

Arctic Sovereignty in Canada: A Case of Successful or Failed Securitization?

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Given the profound changes occurring in the Arctic region, the potential for military conflict between states competing for resources is now a common refrain of the media, political elites and academics. Academic experts on the Arctic warn of the possibility of “armed brinkmanship” (Borgerson, 2008), “resource wars” (Howard, 2009), “a potential battleground” (Emmerson, 2010), “cauldron of political conflict” (Fairhall, 2010), though most of these authors use the potential for conflict to support de-securitizing moves, such as strengthening international cooperation, promoting the Arctic Council or making the Arctic a zone of peace. While this strategy presents an interesting study in the role of academics in the de-securitization process, what is most interesting for the purposes of this study is that the military threat narrative has sufficient resonance to make these dire warnings plausible.

Representations of the Arctic in the Canadian media and by Canadian political elites support this contention. In 2006, the Toronto Star declared that the protection of the Arctic was a key national interest (Granatstein, 2006), while more recently, a Globe and Mail headline read, “In the Arctic, Canada is willing to fight to keep the true north free” (Mahoney, 2010). In his 2005 election platform, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced plans to develop an Arctic national sensor system, a military-civilian deep-water port and the purchase of three heavily armed icebreakers as part of his Canada First Defence Policy (Christensen, 2007). In 2010, Prime Minister Harper tied the purchase of new state of the art F-35 fighter jets to protecting Canadian sovereignty in its far north.

What is puzzling, given the rather commonplace evocation of security threats in discussion of Canada’s Arctic region currently and through much of its post-WWII history, is that Canadian Arctic policy does not appear to reflect these security concerns. The investments proposed by Stephen Harper in 2005, and similar proposals by numerous previous Canadian prime ministers, have yet to come to fruition, as investment in the Canadian Arctic remains modest. Additionally, interaction between Arctic states is more cooperative than not. Canada, Russia and Denmark are proceeding with their territorial claims in the Arctic within internationally recognized procedures associated with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Furthermore, Canada regularly engages in cooperative endeavours with other Arctic nations, including those with whom it has boundary disagreements: Denmark, Russia and the United States (Byers, 2009). The disjuncture between the securitized rhetoric and actual practices in the Arctic indicates either a failure of the securitization process or a failure of securitization theory to account for what evoking ‘security’ accomplishes.

And it is not only the militarized security narrative that has failed to have much impact on Canadian Arctic policy. The environmental security frame is a recurrent element in the discussion over Canadian Arctic policy since the early 1960’s and numerous governments have made policy proposals based on potential threats to the fragile Arctic ecology. Similarly, Canadian policy pronouncements often draw on potential threats to the socio-cultural, economic and political survival of indigenous populations in the Arctic region as well. Yet, as with the more recent

military security threats, these security claims have not translated into concerted policy change on the part of the Canadian government.

One possible explanation for the apparent failure of these securitizing narratives is that they all compete with one another, and ultimately act as counter-securitizing narratives that undermine policy proposals consistent with the other frames. However, the existence of counter-securitizing narratives on its own does not resolve the problem of failed securitization. Rather than providing an answer to why military securitization has failed, the existence of counter-securitizing narratives prompts the question of why none of these narratives have been successful in terms of producing drastic policy change in the Canadian Arctic.

In this paper I explore how various policy changes on the Arctic have been justified on the grounds of either military or environmental security. I contend that assessing the success or failure of a security claim should not be based on whether the policy measures are consistent with the logic of the securitizing claim (environmental security claim = environmental protection) but rather in exploring what securitizing actors seek to accomplish by evoking the term 'security'. This can only be done by focusing on proposed policy changes, and how they fit into the securitizing narrative. The paper is divided into three sections, the first explores the concept of securitization, in particular how to conceptualize and explain success and failure. The second section focuses on the successful military securitization during the Second World War and early Cold War, and the demise of this security narrative in the early 1960's. The third section focuses on the role of the environmental security narrative from the early 1960's until the mid 1980's that was used to justify the expansion of Canadian territorial claims in the Arctic. What these cases demonstrate is that Canadian political elites have successfully securitized the Arctic in various ways, but that to understand success or failure of these claims requires closer examination of the policy goals of the securitizing actors.

