**"Explaining Regional Variation in
Canadian Popular Support for Redistribution"**

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Abstract

Current trends in the macroeconomies of advanced industrialized democracies and the results of the 2011 Canadian election raise important questions about Canadians' attitudes towards redistributive public policies. This paper investigates regional variation in Canadians' support for the public provision of adequate living standards. Evidence indicates that Atlantic Canadians and Quebecers are much more likely to support this form of redistribution than those from the Rest of Canada (RoC), while Albertans are less likely. Surprisingly, these variations are only modestly attributable to differences in micro-level economic factors such as income, education or employment status. For Atlantic Canadians, a marked difference in the effect of feminism has a greater impact. Residues of Catholic sentiments are a key determinant that differentiates Quebecers' outlooks, while the impact of age is also important. Young Quebecers are much more likely to support redistributive politics than their English-Canadian counterparts. For Albertans, atypical predispositions to hold conservative values and beliefs – specifically lags in the adoption of feminist and other socially progressive values and differences in micro-level economic beliefs – play a central role in distinguishing these from other Canadians' policy preferences. One economic factor, however, is significant. Consistent with welfare-state regime theory, cross-provincial variation in income inequality is an important macro-level determinant of public support for redistribution.

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[§ 1] Introduction

Wise tells us that "values, beliefs and attitudes are at the heart of political culture" (1985, 165).[1] This paper examines one specific aspect of Canadians' political culture: their attitudes towards redistributive public policies. While scholars of Canadian politics will be unsurprised to learn that, on aggregate, Albertans are less likely to express support for redistributive public policies than are their counterparts from Atlantic Canada or Québec, few analysts have attempted to explain precisely why these regional differences persist. This analysis endeavours to further the understanding of differences in the political cultures of Canadian regions by assessing the impacts of a broad range of economic, social and political factors in order to provide an explanation of inter-regional variation in Canadians' redistributive public policy preferences. The research question of the investigation asks: Why are Canadians in some regions more or less likely to support economic redistribution than in others? The thesis of the paper is that while micro-economic factors are key determinants of individual-level social policy outlooks, these factors play only a modest role in explaining aggregate-level differences in support for redistribution. Instead, the predominant sources of cross-sectional variation are socio-political factors such as age, religion, socio-economic beliefs and political values, partisan political leadership, and macro-level income inequality.

Following this introduction, past scholarship which has investigated Canadian regional political cultures is considered in order to contextualize the present discussion. A descriptive analysis is undertaken to identify the extent of cross-regional differences in citizens' redistributive attitudes. The analysis then turns to outline a broad range of theoretically and empirically plausible explanations for the identified variations, followed by a discussion of methods and a presentation of the results of the empirical analysis. The paper concludes with a brief summary of key findings and proposals of possible avenues for further research.

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[1] A comparable definition is provided by Ornstein, Stevenson and Williams, who suggest that "broadly conceived, political culture includes all ideas – attitudes, values, theories – which justify or explain political activity" (1980, 235).

[§ 2] Controversies of Canadian Regional Political Culture Scholarship

This research makes no pretense to provide an expansive analysis of a broad range of Canadians' political ideas such as that presented by Nevitte (1996) or Wiseman (2007). Nor does it investigate key aspects of political culture that have been the focus of the canon such as political trust, efficacy and participation (Almond and Verba 1963, Simeon and Elkins 1974), postmaterialism (Inglehart 1977, 1990) or social capital (Putnam 1993, 2000). This research can be linked to preceding scholarship investigating Canadian political culture in two limited respects. First, it assesses the impact of a range of what might be described as 'cultural', 'ideational' or 'ideological' variables, but investigates the impact of these factors merely as competing explanations within a model that incorporates an expansive set of economic, social and political factors, giving primacy to none. Second, it investigates enduring regional variations in Canadians' outlooks towards one specific political attitude: support for the public provision of adequate living standards.

Although the research focuses on only one particular aspect of cross-regional Canadian political culture, it is by no means an insignificant one. As Banting emphasizes, "redistribution lies at the heart of modern politics" (1987, 83). Every advanced industrialized democratic state employs progressive redistributive policies to mitigate the negative effects of the free market and provide publicly funded social protection for the economically vulnerable. A substantial proportion of the gross economic products of advanced industrial democracies and the largest share of their governments' expenditures continue to be allocated to the maintenance of the welfare state. While the publics' increasing dissatisfaction with democratic political institutions and upward trends in economic inequality over the past three decades warrants heightened attention to citizens' redistributive outlooks, recent economic instability can only amplify the importance of a greater awareness of public attitudes. The North American economies continue to struggle to recover from what has widely been described as the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, a period of economic dislocation that engendered such notable social policy reforms as the Bennett and Roosevelt New Deals. If Canada is once again in the midst of following the United States into a comparable period of economic anemia and insecurity, then to the extent that politicians, public servants and policy experts are concerned with how Canadians feel about their social programs, there seems no better time to investigate Canadian citizens' redistributive policy preferences in order to gain a better appreciation of what sorts of policies they have supported and can be expected to support in the coming years and decades.

Despite the modest connection between the present analysis and other political culture scholarship, a discussion of previous research that has investigated regional variations in Canadians' political attitudes is instructive, providing an understanding of the range of available analytical strategies and contextualizing the limits of the scope of the current analysis. Several controversies surround discussions of Canadian regional political cultures. Perhaps the most straightforward of these is the extent to which different scholars emphasize the extent and significance of inter-regional variation. Simeon and Elkins begin their classic *CJPS* article –

modestly entitled 'Regional Political Cultures in Canada' – with the suggestion that "Canadian politics is regional politics; regionalism is one of the pre-eminent facts of Canadian life" (1974, 397). Stewart goes so far as to propose that it is a truism that "region is the most salient political cleavage in Canada" (2002, 34-5) and to suggest that it would be difficult to exaggerate the consequences of Canadian regional distinctiveness. Other scholars hold quite different perspectives about the importance of cross-regional difference, however. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Clarke, Pammett and Stewart tell us plainly that "the traditional emphasis on regional variations in Canadian political culture is overstated" (2002, 69). Others take more moderate positions. Ornstein, Stevenson and Williams, for example, adopt a more nuanced view, indicating that while Canadians' attitudes towards electoral politics and governmental institutions are largely regional in character, ideological difference is better explained by socio-economic factors than regional variation (1980).

