

Governance Reform in Japanese Local Governments

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Introduction

Japanese local governments have experienced many reforms since the late '90s, and among these are reforms that encourage citizen involvement in the administrative process. In this paper, I focus on such efforts for the institutionalization of citizen involvement and analyze why Japanese local governments adopted the reforms. Specifically, I make an index of institutionalization of participation with the administrative reform survey by Nikkei Inc. and use Item Response Theory (IRT) to summarize the answers. Then, I statistically analyze the determinants of the degree of institutionalization.

The paper proceeds as follows: In the first section, I explain governance reform in the world and its implications in Japanese public administration; in the second section, I briefly describe the history of public administration reforms at the local level in Japan; in the third section, I present the model of public administration reform and introduce the dataset; and in the fourth section, I present and interpret the results of statistical analysis. In conclusion, I summarize the findings from the statistical analysis and give the current conclusion on the reform efforts in Japanese local governments.

1. Public Governance Reform and the Expansion of Participation

New Public Management (NPM) has been the core idea of public organization reform for the last two decades. Although the main approach in public organizational reform has been changing (O'Flynn, 2007; Dunleavy, Margetts, Simon & Tinkler, 2007), it is still important to analyze public organization reform. During the movement, the citizen participation in the administrative process and the cooperation with local governments has been expanded. In this section, I review the expansion of such involvement as the realization of the idea of NPM and other recent movements of public administration reform.

1.1 Participation in the Era of Reform

More than 20 years have passed since the idea of NPM appeared. Until the 1990s, the research on NPM focused on theoretical or philosophical understandings of the practical NPM movement and criticism against it (Hood & Peters, 2004). Then, theoretical understandings of the researcher were summarized in textbooks and had tremendous impact on the practitioners as guidebooks for reinventing public administration organization (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) .

Many scholars explore the components of NPM theoretically and empirically (Hood, 1991; Falie et al., 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). Various policy targets have been presented, and each researcher emphasizes slightly different points. Theoretically, NPM consists of several general guidelines which claim to be effective at reforming old-fashioned bureaucratic organizations.

In general, NPM reform promotes market-style competition within organizations; however, empowerment and partnership are two core ideas of NPM too (Peters & Wright, 1996). Actually, it is widely known that many local governments in the world have tried to encourage citizen participation in various ways (Falie et al. 1996; Callanan, 2005). Overall, NPM reforms encouraged citizen involvement in public policy process. In addition, along with NPM, citizen involvement in government activity is also strongly recommended in newer theories such as the public value approach (Stoker, 2006; O'Flynn 2007).

1.2 Microlevel Analysis of NPM Reform

In addition to exploring the theoretical components of reforms, many papers empirically analyze the reform of organizations and its determinants. For example, Brudney, Hebert, and Wright (1999) wrote the famous paper analyzing the reinvention of reforms at the state level. Other famous papers analyzing the reform of public organization include a series of

papers by Walker analyzing the determinants of organization reform (Walker, 2006, 2008). Moon and deLeon (2001) investigated reinvention at the municipal government level. Their statistical analysis shows that the political/managerial values of the chief manager as well as socioeconomic and institutional factors all affect the level of invention. Although many papers tried to reveal the progress of the reforms, scholars still do not seem to agree on the factors that encourage public administration reforms.

2. Japanese Local Governments

Japanese local governments have also experienced many reforms since the late '90s. In this section, I give a brief explanation of the history of Japanese governance reforms at the city level and its current situation. I first explain institutional aspects of Japanese local governments, followed by a short review of the history of Japanese local government reforms in its organizations, focusing especially on the expansion of citizen participation in the administrative process.

2.1 Regal Institutions

In this subsection, I explain the legal institutional aspects of Japanese local governments. Japan has a two-tiered system with prefectures serving a wider region, and the primary local governments are within the prefecture. A city is a form of the primary local government and has the mayor-council government system.

Within a city, it is usually said that a mayor has more power than a council, as a mayor is supported by bureaucrats and has more legal authority than a council. It is also said that the central government checks the activities of local governments in detail and has strong influence on local governments as a result. In addition, cities don't have full authority to decide their revenues and tax rates. Therefore, scholars argue that the level of autonomy of

Japanese local governments is generally low. Regarding the organizational aspects of cities, there is no legal restriction on their organizational form, while the Local Autonomy Act restricted the organizational form of Prefectures (Inatsugu, 2006; Ito, 2009).