Section One: Successful and Failed Securitization

Securitization theory, prominently associated with the work of Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and their colleagues, often referred to as the Copenhagen School (CS), postulates that securitization entails the presentation of an issue as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying measures outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al, 1998:25). According to Buzan et al (1998), the success of these claims is a product of both language and society. Thus securitizing claims requires acceptance by an audience, which hinges on the employment of the grammar of security, the social capital of the enunciator and pre-existing socially accepted features of the threat (33). A number of scholars have attempted to further clarify and theorize how securitizing moves are successful by incorporating societal context (Balzacq, 2006; Stritzel, 2007), but with a few recent notable exceptions, securitization scholars have not explicitly studied failed cases of securitization.

This may partially reflect the desire to test and build the theory by examining successful cases; alternatively I would argue scholars have not examined failed cases because it is not yet clear what counts as a successful or, in turn, a failed case. Securitization theorists employ two broad measures or indicators of success: discursive success (audience acceptance and resonance) and policy success

(implementation of emergency measures), though the Copenhagen School prioritizes the former. This is evident in the claim that

“we do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan et al 1998:25).

The problem with a discursive standard of success is that ‘resonance’ is a difficult category to evaluate and it lends itself to or essentially relies on counter-factual analysis (Salter, 2010:121). In place of resonance, Salter and others have offered a threshold of success that includes new or emergency executive powers, or public policy change/policy action (Salter, 2010:121; Sjostedt, 2010; 151). This is certainly a more empirically reliable and testable indicator of success, since it is easier to empirically establish if new legislation passes or if war is declared.

Nonetheless, this move does represent a significant departure from the CS understanding of securitization. A discursive understanding of success identifies conditions under which it is possible to countenance certain policy measures, even if they are not implemented. From this perspective, examining cases of attempted policy change, even failed change, implies the analysis of a successful case, since the securitizing move must be partially successful for actors to even conceptualize and publicly entertain certain measures as a legitimate response. One example aptly illustrates this point – Prime Minister Harper’s 2005 election campaign announcement to protect and defend Canadian sovereignty by constructing a national sensor system, a military base, a military-civilian deep-water port and three heavily armed icebreakers. From a discursive based measure of success this represents successful securitization, since an existential threat to Canadian sovereignty had been argued and had gained enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it was possible to legitimize these emergency measures. From a policy change based measure of success the securitizing move was a failure, since few of these policies have subsequently been implemented, or have been substantially reduced.

There is a more fundamental issue at stake in this distinction as it ultimately implies a difference in the treatment of discourse, identity and preferences. A policy-oriented approach to securitization tends to treat securitization as a strategic act. For instance, Balzacq contends that a strategic view of securitization deals with language usage, including the colorful use of language to attain a goal (Balzacq, 2005:172). Similarly, Salter suggests that securitization is a competition for attention and resources that takes place on multiple fronts (Salter, 2010:117). The focus on the tactics and strategies that actors employ to achieve particular policy measures resembles a rationalist approach to security, in which actors have embedded, pre-existing identities and policy preferences. These actors employ the language of security and target distinct audiences strategically to legitimize policy measures that they already prefer – given their understanding of the world and their fixed place within the socio-political context.

On the other hand, a discursive-oriented approach to securitization focuses on how actors come to hold shared understandings of the world and to accept

certain measures as appropriate (Waever, 1996; Buzan et al, 1998). What is taken as given in the strategic approach is problematized and examined through the discursive approach. Thus, the question changes from how actors favoring a renewed militarization of the Canadian Arctic or enhanced environmental protection have employed the language of security and target specific audiences to justify the implementation of their preferred policy, to how the Canadian Arctic came to be regarded in such a way that a militarized response was accepted as appropriate or necessary. In short, it focuses on how identities and policy preferences change as issues become constructed as threatening.

Adopting one measure of success over another also entails methodological choices. The policy-oriented approach takes as its starting point attempted policy changes, and works forward to explore how discursive practices and socio-political contexts affect the implementation of these measures. In the example related above, of interest to the analyst is what happens between 2005/6 when Prime Minister Harper makes his policy announcement and the current time, at which it has still not been fully implemented. On the other hand, the discursive approach can (but need not) begin with proposed policy changes and examine back from this point to examine the discursive and socio-political context that gave rise to the policy recommendation. Again, using Harper's Canada First Defence platform as an example, the analyst is concerned with how the threats to Canadian sovereignty were constructed in such a way to make a militarized response appropriate as an election platform in 2005/6. This strategy, however, precludes the examination of failed cases, since from a discursive approach a failed case is one in which there is insufficient resonance to even propose emergency measures, as such there may be no failed platform or policy change to work back from. Here then the analyst must rely on discursive proclamations or securitizing speech acts, and work forward to explain why the proclamation did not gain sufficient resonance to even mount a platform of change.

