The Development of Integrated Security Units and Cross-Level Security Governance[1]
CPSA 2011, Waterloo

Veronica M. Kitchen, University of Waterloo
vkitchen@uwaterloo.ca

Draft – not for distribution or citation without permission

National security priorities in Western democracies have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. No longer solely concerned with protection from nuclear bombs, scholars and practitioners of civil defence, public safety, and homeland security have turned their focus instead to protection from terrorism. More than ever before, national, civil, and homeland security are characterized by diverse authorities charged with different parts of counter-terrorism's activities: prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery. As Western democracies give more attention to counter-terrorism in their national security plans and strategies, however, they also seek better ways of structuring these different authorities for more efficient co-ordination of counter-terrorism efforts. At the same time, it has become plain to see, if not yet quite cliché to note, that the boundary between internal and external security is dissolving (Eriksson and Rhinard 2009). Together, these phenomena mean that the local and the global or international aspects of security are intimately connected. At the micro-level, cities or towns can be physically divided by a border (Metz 2002; Lundy 2010) or emergency management personnel may be located in another country (Peritz 2007). At the macro-level, local governments may have relations abroad which look like traditional diplomacy: the NYPD, for instance, has police officers posted abroad in police departments, in a program distinct from the FBI's liaison officers to foreign embassies (Dickey 2009). New York's counter-terrorism squad after 9/11 is only part of a much larger phenomenon of the development of counter-terrorism capacity across governments and the private sector. Cities, provinces and states, regions, central governments, and international organizations have all developed new mechanisms or institutions for information sharing, inter-agency co-operation, special operations, and other functions. Conceiving of these new institutions as simply new forms of co-operation, however, belies the important synergies which may result from such co-operation, and the ways in which this new institutional co-operation might signal changes in the global governance of security.

This paper examines a particular set of co-ordinating institutions in counter-terrorism and national security which I call "integrated counter-terrorism institutions" (ICTIs). These institutions share a common goal (improved counter-terrorism co-ordination across levels of government) and a basic structure (institutionalized, function-specific centres bringing together experts from the fields of intelligence, policing, security, and emergency planning). Examples include Canada's Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs), the United Kingdom's Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs) and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs), and the United States's Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. While co-operation between local and federal police, security, and intelligence professionals is not new, the institutions in each of these cases are. They can be conceived as examples of what Hooghe and Marks call "Type II multi-level governance," characterized by flexible, functionally-specific co-operation across a number of jurisdictions (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 237). This paper is the most preliminary stage of a large comparative research project comparing ICTIs in Canada (Schneider and Hurst 2008; Chalk 2009), the United States (Monahan 2009; Monahan and Palmer 2009; Forsyth 2005), and the United Kingdom (Field 2009; Clutterbuck 2009). While there is a secondary literature which discusses ICTIs in each country, so far, there has been no comparative work.

The emergence of Integrated Counter-Terrorism Units

The integration of policing and national security functions is not new; indeed, in many cases—such as on the colonial frontiers of Canada and the United States—securing national boundaries, establishing the state's sovereignty, and catching criminals were one and the same. The most recent iteration of co-operation, however, emerges in the particular global context of the securitization of terrorism. The 9/11 attacks in the United States were perceived to have resulted from a lack of co-operation between different parts of the security bureaucracy. The importance of inter-agency co-operation was identified in the US's 9/11 Commission Report, the UK's Report on the 7/7 transit bombings in London, and in Canada's 2004 national security strategy, *Securing an Open Society*. In each case, improved co-operation between security institutions at various levels of government was identified as an important need. The threat of terrorism was securitized (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1997) in Western societies as the most important contemporary threat to national security, outweighing, in public discourse, many more probable threats to human security.

Around the same time, scholars identified a shift in policing away from traditional policing and towards 'intelligence-led policing' or 'high policing'. This "securitization of policing" (Murphy 2007; Bornstein 2005) and the integration of police, military, intelligence and emergency management functions has important ethical implications related to the militarization of domestic life.

