationship between divine justice and the city according to justice. Perhaps we can make the following inference: Lebow's attempt at a grand theory on the grounds of culture is (using Morgenthau's phrase) a rejection of Realism's godless and justless view of politics “under an empty sky”, while devoting the final words of his tome to the resuscitation of *thumos* and the pursuit of the just or good world society (2009a: 569-70).

understood as self-interested in the respect that they all aim at this end. By reincorporating the original understanding of *thumos* we open an avenue of critique that can rewrite the traditional understandings of the realist position, while maintaining a space for the role that emotions other than fear play in political relations. As Lebow puts it, incorporating Greek lexicon “allows a more sophisticated analysis of such concepts as power, hegemony, and persuasion [and] can enrich our understanding of power” (2009b). The concept that will benefit from a concern for ancient political philosophy is the concept of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty is the distinctive feature of modern political science, and the organizing principle of International Relations. Yet, if we recall that Hobbes's *Leviathan* is published a mere three years after the treaties of Westphalia come into effect in 1648, a new picture emerges around the genesis of the concept of sovereignty and its relation to a specific picture of political psychology. Hobbesian and Westphalian sovereignty begins to appear as a specific interpretation about the way that politics affects us, and that the particular tradition of sovereignty that has come down to us is predicated on the ability of fear to overwhelm hope, and to moderate all human actions.¹⁵ That is, sovereignty is built on an understanding of human emotion that privileges the compelling force of fear ahead of all other passions. Only by recalling the choice that Hobbes made in his presentation of human political psychology to privilege the emotion of fear when *thumos* was primarily at work can one begin to dig our inherited concept of sovereignty up at the roots.

What is driving Hobbes's presentation is the role of this “continual fear and danger of violent death” (*Lev.* XIII.9). The fear of violent death is one of the “passions that incline men to peace” precisely because it is a fear of other human beings rather than “spirits invisible”:

“The passion to be reckoned upon is fear, whereof there be two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, the power of those men they shall therein *offend*. Of these two, though the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear. The fear of the former is in every man *his own religion*...The latter hath not so, at least not place enough to keep men to their promises, because in the condition of mere nature the inequality of power is not discerned *but the by the event of battle*” (*Lev.* XIV.31, my emphases)

The fear of violent death at the hands of another human being replaces the fear “in every man” of his own religion. That is, the fear of violent death *replaces* in Hobbes's scheme the role that prophecy or divine authority would normally fill “in the nature of man before civil society” (*ibid.*). Fear of violent death is the new ordering principle, because of how it affects us, how this fear encourages the disciplining of our behaviour in the name of security. Yet this fear for survival does not derive from the desire to seek “the preservation of [our] own nature” by any means, but from the *offense* of other human beings, from our inability to esteem, recognize, and value another person “at the same rate that he sets upon himself” (*Lev.* XIV.1; XIII.5). “The event of battle” is a most violent teacher that educates us, says Hobbes, by revealing the “inequality of power” to which our *thumos* was blind. The passion, the “interiour motion” laying the foundation of the modern security state is not fear of violent death, but the hope, the affect, of justice. Fear comes to sight as “the passion to be reckoned on” not because it is the primary motivator of human action, but because it capable of educating, of making us reasonable, despite our inherent thumotic tendencies. That first sovereign Leviathan is, in the final analysis, “King of the Proud”, or king of those that value themselves relative to others more than they ought (*Lev.* XXVIII.27). Thus, we can conclude that security, the desire to avoid battle and seek peace, arises out of the hope to be esteemed at the rate that we think we should be

¹⁵ One of the goals of this paper is to demonstrate sovereignty and security are the *same* concept, abstractions from the same idea.

esteemed. In other words, the desire, the hope, the *affect* of justice is the security state, or we could say that the institution of sovereignty is the greatest of all political *affects*. Yet at the basis of this picture is a *lack* not in safety but of knowledge, either of our condition or the condition of others. Violence erupts when we act in the ignorance of our condition relative to others.

