

# Selecting, Disentitling, or Investing? Exploring Party and Voter Responses to Immigrant Welfare Dependence in 11 West European Welfare States

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**Abstract.** Academics have long predicted the tension between immigration policies and welfare institutions to lead to the erosion of welfare state structures. Empirical studies, however, have found little evidence for that prediction. This paper argues that concerns about immigrant welfare dependence are more likely to lead to one or more of the following three responses: (1) restrictions and limits on immigrants' access to social programs and benefits; (2) changes to admission policies aimed at attracting those immigrants who are least likely to turn to the state for financial support; and (3) extensive integration services and immigrant-targeted labour market programs. The paper maps the currency these three policy responses enjoy among parties and voters in eleven European welfare states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Observing much cross-country variation, the paper concludes that the same policy challenge solicits very different responses in different political systems. A second finding concerns the relationship between party and voter views on this subject. While voters tend to agree more with the positions of parties they vote for than with other parties, there is less evidence that a certain policy response is more popular among voters in countries where parties express more belief in it.

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Critics of immigration have long complained that decisions about admission and integration policies take place behind closed doors. Especially in European countries with a history of relative ethnic homogeneity, the argument that the democratic majority has never asked for migration can frequently be heard. In other words, a persistent critique has been that while the public at large tends to be sceptic about immigration, the political elite ignores those concerns and concocts generous and permissive policies in a depoliticized context.

It is difficult to maintain this argument today. This paper focuses on the connection between immigration and welfare state structures, and one would be hard-pressed to accuse contemporary politicians of silence on this issue. Levels of immigrant welfare

dependence and fears of 'welfare migration' are common subjects of political debate, and have indeed led to restrictive policy changes in some countries.

At the same time, it is important to note that the response has not been the same in every Western welfare state. Some have recently decided to introduce restrictions and limits on immigrants' access to social programs and benefits. Others have chosen to employ a selective admission policy, attracting those immigrants who are least likely to turn to the state for financial support. Yet others have sought a remedy in extending integration services and immigrant-targeted labour market programs.

The academic literature pays increasing attention to the immigration-welfare connection, but so far few contributions have directly addressed this variation in responses. This paper maps the currency the three alternative responses enjoy in eleven North West European welfare states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It does so by analyzing both what political parties have to say on the subject in their manifestoes, and the views the public at large expresses in cross-national surveys.

As we will see, there is indeed much disagreement in Europe on how best to manage the tension between immigration and welfare. This suggests that theories of political translation are particularly applicable to this subject. While the policy challenge is fundamentally the same in each country under study – how to avoid that immigrants end up relying on the state for their income in disproportionate numbers (see also notes 9 and 17) – the way this challenge is understood differs considerably from one political system to another.

By comparing the views of voters and parties, this paper also conducts a partial investigation of the claim that parties are out of touch with their constituents on this policy file. For one thing, there is no evidence that political parties ignore the tension between immigration and welfare. Moreover, we find that the views of voters tend to be in line with those of the parties they vote for. On the other hand, however, from a comparative perspective the evidence that parties and voters see eye to eye is weaker. In some countries, the public expresses much support for exclusionary strategies while parties indicate little interest in such approaches. In others we see the exact opposite, with parties proposing many restrictions while survey respondents appear comparatively unsupportive.

This paper is structured as follows. It begins by reviewing the available literature on the subject and the contributions this paper aims to make to it. The second section reports the findings of the analysis of party manifestoes, after which section three investigates the opinions of voters as expressed in recent survey data. I then compare the findings of section two and three to assess whether the opinions of parties and voters appear to be in line with each other. The final section summarizes the findings and briefly reflects on their implications.

### **Immigration, welfare, and the conspiracy of silence**

This paper engages two bodies of research. First and foremost, it aims to contribute to the growing literature on the tension between immigration and welfare. Sometimes

referred to as the 'Progressive's Dilemma', virtually all authors agree that liberal admission policies and generous social policies cannot coexist (Bommes & Geddes, 2000; Entzinger & Van der Meer, 2004; Freeman, 1986). This argument usually comes in one of two variants. One is economic and reasons that a combination of open borders and generous social policies risks significant increases in social expenditure. In other words, in this account immigration is seen as a threat to the welfare state because immigrants are expected to rely in large numbers on social benefits and therefore will ultimately make the system more difficult, if not impossible, to finance (Razin, Sadka, & Suwankiri, 2011; Sinn & Ochel, 2003).

The second version of this argument, more common in the political science literature, builds on the assumption that immigration-induced diversity will make it difficult to sustain the solidarity necessary to legitimize an extensive welfare system (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). There is some disagreement on the exact causal mechanism driving this effect – for example, some point at the insights of social identity theory and reason people are unwilling to share with individuals they perceive to be part of an 'out-group' (Burgoon, 2011; Shayo, 2009) while others rely more on rational choice theory and argue it reflects humans' unwillingness to be engaged in reciprocal relations they expect not to benefit from (Fong, 2007; Lee, Roemer, & Van der Straeten, 2006) – but what unites these perspectives is the belief that the arrival of immigrants makes voters withdraw their support for the welfare state and favour initiatives for retrenchment.

Despite the plausibility of these arguments, scholars increasingly come to the conclusion that there is little evidence for an overall negative effect of immigration on the welfare state. It is indeed true that immigrants tend to depend on welfare and other social benefits in larger numbers than native-born citizens (Boeri, 2009; Brochmann, 1996).<sup>1</sup> However, most studies that have tried to measure the overall economic impact of migration on the welfare state conclude that it is positive but small (Spencer, 2003; Venturini, 2004; Zimmerman, 2005) – mostly because immigrants' standing in the labour market tends to improve over time, the state typically does not have to pay for immigrants' education (Borjas, 1999), and immigrants stimulate the economy by taking on jobs that are unattractive to native-born citizens (Facchini & Mayda, 2009). More to the point of this essay, there is not much evidence either that immigration has led to increased calls for across-the-board welfare reforms. While a few studies do find a sizeable negative effect on support for redistribution or social programs (Dahlberg, Edmark, & Lundqvist, 2011; Eger, 2010), most do not (Crepaz, 2006; Finseraas, 2012; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Soroka, Johnston, & Banting, 2004; Van Oorschot & Uunk, 2007). There is even less evidence that migration has led to actual welfare retrenchment (Crepaz, 2008; Gerdes, 2011; Soroka, Banting, & Johnston, 2006).

These null findings are, in retrospect, not surprising. For one thing, we know that there are formidable institutional obstacles to welfare retrenchment (Brooks & Manza, 2007; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 1994). Moreover, there is little in the theoretical accounts referred to above that should lead us to expect that the most virulent opponents of immigration – typically low-skilled workers and the unemployed (Scheve

& Slaughter, 2001) – would suddenly want to cut programs or tax rates they benefit from themselves.<sup>2</sup>

Rather than implementing across-the-board welfare cuts, then, policy-makers seem more likely to propose tackling the tension between immigration and welfare by one or more of the following three responses. First, and perhaps most obviously, they can choose to restrict admission policies. Many European countries have in recent years turned to the ‘Canadian’ strategy of carefully selecting those migrants who are least likely to turn to the state for support (Menz, 2013). Typically, this entails restrictive changes in the streams of family and refugee migration, and the implementation of skill and language requirements in the labour migration stream.

A second response does entail amendments to social policies, but rather than across-the-board cuts involves restrictions on immigrants’ access to benefits. A wide variety of countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States have in recent years made it harder for immigrants to qualify for benefits and programs, for example by implementing or extending residence requirements, disentitling certain categories of migrants, or making eligibility requirements more onerous for newcomers than for native-born citizens (Koning, 2013; Sainsbury, 2012; Wilkinson & Craig, 2012).

Third, and finally, policy-makers can suggest proposals that are in some way the exact opposite of the former strategy, namely to introduce or expand programs and services aimed at ameliorating immigrants’ position on the labour market. Well in line with the recent move in many welfare states towards a ‘social investment model’ (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003), to some politicians the most obvious strategy to alleviate immigrant welfare dependence is by what one might call economic integration programs or immigrant-targeted labour market policies. Examples include state-funded language classes, internship programs, micro-credit initiatives for newcomers, efforts to recognize foreign credentials, tax breaks for employers who hire immigrants, and initiatives to counter discrimination on the labour market.