Intelligence-led policing is not a post-9/11 phenomenon, but combined with the securitization of policing has emerged as an important factor in the securitization of domestic society. Intelligence-led policing relies on the use of technology, statistics and prediction to focus on the prevention and mitigation of criminal activity, rather than on the detection and prosecution of crimes (Innes and Sheptycki 2004, 2). 'Broken window policing' leads police to focus increasingly on trivial matters of public disorder, on the assumption that small transgressions are likely to lead to larger ones, and potential criminals are more likely to commit crimes in neighbourhoods where they believe policing to be lax (Boyle and KD Haggerty 2009, 263). Boyle and Haggerty argue that this leads to a different conception of risk: such forward-looking models of policing lead security officials to focus on the greatest possible risk, rather than the most likely risk. The risk of an event such as a terrorist attack is incalculable, and so security governance must shift to a precautionary model where every contingency is planned for (Boyle and KD Haggerty 2009, 260). Police and other security officials are particularly prone to this tendency at mega-events, where security rapidly becomes "spectacular" and budgets spin out of control (Boyle and KD Haggerty 2009, 261). Attitudes towards criminal punishment also shifted away from rehabilitation and towards punitive incarceration, with the result that police capacity increased, often by using private actors (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, 4). In each of the three countries, the securitization of terrorism has been accompanied by an increase in security budgets, legislation, and a proliferation of government units with a formal responsibility for anti-terrorism policy. The increasing pressure on police departments and other security agencies to prevent and pre-empt the (perceived) threat from terrorism can easily lead to increased probability of errors or abuse (Murphy 2007, 8). Despite the common context, however, the landscape of counter-terrorism institutions looks quite different in each of Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. This is due to a variety of historical factors which have influenced the development of ICTIs in each domestic context.

United States: JTTFs and Fusion Centres

In the United States, there are two sets of institutions which meet the definition of ICTIs: the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and the Fusion Centers. JTTFs are part of the FBI and have an operational mandate to investigate and respond to terrorist attacks; Fusion Centers have a more amorphous structure and an information sharing mandate.

JTTFs are managed by the FBI, and located in FBI field offices, but also include local and state law enforcement personnel and members from other federal agencies who are effectively seconded to the FBI as Special Deputies, with corresponding security clearances and arrest powers, for the duration of the partnership (FBI n.d.; Etowah County Sheriff's Office). JTTFs have a legal existence solely as part of the FBI, but each local or state agency can decide for itself whether or not to participate. Portland, Oregon's City Council, for instance, refused to allow Portland's police to co-operate with certain JTTF activities since 2001, and withdrew the force from the JTTF entirely in 2005. In 2011, City Council voted to renew Portland's participation on a case-by-case basis (Yardley 2011). The first JTTF was established as a joint venture between the FBI and the NYPD in 1980 (Martin 1999); by 9/11 there were 35 JTTFs in FBI field offices in the United States (FBI n.d.). Today, there are 106 JTTFs staffed by 4400 members from 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal agencies. According to the FBI, this is quadruple the number in the pre-9/11 era (FBI n.d.).

Fusion Centers seem to be the less prestigious younger siblings of the JTTFs. The earliest references to calls for an intelligence fusion center for anti-terrorism investigations seem to come from a media article discussing Vice-President George H.W. Bush's 1986 report on anti-terrorism, written in the aftermath of the 1985 hijacking of Flight 847 in Lebanon. Written in the run-up to the 1988 presidential election, the article excoriates Bush for failing to implement many of its recommendations, including a call for an "intelligence fusion center" (Emerson 1988). There were precedents for intelligence co-operation in other fields. An intelligence fusion centre focused on border security has existed in El Paso since 1974 (Drug Enforcement Agency n.d.). In the 1980s, intelligence-sharing networks were established to focus on co-operation in gang and organized crime investigations. In some cases, anti-terrorism fusion centers were built on these criminal intelligence networks (Hancock 2008). Since the mid-1990s, Terrorism Early Warning Centres have been established which have the characteristics of ICTIs; the first of these was in Los Angeles in 1996 (Sullivan and Wirtz 2008). The 9/11 Commission Report explicitly called for the creation of intelligence fusion centres for counter-terrorism, and most of the fusion centers (which now number 88) which meet the definition for ICTIs were created from the mid-2000s. Most of these receive funding from the Department of Homeland Security. Fusion centres are created by memoranda of understanding undertaken between the participating agencies and based loosely on a set of guidelines developed in 2005 by the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Global Advisory Committee (GAC) (Rollins 2008, 20; Anon. 2005). In most cases, therefore, fusion centers derive their legal status from existing law enforcement agencies (Rollins 2008, 26). Fusion centers, as a group, do not therefore have a formal co-ordinating structure, although in 2009, the DHS announced it would establish a Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office to co-ordinate all of its fusion centres (Napolitano 2009).[2]

Each state has an anti-terrorism fusion center, together with several regional fusion centers. Wyoming is the exception, though the State's Criminal Intelligence Unit in the Department of Criminal Investigation seems to serve the function on an ad-hoc basis. In 2009, when there were only 58 DHS-funded fusion centers, the DHS spent $380M on them, and involved about 800 000 people (Monahan and Palmer 2009, 619). It is safe to assume that these numbers have increased significantly. There are also several national fusion centers, notably a hazardous materials fusion centre, a biometrics fusion center, and a national counter-terrorism centre, but these do not meet the definition of ICTIs because they do not involve agencies across levels of government. Fusion centers in the United States seem to be designed to serve the function of a domestic intelligence agency, which has long been resisted in the United States. While fusion centers do not deal with classified information, they do share information with various public and private partners and the general public (Rollins 2008, 20).

