

# Position Taking and Partisan Representation by Federal Political Parties in Canada, 2004-2008<sup>1</sup>

John McAndrews  
University of British Columbia

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<sup>1</sup> Although this project is still in its infancy, I have already incurred several scholarly debts to date. I gratefully acknowledge the advice provided by Paul Quirk, Fred Cutler, Penny Miller, and Go Murakami.

## **Abstract**

In this paper, I provide an initial descriptive account of the characteristics and policy attitudes of the core supporters and swing voters of the major federal political parties and position taking of the parties with respect to these groups. In particular, I ask: (1) who are these core supporters and swing voters? (2) what kinds of policies do they want? and (3) what policy positions do the parties take relative to these groups? Drawing on a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2006, and 2008 Canadian Election Studies and the voting records of the party leaders in House of Commons votes over the same period, I find that while swing voters in general (as well as the swing voters associated with each party) tend to largely reflect the characteristics of the broader adult population, the core supporters of each party often differ substantially from the mass public. I also find that – on several selected salient policy debates during this period – the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, and the Bloc Québécois often faced tension between the policy preferences of core supporters and swing voters, although these differences – with the partial exception of the Conservative Party – were typically modest in scope. In virtually all situations in which a party’s core supporters and its swing voters noticeably differed, I find that the party’s leader favored the aggregate position of its core supporters.

Ambitious political parties that seek support from a heterogeneous set of prospective voters likely often face a strategic dilemma: position taking that appeals to one subset of this prospective electorate risks alienating another subset. This challenge is framed – typically in media accounts, but increasingly in the academic literature as well – as a tension between a party’s so-called base, or core supporters, and its swing voters. The chief purpose of this paper is to provide an initial descriptive assessment of how prevalent this phenomenon is in Canadian federal politics.

To that end, I ask three main questions. First, who are these core supporters and swing voters? In particular, do their socio-demographic characteristics and political behavior differ from the wider public and, if so, how? Second, what kinds of policies do they want? How often, and by how much, do the aggregate policy attitudes of a party’s core supporters and its swing voters differ? Third, which group gets what it wants? In other words, if there is indeed a tension between the policies advocated by a party’s core supporters and its swing voters, which of these two groups is favored in the party’s position taking?

Much of what we know to date about these questions comes from the US literature. Bartels [2010] – on which this paper is modeled – finds, for example, that both Democratic and Republican core partisans are better educated and follow politics more closely than swing voters; that Republican core supporters are “more affluent than the electorate as a whole”, and “more likely to attend church regularly”; and that the Democratic base is disproportionately female and black (15). He further finds that, in terms of social welfare, moral, and racial policy

attitudes, “there is a clear separation ... between the distributions of opinion for the Democratic base on the left and the Republican base on the right, with swing voters in between” (21). However, he cautions that, “even in these instances the Democratic and Republican distributions overlap significantly, belying any simple-minded notion that core partisans uniformly hold consistent, extreme positions on matters of vigorous partisan contention” (21).

As for the position-taking of the parties and their candidates relative to these groups, Bartels [2010] finds that Democratic presidential candidates tend to take positions proximate to Democratic core supporters while Republican presidential candidates tend to occupy a middle ground between swing voters and Republican core supporters. The evidence is similarly mixed as to whether or not certain partisan groups are disproportionately represented in Congress (Shapiro *et al* 1990, Bafumi and Herron 2007, and Kestelc *et al.* 2010; cf. Wright 1989, Hurley and Hill 2003, and Clinton 2006).

Why should Canada be any different? Aside from obvious differences in the party systems, there are also important institutional differences between the two countries with respect to how candidates are nominated and how parties are funded – differences that have potential implications for the position taking motivations of Canadian parties. Standard US accounts (e.g., Aldrich 1995) assume that candidates seek the support of their party’s core supporters in order to win the party nomination, motivate volunteers for the general election, and to secure funding through donations. In contrast, in Canada, incumbent members of Parliament are often protected from nomination challenges and, since 2004, federal parties have

enjoyed substantial direct public subsidies (Coletto 2007). These two phenomena should, in theory, reduce the pressure on Canadian federal parties to appeal to their core supporters.

What do we already know about partisan representation in Canada? Judging from popular media accounts, parties – particularly the Conservative Party – appear to regularly play to their respective bases (e.g. Hébert 2008; Simpson 2008; Delacourt 2009 and 2010; cf. Martin 2010).<sup>2</sup> However, to report as newsworthy a particular alleged instance of partisan representation is to imply that there are instances in which partisan representation does not occur. Importantly, few media reports are accompanied by compelling, systematic evidence of when and why partisan representation does – and presumably does not – take place.

The Canadian academic literature on this point is similarly incomplete. Carty *et al.* (2000) observe that the post-1993 party system is characterized, among other things, by (1) an increased capacity for parties to target “relatively small groups of voters with specially tailored messages” (8), and (2) the democratization of party leadership and policy selection that empowered rank-and-file party members at the expense of traditional party elites. Together, these two changes suggest that parties possess both the means (through targeted appeals) and the motivation (by virtue of greater activist influence) to engage in partisan representation.

But do they? Petry and Mendelsohn (2004) find that government policy outputs during the Chrétien years were more likely to be consistent with national

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<sup>2</sup> This phenomenon is not limited to journalists. Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff, in the 2011 federal election campaign, is quoted as saying in the *Toronto Star* that he believed his party’s “base would show up” (Delacourt, April 30, 2011).

majority opinion when those majorities were themselves “positively associated with a vote for the Liberal party” (522). This leads the authors to suggest “that officials in the Chrétien government made a distinction between the opinion of all Canadians and a Liberal public opinion, and that they were prepared to be more responsive toward the latter because it was more important to them” (523). Similarly, Penner *et al.* (2006) find that parties tend to favor the issues agendas of their partisans in Question Period. They observe, for example, that NDP MPs and NDP partisans in the mass public “devote more of their attentiveness ... to health issues than any other group” (1013-1014).