So far, the literature on the immigration-welfare connection has made little attempt to explore the relative popularity of these three strategies among different political actors and in different jurisdictions. The main goal of this paper is to address this omission, and to provide a first overview of the extent to which political parties and voters in North West Europe favour each of these three policy responses.

Although my main interest is thus descriptive, I will also provide a cursory exploration of three possible explanations for the variation we will encounter. First, it seems plausible to hypothesize that views on how best to respond to immigrant welfare dependence are related to political ideology (Breunig & Luedtke, 2008; Ireland, 2004; Messina, 2007). More specifically, I expect the responses of selective admission and exclusive welfare to be more favoured by those who are associated with conservative or anti-immigrant parties, and the approach of offering targeted labour market policies to be more popular among adherents of socialist or social democratic ideologies.

In addition to finding differences *within* countries, it is also likely that dominant views on this subject will differ *between* countries. As the large literature on political

translation shows, the same social facts can receive a very different treatment in different politico-institutional systems. Similar developments receive much more attention in some communities than in others, and even when there is little difference in salience the way the developments are discussed are likely to be influenced by the political system. Especially when it concerns sensitive and controversial policy areas such as redistribution and immigration can we expect the importance of political translation to be large (Boin, 't Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Cox, 2001; Jedwab, 2008; Sides & Citrin, 2007).

In regards to the subject of this paper, it seems likely that two aspects of the political system are of particular relevance. First, the presence of a sizeable anti-immigrant party can be expected to increase the popularity of the two exclusionary strategies (selective admission and exclusive welfare). By frequently bringing up immigration-related concerns and framing them in divisive terms, these parties have the potential of not only spreading anti-immigrant sentiment among the public (Green-Pedersen & Odman, 2008; Rydgren, 2003), but also of making more mainstream parties move in a more restrictive direction on the immigration file out of electoral calculations (Norris, 2005; Van Spanje, 2010). Second, we can expect the approach of immigrant-targeted labour market policies to enjoy more currency in universal welfare systems. For one thing, institutionalist theory teaches us that solidarity tends to be higher in countries with a universal welfare structure (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1980; Larsen, 2008), and there is evidence that this is also the case when it concerns solidarity with immigrants in particular (Crepaz & Damron, 2009; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009). Moreover, the large reliance on active labour market policies in those countries (Huber & Stephens, 2001) makes it likely that policy-makers will turn to those strategies as well when devising a response to welfare dependence among immigrants.

By analyzing views of both political parties and voters, this paper also speaks to the literature on the political representation of immigration attitudes. Often referred to as the 'conspiracy of silence', a persistent argument among both public commentators and academics is that immigration has predominantly been an elitist project, either run by multiculturalist ethnic engineers and immigration advocacy groups, or by employers looking for cheap labour. Indeed, many maintain that the political elite tends to have much more permissive views on immigration than the public at large (Bosma, 2010; Freeman, 1995; Huntington, 2004; Menz, 2013; Messina, 2007).

At the same time, however, there are also reasons to expect that this argument does not apply to the subject of immigration in relation to welfare, at least not anymore. Immigrant welfare dependence is frequently mentioned and criticized by European politicians, not only by those of anti-immigrant parties but also, as mentioned above, by those from mainstream parties fearing that too permissive a stance would have negative electoral repercussions. In fact, some have argued that such fears have led to overreactions on the part of policy-makers, attempting to placate voters with restrictive measures that have little demonstrable effect and are not even actively demanded by the electorate (Sales, 2007). This paper therefore explores whether there is evidence of congruence between the views of voters and political parties on the subject of the

immigration-welfare connection. Before turning to that analysis, however, we first map the views of these two groups separately.

### **Analysis of party manifestoes**

The sample of this analysis consists of all political parties in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom that in late 2012 occupied at least 5 percent of the seats in parliament.<sup>3</sup> For each of these 61 parties, I consulted the campaign manifesto for parliamentary elections from the period 2008-2012. In some cases, the manifesto turned out to be very short or to contain little information on immigration issues. In those instances I relied on other party documents as well. For more information on the parties and the documents consulted, see Appendix Table A1.

The first investigation was to determine whether the manifesto contained any reference to the tension between open borders and generous welfare or to high levels of immigrant welfare dependence more generally. Many manifestoes did, although it is worth noting that the framing differed considerably between parties of different ideological profiles. Dutch anti-immigrant party PVV, for example, boldly states: “either you go and provide the entire world with a social benefit, or you choose unequivocally for your own population”<sup>4</sup> (PVV, 2012, p. 22)<sup>5</sup>. The British Labour Party, by contrast, adopts a less divisive tone: “We understand people’s concerns about immigration – about whether it will [...] put pressure on public services or housing” (Labour Party, 2010, p. 5:2). Yet other parties, such as the Norwegian and German socialist parties, mostly emphasize immigrants’ vulnerable position in the labour market, noting that the welfare system appears ineffective to take care of newcomers in the same way as of native-born citizens (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*, 2009, pp. 27, 95; *Die Linke*, 2009, p. 29).

Next, I determined what kind of suggestions, if any, the party brought forward to tackle this tension. More specifically, I coded whether the party supported the strategy of (a) employing a selective admission policy targeting migrants who are unlikely to turn to the state for support; (b) disentiing immigrants from benefits and services; and (c) investing in economic integration policies and immigrant-targeted labour market programs.

For many parties, it was relatively straightforward to establish the position on these three possible policy responses. The Danish *Liberal Alliance’s* party document on immigration, for example, is called “Open borders, closed public funds”<sup>6</sup>, indicating a clear preference for exclusive welfare over selective admission policy. In other cases, party positions appeared more ambiguous. The Austrian environmentalist party, for example, argues in its manifesto that “education, language skills, [and] employment experience [...] determine who is allowed to immigrate”, but at the same time proposes policy reforms in a more generous direction when it comes to family and refugee migration (*Die Grünen*, 2008, p. 17). Whenever a manifesto contained such ambiguity, I coded the party as expressing ‘some’ support. Finally, in a few other cases party

positions were difficult to determine because party manifestoes did not state them explicitly. In those cases, I assumed the party does not favour the policy response in question, unless I could find clear evidence to the contrary on the party's website or in other policy documents.

Table 1 shows descriptive results of this analysis. Two findings are of particular interest. First, overall there is little evidence of a 'conspiracy of silence': more than 3 in 5 parties explicitly note the potential for free migration to burden the social security system. Second, there is much variation in the strategies deemed appropriate to counter such an effect. Political parties in North West Europe are more or less split on the desirability of selective admission policies and immigrant-targeted programs. Limiting immigrants' access to welfare benefits is favoured by a minority of parties, but the number is certainly not trivial.

TABLE 1

Views on immigrant welfare dependence and possible responses among 61 West European parties

	<i>Tension mentioned</i>	<i>Selective admission</i>	<i>Exclusive welfare</i>	<i>Targeted programs</i>
No	39.3% (24)	37.7% (23)	62.3% (38)	39.3% (24)
Some	-	11.5% (7)	8.2% (5)	3.3% (2)
Yes	60.7% (37)	50.8% (31)	29.5% (18)	57.4% (35)

Based on analysis of party manifestoes from the period 2008-2012. For complete information, see Appendix Table A1.

TABLE 2

Relationship between different responses

	<i>Tension mentioned</i>	<i>Selective admission</i>	<i>Exclusive welfare</i>	<i>Targeted programs</i>
<i>Tension mentioned</i>	1	0.404 **	0.236	-0.021
<i>Selective admission</i>	0.404 **	1	0.510 **	-0.411 *
<i>Exclusive welfare</i>	0.236	0.510 **	1	-0.591 **
<i>Targeted programs</i>	-0.021	-0.411 *	-0.591 **	1

N=61. Cell entries are Kendall's tau coefficients. \* Significant at level  $p < 0.05$ . \*\* Significant at level  $p < 0.01$ .

The relationships between these four party positions are largely as we would expect (Table 2). Unsurprisingly, we see that the strategies of selection and disentanglement are positively related with each other, and negatively with the more inclusionary approach of developing targeted programs. In other words, a party that favours one of these two exclusionary approaches is more likely to favour the other one as well, and less likely to propose improving immigrants' employment opportunities by targeted programs.