---

[2] There is clearly a paper to be written—if it hasn't already—on the political economy of inter-agency co-operation. Creating fusion centers to co-ordinate fusion centers seems somehow contradictory to the original intent of the 9/11 report.

Canada

In Canada, Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams are located in Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal. Like the JTTFs in the United States, they are led by the federal police force, the RCMP. Originally, they were all located within the RCMP's Divisional offices, but some quickly moved to dedicated locations described as "discreet" although not covert (Canada Newswire 2003). Vancouver's INSET is housed in the Vancouver Police Department. Each INSET comprises representatives from the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, and provincial and municipal police forces. In Canada, the integrated security model also appears in an explicit way at mega-events like the Vancouver Olympics and the G20 in 2010, and will be used again to secure the Pan Am Games (and, almost certainly, the Women's World Cup) in 2015. The London (UK) 2012 Olympics use a similar integrated model.

The development of the INSETs is the latest in the sometimes difficult relationship between policing and domestic intelligence functions in Canada. The domestic intelligence function was originally housed within the RCMP, and grew as the Cold War intensified. In 1970, in response to the 1969 McKenzie Commission, an RCMP Security Service was created, and ties between the policing and intelligence functions loosened. It was not until 1984 that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was created, in response to the 1977 McDonald Commission report. This loosening of the relationship between intelligence and security happened not least because of concerns about civilian oversight of domestic intelligence, and the difficulty of balancing privacy, civil liberty and democratic freedom with security issues. These concerns did not go away, however, and it is perhaps telling that within the first five years of CSIS's existence, its counter-subversion branch was abolished and the report on its first five years was tellingly titled *In Flux but not in Crisis*. From the moment the INSETs were created in 2001, there were concerns about the relationship of the new teams to CSIS (MacCharles 2001).

The Integrated National Security Enforcement teams replaced the RCMP's National Security Investigations Service. They were first mentioned in the media only a month after 9/11 (Steinbachs 2001), and formally launched in June of 2002 (Woods 2002). This kind of integration had existed before in the realm of security. Faced with a threat from the FLQ in the 1960s, the RCMP, Sûreté de Québec, and Montreal Police co-operated in a task force to respond; it was disbanded in 1970 after the October Crisis (Schneider and Hurst 2008, 362). Before 9/11, Canadian officials co-operated with Americans in Washington State on border security issues in the form of an Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) in British Columbia. The IBET model, too, was expanded across the country after 9/11. The INSETs have a mandate for collecting and sharing intelligence among partners, enforcing laws related to national security, and enhancing Canada's capacity to combat national security threats.

Once again, the intelligence and policing functions of domestic security were close bedfellows, and it was not long before they were in tension again. In September 2002, Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, was detained in New York on his return to Canada from a holiday in Tunisia. Instead of being returned to Canada, American officials sent him to Syria, where he was also a citizen. He was held and tortured on suspicion of terrorism for more than a year. An inquiry into his detention determined that he had been tortured, that there was no evidence that he was guilty of the suspicions of terrorism laid against him, and that the RCMP and CSIS had indirectly contributed to Arar's arrest, detention, and torture because of their sloppy information sharing (Commission of Inquiry into the Action of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar 2006). Among other things, the O'Connor Commission's Report recommended that the RCMP respect their mandates, and that when they work together in integrated units, they should do so on the basis of written agreements so as to preserve the distinction between policing and intelligence collection. Around the same time, in 2005, former Ontario Premier Bob Rae was appointed to review the 1985 Air India Flight 182 disaster, in which 280 Canadians were killed as a result of a terrorist attack, and in which only one person has ever been convicted. Rae concluded that the question

of information sharing between the RCMP and CSIS should be part of the terms of reference for the subsequent Inquiry. The Major Commission, whose final report was released in 2010, concluded that there was a failure of intelligence sharing between the two organizations which helped lead to the disaster and which helped prevent more convictions (Major 2010). Clearly, the relationship between policing and intelligence in the realm of national security is a fraught one in Canada, and any new co-operative initiative like the INSETs deserves to be scrutinized. Since their inception, the INSETs have been involved in several investigations into national security issues across Canada.