It is for these reasons that we could not agree with Dalby and Neocleous against Williams. The idea of security derives from Hobbes's rhetorical use of the "fear and danger of violent death" as a replacement for the divine authority of punishment and reward to govern human behaviour. Certainly one can agree with the spirit in which Neocleous and Dalby respond to Williams, but the problem of security is somewhat more complicated than a simple tradeoff between liberty and safety, freedom and obedience, and so on. The fear of violent death is the *new* modern political theology, but is based on experience rather than belief. We cannot think about the idea of security independently because it is coeval with the idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty replaces the appeal to divine law or prophecy in the structure of politics with the fear of violent death at the hands of another human being. More specifically, the idea of God is replaced by the fear of violent death as the new orienting principle for political life. But this is a fear of things *visible* not invisible. As such, this newfound fear for our life, this lack of security, is felt equally and the Leviathan, the Sovereign, is conjured up to reduce this fear. Insofar as sovereignty is the political phenomenon that demarcates the movement from antiquity to modernity, the idea of security and all concepts that flow from it —especially rights, liberty and equality —must be understood to have their origins, their beginnings in the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot be conceived without security, nor can security be conceived without sovereignty. Sovereignty is the affect or expression of this desire for security.¹⁶ "If you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind" when the hole is the whole of modernity, sovereignty, and political theology, with the idea of natural freedom and equality that have flown from these? This is not meant to say that critiquing security is not a worthwhile pursuit, but that we must recognize the high stakes of such critique.

This very quick rereading of Hobbes's original presentation, however, reveals that fear is not the problem: these other emotions that surround feelings of justice and self-esteem are what current scholars would like to bring back in to IR theories (Muldoon 2008; Roberts 2010). Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison (2008) argue that the study of emotion has been around for a long while in IR, and Realists have had a monopoly on its study because of the role that fear plays in the Realist worldview. Bleiker and Hutchison's primary innovation is to integrate the revived interest in the emotions with the Aesthetic turn in IR theory. Emotions are the site of representation of inner feeling, a move usually associated with the logic of political aesthetics. In Bleiker's seminal essay on the Aesthetic Turn in IR he argues that the constant gap between a form of representation and the thing being represented is the site of politics; moreover, rather than trying to narrow this gap aesthetics highlights the inherent political nature of representation in all of its forms (Bleiker 2001). Bleiker (2000) also points our attention to the importance of poetry, insofar as poetry is "ideally suited" to rethink global politics, as the essence of poetry its self-conscious link between language and political reality.

Margaret Lyon, a cultural anthropologist that has written widely on the subject and study of emotion, presents a case for understanding emotions as primarily social phenomena, precisely because of their affect on the body (Lyon 1995). She argues that emotions both re-embody individuals and are social in nature. Emotions and ideas are both located in the self, and thus emotion and cognition are "linked" through the body. Our bodily existence, says Lyon, means that we exist in relation to other material entities, and understanding the *agency* of the body requires understanding that its communicative and emotional capacities are closely linked to its sociality (Lyon 1995, p.256). We have a point of comparison with Hobbes

¹⁶ Complicating matters, this desire is not born of knowledge but of imagination.

on this score, as Hobbes makes us all *wholly body*, all pieces of matter coming into contact in political ways. We are bodies, first and foremost, hence his beginning with those things that seem to move the body in specific ways, the passions, the “interiour motions”. We must say that Lyon and Hobbes agree on this, and that Lyon's argument is immanent in Hobbes's analysis.

Paradigmatic, Episodic, and Dispositional Passions

Hobbes's attachment to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with which we began rests on the *Rhetoric's* concentration on the study of the passions, “those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments”, those things that move bodies in politics (*Rhet.* 2.1.8). The response to the orthodox understanding of material well-being and emotion in Hobbes, and the same connection of body-passion in contemporary literature—what we can loosely call a sort of materialistic psychology—finds its response in Aristotle, and in the study of rhetoric. The passions affect judgment, and rhetoric “is concerned with making a judgment” (*Rhet.* 2.1.2). Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is famous for its analysis of the “enthymeme” as a rhetorical tool for persuasion, and its systematic account of the passions that occupy the central book of the work. Aristotle enumerates fourteen individual passions, or seven pairs of negative and positive passions of which anger is understood to be the paradigm, receiving the most sustained attention because of the role that it plays in politics (cf. Sokolon 2006).