The connection between acknowledging the tension and the three possible policy responses is less intuitive. While it is true that all parties in the sample that make mention of the immigrant-welfare connection do express support for at least one of the three policy options (see Appendix Table A1), there is much variation in the options they prefer. Indeed, we only see a clear association between ‘tension mentioned’ and ‘selective admission’. In other words, a party that mentions high rates of welfare dependence or the potentially high costs of open migration is more likely to prefer sharpening admission policy than their counterparts that are silent on the issue, but is no more or less likely to favour welfare exclusion or targeted programs. Clearly, we are dealing with a challenge that has no obvious answer – at least not to political parties in Western Europe.

Part of the answer why different parties favour different strategies is, of course, that they adhere to different political ideologies. As mentioned above, we can expect that parties of different ‘families’ have different preferences on this policy file. To test this hypothesis, I categorized each party as belonging to one of six party families: socialist or green, social democrat, social liberal, Christian democrat, conservative liberal, and anti-immigrant. This classification scheme follows conventional classifications and covers the large majority of parties in North West Europe. Only a few parties under study fit this categorization awkwardly.<sup>7</sup>




FIGURE 1

Party support for 3 responses to immigrant welfare dependence, by party family (N=61)

Figure 1 shows parties’ positions on the three possible responses to immigrant welfare dependence by party family.<sup>8</sup> As expected, we see that as we move right on the political



spectrum, the percentage of parties supporting selection and disentanglement increases, and the share favouring immigrant-targeted programs decreases. Nevertheless, there is much variation within party families. Only socialist and green parties on the one hand and anti-immigrant parties on the other are near-unanimous in their preferences. Parties of the other party families, conversely, are much less likely to agree. In other words, ideological profile has something to do with party positions, but it only tells part of the story.

At least equally important is the country in which the party operates. In fact, when we compare variation ratios by country and by party family, we see little difference (see Appendix Table A2). In other words, two parties in one country are about as likely to agree on appropriate ways to deal with immigrant welfare dependence as two ideologically similar parties in different countries. It is important, then, to investigate cross-country variation in party preferences.




FIGURE 2

Party support for three different responses to immigrant welfare dependence, by country (N=61) (weighted by percentage of seats in parliament)

Figure 2 shows the percentage of parties in favour of the three possible policy responses in each of the eleven countries under study, weighted by the percentage of seats they occupy in (the lower house of) parliament. The differences are huge. In Ireland, the topic seems to be a non-issue altogether. In Sweden, investment is by far the most preferred approach. Austrian, German, and Norwegian parties appear to favour a combination of selection and investment, while their counterparts in the Netherlands,

Switzerland and the United Kingdom apparently prefer to combine selection with disentanglement. In Belgium, Denmark, and France, finally, all three strategies seem to garner considerable support.

In sum, we are dealing with a clear example of political translation. The same socio-economic challenge is understood in very different ways in different countries.<sup>9</sup> As mentioned above, there are good reasons to hypothesize that two aspects of the political system are helpful in understanding what this translation might look like: the presence of an anti-immigrant party and the structure of the welfare regime.

TABLE 3

Party views on immigrant welfare dependence, split up by success of anti-immigrant parties and nature of welfare regime

	<i>Large anti-immigrant party?*</i>			<i>Universal welfare state?#</i>		
	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>sign.^</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>sign.^</i>
<i>Tension mentioned</i>	69.2%	45.5%	0.07	71.4%	55.0%	0.19
<i>Selective admission</i>	65.4%	40.9%	0.06	38.1%	66.3%	0.03
<i>Exclusive welfare</i>	43.6%	11.4%	<0.01	26.2%	35.0%	0.47
<i>Targeted programs</i>	57.7%	61.4%	0.78	76.2%	50.0%	0.03
N	39	22		21	40	

\* Countries with sizeable anti-immigrant party are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. # Countries with a universal welfare regime are Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. ^ Calculated by compare proportions z-test (two-tailed).

Table 3 investigates these hypotheses by comparing the positions of, first, parties inside and outside a party system with a large anti-immigrant party and, second, parties in universal and non-universal welfare states. In countries where anti-immigrant parties have a large political presence, political parties appear to be more likely to mention the tension between immigration and welfare, to propose selective admission policies, and to favour excluding immigrants from social benefits. These differences persist when we exclude anti-immigrant parties themselves from the comparison, although they would become considerably smaller.<sup>10</sup>

The second feature of the political system also appears important. Parties in universal welfare states seem less likely to propose selective admission policies and more likely to favour targeted programs than their counterparts in different welfare regimes. It is worth noting that this difference is not a product of a reluctance of parties in universal welfare states to mention the tension between immigration and welfare. In fact, although the difference is not large, parties in universal welfare states appear more prone to note this tension than parties elsewhere.

All in all, we can summarize the findings of this section by four observations: first, there is widespread recognition among parties in Europe that uncontrolled migration can burden the welfare state; second, parties differ considerably in how they prefer to

tackle this challenge; third, these differences are not only the product of political ideology but are also very different from one country to another; and finally, looking at the presence of anti-immigrant parties and the structure of the welfare regimes helps to understand this cross-country variation. In the next section, we move on to see whether these observations hold when we focus on the preferences of voters rather than political parties.

### **Analysis of survey data**

This section investigates how voters in the eleven countries under study view the tension between immigration and welfare, and which policy responses they favour. It is important to note that my main goal here is not to conduct a systematic investigation of the origins of immigration attitudes, but rather to provide summary findings that can subsequently be compared to the findings in the previous section.

Unfortunately, there is no cross-national survey available that serves our purposes perfectly. For one thing, no survey has directly asked respondents how they think the government should address immigrant welfare dependence, and therefore we are forced to rely on more indirect questions. Moreover, there is no survey that contains such indirect questions for all of the four pieces of information we are interested in (whether the respondent thinks that immigration can burden the welfare state, that more selective admission policies should be employed, that immigrants' access to benefits should be limited, and that immigrant-targeted programs should be expanded). For these reasons, I rely on a total of seven different questions, drawn from three different surveys: the 2008 European Values Survey (EVS), the fourth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS 2008), and Eurobarometer (EB) 69.1 (2008). Unfortunately, the ESS has not been conducted in Austria, and the EB is not administered in non-EU countries Norway and Switzerland. In all analyses, I exclude non-citizen respondents.<sup>11</sup>

To gauge voters' views on the immigration-welfare connection, I make use of two questions: 'are immigrants a strain on the welfare system?' (EVS) and 'do immigrants receive more in benefits than they pay in taxes?' (ESS). While the formulation of both questions is rather accusatory<sup>12</sup>, they do clearly tap respondents' views on immigrant welfare dependence. As indicators of support for selective admission policies, I rely on the questions 'Should the government allow people from less developed countries to come here to work?' (EVS) and 'Should [country] allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to come and live in [country]?' (ESS). An advantage of these two questions is that they refer to 'less developed' and 'poorer' countries, and thus implicitly invite respondents to take economic considerations into account. Neither question is perfect, however, The EVS question asks exclusively about labour migration (and thus people favouring limits on asylum and family migration might still answer they oppose restrictions), and the ESS question has not been asked in Austria. Next, to measure whether respondents think that immigrants' access to benefits should be limited, I use ESS question 'When do you think immigrants should

obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?' Finally, there is no good indicator available of voters' views on immigrant-targeted programs. The item that probably comes closest is EB question 'What do you think of measures to ensure equal opportunities in the labour market on the basis of ethnic origin?' As said, however, this question has not been asked in Norway and Switzerland. As a (very rough) approximation, I therefore also use EVS question 'do you feel concerned about the living conditions of immigrants?' Despite their limitations, these questions are - to my knowledge - the most suitable among available cross-national surveys.<sup>13</sup> For exact question wording and descriptive statistics, see Appendix Table A3.