Given the timing of the creation of the INSETs, it is tempting to hypothesize that their creation is part of a strategy of "defence against help" often undertaken by Canadian governments in response to American security threats (Fortmann and Haglund 2002). According to this perspective, Canadian security initiatives can be explained by the need to protect Canada not against threats to Canadian territory and sovereignty, but against the American temptation to "help" Canada secure itself if Canadian security does not meet American standards. Without further research, I would caution against this perspective because the story often turns out to be more complicated (Kitchen and Sasikumar 2009).

United Kingdom

Like Canada, but unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has long had a domestic intelligence agency, MI5. In the UK, Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs), which are focused on investigation, and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs), which are focused on the development of intelligence, fit the definition of ICTIs. They were created under the auspices of the UK's counter-terrorism policy, CONTEST, which is administered by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism of the Home Office. The CONTEST policy has three parts: Prevent, Pursue, and Protect & Prepare. The CTUs fall under the 'Pursue' mandate. Unlike Canada and the United States, the United Kingdom has no national police force, so each counter-terrorism unit is under the mandate of the police force which operates it (Jackson 2009, 131, note 10). The CTUs comprise members of the Special Branches from the local forces, together with "surveillance operatives, intelligence analysts, interpreters, forensics specialists, and high-tech investigators" (Field 2009, 1003). Each CTU also houses a Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA), who has a mandate to "identify and assess local critical sites within their force area that might be vulnerable to terrorist or extremist attack; then devise and develop appropriate protective security plans to minimise impact on that site and the surrounding community" (National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2010).

The CTUs and CTIUs were designed by the Association of Chief Police Officers, and are considered "regionally located national assets" (Association of Chief Police Officers 2009). The CTUs are geographically distributed across England: Greater London CTU, West Midlands CTU, Northeast (West Yorkshire or Leeds) CTU, Northwest (Greater Manchester) CTU, Southeast (Thames Valley) CTU. The Eastern, East Midlands, Southwest, and Wales regions contain smaller CTIUs. The Association of Chief Police Officers of Scotland (ACPOS) has established a CTU which apparently so well-integrated with the English and Welsh CTUs that, according to Counter-Terrorism Command Assistant Commissioner Robert Quick, "you would hardly notice that they are actually in a different country" (United Kingdom. Parliament. House of Commons 2009, Q101). The CTIU in Northern Ireland is heavily focused on the domestic conflict there, rather than on globalized terrorism (United Kingdom. Parliament. House of Commons 2009, Q104).

The Greater London region is home to the Counter-Terrorism Command, a CTU which emerged as the result of the merger of the Anti-Terrorist Branch and the Special Branch of the London Metropolitan Police (United Kingdom. Home Office. 2009, 63) It acts as first among equals, taking some responsibility for co-ordination and national counter-terrorism policy as well as acting as the first point

of contact for international co-operation on policing counter-terrorism (Jackson 2009, 131). As of 2010, this status was a normative, rather than a legal, privilege (United Kingdom. Parliament. House of Commons. 2010, Para. 24). It is the largest CTU, employing about half of the more than 3000 personnel who were employed by CTUs in mid-2009 (Association of Chief Police Officers 2009; United Kingdom. Parliament. House of Commons 2009, Q98).

The ACPO created a Counter-Terrorism Co-ordination Centre, or National Counter-Terrorism Network, in 2009, to co-ordinate the CTUs and CTIUs (United Kingdom. Parliament. House of Commons 2009, Q98). It also operates three other units related to counter-terrorism policy: National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination Unit (NETCU), National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), and the Domestic Extremism Team. By the spring of 2011, these will be brought under the Met's Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15) (Press Association 2010). It is not yet clear whether they will be cross-level, integrated units.

The UK's counter-terrorism policy is much more focused on addressing domestic terrorism and preventing radicalization than the United States's is; this reflects the British experience with terrorism. The 7/7 2005 bombings on the London transit system were committed by British-born citizens, and seem to have provided the trigger for forming the CTUs. They also differ from both the Canadian and the American ICTIs in that recruitment is done directly into the CTUs. In both Canada and the United States, security officials are seconded to INSETs and Fusion Centers.