Aristotle defines anger as “desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] distress, for conspicuous retaliation because of a conspicuous slight that was directed, without justification, at oneself or those near to one” (*Rhet.* 2.2.1). What makes this emotion political is the “dreamlike” pleasure “that follows all experience of anger from the hope of getting retaliation” (*Rhet.* 2.2.3). That is, anger is necessarily relational and therefore a social and political passion. Aristotle is explicitly speaking here of *thumos*, which he describes as “a thing much sweeter than honey in the throat” (ibid.). The source and feeling of this slight that leads to the pleasure of imagining retaliation is the feeling of “belittling” by others. Belittling causes pleasure in those who do it because “they think they themselves become more superior by ill-treating others” (*Rhet.* 2.2.6). “In general” says Aristotle, “those longing for something and not getting it are irascible and easily stirred to anger, especially against those belittling their present condition”, and all the more easily stirred if one was expecting the opposite treatment, “for the quite unexpected hurts more” (*Rhet.* 2.2.9-11).

The parallels with Aristotle's presentation of anger and Hobbes's depiction of the natural condition should be readily apparent. In both cases, the desire for revenge causes one to seek retribution, not out fear or loss, but for the sake of indulging the imaginary pleasure of revenge. Where Hobbes uses the language of esteem Aristotle uses the language of belittlement; however, in both cases the belittling is judged to be “without justification” because it does not accord with the way one understands one's own “present condition”. Turning momentarily to Aristotle's thoughts on fear, he tells us that we are more apt to fear something that “seems near at hand” rather than far off, and anger is just such a sign “of something that causes fear” close at hand (*Rhet.* 2.5.2). As a result, Aristotle says fear makes people “inclined to deliberation, while no one deliberates about hopeless things” (*Rhet.* 2.5.14). Once again, fear can be reckoned with because it is inclined to deliberate, and fear makes one inclined to deliberate because of the “fear of powers visible” that is represented by one who is angered. The dangers from which one seeks protection are the actions of those who have not been valued as they value themselves, or those who have been belittled. Perhaps the most striking aspect of Aristotle's presentation of the political passions is his definition of calmness. Calmness is the “settling down and quieting of anger” (*Rhet.* 2.3.2). Calmness does not receive its *own* definition, but is simply the absence or negation of anger. Aristotle is implying that the affect of anger is the dispositional political behaviour. Given that the imaginary pleasure of retribution can only be moderated

by the fear of imminent danger in Aristotle's presentation, it is little surprise that Hobbes judged this work to be "something rare."

The approach to the study and integration of affect into political analyses that has made the greatest effort to reconcile the history of political philosophy with new advances in brain science, political psychology, and critical or postmodern theory is to be found in the complementary research of Daniel Gross and Philip Fisher. Daniel Gross (2006) and Philip Fisher (2001) both offer pathbreaking attempts to understand *what* passion is and *how* passion, affect, and emotion influence individual and political life.¹⁷ Gross and Fisher both provide invaluable tools for our excavation of sovereignty and the security state. My approach is indebted to the insights of these two writers in two ways. First, Gross—by using Aristotle as a touchstone—recognizes that the rhetorical tradition is a resource that is at least as rich for insight into the emotions and affect as is psychology. However, where Gross emphasizes Aristotle's insight that all passions are social phenomena in contrast to Damasio's belief that they are "psychophysiological sufferings of the individual," Gross does not develop Aristotle's connection between the practise of rhetoric and the pursuit of justice or recognition in political relations (Gross 2006, p.9). Nonetheless, Gross refuses to grant authority in understanding affective and emotional phenomena to the sciences.