Since these seven questions are drawn from different surveys, our investigation of their relationships with each other is necessarily limited. Studying the relationship between items on the individual level is only possible for questions within one survey (see Appendix Table A4). For comparisons of all items, we have to make due with country-level correlations measuring the association between the percentages of citizen respondents answering positively to the seven questions (Appendix Table A5). Taking these limitations into account, we can make two observations about the relationships between the seven survey questions. First, questions aimed at measuring the same concept turn out to be positively related, although only in case of the questions on immigrant welfare dependence does the association appear to be strong. Second, we see similar patterns as we saw in the party analysis, with one important exception: when it comes to voters, perceiving immigrants as a potential threat to the welfare state is not only associated with more support for selective admission policies, but also with more support for exclusive welfare policies and less support for immigrant-targeted programs. This probably has much to do with the way the questions on the tension between immigration and welfare are worded (see also note 12).

Analogous to the analysis of party manifestoes, we begin by illustrating the differences in survey responses by ideological orientation. Using questions on vote intention (EVS) and past voting behaviour (ESS)<sup>14</sup>, I was able to link respondents to the parties investigated in the previous section, and use the same classification scheme to categorize voters according to party family.<sup>15</sup> Figure 3 illustrates respondents' answers by party family for four of the survey questions under investigation (the EB did not include a question on vote intention and could therefore not be used in this analysis; the answers on the other two questions are reported in Appendix Figure A1).

The results are very similar to what we saw in the analysis of party manifestoes. We again see that as we move rightward on the political spectrum, support for selection and disenfranchisement increases, and support for targeted policies decreases. It is also worth noting that party family appears strongly related to respondents' views on the scope of immigrant welfare dependence. No such association appeared in the analysis of party manifestoes<sup>16</sup>, but again it seems we should not make too much of this difference. After all, any mentioning of the tension between immigration and welfare, in any formulation, was coded the same way in the party analysis, while the survey question clearly taps one specific interpretation of this tension.




FIGURE 3

Citizen attitudes on immigration and welfare, by party family respondent (intends to vote(d) for (point estimates with 95% confidence intervals)

More interesting are the differences between countries. Figure 4 shows the responses of citizens in the eleven countries under study for four of the seven questions (response patterns on the other three are reported in Appendix Figure A2).

It is clear that respondents' views vary considerably between countries. For example, British respondents seem much more supportive of selective admission policies than their Swedish counterparts, the Dutch appear to favour welfare exclusion more than the Swiss, and measures to ensure equal opportunity on the labour market appear much more popular in Ireland than in Austria. As we already learned from the low country-level correlations, the response patterns for the other three survey questions (see Appendix Figure A2) are somewhat different from the findings in Figure 4. In particular, it seems worth noting that Swiss respondents appear much more in favour of selective admission policy in the ESS, when they are asked about people coming to 'live', than in the EVS, where the word 'work' is used. The two questions meant to measure respondents' support for targeted programs do not line up very

closely either - especially the relative position of Ireland and the United Kingdom is considerably different on the two questions.<sup>17</sup>




FIGURE 4

Citizen attitudes on immigration and welfare, by country (point estimates with 95% confidence intervals)

Table 4 investigates whether citizen respondents in countries where anti-immigrant parties are important political players, and where the structure of the welfare regime is universal, differ systematically in their views on immigrant welfare dependence and its possible policy responses from citizens in other politico-institutional settings. While the small number of independent observations warrant caution in the interpretation of the results, the conclusions in many ways appear to be similar to the findings in the previous section. We again find that in universal welfare states support for selective admission policies tends to be lower and support for targeted programs higher. We also find again that exclusive welfare policies are more likely to be favoured in the presence of a large anti-immigrant party.

Three findings are less expected, however. In countries with large anti-immigrant parties we find first, that the perception of immigrant welfare dependence seems to be less pronounced and second, that on the EVS question respondents express less support

for selective admission policies. Third, it is surprising to see that in this analysis immigrant-excluding welfare reforms appear to be more popular (although not by much) among citizens of universal welfare states than among their counterparts in different regimes.

TABLE 4

Answer to survey questions, respondents split by country's success of anti-immigrant parties and nature of welfare regime

	<i>Large anti-immigrant party?*</i>			<i>Universal welfare state?#</i>		
	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>sign.</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>sign.^</i>
<i>(T1) Immigrants are a strain on the welfare system (&gt;6 on 1-10 scale)</i>	58.5%	61.8%	<0.001	53.9%	62.0%	<0.001
<i>(T2) Immigrants receive more than they contribute (&gt;5 on 0-10 scale)</i>	33.9%	39.2%	<0.001	29.9%	39.4%	<0.001
<i>(S1) 'Strict limits' or 'prohibit everyone' from developed countries</i>	51.5%	55.8%	<0.001	48.6%	55.0%	<0.001
<i>(S2) 'Few' or 'none' regarding people from poor countries outside Europe</i>	43.9%	41.2%	<0.001	34.1%	45.3%	<0.001
<i>(E1) Equal access to benefits and services 'never' or 'once citizen'</i>	37.4%	35.5%	0.009	37.6%	35.9%	0.034
<i>(I1) 'Totally' or 'somewhat' in favour of measures to ensure equal opportunity</i>	67.0%	76.6%	<0.000	74.8%	71.4%	<0.001
<i>(I2) 'Very much' or 'much' concerned about immigrants</i>	21.7%	23.7%	0.004	30.9%	20.1%	<0.001

\* Countries with large anti-immigrant party are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. # Countries with a universal welfare regime are Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. ^ P-value calculated by compare proportions z-test (two-tailed).

All in all, the findings in this section are similar to those from the manifesto analysis in some respects, but different in others. On the one hand, we again conclude that there is much variation in views on immigration and welfare, that this difference is not merely a product of political ideology but also differs considerably between countries, and that features of the political system seem helpful in understanding these differences. On the other hand, the last analysis showed that cross-country differences between voters do not follow the same patterns as cross-country differences between parties. The next section explores this point further by investigating the link between parties and voters on this subject.

### **The representation of views on immigration and welfare**

In light of the common argument that the views of political elites on immigration are poorly in tune with those of the public at large, it is worth exploring to what extent the views on immigration and welfare expressed in party manifestoes line up with the

opinions of voters. We already saw some indication that the effect of political ideology on those views is largely similar for parties and voters alike. In this section, we will investigate the connection between party and voter views more closely, for as far as the data under study permit.

We start this investigation by analyzing whether the views of citizens and the parties they vote for are positively associated, or, in other words, whether people who vote for parties that express support for a certain policy response in their manifesto are also more likely to favour that response. Using the same questions from the EVS and ESS surveys on vote intention and past voting behaviour as above (see notes 14 and 15) and the information from the manifesto analysis, I was able to code the position on welfare and immigration of the party of each respondent's choice.

TABLE 5

Relationship between respondents' views and views of party they (intend to) vote(d) for

		<i>Party position on strategy</i>				
		<b>no</b>	<b>some</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>Tau</b>	
<b>Tension mentioned</b>	<i>(T1) Immigrants are a strain on the welfare system (&gt;6 on 1-10 scale)</i>	57.8%	-	58.4%	0.008	
	<i>(T2) Immigrants receive more than they contribute (&gt;5 on 0-10 scale)</i>	36.5%	-	35.4%	-0.014	
<b>Selective admission</b>	<i>(S1) 'Strict limits' or 'prohibit everyone' from developed countries</i>	45.9%	46.3%	55.1%	0.085 *	
	<i>(S2) 'Few' or 'none' regarding people from poor countries outside Europe</i>	30.7%	30.9%	49.3%	0.169 *	
<b>Exclusive welfare</b>	<i>(E1) Equal access to benefits and services 'never' or 'once citizen'</i>	33.4%	27.5%	42.6%	0.093 *	
<b>Targeted programs</b>	<i>(I2) 'Very much' or 'much' concerned about immigrants</i>	17.9%	24.5%	28.5%	0.150 *	

\* Significant at level  $p < 0.001$ . Kendall's tau-c coefficients have been calculated on the basis of all ordinal answer categories of the survey questions. The comparison of proportions is for presentation purposes only.

On aggregate citizens' views on how to address immigrant welfare dependence seem well in line with those of the parties they vote for (see Table 5). The differences between people who vote for parties that do not favour a strategy and only express lukewarm support tend to be small (and in case of the question on exclusive welfare, even in the unexpected direction), but overall we find positive and statistically significant associations on the subjects of selective admission, exclusive welfare, and targeted programs. In contrast, no such association appears to exist on the first two questions: people who vote for parties recognizing the tension between immigration and welfare appear no more or less likely to think that immigrants are a strain on the welfare system or that immigrants receive more than they contribute than other voters.