Comparing ICTIs

The combined phenomenon of the securitization of policing and the integration of different security actors have a number of clear effects which must be understood in order to properly conceptualize the structures which govern and manage counter-terrorism in Western democracies. First, security is governed by a plurality of actors, not all of them public. Second, there is no clear distinction between local, national, and global boundaries and security concerns. Third, the boundaries between policing and intelligence, and the police and security functions are blurry. This may lead to serious ethical concerns.

The governance of counter-terrorism in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom is characterized in each case by the plurality of actors. The most obvious difference between the Canadian, American, and British models for cross-level co-operation on counter-terrorism is the fact that the United States has two more-or-less parallel systems of institutions—JTTFs and Fusion Centers—where the UK and Canada only have one. This can likely be explained by the fact that the United States did not have a pre-existing domestic intelligence agency. Fusion centers have a much more haphazard structure than JTTFs, INSETs, or CTUs. They are not consistently named across the country, nor do they have a consistent structure or membership. The amount of information available about them varies highly from fusion center to fusion center. The United States is a much larger country than Canada or the United States, so it is not surprising to see that it has a more complex system. It also seems likely that some of the complexity can be explained by the distorted set of incentives that faced state and local governments after the creation of the DHS, when appealing to security and counter-terrorism was very often the best or only way to get funding (De Rugy 2004). The United Kingdom has the most streamlined system, which can probably be explained by the fact that the UK's system of government is far more centralized than it is in Canada or the United States. Both CTUs and INSETs combine intelligence sharing and operational capacity in a single organization, while JTTFs and Fusion Centers split the responsibility. As noted above in the discussion about the relationship between intelligence and policing in Canada, this can have advantages to efficiency and accuracy, but has greater risks of being detrimental to privacy and democratic rights.

The landscape is rendered more complex by the presence of para-governmental and private actors. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the guidelines for Fusion Centers and CTUs were designed by the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Advisory Committee (GAC) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) respectively. These can both be considered para-governmental organizations. The GAC comprises representatives from 30 organizations in the United States as diverse as Interpol, the FBI, the DHS, the National Association for Court Management, and the National Governors' Association (US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs). As a Federal Advisory Committee, it cannot issue directives, but the DHS uses the Fusion Centre Guidelines it created in its evaluations of fusion centers. The ACPO exists as a professional organization for Chief Police Officers, but because there is no federal police force in the UK, it has also come to serve the function of developing national policing policy (Brown 1998, 32). Therefore, like the GAC, it is also consultative, but has managed to have a great deal of influence on the co-ordination of counter-terrorism policy in the UK. While these para-governmental beginnings are slowly being incorporated into more traditional lines of accountability, the structures of governance remain convoluted in both countries.

In addition to these para-governmental actors, there are a number of fully private actors integrated into the counter-terrorism landscape. Each country's ICTIs have strategies for outreach to the community and working with the private sector. This may have pros and cons. On the one hand, the nature of a terrorist attack is such that the public and the private sector must be involved. Much of critical infrastructure lies in private hands, and volunteers and private citizens are essential in the immediate aftermath of any disaster, whether manmade or not. Abrahamsen and Williams describe the increasing privatization of security as emerging through much the same process. Neoliberal theories of governance, they argue, led to a general privatization of public functions, including, eventually, security functions like airport security, immigration control, and prisons, which resulted in a move towards a view of the state as horizontally networked with other actors (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, 4).

In the summer of 2010, the Washington Post published an investigation into the private contracting of security functions in the United States. They found that 1 931 private companies work on matters related to "counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence" in the United States (Priest and Arkin 2010). The concern with privatizing security, according to Anna Leander, is that it endows actors with private interests with particular structural power in the field of security. If private security contractors are given mandates which include the power to collect and analyse intelligence, they can shape dominant security discourses through hteir agenda setting powers, by framing some concerns are more important than others (Leander 2005, 813). Because they have a profit motive as well as a national security motive, their interests are not necessarily congruent with the interests of elected officials. In a competitive market, private firms have incentives to promote a vision of security that necessitates the purchase of their services. Promoting the use of private companies implicitly (though generally not explicitly) relies on a discourse of public servants as incompetent and possibly even immoral (Leander 2005, 823). The result is a shifting of decision making about security matters out of the public sector where it is discussed more broadly into the private sector where it tends to be discussed in more technocratic, managerial terms— and where, moreover, private firms tend to decide the criteria for their own evaluation (Leander 2005, 820). It seems likely that similar privatization effects will be observed in Canada and the United Kingdom.