Fisher, though he does not explicitly discuss the concept of sovereignty, provides an heuristic through which we can better understand the assumptions sovereignty makes about the operation of the passions in politics, with his distinction between *episodic* and *dispositional* passions. Fisher reserves the phrase "vehement states" for passions that are "eruptive momentary impassioned states" rather than those "more enduring underlying states" that we often refer to as passions (Fisher 2002, pp.19-27, 71-9).¹⁸ In our discussion of Hobbes, if we succeeded in presenting sovereignty as the attempt to manage the passions to secure long-term political stability, then Fisher's distinction between episodic and dispositional states reveals an assumption buried in the psychology of sovereignty: sovereign power must treat episodic passions as if they were dispositional or constant. The disturbance to the status quo that an eruption, for example, of anger or fear represents *must* be treated as if it is a dispositional characteristic of the subjects of sovereignty in order to justify the continual and ever present disciplining threat of sovereign power.¹⁹ On this point, Hobbes's application of Aristotle is clear: just as calmness is the quieting of anger, fear of violent death erases vain hopes. Even if we are convinced by the traditional interpretation of Hobbes's rhetoric, that sovereign power is the required solution for the occasions of violence emanating from the fear of violent death, than sovereignty is a *permanent* reaction, the permanent securing against dangers that are merely episodic. Believing Hobbes's more evasive argument that vanity, pride, and the unabashed political hope are the actual dangers and sources of political violence, the distinction between dispositional and episodic passions still presents itself as a viable tool for understanding the political psychology at work in the foundation of sovereignty. In both cases, the security state presents itself as the permanent solution to psychological or

¹⁷ Gross's treatment of the various literatures on the passions is especially impressive, as is his unwavering humanistic critical eye. He centres out Martha Nussbaum and Judith Butler for refusing to go *far enough* in their analyses of affect and their critique of orthodox approaches to political psychology that have their basis in Cartesian naturalistic philosophy while neglecting the tradition that appeals to Aristotelian rhetoric. Nussbaum is especially guilty for appealing to the authority of neuroscience rather than justifying her conclusions on purely humanistic terms, abrogating previous theoretical gains. See Gross (2006, pp.74-84).

¹⁸ Examples illustrating this difference are falling-in-love versus love itself, or being afraid versus avarice and jealousy. We can also compare Martha Nussbaum's metaphor of "upheaval" to describe these vehement episodes and disruptions.

¹⁹ The benefit of analyzing sovereignty in this way is that it separates the actions and deeds of a sovereign power from the philosophic speeches that have justified it. I draw the following conclusion for our current situation. Hobbes disguises his true argument for sovereignty underneath the veil of an ever present fear of violent death, with the actual threat to peace and stability being eruptions of righteous indignation in a vain hope for justice in the absence of an arbiter of justice. Whether one has been convinced either by Hobbes's rhetoric or his esoteric justification for sovereignty, both presentations require sovereignty to treat as dispositional psychic aspects that are merely episodic.

pathological problems that are merely episodic and occasional.²⁰

We have here the opportunity to speak of affect in the light of security studies. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, in a revisitation of the securitization theory of the Copenhagen school to bring it into line with “higher securitizations” (grand/global struggles, climate change, religion, etc.) note that this effort opens up more difficult questions about how to theorize fear or a general social anxiety (2009, p.267). Anxiety seems to allow for a securitizing move against the indissoluble objects of two types of fear: the Freudian fear of a lack of self-knowledge or ignorance about oneself, and the fear of mortality (cf. Honneth 2009, pp.126ff.). That is, anxiety compels solutions for the problems of self-knowledge and the fear of death. Now that we have given the securitization problem its most Socratic formulation, we can do no more than recognize that possibilities opened up by turning to affect in securitization theory for solving them. Returning to the parallels in the presentation of the political emotions in Hobbes and Aristotle was meant to demonstrate the extent to which a fundamental *lack* of knowledge about oneself (*i.e.* the *value* or *standing* of oneself in relation to others versus one's self-perception) and how this lack is treated by affecting the *fear* of violence structures the architecture of the security state. A possible next step is to develop the latter parts of Tomkins's Affect theory known as Script theory, or the treatment of personality structure and dynamics in the “scene”, or the basic element of lived experience. Simply, or actions and feelings can be interpreted as falling into “scripts” (like that of fictional character) as indicated by our affective responses, just as our affections can be categorized as one of Tomkins's nine affects. If one were to combine this with Aristotle's understanding of the relationship between rhetoric and the movement of the political passions—for example, one uses specific rhetoric to make a crowd angry and intend the adherence to a script of vengeance—one can develop a path for new insights into the affective politics of identifying and reducing security threats.²¹

Going “Nuclear” or the Script of Security

The “maverick” psychology of Silvan Tomkins is an outlier within this general conversation of affect and politics. Tomkins's Affect Theory, developed over thirty years in four volumes of *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness*, understands affect to be a form of communication through facial physiognomy, with an underlying streak of Freudian psychoanalysis. For example, Tomkins says of crying that “the crying response is the first response the human being makes upon being born”:

“In the cry the mouth is open, the corners of the lips are pulled downwards, rather than upwards as in laughing, and vocalization and breathing are more continuous, rather than intermittent as in laughter. In addition, there is an arching of the eyebrows which accompanies crying, which, if it appears without crying, gives a sad expression to the face.” (1963, p.3)

Tomkins distinguishes this “distress-anguish” crying affect from the affects of “fear-terror” based on how

²⁰ Aristotle's definition of calmness complicates our presentation in an important way, and in a way which is important for the current argument. Aristotle defines calmness as the “quieting of anger” implying that anger is the *dispositional* state of humanity while calmness is the occasional state. We should remind ourselves that, though Hobbes is indebted to Aristotle's political psychology for his own, Hobbes's political philosophy and the invention of sovereignty are intended to be critical reactions to the same. What Hobbes says, which neither Aristotle nor Thucydides say, is that excessive fear is enough to discipline this angry (*id est* thumotic and retributive) state.

²¹ We point to Aristotle's general scheme for analyzing the passions, of which his analysis of anger is the paradigm: What is anger? What is the state of mind of people who become angry? Why do people become angry and for what reasons? To whom is anger directed? Aristotle's answers to these questions give rhetoric a preeminent role in understanding and controlling political affects (*Rhet.* 2.2.1-17).

“they appear on the face” (1963, p.5). The critical distinction between distress-crying and fear-crying is “the difference between the wide-open eyes of fear versus the characteristic contraction of the muscles around which produces the arched eyebrow” (ibid.). This relationship between affect and the body is not mono-directional, as the awareness of “the feedback of crying *is* the experience of distress or suffering” (1963, p.6). Tomkins uses this physiognomic and affective bodily evidence to conclude that one can experience different types of and degrees of suffering as indicated by the variation in their duration and intensity, especially of tonus or constant low level muscle activity. Overall, he identifies nine affects, classified as positive, negative, or neutral. There is obvious space here for the development of a biopolitics of affect, or at least a biopolitical critique of an overly scientific approach to affect. Tomkins is emphatic that it is the movement of the face that expresses affect, to others and to oneself via sensory feedback (Tomkins 1962, p.201-42).

The face is the dominant medium of communication for voluntary and involuntary affective responses. Movements of the face are how we communicate inner feelings. These observations allow us to suggest that a path exists which we can trace from inner feeling to expression/affection to communication. Thus we see a preliminary relationship between affect and techniques of communication, language, and rhetoric. If this scheme is correct, we can identify a step in between feeling and the expression of feeling where the *choice* to communicate exists. This nuance is also present in Aristotle's discussion of the emotions, if only implicitly. To use Damasio's terms, emotional marking is the first step of the communication of inner feelings. Thus, we must be prepared to recognize that the concern for affect makes the art of rhetoric, the art of communication, relevant again because of the way that speech can work to construct and inform affective responses.

Tomkins's insights into affect evolve to include something he refers to as Script theory. Script theory is a way to interpret the link between stimulus, affect, and response (Tomkins 1995b, p.178). The basic unit of a script is the scene, or “the basic element in life as it is lived” which includes one affect and at least one object of that affect (ibid.). Interestingly, the object of affect can be affect *itself*. For example, regarding the question, “Why am I afraid?” or “Will my fear abate”, affect is generated by the affect of fear (ibid.). If security requires an object to be securitized, we must leave open the possibility that the object of security is affect itself. Script theory, emerging out of affect theory and personality development, intends to theorize the difference between the interpretation of scenes from the perspective of the individual, and the perspective of society. Societal change comes about when there is tension between society's definition of a certain situation and an individual's script: “If society is to endure as a coherent entity, its definition of situations must in some measure be constructed as an integral part of the shared scripts of its individuals” (Tomkins 1995b, pp.180-1). Society's coherence is therefore founded on similar affective responses to the political. The politics of memory play an integral role here, as “memorially supported plots” and “cultural inheritance” are required for the augmentation of *partial* or incomplete scripts (Tomkins 1995b, p.182). Also important is the idea of *ideological* scripts, which provide a “general orientation of the place of human beings in the cosmos” (Tomkins 1995a, p.342, 353). These are inherited simply by being a member of a group as large as a civilization and as small as a school (ibid.). These ideological scripts represent the faiths by which humans live and die, and are the source of bonding and division; moreover, they endow worldly facts with “value and affect” (ibid.). Additionally, destructive war scripts can be generated by states in the defense of ideological scripts, or in defense of a series of aggregated scripts that define a shared way of life (Tomkins 1991, p.490) Such an application of affect theory should make us wonder whether there is in fact *any* differentiation between politics and affect; at the very least, it confirms our suspicion that affect is the site of the political, as the critique or restructuring of ideology must begin (in Tomkins's scheme) with an account of affect. This said, Tomkins also describes the affective human as a “humanomaton” because affect is programed into the body as software into a computer, implying the obedience to affect rather than its autonomy (1995b, 441ff.).