2.2 Brief History of Organizational Reform in Japanese Local Governments

The history of local government reform is not long. Kanai (2010) reported that the public administration reform in Japanese local governments started in the 1980s, inspired by national-level administrative reform such as the privatization of three public corporations. Aspects of reform such as outsourcing and reduction of cost appeared already in the 1980s and are still important today. On the other hand, some important reform topics such as empowerment and disclosure of public information had not appeared yet. Some pioneering local governments began enacting the Information-Disclosure Ordinance in the 1980s, but the movement was not widely diffused at that time (Harada, 2001; Ito, 2002).

The movement of public administration reform expanded with the promotion of decentralization; however, because of the economic boom and the rapid increase of tax revenue by the bubble economy, this administrative reform moment slowed down (Kanai, 2010). The bubble economy not only affected the practice of public administration reform in local governments, but also academic works by scholars and national government at that time. By the early 1990s, the NPM movement had become a major topic of academic interest in the world, but Japanese scholars failed to notice the importance of it (Muramatsu, 2011).

In the late 1990s, public organization reform once again became an important issue in local politics. It is said that the local government organization has experienced extensive change since then, and there are several reasons why administrative reform again became an important agenda and the target of political and academic interests.

First, the fiscal environment surrounding local governments has changed dramatically. In the late '90s, because of the rapid drop of revenue after the bubble economy and the huge public construction projects for the economic stimulation afterward, the fiscal balance of local governments rapidly worsened. Massive fiscal structural reform under the Koizumi government (what are called “trinity reforms”) worsened fiscal balances of local governments further, and the bankruptcy of the city of Yubari made the impression that administrative and fiscal reforms were urgent issues for many local governments. Under this situation, citizen came to demand the efficiency of governance in local governments. Another factor is that the national government introduced the idea of NPM reform for its own organizational reform under the Hashimoto government. Several textbooks were also written by Japanese economists (e.g., Ueyama, 1998), and Osborne and Gaebler’s 1992 book was also translated and widely read by practitioners and scholars. Finally, recent reform on the relationship between central and local governments and the progress of decentralization of power also encouraged local governments to reconsider their management system.

Because of the fiscal environmental change along with decentralization, “reformist” mayors appeared at the prefecture level. A few governors started reforming the public organization and procedures according to the NPM theory in the late 1990s. Masayasu Kitagawa, the governor of Mie prefecture from 1995–2003 and now the professor of public administration at Waseda University, had let bureaucrats of Mie prefecture study the public administration reform in New Zealand and tried to apply the methods to Mie prefecture. As Kitagawa became more and more famous, other prefectures and large cities also started reforming their organizations (Muramatsu, 2003). In addition, electoral competition based on manifestos has been desirable since the late 1990s, and mayors now make their manifesto before the election.

An administrative or vertical factor worked too. The Ministry of Home Affairs has advanced the administrative reform in local governments; since the late 1990s, it has requested local governments to publicly announce their administrative reform plans. For example, on its 1997 order, it requested local governments to reveal their plan to control the number of personnel. In 2005, it ordered local governments to make “the intensive reform plan,” which includes the administrative plan for the number of personnel and other reform plans and made it publicly accessible through the internet in order to facilitate competition among local governments (Omori, 2008).

The above factors are general aspects of administrative reform. Finally, horizontal diffusion is an important factor facilitating administrative reform. In the late 1990s, several reformist issues were originally started at the local level and later adopted by the national government. For example, Ito (2002, 2004) explained that some important policies such as the Information-Disclosure Ordinance were first fulfilled at the local level and later adopted by the national government, which then boosts its diffusion. Introduction of the information and communication technology (ICT) is another example of such diffusion. Since the late 90s, local governments have started introduction of ICT by themselves. However, after enacting the law in 2001 that aims the comprehensive introduction of information technology at the national level, ICT in local governments spread rapidly (Matsui, 2004; Morohashi, 2007). In summation, during the last decade, Japanese local governments have finally been involved in the worldwide wave of reform movements.

3. The Model of Participation Reform in Japan

As reviewed, Japanese local governments have experienced many reforms. In this paper, I explore in particular the institutionalization of citizen participation. Several reasons are commonly identified to explain the expansion of citizen participation in Japan. In this

section, I provide a schematic model of the expansion of participation in Japanese local public administration. Then, I explain my dataset and estimation schemes and the results of descriptive statistics.