The appropriate approach to the conceptualization of regions themselves is also a subject of considerable debate. In their analyses of variations in Canadian regional politics, researchers have generally taken one of two distinct approaches. The first corresponds to what might be described as the 'non-territorial approach,' wherein the country is segmented not geographically, but rather separated into groupings that are most proximately associated with each other on some alternative set of specified parameters. Innis' key observation of the uneven and discontinuous development which distinguishs metropole from peripheral region was an early precursor to this approach (Innis 1930). More recent exemplars include Gidengil (1989) and Henderson (2004). The second, more usual, is the 'territorial approach' to regional analysis, wherein regions are understood as territorially contiguous units which possess at least loosely specified boundaries. Here the goal is not to identify and assemble disparate locales into comparable though imagined aggregations, but rather to take preconceived notions of distinctiveness and investigate to determine the extents to which actual differences exist and can be explained. The territorial conception of regions also lies at the core of the strategy employed by Simeon and Elkins, as they outline their Przeworski and Tuene (1970) inspired 'regions as containers' approach by explaining that:

> We use the term regionalism simply as a descriptive statement about the way provinces or other areas differ. It is not an explanation. Regions are containers, and other factors are necessary to account for variations in their contents (1974, 399).

The territorial approach to regionalism has been the overwhelming favorite of Canadian political scientists, including such luminaries in the field as Alford (1963), Blake (1972), Wilson (1974), Ornstein, Stevenson and Williams (1980), Aucoin (1985), Engelmann (1986), Bakvis (1991), Savoie (1999), Blais (2005) and Wiseman (2007).

Even amongst adherents of the territorial approach to regional analysis, there is disagreement. A fourth major controversy in the analysis of Canadian political subcultures is a lack of consensus regarding the appropriate number of regional units. Wiseman does well to identify a diverse array of configurations, including numerous uses of tri- (Eastern, Central and Western Canada), quadri- (Atlantic Canada, Québec, Ontario and the West), and pentapartite (Atlantic Canada, Québec, Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia) categorizations (Wiseman

2007, 139). Wiseman himself settles on the most usual number of five but takes the unusual step of cleaving Alberta from the other Prairie provinces to join it with British Columbia under the auspices of a 'Far West' regional political culture. Others analyze each of the ten provinces as distinct units (Wilson 1974, Ornstein, Stevenson and Williams 1980), while Simeon and Elkins treat not only each province separately, but also create separate categories for Anglophone Quebecers and Francophone non-Quebecers, leading to a total of 12 categories.[2] It is noteworthy that little of this research makes more than a passing reference to Northern Canada. Again, different scholars adhere to different views. The broad disposition for Canadian political scientists to use regional lenses in their analyses lends legitimacy to the practice of combining or disaggregating the populations of different provinces. Other scholars who disavow this practice, however. For example, there is research that points to the chimerical nature of an 'Atlantic Canadian' regional political culture, drawing attention to substantive inter-provincial differences between the four easterly provinces (Beck 1981; Stewart 1994). Ornstein and Stevenson go even further, suggesting that the findings of their and other scholars' research "throw serious doubt on the credibility of regional comparisons that employ Prairie or Atlantic composites" (1999, 194).

[§ 3] Data, Method and Empirical Analysis, Part I: Contextualizing Regional Variation in Popular Support for Redistribution

3.1 Data and Method

Micro-data for this analysis are taken from the 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2008 iterations of the *Canadian Elections Study* (*CES*).[3] The dependent variable of the analysis measures citizens' willingness to indicate agreement with the statement "The government should see to it that everyone has a decent standard of living" or to prefer that it should "Leave people to get ahead on their own." Respondents who suggest that they are more inclined to favour the first of these two statements are counted as being in favour of this type of redistribution, whereas those favouring the second are considered to be opposed.

In broad strokes, this research follows the methodological approach set out by Simeon and Elkins' pioneering scholarship three decades ago. It follows the territorial 'regions as containers' model which they popularized and uses their two-step analytic strategy, first presenting a descriptive analysis of inter-regional difference, and then moving to an attempt to provide an explanation for its existence. Finally, the same data source – the *CES* – will be also used. In other respects this analysis parts ways with Simeon and Elkins' approach. The strategy employed for the selection of the number of regional units is the first, most crucial difference.

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[2]   One of which – Prince Edward Island – they like Ornstein, Stevenson and Williams (1980) discarded due to a diminutive sample size.

[3]   Because of concerns about non-random respondent attrition, respondents who participated in the 2004-2006-2008 *CES* panel study were only included in the present analysis as respondents in the 2004 wave. Information on the indicator of the dependent variable was not collected in the 2006 wave, so no respondents from this data set are included in the current analysis.

Rather than treating each of the ten Canadian provinces as distinct, the appropriate number of regional units will be established by letting the data 'speak for themselves'. As mentioned previously, Simeon and Elkins concede that regional designations are merely descriptions based upon similarities or differences, such that what makes for a region is that it is 'different' from the others. While this contentless definition will not be used to produce haphazard regional configurations – territorial contiguity and previous historical usage are to be carefully observed – in turn neither will obvious extra-provincial regional configurations be ignored. A second departure from Simeon and Elkins' approach is that, following Ornstein and Stevenson (1999, 195), Anglophone Quebecers and Francophone Non-Quebecers will not be designated as separate regions. While doing so was certainly an appropriate tip of the hat to official bilingualism, population levels preclude a justification of such an analysis even were it to be consistent with the thematic approach of territorial regional containership.[4]

3.2   Empirical Analysis

Figure 3.2.1 presents estimates of aggregate-level redistributive policy preferences of Canadians, by province and year. These years, increasing from left to right, correspond to each of the five iterations of the *CES* included in the analysis. Note that with ten provinces and five data waves for each, a total of 50 point estimates are produced.