While highly suggestive, these findings do not provide an entirely satisfying answer to the question of partisan representation in Canada. Petry and Mendelsohn (2004) focus on government policy outputs, which even if we are prepared to assume that the governing party in a majority government gets exactly what it wants, still limits our ability to assess partisan representation among opposition parties. Penner *et al.* (2006) have the opposite difficulty: by virtue of the fact that oral questions are almost exclusively asked by opposition parties, such an approach is inherently limited in its ability to assess the representational behavior of the governing party. Moreover, neither Petry and Mendelsohn nor Penner *et al.* directly measure the groups of interest here. While both identify partisans on the basis of respondents’ vote choice (or intended vote choice), a party’s *core supporters* likely only constitute a small fraction of those who end up voting for it. For example, a respondent’s intention to vote Liberal does not necessarily make her a Liberal core supporter. Neither work examines the aggregate preferences of swing voters.

In this paper, I develop a simple method of identifying the core supporters and swing voters of each of the four major federal political parties during the 2004-2008 period: namely, the Conservative Party (CPC), the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), and the Bloc Quebecois (BQ). Drawing on a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2006, and 2008 Canadian Election Studies (CES), I identify these electoral groups, their regional distribution, socio-demographic characteristics and political behavior, as well as a selection of their policy attitudes on salient policy debates during this period. I then match these aggregate policy attitudes with the voting behavior of the party leaders in the House of Commons to assess the extent to which the parties favor one group over another.

I find that while swing voters as a whole (as well as the swing voters associated with each party) tend to largely reflect the characteristics of the adult population, the core supporters of each party often differ substantially. Consistent with some stereotypes, for example, I find that CPC core supporters are more likely to live in the West, to be of British ethnicity, to have less formal education, and to be very religious than the broader Canadian adult population. Contrary to popular clichés, however, religiosity is higher among the core supporters of all three federalist parties than among the general population. Furthermore, I find that – on the selected policy issues – the CPC, the Liberal Party, and the BQ often face tension between the preferences of their respective core supporters and swing voters, although these differences – with the partial exception of the CPC – are typically modest in size. In virtually all situations in which a party’s core supporters and

swing voters noticeably differed, the party's leader favored the aggregate position of its core supporters.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I set out how I identify the core supporters and swing voters for each party. Second, I provide a descriptive summary of the socio-demographic and political characteristics of each electoral group. Finally, I calculate the aggregate policy attitudes of each of these groups and compare them with the positions taken by the party leaders in House of Commons divisions.

### **Finding a party's core supporters and swing voters**

There is no single, definitive way to identify a party's core supporters and swing voters. Bartels [2010] uses American National Election Studies data to identify a party's core supporters on the basis of respondents' party identification and specially constructed summary measures of respondents' political activity and partisan enthusiasm. In turn, he identifies swing voters on the basis of statistical models of respondents' self-reported turnout and vote choice. I keep much of Bartels's intuition, but employ a simpler method. The CES are helpful in this regard because they employ both campaign period and post-campaign period survey waves and the former is especially rich with measures that seek to capture all aspects of respondents' voting decisions.

I identify a party's core supporters solely on the basis of the direction and strength of respondents' party identification.<sup>3</sup> For the purposes of this paper, a given party's core supporters are individuals who strongly identify with the party. I

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<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, the CES over this period does not provide a consistent set of questions about political activism, otherwise I would have incorporated such measures.



argue that party identification better captures the more enduring and affective nature of being a core supporter than simple vote choice. An individual, for example, could easily vote for a party – even the same party in two or more elections – without being a core supporter.

I identify swing voters on the basis of their self-reported likelihood of voting and of voting for a particular party. More specifically, I define a swing voter as a respondent who, in a campaign period survey, (1) reports that she is certain to vote, and (2) either reports that she is undecided about who to vote for or reports that she may change her mind about which party to vote for prior to election day. This, I argue, captures the dual nature of a swing voter: certain to vote but uncertain for whom to vote. Not included among either core supporters or swing voters, by construction, are nonvoters as well as decided voters who do not strongly identify with a party.

Canada's multi-party system at the federal level presents an additional complication not present in the American analyses. A swing voter does not necessarily swing between all parties. For example, a swing voter may consider voting for either the CPC or the Liberal Party, but never for the NDP. To that end, I identify a specific subset of swing voters particular to each party on the basis of respondents' feelings thermometers towards each of the parties. A swing voter for a particular party must not only satisfy the two conditions set out above but must also rate the party in question above her average rating of all the eligible parties (in Quebec, this includes the CPC, the Liberal Party, the NDP, and the BQ; in the rest of Canada, this includes only the CPC, the Liberal Party, and the NDP). Thus, for

example, to be classified as a CPC swing voter a respondent must (1) be certain to vote; (2) be undecided or uncertain about how to vote; and (3) rate the CPC more warmly than her mean thermometer score for all major parties.

\*\*\*TABLE 1 HERE\*\*\*

I apply these definitions to a pooled dataset of those respondents to the 2004, 2006, and 2008 CES obtained through random digit dialing (N=9,639).<sup>4</sup> Throughout the following analyses, unless otherwise specified, I employ survey weights created by the data providers to correct for the oversampling of small provinces and of individuals from small households (Northrup 2007).

Table 1 reports, for Canada as a whole, the sample size of the electoral groups and their estimated percentage of the adult population. The swing voters of the three federalist parties each constitute approximately 15% of the adult population, with swing voters as a whole making up roughly 30% of the population (with obviously some overlap between the swing voters associated with the various parties). The core supporters of the CPC and the Liberal Party constitute approximately 6% of the adult population. NDP core supporters are roughly half as numerous.

Notably, even after pooling three CES to arrive at a sample of nearly 10,000 respondents, the sample size for the core supporters of each party – especially the NDP and, as we shall see, the BQ – are still small. This makes it difficult at times to estimate precisely – on the basis of the raw sample alone – the characteristics and attitudes of these groups, particularly when survey questions are asked of only a

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<sup>4</sup> I exclude the panel respondents from the 2006 and 2008 cross-sections.

subset of these groups (e.g., when the survey question is not administered in every CES year or when it is asked in a wave with a lower response rate, such as the mail-back questionnaire). I address this concern more directly in the section on policy attitudes.

\*\*\*TABLE 2 HERE\*\*\*

Table 2 reports the same figures for Quebec only. These estimates roughly match the national story: BQ core supporters constitute roughly 6% of Quebec's adult population and the party's pool of prospective swing voters is roughly three times larger.

### **Who are they and how do they behave politically?**

Having identified the core supporters and swing voters of each party, we can begin to ask how these groups differ from each other and from the adult population more generally. Table 3 presents the regional distribution of the electoral groups associated with the three main federalist parties. The regional distribution of swing voters in general, as well as the swing voters of each of the three main federalist parties, roughly reflects the regional distribution of the adult population. Put differently, the data suggest that, during this period, there is no pronounced regional concentration of swing voters (although, from the national perspective, of course, the BQ's support is regionally concentrated by design).