3.1 A Schematic Model of Expansion of Participation in Japan

I here provide a model of reform. According to the diffusion of literature, we can classify the factors as internal and external ones (Berry and Berry, 1990; Daley and Garand, 2005; Karch, 2007). I begin by describing the internal process of policy adoption in Japanese local governments.

Demand, Benefit and Capacity Hypothesis

If a local government tries to expand participation, the reform should be beneficial in a broader sense. Specifically, there should be a fair amount of citizens who want to participate in the administrative process. Thus, it should also be beneficial to the mayor to allow them to enter into the administrative process. We can expect that the request for citizen participation is high when the population size is large; additionally, we may expect the number of voluntary groups and NPOs to affect the demand. Furthermore, if a large number of people have strong psychological attachments to the city, requests for participation will increase. In any case, the demand for participation is the start of the process of reform.

In addition, it is also necessary to have administrative capacity for managing the citizen participation. Generally speaking, large cities have such management capacity and resources. In Japan, some large cities such as government ordinance-designated cities and core cities have legal privilege to have more autonomy in their financial and administrative

capacities. They also have more personnel.

Another important resource is financial means. Financially restrictive cities are unable to start new projects; thus, it is difficult to manage citizen participation.

Mayors' Electoral Politics Hypothesis

If citizens' requests are strong and there are enough administrative and financial capacities, then mayors try to advance the project into political process. Thus, the political factors are the next interest. First, political values that mayors have affect the degree of the citizen participation. This policy orientation might be measured by the parties that support the mayor in elections. Another seemingly important determinant is electoral strength. If they are weak in election, mayors might try to get more votes by launching new projects. The administrative capacity of mayors is important too. Generally speaking, mayors who have already been serving for many terms are reluctant to launch a new project because they don't want to change the style of their governance. However, mayors serving their first term might find it difficult to start a new project by persuading councilors. Thus, their careers have an effect on the introduction of new projects and expansion of participation.

Council Veto Player Hypothesis

Finally, if a city council does not agree with the introduction of a new project, then mayors cannot introduce it; therefore, the political and factional composition of the city council is important. In addition, we must confirm the relationship between mayors' political values and those of the councilors. For example, traditionally, the citizen participation has been considered the left issue, and therefore, the combination of left mayors and councilors

might advance the institutionalization. Also, sometimes independent mayors face difficulty with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) majority council. Thus, the interaction between the mayor's partisan affiliation and the partisan composition of the council can have an important effect on the institutionalization of participation.

3.2 Empirical Dataset

In this subsection, I introduce the dataset that I use in this paper. In order to see the responses of local governments to NPM style reforms, I use two datasets collected by the Nikkei Inc. and Japan Center for Cities. The Nikkei Newspaper is the most famous business newspaper in Japan. It started the mailed survey on the administrative reform in local governments in 1998, and the biennial survey continued until 2008. As a business newspaper, the company has shown strong interest in the movement of the NPM reform. In the survey, they asked comprehensive reform-related questions.

The Japan Center for Cities was built in 1959 as a policy research center for cities. In the late '60s, it began a comprehensive mailed survey on local government organizations and has continued the survey about every ten years. Because the center has strong connection with mayors, the collection rate of the survey has been generally high. They conducted survey research about city management with mayors in 2007. I combine the data with the Nikkei Survey and investigate the relationship between the organizational reform and the mayors' political and administrative opinions.

4. Statistical Analysis on the Determinants of Citizen Participation

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

In this section, I first show the descriptive statistics on each item. There are several

methods that encourage the citizen involvement. Here I pick up eight methods which are widely used in Japan.

Public Information Disclosure (including Agencies)

Ombuds Person

Public Comments on Important Plans

Administrative Council by Open Recruitment from the Public

The Ordinance for Supporting NPOs

Management of Local Convention Facility by Citizen Organization

Citizen Satisfactory Survey

The Ordinance that assures comprehensive citizen participation

Public Information Disclosure is the most basic policy. Now all cities have related ordinances. Some are from ideas based on NPM. For example, citizen satisfactory survey is rooted in the customer oriented administration. On the other hand, the Ordinance for Supporting NPO is the network governance or new governance oriented.

[Table 1 and 2 are about here]

The progress of reform of participation until 2008 is shown in Table 1. Some reforms are widely accepted such as the “Open Recruitment of the Administrative Committee Members,” but others such as the “Ombuds-Person” are not.

The Nikkei Inc. continued to ask the five questions out of eight since 2002. The record of the answers is shown in Table 2. As shown in the table, these reforms have rapidly spread among Japanese local governments.