The presented evidence can be considered both in terms of overall levels, and general trends. First, observe that the levels of support for redistribution east of the Ottawa River are clearly higher than to the west. Overall, levels of support in Ontario and the West tend to be lower than the Canadian average, but are generally only substantially so in Alberta, the one western provinces that seems unusual in comparison to the others. Second, given the larger sample sizes in British Columbia, Ontario and Québec, clear upward trends in support for redistribution are identifiable in each of these three provinces. Given the relatively larger sizes of the confidence intervals in each of the remaining provinces, however, speculating about trends in these cases seems imprudent.

These findings conform surprisingly well to those observed in Ornstein and Stevenson's analysis of interprovincial attitudes in the late 1970s and early 1980s, wherein they explain that mean provincial positions on a 'redistribution scale' "conform to the following pattern: Québec is on the left; Atlantic Canada occupies an intermediate position; and Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Ontario, and then British Columbia and Alberta (in that order) are on the right" (1999, 133 and 203).[5] One might quibble that if five provinces are to the right and only one is to the left of Atlantic Canada, it might seem more reasonable to designate the interim position as

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[4]   Anglophone Quebecers constitute only about 8.6% of the Québec population; for comparative purposes, Allophones constitute 12.6%. Francophone Non-Quebecers are an even smaller segment of their respective population, constituting 4.3% of the total; again, for comparative purposes, Allophones constitute 23.1%. Source: The 2006 Canadian census, available at http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/hlt/97-555/T401-eng.cfm?Lang=E&T=401&GH=4&SC=1&S=99&O=A.

[5]   Sample points are indicated on page 133, whereas the quotation is located on page 203.

Figure 3.2.1:   Canadian Popular Support for Redistributive Public Policies by Province, throught TIme

the Prairie provinces (i.e. Manitoba and Saskatchewan). However, given the current trends observable in B.C. and Ontario, it seems unsurprising that the average British Columbian and Ontarian has by now parted ways with the average Albertan and joined the average Prairian in the interim position.

On the basis of the indications provided by the data, we will follow Wiseman's lead, constituting an Atlantic Canadian region composed of Newfoundland and the three Maritime provinces and a Prairie region composed of Manitoba and Saskatchewan but separate from Alberta. Unlike Wiseman, however, we will not join Alberta to B.C., but rather treat them as separate cases. In total, this leaves us with six regional categories: Atlantic Canada, Québec, Ontario, the Prairies, Alberta and B.C. The most evident case that might be made for an alternative configuration on this redistributive policy dimension is to separate Atlantic Canada into 'Mainlander' and 'Islander' Atlantic Canadian political cultures.

Figure 3.2.2 presents estimates of Canadians' aggregate-level redistributive policy preferences, by each of the six identified regions. On the one hand, the evidence indicates that, to a considerable extent, there is little aggregate-level variation in redistributive preferences between three of the six regions. Levels of support for redistribution amongst the publics of British Columbia, the Prairie provinces (Saskatchewan and Manitoba) and Ontario are virtually indistinguishable. Between these three cases, levels of support range from 69.8% to 70.9%, a statistically insignificant difference of just over 1%. On the other, the evidence indicates that there is substantial variation in the aggregate-level redistributive public policy preferences

between these and the other three of the six regions. Figure 3.2.2 indicates that Atlantic Canadians are 14.1% and Quebecers are 13.2% more likely to indicate support for redistributive public policies, respectively, while Albertans are 6.8% less likely to do so than other Canadians.

Figure 3.2.2:   Canadian Popular Support for Redistributive Public Policies by Region

Source: The 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2008 iterations of the Canadian Elections Study (n = 7,091).
Note: The question used to measure attitudes towards the provision of adequate living standards asks respondents whether they agree that "the government should see to it that everyone has a decent standard of living" or that "the government should leave people to get ahead on their own."

        While these findings will certainly not astonish scholars familiar with the broad contours of Canadian political culture, the principal aim of this paper is not to identify but to explain the bases of these regional policy preference differences. More precisely, it endeavours to explain differences in popular support for redistribution between Atlantic Canadians, Albertans, Quebecers, and residents of the Rest of Canada (ROC). Moving forward, we shall refine our research question and ask: Why are those in Atlantic Canada and Québec more – whereas those in Alberta are less – likely to support economic redistribution than other Canadians?

[§ 4] Theoretically and Empirically Identified Determinants of Support for Redistribution

What are the mechanisms that might influence public attitudes towards redistribution? Previous theoretical and empirical research identifies a broad range of factors that may effect variation in individuals' redistributive policy outlooks. These can be stylized as corresponding to one of four schools of thought: (1) interests, (2) institutions, (3) identities, and (4) values and beliefs. While the preponderance of preceding scholarship has considered a multiplicity of competing factors, researchers have often tended to focus on a specific dimension that can be conceived of within the scope of this broad rubric.

The first category of factors considers the impact of an individual's *economic self-interest*. A vast quantity of research demonstrates that those with greater levels of *income*, *education*, *labour market security* and *occupational status* are less likely to benefit from – and are therefore less likely to support – redistribution. Conversely, the anticipated effects of shifts in levels of *aggregate economic output* are theoretically indeterminate. Some argue that citizens will have less empathy for redistributive goals when macroeconomic conditions are poor, but others suggest that the demand for redistribution will diminish when macroeconomic conditions are more favourable (Wilensky 1975, 55; Alt 1979, 258; Kluegel 1987; Clark and Inglehart 1998, 51). Research that investigates the Canadian case at both the constituency and national levels, however, indicates that the relationship between economic performance and support for redistribution seems to be is positive (Cochrance and Perrella 2012; Andersen and Curtis 2013). The anticipated effect of *macro-level inequality* is also theoretically obscure. Recent theoretical elaboration suggests that cross-national and longitudinal effects may differ in direction (Kenworthy and McCall 2008). Research has shown that, over time, increases in inequality should lead to increases in support for redistribution, suggesting a positive relationship (Meltzer and Richard 1981, 1983; Andersen and Curtis 2013; Sealey 2012). Research also indicates that political jurisdictions with publics who are less supportive of redistributing income tend to have more inequality, such that cross-sectional income inequality is negatively correlated with support for redistribution (Esping-Andersen 1999; Weakliem, Andersen and Heath 2005; Brooks and Manza 2007; Sealey 2012). Given the directionality of this effect, it seems more properly conceived of as a result not of self-interest, but rather as an effect of cultural-institutional inertia.