From the perspective of the relationship between affect, security, and sovereignty, the aspect of Tomkins's work that appears especially helpful is his idea of the Nuclear Script. Nuclear scripts are the “central phenomena in any human being” that “*govern* that large and ever-growing family of scenes we define as nuclear scenes” (Tomkins 1995b, p.183, my emphasis). Nuclear scripts grow in intensity and duration of affect; they “never stop seizing the individual” (ibid.). Nuclear scenes are the “good scenes we can never totally or permanently achieve” and when striving for them rewards us with positive affect, we are “forever greedy” for more (ibid.). In contrast to ideological scripts, nuclear scripts are not self-validating; that is, nuclear scripts are not as coherent as ideological scripts in their attempt to balance the good and the bad in the favour of the affected individual (Tomkins 1995b, p.188). Thinking and feeling ideology makes it so, whereas nuclear scripts point to the constant lack of achievement of a fundamental element of life (ibid.). The paradigmatic nuclear script is the script of mortality and death. The mortality script cannot be dealt with effectively because humans cannot “master the threats to which they are exposed” (1995b, p.184). This “victimage” is perpetuated “by reason as well as affect” (ibid.). Tomkins's observations suggest that there is an element of our affective makeup that is constantly and inescapably anxious, and our interpretation of various scripts are efforts to maximize our positive affects in the face of this anxiety.

Returning to the Hobbesian-Aristotelian picture of anger, sovereignty is written in accordance with a certain script of revenge and the seeking of particular ends. This much is clear from Aristotle's presentation of passion and rhetoric: an orator can affect a crowd for the sake of a particular end. Affect, through the movement of the passions under the thumb of rhetoric, can be seen to follow a script. If we can speak of a script of security, it appears as the solution to the gap between the scripts of individuals and the script of society as a whole in the effort of each to understand their general “orientation in the cosmos.” Likewise, since such a security script would also be *nuclear*, because the goal of reducing anxiety cannot be fully achieved so long as human beings remain held to the script of mortality. That is, the script of security takes as its object affect itself, in an endless and futile effort.

We will close with this thought. A commitment script “validates the importance and necessity of the struggle” but achieving that to which one is committed erodes the script, or requires its redefinition to continue (Tomkins 1995, p.181). The last decade has seen American foreign policy follow just such a script. The War on Terror, having been framed around the initial conspicuous slight of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, follows a commitment script, with the commitment to capture Osama bin Laden, “Dead or Alive”. Thus, in an echo of Aristotle's remarks on dream like pleasure, “Operation Infinite Justice” inaugurated by President Bush in September 2001 can be brought to its necessary and scripted conclusion by President Barack Obama in May 2011 with the phrase “Justice has been done”.

Works Cited

- Aristotle. *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. Trans. Bleiker, Roland. “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory” in *Millennium*. Vol.30 No.3 (2001), 509-533.
- Bleiker, Roland. “Introduction” in *Alternatives*. Vol.25 (2000), 269-284.
- Bell, Duncan, Ed. *Memory, Trauma, and World Politics: Reflections between Past and Present*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.
- Bleiker, Roland, & Emma Hutchion. “Fear no More: Emotions and World Politics” in *Review of International Studies*. Vol.34 No.1 (2008), 115-135.
- Buzan, Barry, & Ole Waever. “Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations” in *Review of International Studies*. Vol.35 No.2 (2009), 253-276.