Correlations among these reforms are of interest too. It is interesting to know whether there are high correlations between reforms encouraging the citizen participation. The correlation coefficients among variables are shown in Table 3. Even these simple correlations illustrate some points.

[Table 3 is here]

First, correlations among reforms for citizen participation items do not seem high but acceptable considering some of these variables are dichotomous. This fact suggests that institutionalization of participation may be driven by certain common factors. However, simultaneously, there is also a variable showing almost no correlation: “Management of Local Convention Facility by Citizen Organization.” Some local governments started the management by voluntary citizen organization as the result of recent NPM reforms, while others have done so as part of their longstanding practices.

Second, some market-oriented reforms show relatively high correlation with the reforms encouraging citizen participation. For example, “Quantitative Measure on Policy Evaluation” and “Pay by Results Agreement with Private Company” both show fair correlation, while other market-oriented reforms do not have high correlation. In addition, correlations among market-oriented reforms are not high either. It seems that more complex factors affect the progress of market-oriented reforms. Opposition and resistance against the introduction of market-oriented reforms in administrative organizations are generally strong, while it seems much easier to introduce citizen participation-related reforms.

4.2 Making an Index with IRT

Next, I will create an index based on the eight items shown in Table 1. Although the

simple sum is used in the past research on the empirical analysis of NPM, I use Item Response Theory (IRT) to measure the index of participation here. IRT is a method widely used in educational research, and it is considered to create a more appropriate index rather than the simple sum.

[Table 4 and 5 are about here]

I use R and its package MIRT. The result of the indexation is shown in Table 4. Although all items are almost equally weighted, the “Management of Local Convention Facility by Citizen Organization” has by far the smallest coefficient. Thus, it does not have strong correlation with the underlying latent measure on the citizen participation. On the other hand, the participating factor shows fair correlation with market oriented reforms as shown in table 5. I use the measure and the statistical analysis to show what encourages the citizen participation in the next section.

4.3 Factors that Encourage Citizen Participation

Regional Model

[Table 6 is about here]

I begin with the analysis from the regional variables, which work as the proxy of diffusion. The result is shown in model 1 in Table 6. Cities in south Kanto, which includes Tokyo special district, show high average scores, while Tohoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu mark significantly low scores. It is probably because new policy movements are usually born in Tokyo or at least broadcast from Tokyo. It is also said that cities in western Japan do not

reform as much as cities in eastern Japan. If we just focus on Tokyo (eastern Japan) and Osaka (western Japan), we might consider the cities in the eastern part of Japan to advance the reforms more. However, cities in other part of eastern Japan such as Tohoku do not seem to advance the reforms. It seems more appropriate to consider that reforms are not developed in the country while it is developed in urban areas.

Demand, Benefit and Capacity Hypothesis

From here, I use regression analysis for investigating the effects of variables. I first explore the effects of benefit and ability hypothesis. As the proxy of administrative capability, I use two special cities, a population log, and the financial capacity index as independent variables.

Moreover, I also use three variables to represent the willingness of citizen participation. I use the average per-person tax amount as the proxy for the average income of residents in the city, the number of NPOs, and the ratio of working persons employed within the city. The financial capacity index and average per-person tax amounts are similar; the former directly measures the financial wealth of the city. Therefore, the financial capacity index is high if there is a nuclear power plant, Toyota motors factory, and so on. On the other hand, the average per-person tax amount is a measure of the wealth of citizen themselves.

The result is shown as model 2 and interesting because only the population log and average per-person tax amount are significant. The population log has very strong and consistent effects on the advancement of the citizen participation reforms. Urbanization produces the demand for the participation and may affect the ability of the city administration. The average per-person tax amount also shows stable effects, while the financial capacity index is insignificant. This means that the effect of affordance of a city's financial capacity is smaller than that of its citizens'.

Another interesting point is that none of the other variables show significant effects. For example, the number of NPOs and the ratio of in-city workers are not significant, probably because these variables are too specific to explain the comprehensive index of citizen participation. Contrary to our impression, government ordinance-designated cities and core cities do not have a higher average of participation either. Their index points are generally high, but are not among the highest group. It is probably because the large administrative organization cannot quickly respond to the demand.

Mayors' Electoral Politics Hypothesis

Next, I analyze the effects of the characteristics of mayors. I use a population log and per-person tax amount as control variables and input the mayor's political background, the electoral support by LDP, support by DPJ, and support by both LDP and DPJ. In addition, I include a dummy variable representing independent mayors in large cities because they usually advance the expansion of citizen participation as an important tool to politically fight with the council. In addition, I include the vote share, no vote election with no rival candidate, and the number of terms served and its square too.