Other *institutional factors* may also have important consequences. Theories of the relationship between political elites and mass publics suggest that public opinion is shaped by political leadership (Miliband 1973; McCloskey and Zaller 1984; Zaller 1992), while power resource theory identifies unions and government partisanship as important determinants of redistributive outcomes (Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990). Parties of the left and unions may be expected to increase citizens' support for redistributive policies through their organizational and advocacy activities, whereas dominance of parties of the right may decrease public support (Kluegel and Smith 1986, 157; Krieger 1986; Bashevkin 2002). Perceptions of the institutional costs of redistribution may also be important (Okun 1975). As the 'transfer cost' of redistribution from the taxed to the benefit recipient increases, public opinion in favour of redistribution should decrease. Evidence indicates that, at the aggregate level, there is a substantial relationship between the quality of a state's governing institutions and levels of welfare benefit generosity and social spending as a percentage of GDP (Rothstein, Samanni and Teorell 2012). To the extent that citizens perceive that their bureaucracies can effectively implement public policies, they should have greater confidence in their public servants. This confidence should translate into lower perceived costs, leading to higher levels of support for redistribution.

Third, *group identities* such as one's gender, ethnicity, age or religion may also be significant. A significant body of research demonstrates that there are important economic and social policy issue position differences between men and women (Gidengil 1995; Howell and

Day 2000; Gidengil *et al* 2003). Other scholarship suggests that ethnicity effects are group-based rather than merely a result of differences in personal economic situations (Kluegel and Smith 1986, 169). Conversely, inter-group antipathy may have the opposite effect. Negative feelings about racial outgroups and intolerance towards immigrants may reduce an individual's propensity to support redistributive politics (Kluegel and Smith 1986, 158). The effects of these sentiments, however, may be less overt. Research suggests that they may function at a contextual level, such that increases in ethnic diversity may decrease citizens' willingness to redistribute (Luttmer 2001; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Age has been shown to be an important determinant of those who support and receive the benefits of social policy programs (Busemeyer *et al.* 2009). Other research suggests that the Weberian thesis still applies (Barker and Carman 2000). One's sentiments towards citizenship, or group membership in a state, may also have important effects. Some analysts argue that nationalism can foster sentiments of social solidarity and in-group cohesion that reinforce redistributive politics (Barry 1991; Miller 1995; Béland and Lecours 2006). Others contend that nationalism may be a divisive force that competes with notions of class solidarity (Hobsbawm 1990; Shayo 2009; Solt 2011).

Finally, citizens' *ideas* may have important consequences. Previous research demonstrates that values and beliefs affect citizens' policy preferences, issue positions, partisan identification and vote choice (Rokeach 1968a, 1968b, 1973; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Feldman 1988; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Knutsen 1995a, 1995b; Blais *et al.* 2002). Preceding scholarship investigating the impacts of value and belief dimensions has identified two principal types of factors that affect public attitudes towards redistribution. First, a number of previous analyses find that redistributive outlooks are shaped by the extent to which respondents believe that individuals' economic fates are self-determined or affected by external factors beyond their control (Picketty 1995; Fong 2001; Linos and West 2003; Alesian and Glaeser 2004; Fong, Bowles and Gintis 2005). Those with stronger beliefs in individuals' capacities for self-determination are less likely to support redistribution. Second, research demonstrates the importance of citizens' locations on the 'left-right' ideological spectrum (Bean and Papadakis 1998; Kam and Nam 2008; Breznau 2010; Alesina and Guiliano 2011). This simplification of a complex political reality incorporates a range of different value cleavages (Knutsen 1995a; Cochrane 2010). In order to more fully capture the diversity of respondents' attitudes towards these political phenomena, the present examination will take a multi-dimensional approach to the analysis of citizens' values and beliefs. It will consider five distinct components: (1) the *authoritarianism* dimension includes views on confidence in the police and armed forces; (2) the *feminism* dimension reflects orientations towards feminists; (2) the *social conservatism* dimension incorporates attitudes towards abortion, gays and lesbians, and women's role in the family; (4) the *market efficiency* dimension captures outlooks on government intervention in the private sector; (5) the *economic self-determination* dimension captures the extent to which respondents have faith in individuals' capacities to affect their own economic circumstances.

[§ 5]   Data, Method and Empirical Analysis, Part II: Explaining Regional Variation in Popular Support for Redistribution

5.1   Data and Method

Given the range of factors that have been theoretically and empirically linked to public support for redistribution, the data are a mixture from both the micro- and macro-level. Dimensions with large proportions of missing values are treated using a dummy variable as an additional category. Otherwise, missing values are imputed using Honaker, King and Blackwell's *Amelia II* software.[6]

Within the context of multivariate regression analysis, one nuance is important. A key distinction made in the scholarship which discusses citizens' public policy issue positions is drawn between preferences for the 'existence' and 'intensity' of a given policy (Roller 1995). A preference for the existence of a certain policy type merely indicates whether an individual wants the government to provide some non-zero level of policy. Preferences for policy intensity, however, are relative to a given status quo; they indicate whether an individual wants the government to enact *more or less* policy. Given the nature of the question wording employed for this research, it seems plausible that respondent may conceive of the measure of the dependent variable of the analysis as an indicator of policy intensity rather than policy existence, focusing respondents' attention on the question of whether they are in favour of increases in redistribution relative to the level that currently characterizes their given political economy.[7] For this reason, a measure is included to control for the extent to which a given context already redistributes. This measure is calculated using an index of the progressivity of income tax structures for given provinces and points in time.