\*\*\*TABLE 3 HERE\*\*\*

In contrast, the core supporters of the three federalist parties are disproportionately distributed, reflecting the weakness of all three parties in Quebec and, for the Liberals, their additional weakness in the Western provinces.

Just over half of Liberal core supporters during this period live in Ontario, with another 9%, 17%, and 19% from the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, and the West respectively. The regional distributions of CPC and NDP core supporters are quite similar to each other: both groups are virtually non-existent in Quebec and are disproportionately concentrated in the West and, to a lesser extent, in Ontario.

\*\*\*TABLE 4 HERE\*\*\*

What kinds of people make up these electoral groups? Table 4 presents selected socio-demographic characteristics of swing voters in general and of the electoral groups associated with the three federalist parties.<sup>5</sup> Swing voters as a whole largely reflect the socio-demographic characteristics of the Canadian adult population. The chief exception is education: swing voters as a whole are somewhat more likely to have at least some post-secondary education than the typical Canadian. The same is largely true of the CPC, Liberal, and NDP swing voters. The socio-demographic characteristics of these groups mostly match the profile of the adult population: although here too the swing voters of the three main federalist parties – especially the NDP – are more likely to have at least some post-secondary education than Canadians in general.

In contrast, CPC core supporters tend to be older, less likely to have post-secondary training, more likely to speak English as a first language, and more likely to be of self-reported British ethnicity than the general adult population. Consistent with their popular caricature as religious conservatives, they are also twice as likely to report that religion is “very important” in their lives. However, CPC core

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<sup>5</sup> With respect to the categorization of income, language, and ethnicity, I employ the same CES recoding scheme used in recent work by Richard Johnston.

supporters are not unique in this respect. Nearly one in two Liberal core supporters, and just over one in three NDP core supporters, report that religion is “very important” in their lives.

Like CPC core supporters, Liberal core supporters also tend to be marginally older than the adult Canadian population. Much more striking, however, is the concentration of Allophones and individuals of non-European ethnicity among the Liberal base. During this period, Liberal core supporters are approximately twice as likely as the typical Canadian to speak neither English nor French as a first language. Similarly, roughly one in five Liberal core supporters reports non-European ethnicity, again twice the percentage in the adult population.

NDP core supporters are distinctive in three notable respects. First, they tend to be women, the clearest instance of a gender imbalance among the electoral subgroups discussed here. Second, the NDP core is also the poorest of the subgroups, with only 17% reporting household incomes in the top tercile nationally. Third, the NDP base is predominantly Anglophone, again highlighting the party’s weakness among Francophones.

\*\*\*TABLE 5 HERE\*\*\*

Table 5 reports the comparable figures for Quebec only and for the electoral subgroups associated with the Bloc Québécois. The story of swing voters in Quebec is largely again in keeping with the national story: the socio-demographic characteristics of Quebec’s swing voters as a whole mostly match those of the province as a whole.

Not surprisingly, the distinguishing features of BQ core supporters and swing voters is language and ethnicity. Virtually all of the BQ's core is Francophone, roughly 15 percentage points more than the provincial adult population. Similarly, individuals of British and non-European ethnicity are less common among both the BQ's core supporters and swing voters than in the general Quebec population.

How then do individuals in these electoral groups behave politically? Table 6 reports the voting behavior of the groups associated with the three federalist parties for the 2004, 2006, and 2008 federal general elections. To facilitate readability, the percentage of each group that votes for its associated party (e.g., the percentage of Liberal swing voters that vote Liberal, the percentage of NDP core supporters that vote NDP, etc.) is shaded.

The purposes of Table 6 are: (1) to help validate the identification of the electoral subgroups, and (2) to assess the ability of each party to “close the deal” – that is, to motivate their core supporters and to persuade their prospective swing voters to vote for the party. On the first point, the operationalization of each party's core supporters and swing voters has some face validity. For each of the three federalist parties, in each of the elections studied, no less than three in four core supporters report voting for their party. In contrast, only 30-50% of each party's prospective swing voters vote for the party.

On the second point, there is a variation in the ability of each party to “close the deal”. Roughly nine in ten CPC core supporters, in each of the three elections, vote Conservative. The figure drops to roughly eight in ten for the Liberal base, and slightly lower still for the NDP. The CPC and the Liberal Party are typically able to

persuade a little under half of their prospective swing voters, with some notable and expected variation across elections. In contrast, the NDP struggles to persuade its prospective pool of swing voters, with only one in three voting for the party.

\*\*\*TABLE 7\*\*\*

In Quebec, the BQ typically does better than the three federalist parties do nationally (Table 7). Like the CPC core, roughly nine in ten BQ core supporters vote for the party. It also performs better among its swing voters during this period, regularly persuading majorities to vote for the sovereigntist party.

I examine two other potentially relevant aspects of the political behavior of these electoral groups: their propensity to donate to political parties and their political knowledge. The uneven prospect of donations may create incentives for parties to target their policy appeals to some groups over others. Similarly, differences in political knowledge across groups may suggest that some groups are better able to observe party position taking and thus to reward or sanction a party for its actions.

\*\*\*TABLE 8 HERE\*\*\*

Tables 8 and 9 report, for Canada and Quebec respectively, the percentage of each electoral group that donated to a federal political party in the previous 12 months as well as each electoral group's mean score on a scale of political knowledge from 0 to 4. This scale captures the number of correct answers that the respondent provides to a battery of four factual questions about politics, including

the name of the premier of the respondent's province, the name of a federal cabinet minister, etc.<sup>6</sup>

\*\*\*TABLE 9 HERE\*\*\*

There are two notable findings. First, as one would expect, the core supporters of each party are approximately two to five times more likely to report donating to a federal party in the previous 12 months than Canadians (and Quebecers) in general – and substantially more so than swing voters. Second, CPC, Liberal, and BQ core supporters (as well as CPC, Liberal, and NDP swing voters) are slightly more knowledgeable about political facts than the typical Canadian (or Quebecer).

**What do they want and do they get it?**

Do these differences in the socio-demographic and political characteristics of swing voters and core supporters translate into significant differences in policy attitudes and, if they do, with whom do the parties side? Figure 1 begins to answer these questions by plotting the mean left-right self-placement of each electoral group along a scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). So as to reflect the sampling variability associated with these estimates, I also plot two standard errors on either side of each mean.