The result of the statistical analysis is shown in model 3. The results show that the electoral background of mayors does not have any effect on the expansion of citizen participation. This result is impressive because the expansion of citizen participation is basically the left issue. I will return to this point later. In addition, generally speaking, electoral competitions in large cities are severer, and institutionalization of citizen participation in large cities is higher, but the electoral competition itself does not affect the degree of citizen participation.

In fact, terms of mayors do seem to affect the degree of institutionalization of participation. According to a descriptive statistics of which I don't provide the table here, a

local government whose mayor is serving a third term accepts the participation most widely. As stated before, the wave of public management reform was started in the late 1990s; therefore, the mayors first elected at that time probably started the public administration reform promptly. On the other hand, the mayors serving many terms may not feel the need for reform. Therefore, there may be a suitable number of terms on which mayors can easily advance the reforms.

Council Veto Player Hypothesis

The statistical result of the council veto hypothesis is in model 4. The partisan composition of city councils affects the degree of participation. The number of independent and LDP councilors have negative effects on increasing the level of participation. The number of LDP councilors has positive correlation with the size of the population, while the number of independents has negative correlation with the size of population. Generally speaking, independent councilors basically represent a specific region within a city and transfer the request to the executive branch. LDP politicians have their personal support group, Koenkai, and represent their requests. The traditional work of local politicians is to transfer such requests to the administrative branch. On the other hand, expanding the participation means that citizens' demands and requests functionally skip this traditional route, which deprive the traditional jobs from conservative politicians. This may cause the resistance of LDP and independent councilors.

Another interpretation is that the expansion of the citizen participation is basically a left issue, which means that the conservative politicians do not agree with the policy easily. Some policies consisting of the index of institutionalization of participation require the agreement of the local council. Although mayors have the right to offer proposals for new ordinances to the local council, they do not have any legal method to manipulate the vote.

Mayors' Political Values

The statistical analysis of model 5 and 6 in Table 6 simultaneously treats the electoral background of mayors and partisan configuration of councils. In this analysis, the number of LDP and independent councilors still has negative effects, but the characteristics of mayors do not. However, don't mayors encourage the participation? I will combine the survey research for mayors by the Japan Centers for Cities with the Nikkei data and investigate how the political value of mayors affects the allowance of citizen participation in the public administrative process. I use the answers to four questions concerning the reform orientation of mayors. Questionnaires of these four items are in the appendix.

Because the Japan Center for Cities' survey was conducted in Winter 2007 and the Nikkei Research was done in September 2008 and because the dates of these two mailed surveys have almost a one year difference, there is a question of whether the same mayors answered the surveys. I worked on confirmation of this, and the left column on Table 5 shows the result that I have confirmed the same mayors and the right column shows the result that I use all data available.

From the result in Table 7, we can see that mayors who answer that the administrative work should be smaller have advanced the expansion of citizen participation. This means that the mayors encourage the participation, somewhat considering the NPM ideas. It is also true that those local governments whose mayors prepared their manifest thoroughly in the last election advance the participations. Preparing a manifest means that the electoral competition is severe, but it also means that the mayors have higher standards to prepare the policy. In addition, a manifest can be an important tool to fight against the council. It is politically difficult for a council to refuse a manifest that the mayor advanced in the election thus mayors have more political power after the election.

On the other hand, encouraging participation does not have a strong relationship with the traditional left–right policy orientation such as efficiency and fairness. One may consider that this seems to be “the third way” of public administration. However, it would be more appropriate to interpret that the idea was actually introduced as the result of an amalgam of reforms because the institutionalization of participation is actually correlated with some of market-oriented reforms. At least at the local level, mayors cannot be theoretical or fundamentalist; they generally accept any kind of reform that helps their political success. Encouragement of the citizen participation and NPM-style reforms may theoretically have some tensions, but both of them are naturally accepted in the city office. This reasoning is consistent with the fact that the mayors’ partisanship does not affect the citizen participation.