Macro-level data are also collected for the income inequality, economic growth, government partisanship and ethnic diversity dimensions. Cross-provincial measures of income inequality are constructed from Statistics Canada's *CANSIM* Table 2020709. These are lagged by one year and incorporate data from the preceding 5 years using a flat discount rate of 0.20 per year. The economic growth measure, taken from Statistics Canada's *CANSIM* Table 3840002, is lagged by one year and incorporates data from the preceding two years, with the second year being discounted by a factor of 0.50. The government partisanship measure is constructed from the proportion of seats held in provincial legislatures. These measures range from -1 (total dominance by parties of the right) to +1 (total dominance by parties of the left), are lagged by one year, and incorporate data from the preceding 10 years using a flat discount rate of 0.10 per year. The ethnic diversity of Canadian provinces is estimated from census data.

Given that this component of the analysis incorporates both micro- and macro-level factors and the dependent variable is dichotomous, a generalized linear 'mixed' model is used.[8] Estimated coefficients are transformed into predicted probabilities. At the micro-level, estimates of the effects of particular factors indicate how much change can be expected in the

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[6]   Information about King *et al*.'s *Amelia* project is available at: http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia/.
[7]   The question wording of the dependent variable is presented in § 3.1 of the analysis.
[8]   The analysis uses a glmer (generalized linear mixed effects in R) model with family=binomial (link="logit") from Bates and Maechler's lme4 R package (2010). See http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/lme4.pdf and http://lme4.r-forge.r-project.org/.

probability of expressing support for redistribution from a one-unit change in each of the independent variables, *ceteris paribus*. Because all micro-level factors have been coded at either the binary, nominal, or ordinal level, all elements are coded either as a 0 or a 1. This means that they each indicate the absence or presence of a particular attribute. Thus the predicted probability of a one-unit increase is equivalent to the predicted change in the likelihood of support given the absence or presence of a particular characteristic. For example, the predicted probability for 'female' simply indicates the predicted change in likelihood of support for the given redistributive policy if one were to change the respondent from a man (gender = 0) to a woman (gender = 1). Because all micro-level variables have been treated using this same approach, comparison between individual-level effects is greatly simplified. Given the continuous nature of the included macro-level factors, however, comparisons across these dimensions are not as straightforward. A one-unit increase in income inequality, for example, corresponds to an increase in the Gini coefficient from a state of perfect equality (Gini = 0) to perfect inequality (Gini = 1). Hence in order to facilitate comparison, the difference between the context with the lowest and the highest actual values on each of the macro-level dimensions is determined, and predicted probabilities are calculated on the basic of these differences. Given that previous research indicates that cross-sectional and longitudinal inequality have quite different effects on public support for economic redistribution (Sealey 2012), a measure of each is included in the model in order to partial the effects of each. It is worth noting, however, that – once estimated – the impact of the longitudinal component of this variable is ignored since by definition it seems difficult to conceive how a cross-time factor can contribute to an explanation of cross-regional difference.

For the present analysis, however, what is more important are not the effects of particular factors themselves, but rather of the *differential* effects of particular factors on *aggregate* regional policy preferences. Specifically, differential overall effects on each of the three political cultures that are 'atypical' with respect to redistributive public policy preferences – Alberta, Atlantic Canada, and Québec – are calculated in comparison to the baseline effects observed in the aggregated 'Rest of Canada' (RoC) sample, which includes residents of British Columbia, Ontario, and the Prairie provinces. The method employed broadly follows the approach demonstrated by Gidengil (1995) that differentiates between 'composition components' and 'effect components' and focuses attention on effects that exceed a 1% threshold. The method for estimating these two basis component types differs for each, however. Composition components measure differences in the distributions of particular characteristics within different populations. For example, if the effect of being an immigrant is the same in Alberta and Ontario, but Ontario is composed of a greater proportion of immigrants, then the effect component is the same, but the composition component differs. Whereas if Atlantic Canada and the Prairies have the same proportions of immigrants, but immigrants in Atlantic Canada are more likely than immigrants in the Prairies to support redistribution, then the composition component is the same, but the effect component differs. In order to estimate composition components, differences in the proportions of each factor included in the analysis are calculated. Rather than running separate regressions, effect components are estimated by introducing interactive terms. Estimated log odd effects are transformed into predicted probabilities. The effects of these two basic component types are

then combined into an overall 'differential effect'. One additional difference between the methodology employed in the current analysis and the approach presented by Gidengil (1995) is that no attempt is made to predetermine causal ordering.

Finally, two comments about the tables used to report results in the succeeding section are noteworthy. The first pertains to the reporting of statistical significance. For micro-level dimensions, statistical significance is reported using standard two-tailed tests typically provided by statistical analytic software packages. However, given the diminutive amount of variation at the macro-level and the fact that the expected directionalities of each of these relationships are hypothesized, the levels of statistical significance of these factors are reported using one-tailed tests. Second, for each given micro-level factor, composition components are calculated if the composition of the region being considered differs significantly from the RoC base category and the main effect is statistically significant, indicating both that the composition of the populations of the two regions differ with respect to the given variable and that the variable is of consequence. Effect components are calculated when the interaction effect is statistically significant, indicating that the given variable has significantly different effects in each of the two regions. Both the compositional and effect components of each of the categories are aggregated in order to provide an estimate of the overall magnitude of the effect of each of the considered explanatory variables. As each given macro-level factor is continuous, the magnitudes of the estimates of these effects are calculated using the usual approach, finding the difference between the average values of the given and comparison regions, multiplying this distance by the estimated size of the log odds effect and then transforming this estimate into a predicted probability.

5.2   Empirical Analysis

The results of the empirical analysis are presented in a series of three tables, one each for each of the Atlantic Canadian, Québec and Albertan regions. In these tables, the estimated baseline composition and effect in the base category – drawn from the RoC subsample – of each of the included factors are presented in the 'composition baseline' and 'main effect' columns, respectively, such that these column are invariant in the three tables presented. Adjacent to each of these columns are estimates of the difference in the composition and effect components of each of the included factors between the base RoC subpopulation and the population of the given region under consideration. The final set of three columns on the right of the table are used to calculate and aggregate the compositional and effect components discussed in the preceding subsection of the paper. The right-most of these columns – the primary focus of the following discussion – presents an estimate of the overall magnitude of the effect of each given factor.