\*\*\*FIGURE 1\*\*\*

The figure suggests that, along this general ideological dimension, both the CPC and the NDP face strategic dilemmas, although the tension within the latter party is less pronounced than in the former. The mean self-placement of CPC core

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<sup>6</sup> The exact battery of political knowledge questions varies somewhat in each of the three CES.



supporters is roughly two units to the right of the mean self-placement of CPC swing voters. Conversely, the mean position of the NDP's base is roughly one unit to the left of its swing voters. There is no obvious tension between the core supporters and swing voters of the Liberal Party or the BQ.

In order to place the parties in the same policy space, I rely on additional CES questions that ask respondents to place each of the parties on the same left-right scale. As a proxy for the actual positions of the parties, I calculate the mean rating given to these parties by the most politically knowledgeable individuals in the sample – those who correctly answered all four the political knowledge questions discussed earlier. These ratings are plotted in the lowermost row of the figure. Of the two parties that face strategic tension, both the CPC and the NDP favor their core supporters, taking positions slightly to the right and left of their respective cores. In fact, both parties appear to be slightly more extreme than can be accounted for purely in terms of courting their respective bases.

There are, however, three notable inadequacies with this approach. The first is the weakness of the survey instrument itself. There is comparatively little variance in responses and there is a strong tendency for respondents to self-report at the midpoint of the scale. Second, even if we are able in some way to correct this instrument such that respondents are more widely distributed on the scale, it is still not clear what this scale – or any similarly abstract scale – actually means. For example, what does a difference of one unit represent in terms of policy? Third, by collapsing policy preferences into a single ideological dimension, we may be concealing differences present in more narrowly defined policy domains.

To address these concerns, I catalogued all CES questions during this period that solicit any kind of policy attitude from respondents. This yielded some 200 questions in all, a large proportion of which are repetitions of the same question in multiple CES years. Some of these questions solicit specific policy preferences (e.g., should the gun registry be scrapped entirely?), while others ask only general policy attitudes (e.g., should more be done for racial minorities?).

Given the need to match these survey questions with the position taking of the parties, I classified each prospective question according to its policy specificity and selected – from among the policy-specific questions – those that I believed were most likely to be the subject of a vote in the House of Commons during this same period.<sup>7</sup> The result was a short list of 14 unique, policy-specific survey questions ranging from child care policy to criminal justice policy to foreign policy.

In order to match House of Commons votes to these 14 policy questions, I searched the *Status of House Business* – a procedural document that reports the activities of the Commons by item (e.g., bill, motion, written question, etc.) – in each session of each of the following Parliaments: 37th (2001-2004), 38th (2004 – 2005), 39th (2006-2008), and 40th (2008-2011). These are the parliaments before and after the 2004, 2006, and 2008 federal general elections. To facilitate the search of the *Status*, I developed a list of search strings for each of the 14 selected CES policy questions. For example, for a CES question that asked respondents about whether or not the government should publicly fund child care or give the money directly to parents instead, I searched the following text strings: “childcare”, “child

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<sup>7</sup> Due to time constraints, I was unable to investigate in detail all possible policy-specific CES question.

care”, “day care”, “daycare”, and “childhood”. A full list of text strings for each CES policy question is available upon request.

If I found an initially plausible match between the subject of a CES policy question and the topic of a bill or motion, *and* the *Status* reported that the Commons had made a decision with respect to the bill or motion (i.e., not simply debated it), I noted the bill or motion and the date of the decision. I then investigated each item in more detail. If it was a motion, I read the motion text as reported in the Commons *Journals*. If it was a bill, I read the bill summary accompanying the official text of the bill itself. If, upon this further investigation, the bill or motion was a reasonable match for the CES question, I looked up the Commons’ vote record on the bill or motion in the *Journals*.<sup>8</sup> I inferred the position of each party by examining how its leader voted.<sup>9</sup> When a party lacked an permanent leader (e.g., such as during a leadership contest) or when the leader lacked a seat in the Commons, I used the vote of the party’s interim or parliamentary leader as identified by the House of Commons *ParlInfo* website. In the rare instances when the leader of a party (permanent or interim) did not vote, I did not attribute any position to the party. In this way, I was able to infer the positions of the most, if not all, of the major parties on eight of the 14 CES policy questions. In what follows, I present the results of these eight policy analyses.

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<sup>8</sup> If the match concerned a bill, I typically employed the vote at second reading where the Commons traditionally considers the principle, rather than the details, of the bill.

<sup>9</sup> In some instances, there was dissent within one or more parties on a given vote (e.g., not all Liberal MPs voted with their leader). Unfortunately, the *Journals* do not report voting results by party and time constraints prevented me from documenting the scope of the dissent in each case. That said, I argue that – as the chief spokesperson for the party – the party leader’s position typically captures the position of the party.

As with the analysis of the left-right scale, there are limitations to this approach as well. The first is the potential for strong selection effects (Burstein 2006). While these eight policy questions represent a wide variety of policy domains, they are hardly a representative sample of the universe of government or party policies. Rather, these selected policies were the subject of both a CES survey question and a reasonably clear cut Commons vote. Consequently, they are likely more salient than the typical policy issue and this above-average salience may have implications for configuration of mass opinion as well as for the position taking of the parties. As a result, I limit my inferences in each case to the specific policy issue itself, and do not generalize beyond it.

The second limitation is in the matching process itself. Understandably, the wording of the CES question never exactly matches the text of the Commons bill or motion. CES investigators don't get to decide what gets voted on in the House of Commons! Similarly, in each case, the CES question was never fielded at the exact time of the Commons vote (since Parliament is dissolved when most, if not all, CES waves are in the field). Sometimes a selected CES question preceded a Commons vote (or vice versa) by several years and, during the intervening time, the positions of the electoral groups or the parties may have changed. Moreover, in many instances, I pooled the results of the same CES questions from multiple years in order to arrive at reasonably precise aggregate estimates. In short, matching requires a degree of subjectivity. Consequently, I present the basis of the matches in a transparent fashion and add cautionary notes as required.