Rather than read these as two understandings of success as inconsistent ontological positions within securitization theory, it is most useful to think of them as distinct, but related elements of the process of securitization. Some securitization authors contend that we must disaggregate the process of securitization (Roe, 2008; Salter, 2010:122). This requires asking different questions and examining different time periods. Salter argues as much in his tripartite classification of 'failure'. Salter notes that securitization may be a 'normal' failure, an internal failure, or an external failure. With 'normal' failure, implementation of specific policies may fail for a variety of reasons unrelated to the discourse surrounding its justification (Salter, 2010:122-124). Aside from these normal failures, securitization may fail in two ways: internally – the securitizing move fails to make grammatical and sociological sense; and externally – the specific solution or new emergency power is rejected (Salter 2010:125).

In each of these categories, Salter (2010), building on Roe (2008), argues that securitization may fail in two ways. Internally, the issue may not be considered a matter of politics or may not be accepted as an existential threat (125). Externally, the securitizing move may fail because the specific solution is rejected or the potential for new powers is rejected (ibid.). It is however, unclear from Salter's

distinction how to explain either internal or external failures without employing the concept of resonance. The internal categories of failure explicitly rely on claims about audience acceptance and resonance; but even external failures implicitly rely on audience rejection of specific solutions or new powers for its explanatory power.

Consequently, there is a tension between identifying cases of success or failure (policy change) and explaining cases of success or failure (resonance and acceptance). In this paper I argue that securitization studies cannot abandon its focus on resonance as a meaningful indicator of success, because it is the only way to establish in which instances a securitizing narrative has succeeded. However, Salter and Roe are quite right to note that contestation over policy measures themselves are an important element of the process. Treating policy change as an indicator of success requires greater attention to the securitizing narrative, including its recommended policy changes. Assuming that because an environmental security claim has not resulted in enhanced environmental protection misses what securitization is about. Securitizing narratives function to limit the range of acceptable policy responses. In the next sections, I explore how securitizing narratives narrowed the range of acceptable policy options relating to Canadian Arctic policy.

Section Two: Military Security in the Canadian Arctic: 1939-1964

The first case I explore is the military securitization that produced significant investments in the Canadian Arctic between the late 1930's and early 1960's. In this section I focus on both the success of the military securitizing narrative and the subsequent decline or failure of this narrative in the 1960's. This case demonstrates how security claims limit policy options, and alternatively, how changes in the threat narrative render previously implemented policy measures unnecessary. Though fears over Canadian sovereignty and military security in the Arctic predate the Second World War, I begin my analysis with continental defence policy in the late 1930's as marking a significant shift in Canadian Arctic policy. Prior to WWII, Canadian governments had largely neglected the Arctic region. Coates et al (2008) sum up the reason for the neglect of Canada's Arctic region - "why spend money on a region that lacked economic importance, faced no strategic threats and had a tiny and widely scattered population content to be left alone" (53). This perception changed during the Second World War, when Canadian political elites agreed to participate in a continental defence arrangement with the United States. This policy change produced an unprecedented investment in infrastructure in the Canadian North, but it also introduced a sizable American presence on Canadian soil, during the construction of the Alaska Highway and a series of airfields associated with the Northwest Staging Route (Lackenbauer and Farish, 2007:925). One effect of this policy was to heighten Canadian concerns about territorial sovereignty (Coates et al, 2008:55). Despite these concerns, the Canadian government maintained its commitment to continental defence after the war, primarily due to the emergence of the Soviet threat.

In the early stages of the Cold War, the Soviet threat narrative had a distinctly Arctic element, enunciated through fears of possible military invasion or bombing run over the Arctic - as it was the most direct route of attack between the USSR and US (Sokolsky, 1986:754). Once again, this policy heightened Canadian

concerns about unequal partnership and ceding sovereign control over territory, airspace and defense decisions (Lajeunesse, 2007:52), but the magnitude of the threat from the Soviet Union made refusal to cooperate with the US inconceivable, even as it renewed fears over ceding sovereignty in the Arctic to the US (Tynan, 1979:412). The Canadian Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton summed this up succinctly - "It may be very difficult for the Canadian government to reject any major defence proposals which the US government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America" (Claxton, 1953, quoted in Jockel, 1983).