Conclusion

Here I will summarize the findings and conclusion. In this paper, I tried to confirm the fact that the institutionalization of citizen participation has been expanding, and I investigated why local governments encourage citizen participation. Generally, the policies for expanding participation have fair amounts of correlations with each other. In addition, they are correlated with market-oriented reforms. Thus, the factors that encourage market-oriented reform and citizen participation reform are somewhat overlapped. Statistical analysis shows that the population and monetary resources of citizens enlarge the demand for participation and encourage institutionalization. It is also shown that the independent and LDP councilors, traditional and alternative routes through which citizens transfer their requests to the public administration, affect the degree of institutionalization of participation. In addition, a mayor’s belief in the public administration and reforms actually advances the institutionalization of participation. Mayors encourage participation, who

want to reduce the role of public administration with the detailed manifest, which is a different idea from traditional left–right thinking.

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Appendix: Questionnaires on the Value of Mayors

Small Government

Which opinion do you agree with?

- A. National and local governments play more roles
- B. National and local governments play smaller roles

1. A 2. Lean to A 3. Lean to B 4. B

Amount of Services

Given current amount and quality of service of your city government, which one is the closest opinion to you?

- 1 it is possible to make city government organization smaller while keeping current amount and quality of services.
- 2 The size of the current city government organization is appropriate.
- 3 It is difficult to keep current services and more personnel and organizational capacity are needed.

Efficiency-Fairness

Which opinion do you agree with?

A. National and local governments should pursue the efficiency of public policies.

B. National and local governments should pursue the fairness of public policies.

1. A 2. Lean to A 3. Lean to B 4. B

Manifest

Did you make your manifest last election?

1 yes 2 yes but not detailed 3 no

| | | | | |
|---|------|-----------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| | No | Yes | | |
| Public Information Disclosure (including All Agencies) | 0.50 | 0.50 | | |
| | No | Yes | | |
| Ombuds Persons | 0.94 | 0.06 | | |
| | No | Partial | All (No Written ordinance) | All (with Ordinance) |
| Public Comments on Important Plans | 0.17 | 0.06 | 0.59 | 0.18 |
| | No | Yes | | |
| Administrative Council by Open Recruitment from the Public | 0.12 | 0.88 | | |
| | No | Yes | | |
| The Ordinance for Supporting NPOs | 0.61 | 0.39 | | |
| | No | less than 50% | more than 50% | |
| Management of Local Convention Facility by Citizen Organization | 0.31 | 0.59 | 0.11 | |
| | No | every 3-4 years | every biennial | every year |
| Citizen Satisfactory Survey | 0.72 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.18 |
| | No | Yes | | |
| The Ordinance that assures comprehensive citizen participation | 0.86 | 0.14 | | |

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of 8 items on Participation

| Management of Local Convention Facility by Citizen Organization | | | | | | |
|---|-------|---------|-------|--|--|--|
| year | All | Partial | No | | | |
| 2002 | 11.0% | 46.9% | 42.0% | | | |
| 2004 | 8.8% | 52.5% | 38.7% | | | |
| 2006 | 11.6% | 57.8% | 30.6% | | | |
| 2008 | 10.6% | 59.0% | 30.4% | | | |
| The Ordinance that assures comprehensive citizen participation | | | | | | |
| year | Yes | No | | | | |
| 2002 | 1.6% | 98.4% | | | | |
| 2004 | 3.1% | 96.9% | | | | |
| 2006 | 13.7% | 86.3% | | | | |
| 2008 | 13.6% | 86.4% | | | | |
| The Ordinance for Supporting NPOs | | | | | | |
| year | Yes | No | | | | |
| 2002 | 2.7% | 97.3% | | | | |
| 2004 | 21.9% | 78.1% | | | | |
| 2006 | 32.3% | 67.7% | | | | |
| 2008 | 42.9% | 57.1% | | | | |
| Administrative Council by Open Recruitment from the Public | | | | | | |
| year | Yes | No | | | | |
| 2002 | 58.5% | 41.5% | | | | |
| 2004 | 76.9% | 23.1% | | | | |
| 2006 | 84.7% | 15.3% | | | | |
| 2008 | 88.1% | 11.9% | | | | |
| Public Comments on Important Plans | | | | | | |
| year | Yes | Partial | No | | | |
| 2002 | 2.8% | 38.4% | 58.8% | | | |
| 2004 | 17.2% | 33.4% | 49.3% | | | |
| 2006 | 10.8% | 45.5% | 43.7% | | | |
| 2008 | 18.1% | 59.3% | 22.5% | | | |