The third limitation is that, unlike in Figure 1, we are not able – strictly speaking – to place survey respondents and parties in the same policy space, and thus unable to assess the proximity of party positions to the various electoral groups. That said, the approach below nevertheless provides a measure of pseudo-proximity if we are prepared to assume that respondents prefer policies that are closer to their ideal points than policies that are further away. Given this assumption, we can still imagine a latent policy space in which core supporters become increasingly likely, on average, to share the same policy position as the party when the party’s position converges on the mean position of its core supporters. Likewise, we would expect that a party’s swing voters, on average, become increasingly likely to share the same policy position as the party when the party’s position converges on the mean position of its swing voters. In this fashion, the proportion of individuals in a given party’s electoral groups, *who share the same policy preference as the party*, provides us with some sense of where the party’s position is relative to the mean ideal point of these groups.

### *Child Care Policy*

\*\*\*FIGURE 2 HERE\*\*\*

Figure 2 presents the aggregate preferences of the electoral groups on the question of whether or not the government should “fund public daycare or give the money directly to parents”. CPC core supporters are, on average, the group that most favors giving money directly to parents, while Liberal and BQ core supporters are typically the least favorable to the idea. The figure also illustrates a potential tension present in three of the four parties. In the case of the CPC, the Liberals, and

the BQ, the aggregate preference of each party's core supporters is statistically significantly different from the aggregate preference of its swing voters. The gap, however, is fairly modest in scope. For example, just over 50% of the CPC base favored giving money directly to parents while roughly 40% of its prospective swing voters felt the same way.

The best available match for this policy question is a 2005 opposition motion proposed by Stephen Harper that called on the government to "ensure additional funds for childcare are provided directly to parents".<sup>10</sup> On this question, the leaders of the CPC, Liberals, and BQ all favored their respective party bases, with Harper voting yes and Liberal leader Paul Martin, BQ leader Gilles Duceppe, and NDP leader Jack Layton voting all voting no.

#### *The Public Funding of Political Parties*

\*\*\*FIGURE 3 HERE\*\*\*

Figure 3 presents the aggregate preferences of the same party groups on the question of public funding for political parties. Somewhat surprisingly, given the contested nature of the issue among party elites, there is relatively little variance between electoral groups. No party faced clear tension between its base and its swing voters. Clear majorities in each group, including CPC core supporters, favored public funding. Indeed, CPC opposition to the public funding of political parties – at the time the bill in question was adopted at second reading in 2003 and

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<sup>10</sup> Commons *Journals*, February 15, 2005.

in the years since – is not easily explainable by the exigencies of electoral position taking.<sup>11</sup>

*The federal gun registry*

\*\*\*FIGURE 4\*\*\*

Figure 4 reports the results of a recurring CES question that asked respondents whether or not they agree with the statement: “the gun registry should be scrapped entirely”.<sup>12</sup> On this policy issue, the CPC faced a clear gap between its core supporters and swing voters. Approximately 35% of the party’s prospective swing voters opposed scrapping the gun registry; in contrast, only roughly 15% of the party base felt the same way. Notably, however, sizeable majorities in both camps favored eliminating the registry. No other party faced a similar tension.

The House of Commons voted on multiple occasions to abolish the gun registry during the period in question. The best matches include a BQ opposition motion in April 2009 calling for a continuation for the gun registry and a 2009-10 private members’ bill sponsored by a CPC MP abolishing the registry.<sup>13</sup> In both instances, the CPC party leader vote in favor of scrapping the registry, while the Liberal, NDP, and BQ party leaders voted against it. In sum, the CPC favored its core supporters, although a smaller majority of its swing voters sanctioned the same position. The core supporters and the swing voters associated with the other

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<sup>11</sup> Bill C-24 (37-3), An Act to amend the Canada Election Act and the Income Tax Act (political financing), was read a second time on March 18, 2003. Canadian Alliance leader Stephen Harper voted against it, while the leaders of the Liberal, Progressive Conservative, and New Democratic Parties all voted in favor.

<sup>12</sup> To better reflect the dichotomous nature of Commons votes, I collapsed the CES responses of “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” into simply “agree” and collapsed the responses of “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree” into simply “disagree”.

<sup>13</sup> The vote on BQ opposition motion is recorded in the *Journals* of April 22, 2009. Bill C-391 (40-2) was read a second time on November 4, 2009 and a concurrence motion on a committee report blocking the bill was adopted on September 22, 2010.

parties were more conflicted on the question, but each party's base and swing voters were, on average, roughly equally conflicted.

### *The Iraq War*

\*\*\*FIGURE 5 HERE\*\*\*

The matching process also yielded two highly salient foreign policy questions regarding Canada's role in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Figure 5 presents the aggregate preferences of the electoral subgroups with respect to Canada's decision not to participate in the Iraq conflict. It is important to note, however, that this question was fielded just after the June 2004 federal general election, more than one year *after* the US-led invasion.

As with the gun registry, the CPC alone faces a clear tension between its core supporters and swing voters. One year after the war began, a near majority of the CPC base still disagreed with the Chrétien government's decision not to participate in Iraq. In contrast, just under 20% of CPC swing voters felt the same way. There is no clear tension within any other party.

Unfortunately, matching this policy question to votes in the Commons is difficult. In March 2003, the BQ proposed a motion calling on the government "not to participate in the military intervention initiated by the United States in Iraq".<sup>14</sup> Then Canadian Alliance leader Stephen Harper and Progressive Conservative leader Joe Clark both voted against the motion. However, in the intervening year between the Commons vote and the CES question, there was likely decay in mass support for the Iraq War, and support may well have fallen at a faster rate among CPC swing

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<sup>14</sup> The BQ opposition motion was adopted on March 20, 2003 and the results of the vote are reported of the *Journals* of that date.



voters compared with CPC core supporters. At most, the data suggest that here too the CPC appears to favor its party base. A more conclusive statement would require survey data much closer to the outbreak of the war.