Further adding to the complexity of the American system, while the FBI, like the Metropolitan Police and the RCMP, sends officers overseas to investigate crimes or to act as permanent attachés in Embassies overseas, the NYPD also sends liaison officers directly to other local police departments around the world (Falkenrath 2009). Some US Fusion Centers also co-operate with Canadian police departments, notably the one in Vermont (Vermont State Police 2010). These kinds of linkages can be

viewed as transnational linkages, that is, linkages between constituent parts of a government which do not proceed through normal diplomatic challenges. To some extent, then, we see the creation of what Anne-Marie Slaughter calls "horizontal government networks." These, she argues, may help create policy convergence and help to enforce global norms by sharing information (both general and specific, about particular cases), best practices, and ideas or capacity (Slaughter 2005, 52-58). She paints these kinds of linkages as largely positive for global governance, arguing that they can increase increase the capacity of national government, fill in the gaps left by more formal international organizations, and create a more just world order. However, other scholars have noted the more insidious effects of co-operation of police across borders (D. Bigo 1996). According to Didier Bigo, police officers, intelligence officials, and other security bureaucrats are "managers of unease" who may, simply by doing their jobs, frame contemporary issues in ways that invite them to be viewed through the lens of security and fear (Didier Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006). "Managers of unease" have particular kinds of training which disposes them to have particular kinds of interests, and these interests get entrenched into the system through their control of budgets, agendas, and technologies. International co-operation, then, may also have ethical ramifications beyond those of national cooperation.

The field of counter-terrorism co-operation is, therefore, better conceived of as a case of security governance rather than security government. Some conceptions of security governance focus on the idea that various public and private actors co-operate without the influence of a central authority (Krahmann 2003, 11). This is clearly not what is going on here. It is better to conceive of ICTIs as part of what Abrahamsen and Williams call "security assemblages": "setting where a range of different global and local, public and private security agents and normativities interact, co-operate, and compete to produce new institutions, practices, and forms of security governance" (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, 3). INSETs, JTTFs, Fusion Centers, CTUs and CTIUs have particular power and authority within the discursive field of domestic counter-terrorism.

There are, conceivably, both positive and negatives effects of this kind of co-operation. Improved co-ordination between agencies may indeed make societies more secure, as the 9/11 Commission Report hypothesized. But imprudent co-operation may have negative effects on privacy and civil liberties, as demonstrated by the Arar Inquiry in Canada. But less extreme cases are conceivable as well. Monahan and Palmer identity fusion centers as a manifestation of the surveillant assemblage (Monahan and Palmer 2009, 619). The concept of the surveillant assemblage was developed by Haggerty and Ericson to describe an emerging system of surveillance which works by "abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into distinct 'data doubles' which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention" (K Haggerty and Ericson 2000, 606). The surveillant assemblage is made up of "people, signs, chemicals, knowledge, and institutions" among an infinite variety of other objects that work together as a functional entity (K Haggerty and Ericson 2000, 608). The constituent parts of the surveillant assemblage allow the state to transfer the bodies and identities of anonymous individuals into packets of information, through which it can govern and control the population. The surveillant assemblage grows through the intensification of technological surveillance and the connections made between different systems of surveillance as well as by the search for new populations to monitor (K Haggerty and Ericson 2000, 615). Monahan and Palmer are correct to identify fusion centers are part of the surveillant assemblage, but because they focus exclusively on the United States, they under-estimate the extent to which fusion centers are part of a global system of security governance which may display the characteristics of ineffectiveness, mission creep, and violation of civil liberties to various degrees in various parts of the world (Monahan and Palmer 2009). An important next step in this large comparative research project is to consider the moral and ethical ramifications of security governance. Is it possible for a security bureaucracy to behave in accordance with the values of democracy?

Conclusions

Comparing integrated counter-terrorism institutions has the potential to extend our knowledge in important ways beyond the (limited) existing studies of integrated institutions in each of the three countries. First, studying different institutional structures, political and legislative contexts, and political cultures helps to problematize and explain the development of ICTIs in each country. Second, none of these institutions developed in a vacuum. On the one hand, they are dependent on the existing political and institutional contexts in each country, but on the other, they are all at least partly products of the prevailing Western securitization of terrorism in the post-9/11 era. Finally, each ICTI is embedded in global networks of professionals and of international and transnational co-operation in the realm of counter-terrorism. Obviously, these networks extend beyond the Western context of these three countries, but extending the study of this set of security institutions beyond the domestic context is necessary if we take seriously the idea that the distinction between domestic and international security is far from clear.