5.2.1 Atlantic Canada

Evidence that indicates the relative abilities of the broad range of theoretically-identified explanatory variables outlined in § 4 to explain regional variation in levels of support for the public provision of adequate living standards between Atlantic Canada and the RoC is presented in Table 5.2.1. In terms of explaining such difference, micro-level economic factors play a statistically significant albeit marginal role. There is evidence of an effect from varying the data indicate that the proportion of Atlantic Canadians who have 'very high' income levels is 6.6% lower than those in the RoC, and given that those with very high incomes are much less likely to support such a form of public policy, this provides a partial explanation for why Atlantic Canadians are more likely to support redistribution: there are fewer very rich in Atlantic Canada who oppose the policy. But the estimated overall effect of this impact is quite small. The evidence indicates that this factor explains only a 1.4% of the difference in the levels of support between Atlantic Canadians and other Canadians who reside in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia.

[Insert Table 5.2.1 about here]

The data indicate that the impacts of two other factors – cross-sectional inequality and feminist values – are markedly more substantial. The estimated effect of cross-sectional inequality is 4.7%, which accounts for over a third of the difference between the outlooks of Atlantic Canadians and their counterparts in the RoC. The explanation is straightforward if somewhat simplistic: those who live in political jurisdictions characterized by greater levels of equality are more likely to support redistribution, and Atlantic Canadians live in political jurisdictions characterized by greater levels of equality. Cross-regional differences in feminist values are even more influential. The estimated effect of this factor is 5.9%, which accounts for a bit less than half of the difference between the redistributive policy attitudes of Atlantic Canadians and those in the RoC. In this instance the effect is primarily a result of differences in the magnitude of the impact: feminists in Atlantic Canada are substantially more likely to express support for redistribution than feminists in other Canadian regions. This suggests the possibility that Atlantic Canada has developed a 'feminist political culture' wherein the political and public policy preferences of women have greater cultural resonance.

5.2.2 Québec

Evidence regarding the capabilities of the broad range of included determinants to explain inter-regional variation in levels of support for redistribution between Quebeckers and those who reside in the RoC is presented in Table 5.2.2. Once again, micro-level economic factors play a statistically significant but marginal role in explaining regional differences in outlooks towards this public policy type. There is again evidence of an effect from varying composition:

the data indicate that the proportion of Quebeckers who have 'very high' income levels is 5.9% lower than those in the RoC, such that the estimated impact of this factor is that it explains about a 1.1% difference in the levels of support between Quebeckers and those from the RoC.

[Insert Table 5.2.2 about here]

The estimated impacts of other factors are much more substantial. Cross-sectional inequality is again consequential but the two other most important factors – age and religion – are markedly different from the Atlantic Canadian case. At 3.3%, the estimated effect of cross-sectional inequality in Québec is lower but still substantial – accounting for about a quarter of the difference between the outlooks of Quebeckers and their counterparts in the RoC. The estimated impacts of age and religion are also substantial, accounting for 4.6% and 2.8% differences in the levels of support for redistribution between Quebecers and RoC respondents. The differences in the impact of age are particularly interesting. As was the case for the feminist values dimension in Atlantic Canada, the effect of age in Québec is primarily a result of differences in the magnitude of the effect: the data suggest that younger Quebecers are much more likely to express support for redistribution than younger adults in other Canadian regions. multiple-equilibria explanation. The effect of religion is entirely attributable to the compositional impact of Catholicism, stemming from the well-appreciated facts that Quebecers are more likely to be Catholic than residents of other Canadian regions and that *ceteris paribus* Catholics are more likely to support redistribution than others.

5.2.3   Alberta

Evidence of the capacities of various factors to explain regional variation in levels of support for redistribution between those from Alberta and the RoC is presented in Figure 5.2.3. Yet again, the evidence indicates that micro-level economic factors play a role in explaining the lower levels of support for the public provision of adequate living standards expressed by Albertans than other Canadians. The source of this micro-economic impact is also income, but the type of the component differs from the two preceding divergent cases. Whereas in Atlantic Canada and Québec the impact of income was a compositional effect derived from lower proportions of residents from these regions with 'very high' incomes, the origin of Albertan difference derives from an effect component. While there is no evidence that there are greater proportions of the Albertan population who have higher incomes, those in Alberta who do have high incomes are more likely to oppose redistribution than their higher-income counterparts in the RoC. The overall magnitude of this effect, however, is once again modest.

[Insert Table 5.2.3 about here]

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In this case the factors that are key are compositional differences in Albertans values and beliefs. Interestingly, there is no particular value or belief that stands out as being particularly influential. Proportionally, the data indicate that Alberta has more antifeminists, social conservatives, and believers in the effectiveness of the market and in economic self-determination than any other Canadian region, and these individuals are all less likely to support redistribution than those who are not. Put more simply, Albertans are less likely to support redistribution because they are more conservative on virtually every value and belief dimension. Consistent with Wiseman's observation that "Alberta's populist liberalism, like that of America's, was unalloyed by toryism" (Wiseman 2007, 281), the only dimension on which Albertans are *not* more conservative than their fellow Canadians is the libertarianism-authoritarianism or 'tory touch' indicator, which tellingly is the only dimension of conservatism which the evidence indicates will result in an increase in support for redistribution.

Further evidence of the 'Albertan value difference' hypothesis is given by the other two factors which seems to decrease the aggregate level of Albertan support for redistribution: domination of political parties of the right and religion. The estimated effect of Albertan partisan political leadership is a 3.4% decrease in support redistribution. Given the unique nature of Alberta's political leadership (MacPherson 1953; Stewart and Archer 2000), it is unsurprising that the rightward inclination of their provincial political representatives has such an effect on its citizens' redistributive policy issue positions. As was the case for Québec, the effect of religion is entirely attributable to Catholicism, but in the Albertan case both the type and the direction of the overall effect is quite different. In the Albertan case there is an estimated 2.3% *decrease* in support caused by the fact that Albertan Catholics exhibit lower relative propensities to support redistributive public policies than Catholics in the RoC. While the presence of Catholics in Alberta *ceteris paribus* ought to have resulted in a modest increase in support for redistribution and thus brought the Albertan level of support more in line with the RoC average, the decreased propensity of Albertan Catholics to support redistribution resulted in a net decrease in support, thus increasing the distance between the average Albertan and other Canadians who reside west of the Ottawa River.