### *Afghanistan*

#### \*\*\*FIGURE 6\*\*\*

Canadian participation in Afghanistan also presents a position-taking dilemma for the CPC (Figure 6). Just under 30% of the party's core supporters opposed the deployment of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, while the proportion opposed was roughly twice as large among its swing voters. The Liberals and the NDP may also have faced a much smaller dilemma, with their respective bases somewhat more opposed to participation than their respective sets of swing voters. In this instance, the CPC again favored its core supporters, voting against a 2007 NDP opposition motion calling for an immediate withdrawal, and sponsoring motions in 2006 and 2008 to extend Canada's military presence in the country.<sup>15</sup>

### *Quebec Sovereignty*

#### \*\*\*FIGURE 7\*\*\*

Figures 7 and 8 report the aggregate preferences of the electoral groups on the enduring debate of Quebec's place in the federation. The first question concerns whether or not Quebec has a right to separate no matter what the rest of Canada says. The second concerns attitudes toward Quebec sovereignty itself. In the latter instance, the aggregate preferences of all electoral groups are calculated on the basis

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<sup>15</sup> The vote on the 2007 NDP motion appears in the *Journals* of April 30, 2007. The CPC motions appear in the *Journals* of May 17, 2006 and March 13, 2008 respectively.

of Quebec respondents only.<sup>16</sup> Although, strictly speaking, neither question come to a vote in the Commons during the 37th through 40th Parliaments, I nevertheless use them here so as to not exclude this important dimension of Canadian federal politics.

On the matter of whether the rest of Canada should have a say in Quebec separation, the electoral groups are predictably divided between sovereigntist and federalist camps, with the core supporters and swing voters of the BQ typically agreeing with the statement that Quebec has the right to separate regardless of what the rest of Canada says, and the core supporters and swing voters of the CPC, the Liberal Party, and the NDP typically disagreeing.<sup>17</sup>

Notably, however, both the Liberal Party and BQ faced modest electoral tension on this issue. Very large majorities of the Liberal Party's core supporters and swing voters disagreed with the statement, but the former marginally more so than the latter. Conversely, while both the BQ base and its swing voters agreed with the statement, the level of disagreement was approximately 25 percentage points higher among the sovereigntist party's prospective swing voters.

The question of what say the rest of Canada should have in Quebec separation is nicely captured in Bill C-20 (36-2), the so-called Clarity Act. Among other provisions, the Clarity Act gave the House of Commons a role in defining what might constitute a suitably clear referendum question and majority threshold. The bill was voted on in the Commons in the Spring of 2000, admittedly four years prior

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<sup>16</sup> During this period, the CES only asked this question of Quebec respondents.

<sup>17</sup> As with the gun registry measure, I collapsed the CES responses of "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree" into simply "agree" and collapsed the responses of "strongly disagree" and "somewhat disagree" into simply "disagree".

to when the CES question went into the field. The Liberal leader voted in favor, the BQ leader against.

\*\*\*FIGURE 8 HERE\*\*\*

The same configuration of mass opinion and party position taking occurs on the question of Quebec sovereignty itself: the core supporters of the BQ staunchly favor sovereignty, while the core supporters of the Liberals staunchly oppose it.<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, given the small number of Quebec-based CPC and NDP core supporters in the sample, it is not possible to estimate their preferences with much precision (hence the large confidence intervals). As an interesting side note, given the results of the 2011 federal general election, roughly 45% of NDP swing voters during the 2004-2008 period favored sovereignty.

Figure 8 suggests, that on the sovereignty question, both the Liberal Party and the BQ face tension in Quebec between their respective bases and swing voters. Roughly 35% of the BQ's swing voters, but only roughly 5% of the BQ core supporters, oppose sovereignty. Conversely, roughly 90% of the Liberal core, but only approximately 70% of Liberal swing voters, oppose sovereignty. As ardent separatist and federalist parties respectively, the BQ's and the Liberal Party's positions again favor the aggregate preferences of their respective core supporters in this instance.

### *Same-Sex Marriage*

Finally, in order to round out the selection of policy domains, Figure 9 presents the aggregate policy preferences of the electoral groups on the question of

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<sup>18</sup> I again collapsed the CES response categories, combining "very" and "somewhat" favorable as well as "very" and "somewhat" opposed.

same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage is a classic off-dimensional rights-and-morality issue and is often held up as an example of an issue that creates crosscutting cleavages.

\*\*\*FIGURE 9 HERE\*\*\*

This is indeed the case with the CPC and, to a lesser extent, with the Liberal Party. A small majority of Liberal core supporters opposed same-sex marriage, while roughly only 40% of the party's swing voters did the same. The difference is starker for the CPC: roughly 85% of the party's core opposed the measure while only a very slim majority of its swing voters did the same.

Same-sex marriage came to a vote in the House of Commons on several occasions during the study period, including in 2003, 2005, and 2006.<sup>19</sup> In each instance, Liberal leader at the time voted in favor of same-sex marriage while the leader of the CPC (or its predecessor parties) voted against same-sex marriage. That is, the Liberal Party sided with its swing voters, while the CPC sided with its core supporters.

## **Discussion**

To summarize, swing voters in general (as well as the swing voters associated with each of the major parties during this period) largely resemble the broader Canadian population. In contrast, the characteristics of the core supporters of each party are mostly – but not entirely – consistent with popular stereotypes. Moreover, a given party's core supporters and swing voters often have

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<sup>19</sup> The 2003 vote was on a Canadian Alliance opposition motion to reaffirm the heterosexual definition of marriage (*Journals*, September 16, 2003). The 2005 vote was on the second reading motion of a bill legalizing same-sex marriage (*Journals*, May 4, 2005). The 2006 vote was on a CPC motion calling on the government to "restore the traditional definition of marriage" (*Journals*, December 7, 2006).

systematically different policy attitudes. Of the eight specific policy issues described here, on only one – the funding arrangements for child care – did no party face a strategic tension as defined by a statistically significant difference between the aggregate preference of its core supporters and swing voters.

However, these gaps are often modest. The typical configuration is for a party's core supporters to favor a given policy with an oversized majority, while its swing voters to favor the same policy but with a smaller majority. In short, parties – at least on the eight issues presented here – rarely face enormous and irreconcilable differences between their core supporters and swing voters.

When the parties did face tension between their respective swing voters and core supporters, however, they almost always favored their core supporters. This is evident in terms the general ideological dimension, but also in terms of the eight dichotomized policy debates presented here. In these later instances, a party's core supporters were almost always more likely favor the party's position than the party's swing voters (the sole notable exception being the Liberals on the same-sex marriage issue).

That said, the parties – particularly the governing party, which dominates the Commons agenda – possess a variety of avenues for how to manage potential tension between their bases of support and their prospective swing voters. A party, for example, could obfuscate and avoid bringing a policy issue to a vote in the Commons (Weaver 2006), although the success of such a strategy would require the

complicity of all other official parties in the Commons.<sup>20</sup> Alternatively, a party could permit dissent among its MPs in order to signal its ambivalence to voters. Finally, even if forced to take a clear position on an issue that still divides its core supporters from its swing voters, a party may strategically choose to prime other issues in subsequent election campaigns (Johnston *et al.* 1992). Thus, the logical next step in this project is to develop and test much more systematically a theory of how parties manage both potential and manifest tension within their respective sets of prospective voters.