Bibliography

Abrahamsen, Rita, and Michael C Williams. 2009. "Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics1." *International Political Sociology* 3 (1) (March 1): 1-17. doi:10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00060.x.

Anon. 2005. Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New World. US Dept of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, August. http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/AbstractDB/AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=241165.

Association of Chief Police Officers. 2009. Project CONTEST: The Government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy - Home Affairs Committee - Memorandum submitted by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). United Kingdom. Parliament, June 28. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmhaff/212/212we08.htm.

Bigo, D. 1996. *Polices en réseaux : L'expérience européenne*. Presses de Sciences Po, January 23.

Bigo, Didier. 2002. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease." *Alternatives* 27 (Special Issue): 63-92.

Bornstein, Avram. 2005. "Antiterrorist Policing in New York City after 9/11: Comparing Perspectives on a Complex Process." *Human Organization* 64 (1): 52.

Boyle, Philip, and Kevin D. Haggerty. 2009. "Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex." *International Political Sociology* 3 (3): 257-274. doi:10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00075.x.

Brown, Arthur. 1998. *Police Governance in England and Wales*. Routledge Cavendish, January 31.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde. 1997. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Pub.

Canada Newswire. 2003. "Media Advisory - Police team up in state-of-the-art facility to combat organized crime and terrorism; Media Conference." *Canada NewsWire*, February 11.

Chalk, Peter. 2009. Canada. In *Considering the creation of a domestic intelligence agency in the United States*, ed. Jackson, Brian A., 43-64. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

Clutterbuck, Lindsay. 2009. The United Kingdom. In *Considering the creation of a domestic intelligence agency in the United States*, ed. Brian A. Jackson, 115-142. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

Commission of Inquiry into the Action of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar. 2006. *Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations*. Ottawa: Government of Canada. http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_rec-eng.pdf.

De Rugy, V. 2004. "What does homeland security spending buy?" *American Enterprise Institute Working Paper* 107. http://www.aei.org/docLib/20041101_HSSPEN~2.pdf.

Dickey, Christopher. 2009. *Securing the City: Inside America's Best Counterterror Force--The NYPD*. 1st ed. Simon & Schuster, February 3.

Drug Enforcement Agency. n.d. El Paso Intelligence Center. *Drug Enforcement Agency: Inside the DEA*. http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/epic.htm.

Emerson, Steven. 1988. "Bush's toothless war against terrorism." *U.S. News & World Report* 105 (October 31): 25.

Eriksson, Johan, and Mark Rhinard. 2009. "The Internal--External Security Nexus: Notes on an Emerging Research Agenda." *Cooperation and Conflict* 44 (3) (September 1): 243-267. doi:10.1177/0010836709106215.

Etowah County Sheriff's Office. Northern Alabama Joint Terrorism Task Force - Jurisdiction. *Etowah County Sheriff's Office*. http://www.etowahcountysheriff.com/html/-jurisdiction.html.

Falkenrath, Richard. 2009. Defending the City: NYPD's Counterterrorism Operations. Lecture presented at the The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, June 23, Washington, DC. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/falkenrath20090623.pdf.

FBI. n.d. Joint Terrorism Task Force Memorandum of Understanding. Institute for Intergovernmental Research. http://www.iir.com/information_sharing/global/resources/fusioncenter/joint_terrorism_task_force_mou.pdf.

———. n.d. FBI — Joint Terrorism Task Forces. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.

Field, Antony. 2009. "Tracking Terrorist Networks: Problems of Intelligence Sharing Within the UK Intelligence Community." *Review of International Studies* 35 (04): 997-1009. doi:10.1017/S0260210509990416.

Forsyth, William. 2005. State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers: An Evaluative Approach in Modelling a State Fusion Center. Master's Thesis, Monterrey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/forsyth_fusion_ctrs.pdf.

Fortmann, Michel, and David Haglund. 2002. "Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security: Does the 'Kingston Dispensation' Still Hold?" *Canadian Military Journal* 3 (1): 17-22.

Haggerty, Kevin, and Richard V. Ericson. 2000. "The surveillant assemblage." *British Journal of Sociology* 51 (4) (December): 605-622. doi:10.1080/00071310020015280.

Hancock, Jason. 2008. "Iowa's intelligence fusion center 'connects the dots' | Iowa Independent." *the Iowa Independent*, July 29, online edition. http://iowaindependent.com/2983/iowas-intelligence-fusion-center-connects-the-dots.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2003. "Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance." *American Political Science Review* 97 (2): 233-243.

Huysmans, Jef. 2006. *The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. Routledge.