Table 2. Record of Progress of Reforms

| | Disclosure | Ombuds | Comments | Council | NPO | Facility | Survey | Ordinate |
|---|------------|--------|----------|---------|-------|----------|--------|----------|
| Public Information Disclosure (including All Agencies) | 1.00 | 0.20 | 0.29 | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.01 | 0.27 | 0.17 |
| Ombuds Persons | 0.20 | 1.00 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.22 | 0.14 |
| Public Comments on Important Plans | 0.29 | 0.12 | 1.00 | 0.22 | 0.20 | -0.02 | 0.18 | 0.30 |
| Administrative Council by Open Recruitment from the Public | 0.20 | 0.08 | 0.22 | 1.00 | 0.21 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.13 |
| The Ordinance for Supporting NPOs | 0.22 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 0.21 | 1.00 | 0.03 | 0.25 | 0.18 |
| Management of Local Convention Facility by Citizen Organization | 0.01 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 1.00 | 0.06 | 0.09 |
| Citizen Satisfactory Survey | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.06 | 1.00 | 0.17 |
| The Ordinance that assures comprehensive citizen participation | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.30 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 1.00 |
| Outsourcing Garbage Collection | -0.07 | -0.05 | -0.06 | -0.01 | -0.09 | -0.05 | -0.08 | -0.03 |
| Pay by Result Agreement with Private Company | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.09 | 0.26 | 0.08 | 0.31 | 0.16 |
| The Ratio of Outsourcing the Facility Management | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.09 | -0.07 | 0.09 | 0.04 |
| Quantitative Measure on Policy Evaluation | 0.26 | 0.12 | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.12 |
| Accounting Method Used in the Private Company | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.06 |

| | Garbage | Result | Facility | Evaluation | Accounting |
|---|---------|--------|----------|------------|------------|
| Public Information Disclosure (including All Agencies) | -0.07 | 0.20 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0.08 |
| Ombuds Persons | -0.05 | 0.15 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.13 |
| Public Comments on Important Plans | -0.06 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.27 | 0.11 |
| Administrative Council by Open Recruitment from the Public | -0.01 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.09 |
| The Ordinance for Supporting NPOs | -0.09 | 0.26 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 0.11 |
| Management of Local Convention Facility by Citizen Organization | -0.05 | 0.08 | -0.07 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Citizen Satisfactory Survey | -0.08 | 0.31 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 0.16 |
| The Ordinance that assures comprehensive citizen participation | -0.03 | 0.16 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0.06 |
| Outsourcing Garbage Collection | 1.00 | -0.14 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.05 |
| Pay by Result Agreement with Private Company | -0.14 | 1.00 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.18 |
| The Ratio of Outsourcing the Facility Management | -0.07 | 0.09 | 1.00 | 0.09 | 0.06 |
| Quantitative Measure on Policy Evaluation | -0.08 | 0.17 | 0.09 | 1.00 | 0.12 |
| Accounting Method Used in the Private Company | -0.05 | 0.18 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 1.00 |

Table 3 Correlation Matrix: Correlations among Items

| | Coeffs | d1 | d2 | d3 |
|--|----------|-------|-------|-------|
| Public Information Disclosure (including Agencies) | 0.87 | -0.02 | | |
| Ombdus Persons | 0.89 | -2.11 | | |
| Public Comments on Important Plans | 0.73 | 1.19 | 0.92 | -1.15 |
| Administrative Council by Open Recruitement from the Public | 0.96 | 1.66 | | |
| The Ordinance for Suporting NPOs | 0.65 | -0.30 | | |
| Management of Local Convention Facility by Citizen Organizatio | 0.06 | 0.47 | -1.28 | |
| Citizen Satisfactory Survey | 0.71 | -0.72 | -0.96 | -1.14 |
| The Ordinance that assures comprehensive citizen participation | 0.92 | -1.53 | | |
| | | | | |
| Log-likelihood= | -3684.47 | | | |
| BIC= | 7507.955 | | | |
| df= | 185 | | | |
| RMSEA | 0.049 | | | |
| P | 0.000 | | | |

Table 4 IRT Model (Graded Response Model)

| | Participation Factor based on 8 items |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| Outsourcing Garbage Collection | -0.09 |
| Pay by Result Agreement with Private Company | 0.33 |
| The Ratio of Outsoucing the Facility Management | 0.15 |
| Quantitative Measure on Policy Evaluation | 0.37 |
| Accounting Method Used in the Private Company | 0.18 |