Fears over loss of sovereignty were evident in negotiations over the comprehensive warning and control system designed to detect Soviet incursions into North American airspace. In response to the perceived threat of Soviet bombers, the Canadian and American governments built three radar lines in Canadian territory, the Pine Tree Line, the Mid-Canada line and the DEW Line (Bertrand, 2008:14). The most controversial of these lines was the DEW line, a series of radar installations in the high Arctic, across the 77th parallel. Unlike the other radar lines, it was to be established in areas where there was not a large Canadian presence, either in terms of population or investment. Consequently, the DEW line was an unparalleled investment in the Canadian Arctic region, funded, constructed and initially manned entirely by the US.

Recognizing both the necessity of the line (given the Soviet threat) and the potential implications for Canadian sovereignty, the Canadian government went to great lengths to ensure that this would not erode Canadian claims in the Arctic and to maximize the perception of Canadian participation in and control over the DEW line project (Lajeunesse, 2007:53). One strategy they employed was to frame the project as a cooperative endeavour, by employing the phrases "joint-project" or "cooperation" whenever possible and by presenting the three lines as a comprehensive package (Lajeunesse, 2007). While the US paid the entire \$750 million cost of the DEW Line, the Canadian government stressed that it had contributed one-third of the cost of the Pine Tree Line (Wrong, 1951) and the complete \$200 million cost of the Mid-Canada Line (Lajeunesse, 2007:56). In addition to managing the public perception of the common defence initiative, the Canadian government was also careful to ensure American recognition of Canadian territorial sovereignty. The first clause of the DEW Line agreement specified, "Canada will acquire and retain title to all lands required for the system. Canada grants and assures the United States, without charge, such rights as access, use and occupancy" (Heeney, 1955). Furthermore, the Canadian government insisted on the application of Canadian law in these areas and in immigration matters (clause 6 and 14), control over scientific information obtained in the course of operation of the system (clause 12), regulation over all contact with "Canadian Eskimos" (clause 13), and unfettered access to these sites by the Canadian government (clause 16) (Heeney, 1955). Tynan (1979) observes that in the twelve treaties concerning Canadian and American joint projects in the North, there were over 244 separate statements requiring American recognition of Canadian sovereignty (413). Sutherland (1966) ultimately concludes that the net effect of Canadian participation in the joint defence initiative was to gain explicit recognition of Canada's claim to the exercise of sovereignty of Canadian claimed land in the Arctic (270).

In addition to legitimizing the construction of the DEW Line, the success of the Cold War securitization also produced Canadian cooperation in the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement (NORAD) and contributed to two other extraordinary and controversial policy reversals: agreeing to accept nuclear weapons from the United States in 1959 and involvement in the US missile defence system in the early 1980's (Crosby, 1997:37; Sokolsky, 1986:757). These temporary reversals of Canadian foreign policy speak to power of the Cold War securitizing narrative to alter the scope of acceptable policies.

Many of the policy measures alluded to above were temporary. The Canadian government soon rejected American nuclear weapons and for most of the Cold War declined to participate in missile defence programs (Crosby, 1997). More pertinent for this paper, few further military investments were made in the Arctic, and the expensive and controversial radar lines were soon phased out and abandoned. The Pine Tree Line, Mid-Canada Line and much of the DEW Line installations were abandoned in the 1960's, and the last of the DEW Line stations closed in the early 1980's. (Tsuji et al, 2006:888).