These findings are by and large reproduced when we conduct the analysis for each country separately, eliminating any noise resulting from cross-country differences in respondents' views (see Table 6). A few results deserve some more attention. For one thing, we now do find some significant associations between voter and party positions on the tension between immigration and welfare, although they are negative in some of the countries under study. The explanation appears to be the same methodological problem we encountered before.<sup>18</sup>

TABLE 6

Relationship between respondents' views and views of party they (intend to) vote(d) for, by country

	<i>AUT</i>	<i>BEL</i>	<i>DEN</i>	<i>FRA</i>	<i>GER</i>	<i>IRE</i>	<i>NET</i>	<i>NOR</i>	<i>SWE</i>	<i>SWI</i>	<i>UK</i>
<i>T1</i>	<b>0.179</b>	0.038	<b>0.081</b>	<b>-0.359</b>	0.012	*	-0.058	<b>0.160</b>	-0.063	<b>0.166</b>	<b>0.111</b>
<i>T2</i>	-	<b>0.099</b>	<b>0.110</b>	<b>-0.236</b>	-0.044	*	-0.020	0.064	-0.016	<b>0.198</b>	<b>0.111</b>
<i>S1</i>	<b>0.214</b>	0.052	<b>0.143</b>	*	0.016	*	<i>0.045</i>	<b>0.195</b>	<i>0.111</i>	<b>0.264</b>	<b>0.098</b>
<i>S2</i>	-	0.021	<b>0.276</b>	*	<i>0.064</i>	*	<b>0.094</b>	<b>0.212</b>	0.015	<b>0.412</b>	<b>0.119</b>
<i>E1</i>	-	<b>0.180</b>	<b>0.208</b>	<b>0.193</b>	*	*	<b>0.115</b>	<b>0.078</b>	*	<b>0.227</b>	0.019
<i>I2</i>	<b>0.317</b>	<i>0.042</i>	<b>0.223</b>	<b>0.239</b>	0.008	0.034	<b>0.120</b>	<b>0.183</b>	*	<b>0.192</b>	*

Entries are Kendall's tau-c coefficients. Italicized coefficients are significant at level  $p < 0.05$ . Bold coefficients are significant at level  $p < 0.001$ . \* Tau coefficient is impossible to calculate because there is no party disagreement on this strategy.

A perhaps more important observation is that the congruence between voters and parties appears to be large in seven of the countries under study, but much weaker in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden. In the latter two cases, and on the issue of targeted programs in Germany, this can easily be explained by the relatively marginal extent of party disagreement (see Appendix Table A1). The other findings for Germany and the results for Belgium are more surprising, however.

Upon closer inspection, the lack of congruence in Belgium seems to be caused mostly by the Walloon *Parti Socialiste*. In its party manifesto, it says nothing about immigrant welfare dependence and explicitly laments that admission policy in Belgium is too much based on "essentially economic criteria" (2010, p. 119). Its voters, however, take a very different position, agreeing in large numbers that immigrants strain the welfare system and expressing much support for selective admission policies (on the ESS question, only supporters of anti-immigrant party *Vlaams Belang* express more support for this measure). We encounter a similar mismatch in Germany, albeit in the opposite direction. Those who vote for the FDP and the green party appear to be least supportive of selective admission policies, but these parties do advocate such policy changes in their manifestoes.

Despite these anomalies, overall we find much congruence between the views of parties and their voters. At least in this respect, then, there is little evidence of a

disconnect between immigration stances of political parties and the public at large. Next, we explore the degree of voter-party congruence on the country level. In other words, we now turn our attention to the question whether citizens in a country where many parties favour a certain policy response are more likely to favour that response as well. Figure 5 shows the relationships between party positions (as reported in Figure 2) and survey responses (as reported in Figures 4 and A2) for four of the survey questions (the results for the other three questions are reported in Appendix Figure A3).




FIGURE 5

Relationship between party positions (x-axis) and citizen attitudes (y-axis) on immigration and welfare

Again, because of the small number of independent cases our conclusions are necessarily qualified. However, it seems safe to say that in this analysis the relationship between the views of political parties and the public at large appears much weaker. To start with the general subject of the tension between immigration and welfare, the most noteworthy is the position of Germany and Ireland (the two cases in the upper-left corner in panel A). In fact, this analysis suggests that arguments about a conspiracy of silence might still have some truth to them for as far as these two countries are concerned. After all, parties are virtually silent on the subject, whereas many citizens

seem worried about the consequences of immigration for the welfare state. The connection between voters and parties seems somewhat stronger for the other countries (when we exclude Germany and Ireland, the correlation coefficient rises to 0.59; in the analysis using the ESS question as illustrated in Figure A3, panel A, the correlation is -0.36 with all cases, and 0.68 when Ireland and Germany are excluded).

Turning our attention to views on selective admission policies, Ireland again appears as a case where parties are out of touch with voters. None of the Irish parties propose to make admission policies more selective, while voters appear among the most supportive of that strategy in the sample under study. For the other countries under study, there is more indication of party-voter congruence.<sup>19</sup> While it is true that in panel B Switzerland appears as an outlier as well (with parties appearing more interested in restrictive admission policies than voters), it does not when we use the probably more valid indicator from the ESS (see Figure A3, panel B).

In panel C, it is the position of Switzerland on the bottom-right that attracts most attention (excluding this case raises the correlation coefficient to 0.55). While parties in Switzerland are the most prone in our sample to favour limiting immigrants' access to social benefits and services, survey respondents from that country appear least likely to support that approach. This finding supports arguments about a lack of congruence between voters and parties, but not in the way those arguments are usually presented. It suggests that from a comparative perspective, parties in Switzerland advocate *too much* welfare exclusion.

Finally, in panel D (and similarly in panel C in Figure A3), we see so little evidence of a positive association that we cannot even speak of one or two interesting cases. It is true that the survey questions used in this analysis are not ideal. Nevertheless, it is still striking that there appears no relationship whatsoever between parties' views on immigrant-targeted programs and voters' opinions on labour market regulations aimed at ensuring equal opportunities between native-born citizens and immigrants.

All in all, this section reaches a two-sided conclusion regarding the relationship between parties and voters on the subject of immigration and welfare. On the one hand, voters seem well able to pick out the party that is closest to them – at any rate, people who vote for a party that favours a certain response to immigrant welfare dependence are more likely to favour that response than those who vote for other parties. On the other hand, however, cross-country variation in the views of parties seems more weakly related to variation in the views of the public from one country to another. In other words, exactly what the public in a country thinks about the tension between immigration and welfare seems of limited consequence to what parties say about it in their manifestoes.

## Conclusion

The connection between immigration and welfare is the subject of a growing body of academic literature. Many of the early contributions have investigated the worst case scenario that immigration would ultimately make redistributive welfare systems

decline or even disappear. We now know that this scenario is unlikely. This paper, therefore, turns the attention to three more plausible policy responses - selective admission policies, exclusive welfare policies, and expansive integration services - and more specifically, to what parties and voters in North West Europe think of them.

One of the main conclusions is that there is much disagreement on this issue. Predictably, voters and parties to the right of the political spectrum tend to favour more exclusionary strategies than their counterparts on the left. But party stripe only offers a partial explanation. For example, in the United Kingdom the Labour Party favours limiting immigrants' access to benefits, while in Sweden not even anti-immigrant party Sweden Democrats expresses warm support for that strategy. More generally, it appears that in universal welfare states there is less support for selective admission and more belief in the use of immigrant-targeted programs. In systems where an anti-immigrant party plays a large role, conversely, suggestions for the exclusion of migrants from welfare benefits seem more popular. All in all, the policy dilemma of how to organize a welfare system in an era of immigration has spurred very different reactions in different political communities. In other words, contrary to what politicians might suggest, there is nothing inevitable about any of these approaches. For example, anti-immigrant politicians might frame the exclusion of immigrants from welfare benefits as a necessary evil (Bosma, 2010, p. 206), but it is clear that such 'evils' are considered quite unnecessary in some of the countries under study.