Table 5. Participation factor and correlations

| model1 | | | model2 | | | model3 | | |
|--|--------|---------|--|--------|---------|--|--------|---------|
| dependent variable : participation score | | | dependent variable : participation score | | | dependent variable : participation score | | |
| | Coeff | P-Value | | Coeff | P-Value | | Coeff | P-Value |
| HOKKAIDO | 0.12 | 0.35 | Constant | -5.38 | 0.00 | Constant | -5.18 | 0.00 |
| TOHOKU | -0.40 | 0.00 | Core Cities | -0.18 | 0.19 | log(Population) | 0.36 | 0.00 |
| NORTH KANTO | 0.10 | 0.23 | Government Cities | 0.21 | 0.45 | Per-Person Tax | 0.30 | 0.00 |
| SOUTH KANTO | 0.52 | 0.00 | log(Population) | 0.32 | 0.00 | Terms | 0.15 | 0.03 |
| CHUBU | 0.03 | 0.61 | Financial Capacity Inde | -0.01 | 0.96 | Terms-Squared | -0.02 | 0.04 |
| KINKI | 0.04 | 0.63 | NPO | 0.00 | 0.32 | Vote Share | 0.00 | 0.65 |
| CHUGOKU | -0.13 | 0.22 | Per-Person Tax | 0.55 | 0.00 | Non-Vote | -0.02 | 0.86 |
| SHIKOKU | -0.28 | 0.04 | In City Worker | 0.18 | 0.33 | Supported by LDP | -0.04 | 0.60 |
| KYUSHUOKINAWA | -0.28 | 0.00 | | | | Supported by DPJ | -0.08 | 0.49 |
| | | | | | | Supported by both | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| | | | | | | Independent in Large City | -0.28 | 0.15 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| N | 750.00 | | N | 725.00 | | N | 629.00 | |
| R-squared | 0.11 | | R-squared | 0.29 | | R-squared | 0.29 | |
| model4 | | | model5 | | | model6 | | |
| dependent variable : participation score | | | dependent variable : participation score | | | dependent variable : participation score | | |
| | Coeff | P-Value | | Coeff | P-Value | | Coeff | P-Value |
| Constant | -5.36 | 0.00 | Constant | -5.11 | 0.00 | Constant | -5.22 | 0.00 |
| log(Population) | 0.46 | 0.00 | log(Population) | 0.43 | 0.00 | log(Population) | 0.46 | 0.00 |
| Per-Person Tax | 0.21 | 0.00 | Per-Person Tax | 0.17 | 0.03 | Per-Person Tax | 0.15 | 0.07 |
| LDP Seat Share | -0.02 | 0.01 | LDP Seat Share | -0.02 | 0.05 | LDP Seat Share | -0.03 | 0.01 |
| DPJ Seat Share | 0.00 | 0.76 | Independent Seat Share | -0.02 | 0.01 | Independent Seat Share | -0.02 | 0.00 |
| Independent Seat Share | -0.02 | 0.00 | Terms | 0.11 | 0.10 | Terms | 0.09 | 0.22 |
| Mayors' Support Seats | 0.00 | 0.77 | Terms-Squared | -0.02 | 0.08 | Terms-Squared | -0.02 | 0.16 |
| | | | DPJ Mayor x DPJ Seat | 0.01 | 0.67 | HOKKAIDO | 0.22 | 0.09 |
| | | | Independent Mayor x L | 0.00 | 0.86 | TOHOKU | -0.23 | 0.04 |
| | | | | | | NORTH KANTO | -0.10 | 0.31 |
| | | | | | | SOUTH KANTO | -0.05 | 0.66 |
| | | | | | | KINKI | -0.30 | 0.00 |
| | | | | | | CHUGOKU | -0.15 | 0.24 |
| | | | | | | SHIKOKU | -0.17 | 0.23 |
| | | | | | | KYUSHUOKINAWA | -0.17 | 0.10 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| N | 677.00 | | N | 598.00 | | N | 598.00 | |
| R-squared | 0.30 | | R-squared | 0.29 | | R-squared | 0.32 | |

Table 6. Analysis of Participation Factor

| | Coeff | P-Value | Coeff | P-Value |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|
| Dependent | Participation score | | Participation score | |
| Constant | -4.37 | 0.00 | -4.35 | 0.00 |
| Small Government | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.03 |
| Amount of Service | 0.05 | 0.53 | 0.02 | 0.71 |
| Efficiency-Fairness | -0.01 | 0.75 | -0.04 | 0.30 |
| Manifest | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.01 |
| log(Population) | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.00 |
| Per Person Tax | 0.27 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.00 |
| | | | | |
| N | 333 | | 551 | |
| R-squared | 0.24 | | 0.27 | |

Table 7. Mayors' Values and Participation