- Dalby, Simon. "Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse" in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*. Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, Eds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
- Damasio, Antonio. *Descartes's Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. New York: Penguin Books, 1994.
- Damasio, Antonia. *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*. New York: Harvest Book/Harcourt Inc., 2003.
- Dewey, John. "The Theory of Emotion (I.): Emotional Attitudes" in *The Psychological Review*. Vol.1 No.6 (1894), 553-569.
- Dewey, John. "The Theory of Emotion (II.): The Significance of Emotions" in *The Psychological Review*. Vol.II No.1 (1895), 13-32.
- Dixon, Thomas. *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Edkins, Jenny. *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Edkins, Jenny. "The Rush to Memory and the Rhetoric of War" in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*. Vol.31 No.2 (2003), 231-251.
- Fisher, Philip. *The Vehement Passions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Gross, Daniel M. "Early Modern Emotion and the Economy of Scarcity" in *Philosophy and Rhetoric*. Vol.34 No.4 (2001), 308-321.
- Gross, Daniel M. *The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
- Hobbes, Thomas. "The Whole Art of Rhetoric" in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Vol. VI*. Sir William Molesworth, Ed. London: John Bohn, 1840.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Edwin Curley, Ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994.
- Honneth, Axel. *Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory*. Trans. James Ingram. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
- James, William. "II—What is an Emotion?" in *Mind*. Vol.9 No.34 (1884), 188-205.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. "Power, Persuasion, and Justice" in *Millennium*. Vol.33 No.3 (2005), 551-581.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. "The Future of Memory" in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. No.617 (2008), 25-41.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009a.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. "The Ancient Greeks and Modern Realism" in *Political Thought in International Relations*. Duncan Bell, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009b.
- LeDoux, Joseph E. "Emotion: Clues from the Brain" in *Annual Review of Psychology*. 46 (2000), 209-235.
- Lyon, Margaret. "Missing Emotion: The Limitations of Cultural Construction in the Study of Emotion" in *Cultural Anthropology*. Vol.10 No.2 (1995), 244-263.
- Marcus, George E. "Emotions in Politics" in *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol.3 (2000), 221-250.
- Massumi, Brian. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.
- McDermott, Rose. "The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science" in *Perspectives on Politics*. Vol.2 No.4 (2004a), 691-706.
- McDermott, Rose. *Political Psychology in International Relations*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004b.

- Mercer, Jonathan. "Rationality and Psychology in International Relations" in *International Organization*. Vol.59 No.1 (2005), 77-106.
- Mercer, Jonathan. "Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics" in *Journal of International Relations and Development*. Vol.9 No.3 (2006), 288-303.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil" in *Ethics*. Vol.56 No.1 (1945), 1-18.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. "Thought and Action in Politics" in *Social Research*. Vol.38 No.4 (1971), 611-632.
- Muldoon, Paul. "The Moral Legitimacy of Anger" in *European Journal of Social Theory*. Vol.11 No.3 (2008), 299-314.
- Neocleous, Mark. *Critique of Security*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008.
- Papoulias, Constantina, & Felicity Callard. "Biology's Gift: Interrogating the Turn to Affect" in *Body & Society*. Vol.16 No.1 (2010), 29-56.
- Plato. *Republic*. Trans. Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1967.
- Roberts, Robert C. "Justice as a Emotion Disposition" in *Emotion Review*. Vol.2 No.1 (2010), 36-43.
- Sokolon, Marlene. *Political Emotions: Aristotle on the Symphony of Reason and Emotion*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006.
- Strauss, Leo. *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis*. Trans. Elsa M. Sinclair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952 [1936].
- Strauss, Leo. *Hobbes Critique of Religion & Other Writings*. Trans. Gabriel Bartlett & Svetozar Minkov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Tomkins, Silvan S. *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Volume I: The Positive Affects*. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1962.
- Tomkins, Silvan S. *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Volume II: The Negative Affects*. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1963.
- Tomkins, Silvan S. *Affect Imagery Consciousness, Volume III: The Negative Affects, Anger & Fear*. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1991.
- Tomkins, Silvan S. *Exploring Affect: The Selected Writings of Silvan S. Tomkins*. E. Virginia Demos, Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995a.
- Tomkins, Silvan S. *Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader*. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick & Adam Frank, Eds. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995b.
- Welch, David. *Painful Choices*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.