[§ 6]   Discussion and Conclusion

The analytic strategy employed by this paper broadly follows Simeon and Elkins' 'regions as containers' method. As they point out, this approach does not use region as an explanation. Rather, as Przeworski and Tuene emphasize, "the bridge between historical observations and general theory is the substitution of variables for proper names" (1970, 25). In order to permit generalizations to be made across space and time, this approach conceives of spatio-temporal categories not as independent variables themselves, but rather treats them as residual variance to be explained.

The conclusions that can be drawn from such an approach include the identification of specific explanatory variables which both do, and do not, contribute to the identified cross-regional differences. The most significant 'non-finding' of this research is that micro-level economic factors account for only a minor proportion of the overall aggregate-level differences in support for this form of public policy across Canada's regions. The most interesting over-arching conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that expansive range of factors examined considered, the key regional characteristics that are important for explaining cross-regional differences differ substantially for each of the three atypical regions considered.

As such, there are a number of noteworthy case-specific findings. The case of Alberta is almost certainly the least interesting. At least for scholars of Canadian politics, the explanation that Albertans citizens are less likely to support redistributive public policies because they hold more conservative values and beliefs and because parties on the right wing of the political spectrum dominate their provincial politics is, speaking euphemistically, underwhelming. But the recognition that there is no single 'magic bullet' which explains the negative impact of Albertans' value difference on their support for redistribution is informative. The finding that the effects of political socialization may not simply be additive – but may instead be highly contingent on contextual effects – is also an interesting result that arises from the Albertan case. Catholics may *ceteris paribus* be more likely to support redistributive public policies than their Protestant counter-parts, but the veracity of this effect may be contingent on Catholics being immersed in a socio-political environment more sympathetic to redistributive public policy goals than that found in Alberta. Likewise the identified explanations for Québec and Atlantic Canadian difference are a combination of self-evident and unforeseen results. The particularly strong impact of Atlantic Canadian feminism on support for redistribution is a novel finding. That Catholicism is a cause of Quebecers' increased support for social policies is certainly obvious, but at least for those unaware of the student protests that have taken place in Québec over the past year, the marked difference in levels of support between older and younger citizens of the province is puzzling.

At the macro-level, the impact of cross-sectional inequality on cross-regional support is also a plausible but unanticipated finding of the analysis. While at first blush the proposed explanation – that those who live in political jurisdictions characterized by greater levels of economic equality are more likely to support economic redistribution – may appear to be somewhat self-evident, the sociological processes that are implied by such an explanation may be far more complex. Although cross-sectional inequality is subsumed within the 'economic dimensions' category of the present analysis, this type of explanation conforms more closely to those provided by sociologists than economists. Whereas economists have often argued that the relationship between economic inequality and support for redistribution should be positive (Romer 1975; Roberts 1977; Meltzer and Richard 1981), sociologists have instead drawn attention to the negative relationship between these factors that can be attributed to the impact of the process of institutionalization on the preference and value formation of those in divergent political jurisdictions (Rothstein 1998; Esping-Andersen 1999; Svallfors 2003, 2010; Larsen 2006). Put more simply, this theoretical explanation proposes that Atlantic Canadians and Quebecers are more likely to support economic redistribution because these regions have

developed unique cultural-institutional egalitarian equilibria which characterizes the regions. Albeit that the processes that lead to such cultural-institutional configurations have surely differed substantially – Atlantic Canada has no comparable history of a dominance of social democratic political parties, for example – comparatively speaking the regions can be viewed as liberal analogues to Scandinavia. Such an explanation dovetails nicely with Wildavsky's (1986) contention that how people choose to organize their institutions has a powerful effect on their preferences or Hall and Soskice's (2001) identification of a variety of stable political-economic institutional equilibria.

These two latter findings are worthy of greater elaboration and warrant serious consideration as possible avenues for further research. In the light of Québec's recent student uprising, the substantial differential effect of age is topical. The differences could be investigated to determine the extents of both generational and life-cycle effects of age, as well as the factors that influence differences in levels of support between both younger citizens of Québec and the RoC, and between younger and older Quebecers. Interestingly, previous research indicates that if anything, older Canadians are even *more* likely to support redistributive policies that tend to redistribute 'away from the rich' than younger Canadian citizens, whereas as the present analysis indicates that the younger are more likely to support public policies that redistribute 'towards the poor' and ensure for the public provision of an adequate standard of living for every social member (Sealey 2011a). Other preceding research indicates that this same result also holds cross-nationally (Sealey 2011b). As such, there is clearly more to be learned from research in this direction, knowledge which may be particularly important for determining the future path of citizens' redistributive public policy preferences.

Finally, the discovery of indications of distinctive cultural-institutional egalitarian equilibria in different Canadian regions also merits further investigation. While the present results are certainly indicative of such a conclusion, they are by no means conclusive. Recall that the measure of cross-sectional economic inequality employed in the presented model is constructed with a one-year lag and incorporates data from the preceding five years. While econometric time-series analyses typically emphasize the use of short-term lagged effects in order to promote the identification of causal mechanisms, such an approach hardly constitutes an appropriate measure of what Braudel notably referred to as *la longue durée* (1949; 1958; 1969). If the estimated effect of varying cross-regional economic inequality identified in the present analysis is genuinely a consequence of institutional inertia, we should expect not only to observe relationships between the level of support for redistribution and cross-sectional levels of economic inequality using a short-term lag, but also when using data drawn from much earlier points in time. Such an analysis would be greatly complicated by the facts that economic inequality not only has a separate longitudinal effect, but that as the results of this analysis and other research demonstrates, this effect in fact influences support for redistribution in the opposite direction (Sealey 2012). The development of a model that first parses these distinct sources of variation and then evaluates the effects of long-term institutional processes promises to be a modest contribution to a quantitative investigation of the testable implications of historical institutionalism generally and welfare state regime theory more specifically in the Canadian case.

Table 5.2.1: Estimated Effects on Support for Redistributon in Atlantic Canada

	Base Log Odds	Base Predicted Probability	P-Value
Main Effect Intercept	1.49	0.814	0.083 .