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<sup>20</sup> Commons Standing Orders allocate votable opposition motions to all official parties in proportion to their size. Thus, a party for which a particular issue presents no strategic tension may choose to put the matter to a vote in the hopes of driving a wedge between the core supporters and prospective swing voters of another party.

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**Table 1 - Sample size of electoral subgroups and their percentage of adult population - Canada (pooled)**

	<b>Sample size (unweighted)</b>	<b>Estimated percentage of adult population</b>
<b>Total Respondents</b>	9,639	100.00%
<b>All Swing Voters</b>	2,775	28.97%
<b>CPC Core Supporters</b>	547	5.81%
<b>CPC Swing Voters</b>	1,508	15.81%
<b>Lib. Core Supporters</b>	561	6.02%
<b>Lib. Swing Voters</b>	1,660	17.31%
<b>NDP Core Supporters</b>	278	2.71%
<b>NDP Swing Voters</b>	1,424	14.85%

**Table 2 - Sample size of electoral subgroups and their percentage of adult population - Quebec only (pooled)**

	<b>Sample size (unweighted)</b>	<b>Estimated percentage of adult population</b>
<b>Total Respondents</b>	2,509	100.00%
<b>All Swing Voters</b>	761	30.92%
<b>BQ Core Supporters</b>	157	5.92%
<b>BQ Swing Voters</b>	460	18.75%

**Table 3 - Regional distribution of electoral subgroups (pooled)**

	<b>Adult Population</b>	<b>All Swing Voters</b>	<b>CPC Core Supporters</b>	<b>CPC Swing Voters</b>	<b>Lib. Core Supporters</b>	<b>Lib. Swing Voters</b>	<b>NDP Core Supporters</b>	<b>NDP Swing Voters</b>
<b>Atlantic</b>	7.67%	8.61%	8.70%	9.14%	9.34%	8.92%	10.82%	9.04%
<b>Quebec</b>	26.19%	27.95%	2.02%	25.08%	17.35%	25.58%	4.10%	25.54%
<b>Ontario</b>	37.77%	37.48%	43.30%	39.19%	54.65%	39.67%	42.43%	38.15%
<b>West</b>	28.38%	25.96%	45.98%	26.58%	18.66%	25.83%	42.65%	27.26%

**Table 4 - Socio-demographic characteristics of electoral subgroups – Canada (pooled)**

	<b>Adult Pop.</b>	<b>All Swing Voters</b>	<b>CPC Core Supporters</b>	<b>CPC Swing Voters</b>	<b>Lib. Core Supporters</b>	<b>Lib. Swing Voters</b>	<b>NDP Core Supporters</b>	<b>NDP Swing Voters</b>
<b>Female</b>	52.00%	55.68%	50.70%	52.77%	49.18%	57.00%	62.65%	56.26%
<b>Age (mean)</b>	47.46	47.26	53.67	48.07	54.30	47.50	50.53	46.01
<b>Completed high school or less</b>	37.35%	32.05%	47.45%	34.49%	39.35%	29.79%	41.56%	27.50%
<b>At least some post-secondary</b>	61.51%	67.33%	51.56%	65.20%	59.71%	69.72%	57.65%	72.23%
<b>Household income – top tercile</b>	29.36%	31.52%	29.57%	31.84%	26.64%	35.11%	16.78%	31.83%
<b>Anglophone</b>	60.00%	60.88%	84.83%	64.15%	56.24%	62.12%	74.76%	64.83%
<b>Francophone</b>	25.52%	27.46%	1.70%	24.02%	15.67%	24.64%	5.94%	24.72%
<b>Allophone</b>	13.85%	11.32%	13.24%	11.73%	26.70%	13.12%	18.65%	10.20%
<b>British ethnicity</b>	37.04%	38.86%	55.46%	41.97%	33.59%	38.80%	47.51%	40.55%
<b>Non-European Ethnicity</b>	9.83%	7.89%	5.43%	6.99%	20.82%	9.05%	10.06%	8.54%
<b>Religion “very important” in R’s life</b>	28.25%	26.25%	49.66%	27.69%	45.37%	26.87%	35.23%	23.26%

**Table 5 - Sociodemographic characteristics of electoral subgroups - Quebec only (pooled)**

	<b>Adult Population</b>	<b>All Swing Voters</b>	<b>BQ Core Supporters</b>	<b>BQ Swing Voters</b>
<b>Female</b>	50.48%	53.86%	50.03%	53.70%
<b>Age (mean)</b>	46.83	46.23	49.01	44.18
<b>Completed high school or less</b>	38.88%	36.15%	38.32%	37.01%
<b>At least some post-secondary</b>	60.16%	63.23%	61.36%	62.58%
<b>Household income - top tercile</b>	26.30%	27.21%	24.30%	24.77%
<b>Anglophone</b>	8.24%	8.37%	0.68%	2.39%
<b>Francophone</b>	84.23%	85.06%	98.95%	92.62%
<b>Allophone</b>	7.12%	6.44%	0.37%	4.99%
<b>British ethnicity</b>	7.39%	7.40%	3.47%	4.10%
<b>Non-European Ethnicity</b>	4.92%	2.52%	1.12%	3.04%
<b>Religion “very important” in R’s life</b>	16.21%	15.63%	17.73%	14.01%

**Table 6 – Self-reported voting behavior of electoral subgroups in the 2004, 2006, and 2008 federal general elections – Canada**