By the late 1960's, Canadian concerns over territorial sovereignty and environmental degradation in the Arctic played a larger role in shaping Canadian Arctic policy than the military threat narrative associated with the Cold War. While the Cold War Narrative itself still strongly resonated in Canada, the policy shift in the Arctic was a product of both internal and external failure of the military securitizing narrative. By the mid-1960's, the nature of the perceived Soviet threat had changed, and with it, the importance of investment in the Arctic declined. Technological changes contributed to a changed view of the perceived Soviet military threat from bombers to intercontinental ballistic missiles, which produced a shift in NORAD's focus from air defence to missile defence and a concomitant reduction in the importance placed on the Arctic. The shift is evident in the changes from the 1964 White Paper on Canadian Security to the 1971 White Paper. The 1964 report asserted "the major threat to North America at this time is from the air" and "the future of North American air defence includes the maintenance of radar and active defence components commensurate with agreed estimates of bomber threats" (14). Despite the ongoing threat of Soviet bombers, the White Paper identifies the development of ICBM's and submarine based nuclear missile systems as changing the importance of air defence. As a result of these technological changes, the White Paper concluded, "the proportion of Canada's resources directed to air defense will gradually decline through the balance of the decade (15). While the Soviet threat had not declined, the nature of the threat and of Canada's vulnerability had shifted.

By 1971, when the next white paper on security was released, the threat narrative had altered drastically, as had the type of threats associated with Canada's Arctic region. Entitled "Defence in the 70's"; the report by the department of National Defence asserted that "Canada's overriding defence objective must be the prevention of nuclear war by promoting political reconciliation, by working for arms control and disarmament and contributing to the system of stable mutual

deterrence” (DND, 1971:6).¹ No mention is made of bomber threats, the importance of radar installations or of the importance of the Arctic in military security. This signals an important external shift in the Cold War threat narrative – the policy measures that had been deemed necessary and appropriate earlier were no longer accepted. Part of the explanation for this shift rests with technological changes that altered the perceived nature of the threat from the Soviet Union and diminished the priority placed on the Arctic region in Canadian military security.

There was a second important shift that contributed to a re-orientation of Canadian policy in the Arctic. This is well illustrated in the 1971 White Paper, which noted, “defence responsibilities required re-examination as a result of Government decisions to regulate the development of the North in a manner compatible with environmental preservation and with legislation enacted to prevent pollution in the Arctic and Northern Inland Waters” (DND, 1971:1). Though the military threat narrative retained certain resonance in Canadian society due to the continued Cold War narrative, and was resurrected at various points in Canadian history since 1971 to justify military procurements (a theme I return to in subsequent section), the dominant threat narrative in Canadian defense documents after 1964 relating to its Arctic region focused on territorial jurisdiction and environmental degradation.

Section Three: Political Sovereignty and the Environment

The re-orientation of policy toward territorial jurisdiction and environmental threats in the 1960’s was the product of both technological changes and discursive practices. Technological advances in oil exploration and transportation radically altered the perception of threat in the Canadian Arctic. The discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay in Alaska, and the publication of several US maps showing claimed Canadian territory as both disputed and potentially containing oil, highlighted that the Arctic region held significant economic wealth and that Canada’s claims of sovereignty were contested. Furthermore, the development of ice-breaking supertankers that could traverse the Northwest Passage loaded with oil raised concerns over Canadian control of the passage and the possibility of severe environmental degradation in the eventuality of an oil spill. This threat narrative gained currency following the passage of the US Supertanker, the Manhattan, through the Northwest Passage in 1969. The Canadian government provided support for this voyage, but media and political elites depicted the development as a direct threat to Canada’s territorial sovereignty in the Arctic (Coates et al, 2008:95).

The response of the Canadian government to this development fused the question of Canadian territorial jurisdiction with environmental protection. Canadian political elites justified greater control over Arctic waters by using an environmental securitizing narrative in which shipping through dangerous Arctic waterways posed a severe environmental threat. The measures proposed by the Canadian government included enhanced and enlarged claims to territorial sovereignty. Then Prime Minister Trudeau stated in his 1969 Speech from the Throne, that “Canada regards herself as responsible to all mankind for the peculiar

¹ This in essence was a statement reiterating Canadian opposition to housing American nuclear weapons and participating in missile defence systems.

ecological balance that exists so precariously in the water, ice and land in the Arctic archipelago” (Trudeau, 1969). The Department of National Defense also stressed the threat of the fragile Arctic ecology. The danger articulated in this White Paper was that “oil or other pollution might disturb the finely balanced ecology of the region” (DND, 1971: 8). The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp presented the connection more directly - “a danger to the environment of a state constitutes a threat to its security” (quoted in Henkin, 1971:133).