The second conclusion regards the relationship between the position of parties and voters on this subject. Many authors, both inside and outside academia, have noted that the political elite has historically thought much more favourably about immigration than the public at large. This paper does not directly compare the views of politicians and voters in the way some have been able to through a focused comparison of parliamentary and public surveys (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013), but it still adds three interesting observations to discussions about this relationship. First, there is little evidence that parties are silent about immigrant welfare dependence - more than 60 percent of the parties under investigation explicitly mention it, and this is not limited to parties of the right (8 of the 11 social democratic parties, for example, acknowledge that immigrants tend to be overrepresented among benefit recipients). Second, overall there seems to be much congruence between the views of parties and the voters they attract on the appropriate response to immigrant welfare dependence: in general, respondents voting for parties favouring a certain policy response tend to think more favourably about that response than those who vote for other parties. Third, from a comparative perspective the evidence for party-voter congruence is much weaker. But this does not necessarily confirm suspicions of a conspiracy of silence. We do indeed find that in some countries survey respondents appear comparatively supportive of restrictive policy changes while parties indicate little interest in pursuing them. On the other hand, however, there are also examples of incongruence in the opposite direction, where parties favour more restrictions than what survey responses seem to warrant.

Certainly, many questions remain. For one thing, studying exactly why different countries have adopted such different approaches to tackle immigrant welfare

dependence is worthy of more investigation than the exploratory tests in this paper. An equally important question is how we should evaluate each of these three strategies from a normative point of view. Some of the restrictive suggestions that can be heard in political discourse today, such as denying social assistance to migrants who have legally been in the country for a long period of time or refusing immigrants access to benefits they have paid premiums for, clearly violate some of the most basic principles of justice. On the other hand, the case of Sweden, which employs perhaps the most inclusionary approach of all countries under study but is simultaneously faced with the highest levels of immigrant welfare dependence, suggests that some restrictive changes might be recommendable. Such questions are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, it mostly aims to encourage this subfield of comparative politics to go beyond the by now common investigations of whether immigration leads to the erosion of the welfare state, and instead turn the attention to the three main approaches to reconciling migration and welfare we encounter today.

Word count: 8,637

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted, however, that the degree of this overrepresentation differs considerably from one country to another. For example, according to 2000 data from the Luxembourg Income Study, immigrants receive on average 8 percent more social assistance than native-born citizens in Ireland, while the difference is as large as 840 percent in Sweden (Koning, 2013).

<sup>2</sup> One might argue that Putnam's 'constrict-theory', predicting that diversity makes people less trusting not only of out-groups, but of members of their in-groups as well, would in fact be in line with such a prediction (Putnam, 2007). Putnam, however, theorizes mostly about diversity's effect on social trust and social capital, and those effects do not necessarily translate in a decrease in support for social programs. Besides, his findings have not been replicated in studies outside the United States (Banting, 2008; Gesthuizen, Van der Meer, & Scheepers, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> In countries with a bicameral parliament, I focus on the percentage of seats obtained in the Lower House only.

<sup>4</sup> All translations in this paper are mine.

<sup>5</sup> Party documents are not included in the bibliography - documentation can be found in Appendix Table A1.

<sup>6</sup> In fairness to the party, the Danish *Åbne graenser, lukkede kasser* sounds considerably catchier.

<sup>7</sup> The Belgian *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* is probably the most problematic party in this regard. Labelling itself as 'humanitarian nationalist' and combining anti-establishment populism, separatism, and economic liberalism, it fits none of the categories perfectly.

<sup>8</sup> Parties that express 'some' support have been coded as half opposed and half in favour.

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<sup>9</sup> One might object that the cross-country differences in Figure 2 instead reflect that this challenge is *not* the same for each country under study. At first glance, however, this does not appear to be the case. First, there is no clear relationship between the party positions and the size of the immigrant population: the percentage of foreign-born as a share of the population according to 2008 data from the OECD International Migration Database is uncorrelated with the weighted percentage of parties that mention the tension between migration and welfare, as well as with the weighted percentage of support for each of the three strategies (these results are not shown, but can be made available upon request). Second, it also does not seem to be the case that exclusionary strategies are more popular where immigrants are more overrepresented among welfare recipients. Using 2000 data from the Luxembourg Income Study and expressing the amount of social assistance an average immigrant receives as a percentage of the amount an average native-born receives, if anything it seems that parties are less likely to propose selective admission policies and more likely to propose targeted programs where immigrants objectively lay the largest claim on social assistance (again, results can be made available upon request).

<sup>10</sup> More specifically, 53.1 percent of the 32 parties in a system with a large anti-immigrant party mention the tension between immigration and welfare, compared to 45.5 percent of the 22 parties that are not faced with such a party ( $p = 0.575$ , two-tailed z-test). The comparisons are 57.8 percent versus 40.9 percent for 'selective admission' ( $p = 0.215$ ), 34.4 percent versus 15.9 percent for 'exclusive welfare' ( $p = 0.107$ ), and 68.8 percent versus 61.4 percent for 'targeted programs' ( $p = 0.575$ ), respectively.

<sup>11</sup> Excluding foreign-born individuals would be preferable, but the Eurobarometer does not include a question on country of birth. Fortunately, for the EVS and ESS data the differences between the response patterns of native-born and citizens are small, and very similar in size from one country to another (these findings are not shown, but can be made available upon request).

<sup>12</sup> As a result, a respondent's disagreement with these statements might reflect an objection to the wording rather than an actual disagreement that immigrants are overrepresented among welfare recipients or that uncontrolled migration can pose challenges for the welfare state.

<sup>13</sup> There are a few other questions one might consider, in particular: 'Is immigration good or bad for the economy?' (ESS) as an indicator of the immigration-welfare tension; 'Do you agree or disagree that there are too many immigrants' (EVS) as an indicator of support for selective admission policies; 'Should immigrants have prioritised access to social assistance?' and 'Should immigrants have prioritised access to social housing' from EB 72.1 (2009) as an indicator of support for exclusive welfare; and 'Do you think that anti-discrimination legislation is effective at fighting poverty' (EB 72.1), 'What do you think of monitoring workforce composition in order to ensure equal representation on the basis of ethnic origin' (EB69.1), and 'What do you think of monitoring recruitment procedures in order to ensure equal opportunities on the labour market?'

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(EB 69.1) as indicators of support for targeted programs. All these questions, however, seem less valid than the seven I analyze here.

<sup>14</sup> The exact questions were as follows: 'If there was a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?' (EVS); and 'Which party did you vote for in the last [country] election in [month/year]?' (ESS).

<sup>15</sup> Respondents who mentioned a party that was not coded in the party analysis were excluded from this analysis. Swedish anti-immigrant party *Sverigedemokraterna* was missing because at the time of the survey (2008) it was not represented in parliament yet. In the ESS, Belgian parties CD&V and NVA were lumped together under one category, and it was therefore impossible to distinguish between the two. Since at the time of the survey the CD&V was decidedly larger (the NVA participated in the 2007 elections as the smaller member of a coalition with the Christian Democrats, the so-called Valentine's Cartel), I treated respondents with this code as CD&V supporters and treated the NVA as missing. Fortunately, the differences between the parties are not large: they differ in their party family, and only marginally in their position on exclusive welfare.

<sup>16</sup> It is true that anti-immigrant parties appeared most prone to mention the tension (only the Austrian BZÖ does not make any reference to immigrant welfare dependence or the effect of immigration on social benefits and services in its manifesto), but besides that there is no evidence of the left-right dynamics we see in Figure 3, panel A, and Figure A1, panel A. The percentage of parties noting the immigration-welfare connection are 46.2 for green and socialist parties, 72.7 for social democratic parties, 42.9 for social liberal parties, 44.4 for Christian democratic parties, 69.2 for conservative liberal parties, and 87.5 percent for anti-immigrant parties.

<sup>17</sup> As in the party analysis, a cursory investigation does not suggest that these cross-country differences are meaningfully related to either the size of the immigrant population or the extent of immigrant welfare dependence. The relationships between the indicators mentioned in note 9 and the survey responses tend to be either very weak or to point in the opposite direction from what one might expect (results available upon request).

<sup>18</sup> For example, in the German case, socialist party *Die Linke* and the environmentalist *Grünen* do mention that newcomers in Germany rely on social assistance to a large extent in their party manifestoes, but do so mostly to illustrate immigrants' vulnerable position in the labour market. It is unsurprising, then, that voters for these parties do not indicate much agreement with the statements that immigrants 'strain' the welfare system or receive more than they contribute.