	<b>2004</b>		<b>2006</b>		<b>2008</b>	
<b>Adult Population</b>	Did not vote	15.03%	Did not vote	12.35%	Did not vote	14.72%
	Liberal	29.64%	Liberal	24.53%	Liberal	21.12%
	CPC	26.79%	CPC	31.64%	CPC	31.99%
	NDP	14.36%	NDP	16.85%	NDP	15.47%
	BQ	9.74%	BQ	9.49%	BQ	10.33%
	Other party	4.45%	Other party	5.14%	Other party	6.36%
<b>All Swing Voters</b>	Did not vote	6.29%	Did not vote	6.08%	Did not vote	6.91%
	Liberal	35.48%	Liberal	25.89%	Liberal	26.58%
	CPC	25.02%	CPC	31.70%	CPC	25.58%
	NDP	19.03%	NDP	21.24%	NDP	20.57%
	BQ	10.09%	BQ	7.69%	BQ	11.64%
	Other party	4.10%	Other party	7.41%	Other party	8.71%
<b>CPC Core Supporters</b>	Did not vote	3.69%	Did not vote	1.35%	Did not vote	7.67%
	Liberal	0.71%	Liberal	0.16%	Liberal	0.77%
	CPC	94.42%	CPC	93.63%	CPC	89.38%
	NDP	0.82%	NDP	3.56%	NDP	2.18%
	BQ	0.00%	BQ	0.00%	BQ	0.00%
	Other party	0.36%	Other party	1.29%	Other party	0.00%

<b>CPC Swing Voters</b>	Did not vote	6.23%	Did not vote	5.50%	Did not vote	7.94%
	Liberal	30.51%	Liberal	18.83%	Liberal	19.07%
	CPC	40.91%	CPC	52.57%	CPC	43.47%
	NDP	10.73%	NDP	11.20%	NDP	14.09%
	BQ	6.88%	BQ	6.16%	BQ	5.18%
	Other party	4.74%	Other party	5.74%	Other party	10.24%

<b>Lib. Core Supporters</b>	Did not vote	9.86%	Did not vote	10.87%	Did not vote	8.93%
	Liberal	84.21%	Liberal	75.42%	Liberal	78.34%
	CPC	1.57%	CPC	4.68%	CPC	3.96%
	NDP	1.58%	NDP	4.01%	NDP	7.19%
	BQ	0.61%	BQ	0.00%	BQ	0.00%
	Other party	2.17%	Other party	5.02%	Other party	1.58%

<b>Lib. Swing Voters</b>	Did not vote	7.61%	Did not vote	6.22%	Did not vote	6.86%
	Liberal	47.28%	Liberal	40.07%	Liberal	40.94%
	CPC	17.90%	CPC	23.17%	CPC	16.40%
	NDP	16.10%	NDP	18.95%	NDP	19.59%
	BQ	6.21%	BQ	3.66%	BQ	7.65%
	Other party	4.90%	Other party	7.92%	Other party	8.55%

<b>NDP Core Supporters</b>	Did not vote	7.34%	Did not vote	1.76%	Did not vote	10.28%
	Liberal	14.24%	Liberal	10.47%	Liberal	4.70%
	CPC	0.00%	CPC	1.46%	CPC	7.62%
	NDP	77.14%	NDP	81.65%	NDP	74.24%
	BQ	0.82%	BQ	0.00%	BQ	0.00%
	Other party	0.46%	Other party	4.65%	Other party	3.16%

<b>NDP Swing Voters</b>	Did not vote	5.71%	Did not vote	7.04%	Did not vote	4.14%
	Liberal	31.26%	Liberal	23.73%	Liberal	24.83%
	CPC	18.48%	CPC	20.16%	CPC	18.72%
	NDP	33.86%	NDP	31.86%	NDP	30.64%
	BQ	6.56%	BQ	7.96%	BQ	11.15%
	Other party	4.14%	Other party	9.24%	Other party	10.51%

Table 7 – Self-reported voting behavior of electoral subgroups in 2004, 2006, and 2008 federal general elections – Quebec only

	2004		2006		2008	
<b>Adult Population</b>	Did not vote	13.78%	Did not vote	13.31%	Did not vote	12.21%
	Liberal	26.24%	Liberal	17.97%	Liberal	17.77%
	CPC	7.95%	CPC	18.52%	CPC	16.50%
	NDP	3.98%	NDP	8.50%	NDP	9.57%
	BQ	43.99%	BQ	38.41%	BQ	40.82%
	Other party	4.06%	Other party	3.29%	Other party	3.13%
<b>All Swing Voters</b>	Did not vote	6.50%	Did not vote	6.15%	Did not vote	4.72%
	Liberal	32.25%	Liberal	16.41%	Liberal	24.67%
	CPC	9.49%	CPC	23.59%	CPC	15.49%
	NDP	6.50%	NDP	15.38%	NDP	12.60%
	BQ	42.01%	BQ	34.87%	BQ	37.80%
	Other party	3.25%	Other party	3.59%	Other party	4.72%
<b>BQ Core Supporters</b>	Did not vote	4.88%	Did not vote	0.00%	Did not vote	1.16%
	Liberal	0.00%	Liberal	0.00%	Liberal	5.81%
	CPC	0.00%	CPC	2.78%	CPC	2.33%
	NDP	2.44%	NDP	0.00%	NDP	3.49%
	BQ	92.68%	BQ	97.22%	BQ	87.21%
	Other party	0.00%	Other party	0.00%	Other party	0.00%



<b>BQ Swing Voters</b>	Did not vote	4.07%	Did not vote	5.04%	Did not vote	0.95%
	Liberal	22.76%	Liberal	9.24%	Liberal	16.59%
	CPC	5.28%	CPC	15.97%	CPC	4.27%
	NDP	5.69%	NDP	16.81%	NDP	9.00%
	BQ	60.16%	BQ	51.26%	BQ	65.40%
	Other party	2.03%	Other party	1.68%	Other party	3.79%

Table 8 - Political characteristics of electoral subgroups - Canada (pooled)

	<b>Adult Pop.</b>	<b>All Swing Voters</b>	<b>CPC Core Supporters</b>	<b>CPC Swing Voters</b>	<b>Lib. Core Supporters</b>	<b>Lib. Swing Voters</b>	<b>NDP Core Supporters</b>	<b>NDP Swing Voters</b>
<b>Donated to federal political party in last 12 months</b>	7.11%	3.34%	21.20%	2.62%	17.06%	3.39%	27.47%	4.14%
<b>Political knowledge (mean on scale 0-4)</b>	1.81	1.90	2.11	1.87	2.03	2.01	1.76	2.00

Table 9 - Political characteristics of electoral subgroups - Quebec only (pooled)

	<b>Adult Population</b>	<b>All Swing Voters</b>	<b>BQ Core Supporters</b>	<b>BQ Swing Voters</b>
<b>Donated to federal political party in last 12 months</b>	3.94%	1.77%	19.92%	1.65%
<b>Political knowledge (mean on scale 0-4)</b>	1.79	1.85	2.11	1.77

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9