This representation of the Arctic environment stands in stark contrast to the depiction visited upon it during the highly militarily securitized environment of the Second World War and early Cold War. As an area that had largely been neglected by the Canadian state prior to the 1940’s, the Arctic environment itself was often depicted as a potential opponent in the effort to provide military security through massive construction projects in the region. In his account of the construction of the Alaska highway, Godsell (1944) depicts the construction of the highway as a military battle: “they hacked through black massed battalions of spruce and serrated rows of colonnaded pines still others rose in a seemingly impenetrable sage-green barrier ahead, parading in mass formation like an inanimate army determined by the very weight of numbers to resist and wear down the threatening forces of invasion”. US Air Force researcher Howard (1953) noted that in construction projects in the North “the adversaries in these episodes was the environment”. J.D. Brannian (1957), an engineer involved with the construction of the DEW Line, described the creation of the Line as a “full scale attack on the Arctic”. As Lackenbauer and Farish (2007) note, the Arctic environment was regarded as one more environment that needed to be conquered in the name of the Cold War, like deserts or tropical jungles (928).

By the late 1960’s, the environment was no longer depicted as an obstacle to enhancing Canadian military security, but the referent object of a securitizing narrative in its own right, albeit as part of a narrative that emphasized territorial sovereignty as the appropriate measure to protect the Arctic environment. Consequently the policy measures implemented by the Canadian government in response to the perceived environmental threat enhanced Canadian territorial jurisdiction in the Arctic. In 1971, the Canadian government passed two bills designed to protect both the Arctic environment and Canadian sovereignty – the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) and the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act (TFSZA). The AWPPA was exceptional in that it unilaterally declared an anti-pollution zone up to 100 nautical miles from Canada’s Arctic coast, which rendered the contested Northwest Passage internal waters, forbade pollution in that zone, imposed penalties and civil liability for violations and authorized comprehensive regulation and inspection of vessels to prevent pollution (Henkin, 1971:131). The Canadian government understood this to be an exceptional act, and modified its pre-existing general acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on anti-pollution matters (Henkin, 1971:131; Byers, 2009:46). The exceptionality of this legislation was included in the 1982 UNCLOS; Article 234, referred to as the Arctic exception clause, which allows coastal states to enact laws against pollution out to 200 nautical miles when almost year-round ice creates exceptional navigational hazards (Byers, 2009:47).

The TFSZA was also exceptional in that it unilaterally extended Canada's territorial sea from three to twelve miles with an exclusive fishing zone beyond twelve miles (Coates et al, 2008:98). The TFSZA was not exclusively about protecting the environment in the Arctic, as its passage reflected long-standing battles over territorial seas and fishing rights. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's Canada had repeatedly been outvoted in anti-pollution conferences and fishing zone agreements (Henkin, 1971:132), which undoubtedly contributed to the decision to take unilateral action. Yet, the legislation greatly increased Canadian territorial waters in the Arctic region and the decision to unilaterally extend its territorial seas and protect the environment in the early 1970's reflected Canadian concerns about the exceptional nature of the Arctic and its fragile environment (Henkin, 1971:134).

The response of the Canadian government in both instances strongly resembles both Salter's and Waever's depiction of a securitized response. As noted earlier, Salter identifies successful securitization with policy change that creates new executive powers – these two bills certainly did that. For Waever, successful securitization means that – “a unit does not rely on the social resources of rules shared intersubjectively among units but relies instead on its own resources, demanding the right to govern its actions by its own priorities” (Waever, 1996). The decisions to pursue protection of the Arctic environment and Canadian sovereignty through unilateral declarations rather than multilateral cooperation were exceptional and demonstrated a willingness to govern its actions by its own priorities.

However, these episodes raise crucial questions about how we assess the success of securitizing claims. These policy changes entailed a new legal position with respect to international jurisdiction in Arctic waters, but in terms of addressing environmental degradation in the Arctic, it accomplished little. The Canadian government did not commit any substantial resources to development, surveillance or environmental protection in the Arctic.

Consequently, the evocation of environmental security appears more as an attempt to establish within the international community a shared understanding of the Arctic environment as existentially threatened, and that enlarged territorial control was the most appropriate measure to alleviate the threat. This policy goal fit with already existing Canadian concerns about its territorial sovereignty, which, as the previous section demonstrates, resonated strongly in Canadian society since the end of WWII. Three developments support such an interpretation. First, the emergency measures implemented by the Canadian state focused exclusively on territorial sovereignty, to the exclusion of other possible environmental protection measures – the most pertinent being the Antarctic model of environmental protection. There was little consideration, from Canada or any of the Arctic states, of an Antarctic type multilateral non-statist solution (Young, 1989).