<sup>19</sup> When Ireland is excluded the correlation coefficient increases to 0.45 in the analysis of the EVS question, and to 0.83 in the analysis of the ESS question.

## Appendix

TABLE A1

Positions on immigration-welfare tension, 61 North West European parties.

Party	Party family	% seats <sup>#</sup>	Document(s) consulted	Tension mentioned?	Selective admission?	Exclusive welfare?	Targeted services?
<i>Austria</i>							
SPÖ	Social dem.	31.1	<i>Wahlmanifest</i> (2008)	+ p.32	+ pp.7,33	- <i>n/m</i>	+ p.32
ÖVP	Christian dem.	27.9	<i>Neustart für Österreich</i> (2008)	+ p.19	+ pp.5,19	- <i>n/m</i>	- p.20
FPÖ	Anti-immigrant	18.6	<i>Öst. im Wort</i> (2008), <i>Öst. zuerst</i> (2011) <sup>^</sup>	+ p.4oi	+ p.5oz	+ p.3oi	- pp.3-4oi
BZÖ	Anti-immigrant	11.5	<i>Deinetwegen. Österreich</i> (2008)	- <i>n/m</i>	+ p.10	+ p.10	- <i>n/m</i>
Grüne	Green	10.9	<i>Neu beginnen...</i> (2008)	- <i>n/m</i>	± p.17	- p.9	+ p.17
<i>Belgium</i>							
NVA	Conserv. lib.	18.0	<i>Nu durven veranderen</i> (2010)	+ p.18	+ p.56	+ pp.55,57	+ p.23
PS	Socialist	17.3	<i>Un pays stable...</i> (2010)	- <i>n/m</i>	- p.119	- pp.120,121	+ p.116
CD&V	Christian dem.	11.3	<i>De dialoog. Onze welvaart...</i> (2010)	+ p.53	+ p.54	± pp.53-54	+ p.54,55
MR	Conserv. lib.	12.0	<i>La garantie du respect</i> (2010)	+ p.285	+ p.287-8,292	± p.289	+ 156-7,255,293
SPA	Social dem.	8.7	<i>We moeten weer vooruit</i> (2010), site	+ p.33	+ p.33	- <i>n/m</i>	± site
VLD	Social liberal	8.7	<i>Een nieuwe start</i> (2010)	+ p.21	+ p.58	+ p.60	- p.60
VB	Anti-immigrant	8.0	<i>Vlamingen eerst</i> (2010)	+ p.21	+ p.22	+ p.24	- pp.26-27
CDH	Christian dem.	6.0	<i>Un pacte pour sortir...</i> (2010)	+ p.28	- pp.172-175	- pp.175-6,178	+ pp.28-29
ECOLO	Green	5.3	<i>Des solutions durables</i> (2010)	- <i>n/m</i>	- pp.218-226	- pp.220,223	+ pp.221,223
<i>Denmark</i>							
V	Conserv. lib.	26.3	<i>Fremted i frihed...</i> (2006)*, site	+ p.10	+ p.10, site	+ site	- <i>n/m</i>
S	Social dem.	24.6	Site, <i>Integration</i>	+ site	± site	- site	+ site
DF	Anti-immigrant	12.3	<i>Arbejdspr.</i> (2011), site, <i>Udlændingepolitik</i>	+ site	+ sect.5	+ sect.5, site	- sect.5, site
RV	Social liberal	9.5	Site, <i>Socialpolitik &amp; Udlændinge</i>	- <i>n/m</i>	- site	± site	+ site
SF	Green	8.9	<i>Ny integration-plats til alle der vil</i> (2010)*	+ p.2	± p.4	- p.5,6	+ pp. 3-4,5
EL	Socialist	6.7	Site, <i>Udlændinge och integration</i>	- <i>n/m</i>	- site	- site	+ site
LA	Conserv. lib.	5.0	<i>Åbne grænser...</i> (n.d.)*, site, <i>Invandrere...</i>	+ p.1	± site	+ p.1	- <i>n/m</i>
<i>France</i>							
PS	Social dem.	48.5	<i>Le changement</i> (2012)	+ p.12	+ p.21	- <i>n/m</i>	+ p.12,22
UMP	Conserv. lib.	33.6	Site, <i>Chomage – Emploi &amp; Immigration</i>	- <i>n/m</i>	+ site	+ site	- <i>n/m</i>
<i>Germany</i>							
CDU	Christian dem.	38.4	<i>Wir haben die Kraft...</i> (2009)	- <i>n/m</i>	+ pp.30,48,51	- <i>n/m</i>	± pp.49,51
SPD	Social dem.	23.4	<i>Sozial und Demokratisch...</i> (2009)	- <i>n/m</i>	- pp.60-61	- <i>n/m</i>	+ pp.14,60-61
FDP	Conserv. lib.	15.0	<i>Die Mitte stärken...</i> (2009)	- <i>n/m</i>	+ p. 37	- <i>n/m</i>	+ p.37
Linke	Socialist	12.2	<i>Konsequent sozial...</i> (2009)	+ p.28	- p.27	- p.28	+ p.28
Grüne	Green	10.9	<i>Der grüne neue...</i> (2009)	+ pp.46,81	+ p.39	- p.62	+ pp.143-144
<i>Ireland</i>							
FG	Christian dem	45.8	<i>Let's get Ireland working</i> (2011)	- <i>n/m</i>	- p.69	- <i>n/m</i>	- <i>n/m</i>
LAB	Social dem.	22.3	<i>One Ireland. Jobs, Reform...</i> (2011)	- <i>n/m</i>	- p.55,58	- <i>n/m</i>	+ p.58