Innes, M., and J. W.E Sheptycki. 2004. "From detection to disruption: Intelligence and the changing logic of police crime control in the United Kingdom." *International Criminal Justice Review* 14: 1.

Jackson, Brian A., ed. 2009. *Considering the creation of a domestic intelligence agency in the United States: lessons from the experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom*. Rand Corporation, May 25.

Kitchen, Veronica, and Karthika Sasikumar. 2009. "Canada (En)Counters Terrorism: U.S.-Canada Relations and Counter-terrorism Policy." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21 (1): 155. doi:10.1080/09546550802587572.

Krahmann, Elke. 2003. "Conceptualizing Security Governance." *Cooperation and Conflict,* 38 (1) (March 1): 5 -26.

Leander, Anna. 2005. "The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* (June 1): 803 -825. doi:10.1177/03058298050330030601.

Lundy, Derek. 2010. "Stanstead: A Town on the BorderEfforts to boost security on the Canada-U.S. border brings a bad case of insecurity to a famously laid-back border town." *Canadian Geographic*.

MacCharles, Tonda. 2001. "RCMP's new role no threat to CSIS: MacAulay." *Toronto Star*, December 12, Ontario Edition edition, sec. News.

Major, John C. 2010. Final Report | Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. *Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182*. June 17. http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/air_india/2010-07-23/www.majorcomm.ca/en/reports/finalreport/default.htm.

Martin, Robert. 1999. "The Joint Terrorism Task Force: A Concept that Works." *Law Enforcement Bulletin*. http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/1999-pdfs/mar99leb.pdf.

Metz, Andrew. 2002. "Terrorists in Transit Force New Look at Canadian Border." *Newsday*, February 24.

Monahan, Torin. 2009. "The murky world of 'Fusion Centres'." *Criminal Justice Matters* 75 (1): 20-21.

Monahan, Torin, and Neal Palmer. 2009. "The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers." *Security Dialogue* 40 (6): 617-636.

Murphy, Christopher. 2007. "'Securitizing' Canadian Policing: A New Policing Paradigm for the Post 9/11 Security State?" *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie* 32 (4) (December 1): 449-475. doi:10.2307/20460665.

Napolitano, Janet. 2009. DHS: Testimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, "Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland" (Written Testimony). *Homeland Security*. September 30. http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1254321524430.shtm.

National Counter Terrorism Security Office. 2010. Our Services. *NaCTSO: Who we are and what we do*. http://www.nactso.gov.uk/Services.aspx.

Peritz, Ingrid. 2007. "U.S. border delay kept fire crew from blaze." *Globe & Mail*, November 15.

Press Association. 2010. Police on "tightrope" at protests. *Press Association*. November 23. http://www.pressassociation.com/component/pafeeds/2010/11/23/police_on_tightrope_at_protests.

Priest, Dana, and William Arkin. 2010. Top Secret America. *The Washington Post*. July 19. http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/.

Rollins, John. 2008. *Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress*. Congressional Research Service, January 18.

Schneider, Stephen, and Christine Hurst. 2008. "Obstacles to an integrated, joint forces approach to organized crime enforcement: A Canadian case study." *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 31 (3): 359-379. doi:10.1108/13639510810895759.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2005. *A New World Order*. Princeton University Press, July 18.

Steinbachs, John. 2001. "Police Forces Team Up." *The Ottawa Sun*, October 13, Final Edition edition, sec. News.

Sullivan, John P, and James J Wirtz. 2008. "Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 21 (1): 13-25.

United Kingdom. Home Office. 2009. The United Kingdom's strategy for countering international terrorism. March 24. http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm75/7547/7547.asp.

United Kingdom. Parliament. House of Commons, G. 2009. *Project CONTEST: the Government's counter terrorism strategy, ninth report of session 2008-09, report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence*. The Stationery Office.

United Kingdom. Parliament. House of Commons. 2010. The Home Office's Response to Terrorist Attacks - Home Affairs Committee. The Stationery Office. http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmhaff/117/11702.htm.

US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. http://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=globalJustice&page=1019.

Vermont State Police. 2010. Bureau of Criminal Investigation The Vermont Fusion Center. *Vermont State Police*. http://www.dps.state.vt.us/vtsp/organized.html.

Woods, Allan. 2002. "Four antiterror squads launched." *The Globe and Mail*, June 18.

Yardley, William. 2011. "Portland, Ore., Rethinks Terror Task Force." *The New York Times*, April 30, sec. U.S. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/us/01portland.html.