The second inconsistency in the environmental threat narrative was how it located the environmental threat with external, foreign actors. Prime Minister Trudeau and the DND White paper identified the source of insecurity in the actions of foreign entities, most notably the US. (Coates et al., 2008:98). Newspaper accounts at the time made this connection explicit, stating “The ships that pose the greatest threat of oil pollution in the Arctic are American.” (Ibid.). Conversely,

environmental damage caused by Canadian activities in the Arctic, most notably its military investments, were not presented as an existential environmental threat that warranted violation of existing rules or called into question the appropriateness of enhanced sovereignty as an appropriate solution. Though it would be impossible here to catalogue all the environmental damage that resulted from the construction of military projects in the Canadian North, it is essential to review a few, to examine how investments legitimized by military and sovereignty narrative contributed to environmental degradation. Lackenbauer and Farish (2007) note that military projects in the North from the 1940's through to the 1980's resulted in the disruption of numerous ecosystems, rendered many areas impassable for animals in the region, and contributed directly to forest fires, logging, over-hunting and over-fishing in the region (925). The construction and subsequent abandonment of radar stations in the Arctic occurred with scant attention to environmental impact; consequently pollution at radar sites has become a significant ongoing concern for Arctic populations (Sistili et al, 2005).

The third development that supports my contention that the primary policy objective was to enhance Canada's territorial sovereignty is how the environmental narrative was subsumed under the sovereignty narrative from that point on. Once the Canadian legal position was more or less accepted in UNCLOS, subsequent policy initiatives focused on further strengthening state sovereignty. This is most poignantly illustrated in the case of the Polar Sea voyage in 1985. In that year, an American coast guard icebreaker traversed the Northwest Passage, sparking another round of concern over American activities in the Arctic. This time however, the threat narrative was almost exclusively in terms of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic; the environmental repercussions had already been thoroughly subsumed under the sovereignty narrative. Though the Canadian and American government had hashed out an agreement over the sailing, numerous commentators and activists in Canada warned that this represented a threat to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic (Kenney, 2006:176; Byers, 2009:51-52). Once again the Canadian government responded with a unilateral shift in its legal position by establishing straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago and a formal claim that the Northwest Passage was internal Canadian waters rather than an international waterway (Purver, 1989:170; Kenney, 2006:177).

These were not the only measures announced by the Canadian government in response to the Polar Sea voyage. The government also announced increased surveillance overflights of Arctic waters and announced the construction of a Polar 8 Class Icebreaker to patrol its Arctic waters. As Kenney notes, the only policy measure that had any material cost associated with it, and the only one that would likely have any impact on Canada's ability to monitor and prevent environmental degradation in the region, was the Icebreaker, and this was never built (ibid). Announcing the end of the icebreaker project in 1990, the Canadian Finance Minister declared the proposed icebreaker obsolete and economically unjustified (Canwest, 2007). It was economically unjustified because in 1988 the Canadian and US government had created a formal Arctic Cooperation agreement, in which they more or less agreed to disagree over the status of the Northwest Passage, but would

cooperate in specific cases of American passage through the passage (Byers, 2009:56-58).

Assessing the success of the environmental security narrative on the basis of actual environmental protection suggests that it had failed. Yet, in the context of the measures being proposed and implemented by the Canadian government, it was clearly successful. The international community largely accepted Canada's unilateral territorial expansion made in 1971, and it successfully limited the range of appropriate policy measures within a territorial sovereignty framework. This of course raises further questions about the environmental security narrative, and how states have been able to co-opt or control this narrative – questions that I do not have the space to address in this paper. What I want to do in the next section is to demonstrate how the military and environmental security narratives continue to resonate and legitimate policy measures in Canada.