FF	Conserv. lib.	11.4	<i>Real plan. Better future</i> (2011)	-	n/m	-	p.21	-	n/m	-	n/m
SF	Socialist	8.4	<i>There is a better way</i> (2011)	-	n/m	-	p.36	-	p.22	-	n/m
<i>Netherlands</i>											
VVD	Conserv. lib.	27.3	<i>Niet doorschuiven maar...</i> (2012)	+	p.51	+	p.51-53	+	p.49	-	p.49
PvdA	Social dem.	25.3	<i>Nederland sterker &amp; socialer</i> (2012)	+	p.32	+	pp.33,34	-	p.32	+	p.33
PVV	Anti-immigrant	10.0	<i>Hun Brussel. Ons Nederland</i> (2012)	+	p.22	+	pp.25,33-7	+	p.25,37	-	p.25
SP	Socialist	10.0	<i>Nieuw vertrouwen</i> (2012)	+	p.13	±	pp.13,14	-	pp.14,15	+	pp.13,14
CDA	Christian dem.	8.7	<i>Iedereen</i> (2012)	-	n/m	+	pp.17,22	+	p.22	-	p.22
D66	Social liberal	8.0	<i>En nu vooruit</i> (2012)	-	n/m	-	pp.53-54	-	p.54	-	n/m
<i>Norway</i>											
DNA	Social dem.	37.9	<i>Skape og dele</i> (2009)	-	n/m	-	p.66	-	p.5	+	pp.12,13,15
FRP	Anti-immigrant	24.3	<i>For nyer Norge</i> (2009)	+	p.32	+	pp.32,33	+	p.32	-	pp.32,33
H	Conserv. lib.	17.8	<i>Muligheter for alle. Høyres...</i> (2009)	+	p.52	+	p.21,57	-	n/m	+	p.53
SV	Socialist	6.5	<i>Del godene. Arbeidsprogram</i> (2009)	+	pp.27,95	-	pp.27,31,127	-	p.95	+	pp.10,65
SP	Social liberal	6.5	<i>Senterpartiets prinsipp- og ....</i> (2009)	+	p.63	+	pp.62-63	-	pp.60,69	+	p.61
KRF	Christian dem.	5.9	<i>Politisk program 2009-2013</i> (2009)	+	p.51	-	pp.51-52	±	p.52	+	p.52
<i>Sweden</i>											
S	Social dem.	32.1	<i>Site, Vår politik A till Ö</i>	+	site	±	site	-	site	+	site
M	Conserv. lib.	30.7	<i>Vår tids arbetarparti</i> (2007)*	-	n/m	-	pp.38,91	-	n/m	+	p.38-9
MP	Green	7.2	<i>Öppna fler dörrar till Sverige</i> (2012)*	-	n/m	-	p.1	-	p.2	+	p.2-3
FP	Conserv. lib.	6.9	<i>Egenmakt för ett öppet samhälle</i> (2007)*	+	pp.3,24	-	pp.3-4	-	pp.11-2,19	+	pp.14-7,22-9
C	Social liberal	6.6	<i>Framtiden tillhör dem som vågar</i> (2010)	+	p.3	-	p.5	-	n/m	+	pp.3,6,8
SD	Anti-immigrant	5.7	<i>Invandringspolitiskt program</i> (2007)*	+	pp.1,2	+	pp.2-3,4-5	±	p.4	-	n/m
V	Socialist	5.4	<i>Site, Politik A-Ö</i>	+	site	-	site	-	site	+	site
KD	Christian dem.	5.4	<i>13 Steg och 89 vallöften för ett...</i> (2010)	-	n/m	-	p.6	-	n/m	+	p.6
<i>Switzerland</i>											
SVP	Anti-immigrant	27.0	<i>Schweizer wählen SVP</i> (2011)	+	pp.5,7	+	pp.2,4	+	p.4	-	p.7
SP	Social dem.	23.0	<i>Für ein umfassende und ...</i> (2012)*	+	pp.7,15	-	pp.iv,15-6	-	p.29	+	p.19-20
FDP	Conserv. lib.	15.0	<i>Einwanderung gezielt steuern...</i> (2011)*	+	p.1	+	pp.1,3,5	+	pp.2,3	-	p.4
CVP	Christian dem	14.0	<i>Leitlinien Migrationspolitik</i> (2010)*	+	pp.5,6-7	+	pp.13,16-7	+	p.14	-	p.15
GPS	Green	7.5	<i>Echt grün. Echt stark</i> (2011)	-	n/m	-	p.14	-	pp.13,14	+	p.14
GLP	Social liberal	6.0	<i>Leitlinien</i> (2007)*	-	n/m	+	p.3	-	n/m	+	p.3
<i>United Kingdom</i>											
CON	Conserv. lib.	47.2	<i>Invitation to join...</i> (2010), <i>site, Immigration</i>	+	site	+	pp.21,57	-	n/m	-	n/m
LAB	Social dem.	39.7	<i>A future fair for all</i> (2010)	+	pp.5:2,6	+	p.5:6	+	pp.5:2,6	-	n/m
LD	Social liberal	8.8	<i>Change that works for you</i> (2010)	-	n/m	±	pp.75-7	-	n/m	-	n/m

Only parties with more than 5 percent of the seats in parliament are included in this overview. The classifications in this scheme are based primarily on each party's most recent election manifesto as of May 2013. In some cases, these manifestoes did not include a meaningful section on issues of immigration and integration. In those cases, I referred to party documents on the subject (indicated by \*). If those were not available, I relied on the information provided on official party websites. The party websites referred to in this table are, in order of appearance, [www.s-p-a.be](http://www.s-p-a.be), [www.venstre.dk](http://www.venstre.dk), [www.dansksfolkeparti.dk](http://www.dansksfolkeparti.dk), [www.radikale.dk](http://www.radikale.dk), [www.enhedslisten.dk](http://www.enhedslisten.dk), [www.liberalalliance.dk](http://www.liberalalliance.dk), [www.u-m-p.org](http://www.u-m-p.org), [www.socialdemokraterna.se](http://www.socialdemokraterna.se), [www.vansterpartiet.se](http://www.vansterpartiet.se), and [www.conservatives.com](http://www.conservatives.com).

# In bicameral systems, the percentage refers to the percentage of seats in the lower house of parliament only. ^ In case of the Austrian FPÖ, I relied on two party documents. The page numbers indicated with *oi* refer to election program *Österreich im Wort* (2008); those with *oz* to party program *Österreich zuerst* (2011).

TABLE A2

Average variation ratios of party positions, by party family and by country.

	<i>Tension mentioned</i>	<i>Selective admission</i>	<i>Exclusive welfare</i>	<i>Targeted programs</i>
<i>By party family</i>	0.340	0.310	0.200	0.267
<i>By country</i>	0.320	0.252	0.317	0.280

TABLE A3

Survey questions on three alternative strategies, complete question wording and descriptive statistics (citizen respondents only)

<i>Question</i>		<i>Survey N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.d.</i>
<i>Perception of tension</i>				
(T1) 'Where you would place your views on this scale? Immigrants are not a strain on a country's welfare system (1) VS. Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system (10)*'	EVS 2008	14,645	6.94	2.543
(T2) 'A lot of people who come to live in [country] from other countries pay taxes and make use of social benefits and services. On balance, do you think people who come to live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive?' (0 contribute much more than they receive, 10 receive much more than they contribute)*	ESS IV (2008)	17,340	5.88	2.022
<i>Selective admission</i>				
(S1) 'How about people from less developed countries coming here to work? Which one of the following do you think the government should do?' (1 let anyone come who wants to, 2 let people come as long as there are jobs available, 3 put strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here, 4 prohibit people coming here from other countries)	EVS 2008	14,552	2.54	0.686
(S2) 'How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?' (1 allow many to come and live here, 4 allow none)	ESS IV (2008)	17,908	2.40	0.849
<i>Exclusive welfare</i>				
(E1) 'Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?' (1 immediately on arrival, 2 after living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked, 3 only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year, 4 once they become a [country] citizen, 5 they should never get the same rights)	ESS IV (2008)	17,771	3.11	0.997
<i>Targeted programs</i>				
(I1) 'What do you think of measures to ensure equal opportunities in the labour market on the basis of ethnic origin?' (1 totally opposed, 4 totally in favour)*	EB69.1 (2008)	9,215	2.96	0.976
(I2) 'To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of immigrants in [country]?' (1 not at all, 5 very much)*	EVS 2008	14,823	2.78	1.039

\* Recoded to allow for easy and intuitive comparability.

TABLE A4

Individual-level association between survey questions

	<i>EVS 2008</i>			<i>ESS IV (2008)</i>			
	<i>T1</i>	<i>S1</i>	<i>I2</i>	<i>T2</i>	<i>S2</i>	<i>E1</i>	
<i>T1</i>	1	0.46 *	-0.34 *	<i>T2</i>	1	0.36 *	0.26 *
<i>S1</i>	0.46 *	1	-0.42 *	<i>S2</i>	0.36 *	1	0.36 *
<i>I2</i>	-0.34 *	-0.42 *	1	<i>E1</i>	0.26 *	0.36 *	1

Entries are Pearson's R coefficients. \* Significant at level  $p < 0.1$ . \*\* Significant at level  $p < 0.05$ .

TABLE A5

Country-level correlations between seven survey questions

	<i>T1</i>	<i>T2</i>	<i>S1</i>	<i>S2</i>	<i>E1</i>	<i>I1</i>	<i>I2</i>
<i>T1</i>	1	0.75 **	0.18	0.36	-0.10	0.13	-0.22
<i>T2</i>	0.75 **	1	0.72 **	0.36	0.27	0.39	-0.59 *
<i>S1</i>	0.18	0.72 **	1	0.40	0.60 *	0.21	-0.46
<i>S2</i>	0.36	0.36	0.40	1	0.16	0.28	0.01
<i>E1</i>	-0.10	0.27	0.60 *	0.16	1	-0.39	-0.56
<i>I1</i>	0.13	0.39	0.21	0.28	-0.39	1	0.17
<i>I2</i>	-0.22	-0.59 *	-0.46	0.01	-0.56 *	0.17	1

Entries are Pearson's R coefficients. \* Significant at level  $p < 0.1$ . \*\* Significant at level  $p < 0.05$ .

FIGURE A1

Appendix to Figure 3: citizen attitudes on immigration and welfare, by party family respondent (intends to) vote(d) for (point estimates with 95% confidence intervals)




FIGURE A2

Appendix to Figure 4: citizen attitudes on immigration and welfare, by country (point estimates with 95% confidence intervals)





FIGURE A3

Appendix to Figure 5: Relationship between party positions (x-axis) and citizen attitudes (y-axis) on immigration and welfare



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