Conclusion: The Military and Environmental Narrative Continued

The previous discussion is not meant to suggest that concerns with military security had completely disappeared by the early 1970's, or that Canadian political elites did not actually hold an inter-subjective belief in the threats facing the Arctic environment. Following Canada's unilateral moves in the 1970's to protect its Arctic territorial claims and the fragile Arctic ecology, its approach on Arctic environmental matters has largely been multilateral – including playing prominent roles in the implementation of UNCLOS in 1982 and in the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996. Involvement in these institutions reflects an ongoing recognition of the need to protect the Arctic environment, though conceptualized within a territorial sovereignty framework that requires minimal investment and commitments. The mandate of the Arctic Council is to act as a forum for facilitating regional cooperation in addressing environmental protection and sustainable development in the North. Though the Arctic Council has had a number of important impacts with respect to raising the profile of the Arctic region and in strengthening the identity of indigenous Arctic peoples, it has achieved little in the way of actual protection of the Arctic environment (Koivurova and Vanderzwaag, 2007:159). Though it will have to be the subject of future work, I suggest this is a result of how the environmental security narrative has been captured by states, and how that state-led narrative has restricted the range of conceivable measures within the confines of state sovereignty.

Concerns with military security in the Arctic continue to resonate in Canada, though it has not been overly influential in shaping Canadian Arctic policy. As noted in the opening section, Prime Minister Stephen Harper proposed several policy changes on the grounds of potential military threats in the North, such as three heavily armed icebreakers, a deep-sea military/civilian port and most recently, state of the art fighter jets. Not surprisingly, the Canadian military has played an important role in portraying the Arctic as a zone of military insecurity, by drawing attention to a number of Arctic 'intrusions'. For example, in 1993, a plane allegedly owned and operated by Al Qaeda flew through Iqaluit, and on two occasions (1998 and 2009) unidentified foreign submarines have been spotted operating in Arctic waters claimed by Canada (Teeple, 2010). According to Teeple, these developments

warrant increased military capability in the Arctic. To date, the Canadian government has not fulfilled any of these policy recommendations.

The most recent military 'threat' emerges from Canada's former Cold War adversary – Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, and even earlier, Russia has figured most prominently as challenging Canadian territorial sovereignty in the Arctic, and not as a military threat. But in 2009, the language emanating from Ottawa resembled early Cold War rhetoric. In response to perceived intrusion by Russian bombers nearing Canadian airspace, the Canadian Prime Minister asserted, "I have expressed at various times the deep concern our government has with increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and Russian intrusions into our airspace. We will defend our airspace; we also have obligations of continental defence with the United States. We will fulfill those obligations" (Harper, 2009). In this statement, the Prime Minister portrays Russia in a manner similar to that visited on the USSR during the early Cold War, as aggressive, both against Canada and around the world. In a clear nod to Cold War logic, he also invokes Canada's continental defence agreement with the US and the Arctic as a zone of insecurity and possible military intrusion. In response to one incident in July 2010, the Canadian Defence Minister, Peter McKay, announced that Canadian jets had "repelled Russian bombers, which had come closer than we have seen in recent times" (MacKay, 2010). In August 2010, the Prime Minister's office reported another interception, stating, "thanks to the rapid response of the Canadian Forces, at no time did the Russian aircraft enter sovereign Canadian airspace (Soudas, 2010).

The recent provocations and military threat claims highlight the importance of context in understanding securitizing claims. Though Canadian political elites may employ Cold War rhetoric, or express concern over Russian bombers, these should generally be understood to be in a context where a primary concern between the two states is territorial sovereignty, rather than the actual threat of military invasion as during the Cold War. In this context, the securitizing language of Canadian political elites should also be viewed as a strategic act that draws on continued Canadian concerns about its territorial sovereignty in the Arctic and that is designed to gain support for increased military spending or specific military procurement projects, most notably the F-35 fighter jet purchase.

Political elites from the opposition parties and media commentators stressed that the supposed Russian bomber threat was designed to justify the highly controversial decision to purchase 65 new F-35 fighter jets (see James, 2010). The Canadian government explicitly made this connection, arguing "it is the best plane our government could provide our forces, and when you are a pilot staring down Russian long-range bombers, that's an important fact to consider" (Soudas, 2010). However, unlike the military security narrative in the early Cold War, the threat narrative, as well as the specific policy measures, are heavily contested. This was most clearly illustrated by the de-securitizing efforts of NORAD to downplay the significance of Russian bomber exercises. NORAD representatives claimed, "both Russia and NORAD routinely exercise their capability to operate in the North. These exercises are not cause for alarm" (James, 2010). Controversy surrounding the cost, the necessity of this particular fighter and the non-competitive bidding process made the fighter jet policy an ongoing political issue that may contribute to an early

election. It should prove to be an excellent opportunity to further examine the factors that contribute to successful securitization.

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