	Composition Baseline	Composition Difference	Main Effect			Interaction Effect			Overall Effect		
	Proportion in Base (ROC)	Δ from Base (ROC)	Δ in Log Odds	Δ in Predicted Probability	P-Value	Δ in Log Odds	Δ in Predicted Probability	P-Value	Composition Component	Effect Component	Net Effect
Economic Dimensions											
Income (Base = Low Income)									**0.014**	**0.000**	**0.014**
Medium Low	0.215	0.068 ***	-0.16	-0.026	0.353	0.32	0.044	0.510	0.000	0.000	
Medium	0.207	-0.007	-0.50	-0.087	0.006 **	0.15	0.022	0.775	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.158	-0.008	-0.62	-0.112	0.001 **	0.16	0.023	0.772	0.000	0.000	
High	0.093	-0.017 .	-0.70	-0.130	0.001 **	0.04	0.006	0.946	0.000	0.000	
Very High	0.144	-0.066 ***	-1.07	-0.213	0.000 ***	-0.04	-0.005	0.953	0.014	0.000	
Education (Base = Incomplete Highschool)									**0.003**	**0.000**	**0.003**
Highschool	0.221	0.011	-0.10	-0.015	0.484	-0.32	-0.053	0.394	0.000	0.000	
Some Post-Secondary	0.336	-0.059 ***	-0.34	-0.057	0.012 *	0.15	0.022	0.692	0.003	0.000	
University	0.276	-0.028 .	-0.21	-0.034	0.146	-0.36	-0.060	0.382	0.000	0.000	
Employment Status (Base = Unemployed)									**0.004**	**-0.011**	**-0.007**
Self-Employed	0.140	-0.035 **	-0.55	-0.097	0.030 *	-0.11	-0.018	0.855	0.004	0.000	
Employed	0.470	0.003	-0.31	-0.052	0.189	-0.20	-0.033	0.712	0.000	0.000	
Student	0.044	-0.019 **	0.05	0.007	0.891	-1.60	-0.345	0.116	0.000	0.000	
Retired	-0.010	-0.010	-0.52	-0.092	0.045 *	-0.44	-0.076	0.461	0.000	0.000	
Homemaker	0.052	0.016 .	-0.06	-0.010	0.838	-0.59	-0.106	0.409	0.000	0.000	
Other	0.020	-0.006	1.05	0.112	0.051 .	-2.88	-0.617	0.010 *	0.000	-0.011	
Cross-Sectional Inequality[+]	---	---	-13.90	-0.114	0.045 *	---	---	---	---	---	0.047
Longitudinal Inequality[+]	---	---	7.44	0.076	0.041 *	---	---	---	---	---	0.000
Redistribution[+]	---	---	-1.23	-0.032	0.124	---	---	---	---	---	0.000
Economic Growth[+]	---	---	7.77	0.100	0.000 ***	---	---	---	---	---	0.010
Institutional Dimensions											
Union Status (Base = Not)	0.363	0.025	0.12	0.018	0.207	-0.16	-0.025	0.586	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Confidence in the Civil Service (Base = High)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Low	0.085	-0.021 *	-0.24	-0.039	0.325	1.29	0.127	0.075	0.000	0.000	
Medium Low	0.482	-0.101 ***	-0.09	-0.014	0.668	0.24	0.033	0.657	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.390	0.098 ***	0.11	0.017	0.595	0.44	0.058	0.400	0.000	0.000	
Left Government Domination[+]	---	---	0.33	0.059	0.006 **	---	---	---	---	---	-0.017

Identities Dimensions

Variable											
Gender (Base = Male)	0.497	0.058 **	0.39	0.052	0.000 ***	0.41	0.055	0.102	**0.005**	**0.000**	**0.005**
Couple (Base = Single)	0.651	0.035 *	-0.31	-0.052	0.002 **	-0.20	-0.032	0.527	**-0.002**	**0.000**	**-0.002**
Ethnic Heritage (Base = Western Europe / Canadian)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
East Asia	---	---	-0.36	-0.060	0.202	---	---	---	---	---	
Eastern Europe	0.076	-0.065 ***	0.03	0.005	0.843	---	---	---	---	---	
First Nations	---	---	0.44	0.058	0.244	---	---	---	---	---	
Middle East	---	---	0.71	0.086	0.157	---	---	---	---	---	
Other Ethnicity	0.066	-0.054 ***	0.36	0.053	0.217	---	---	---	---	---	
Ethnic Heterogeneity[+]	---	---	1.45	0.049	0.178	---	---	---	---	---	**0.000**
Immigrant (Base = Not)	0.167	-0.132 ***	-0.09	-0.014	0.458	0.12	0.018	0.842	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Racism (Base = Not)	0.084	0.009	0.09	0.013	0.550	-0.58	-0.104	0.142	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment (Base = Not)	0.196	-0.020	-0.10	-0.015	0.345	-0.11	-0.018	0.723	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Age (Base = Senior)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Low	0.132	-0.015	-0.11	-0.018	0.568	0.97	0.106	0.126	0.000	0.000	
Middle	0.310	0.019	-0.07	-0.011	0.672	0.03	0.005	0.940	0.000	0.000	
High	0.293	0.036 *	-0.05	-0.008	0.721	0.52	0.066	0.189	0.000	0.000	
Religion (Base = Protestant)									**0.010**	**0.000**	**0.010**
Catholic	0.248	0.127 ***	0.37	0.050	0.000 ***	0.42	0.055	0.133	0.010	0.000	
Jewish	0.010	---	-0.35	-0.059	0.432	---	---	---	---	---	
Not Religious	0.214	-0.147 ***	0.14	0.020	0.269	-0.77	-0.144	0.085 .	0.000	0.000	
Other Religion	0.091	0.048 ***	0.22	0.031	0.183	0.35	0.048	0.583	---	---	
Nationalism (Base = Low)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Medium Low	0.087	-0.021 *	-0.23	-0.038	0.358	0.67	0.082	0.339	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.382	0.014	-0.10	-0.016	0.648	1.29	0.127	0.034 *	0.000	0.000	
High	0.493	0.007	-0.12	-0.019	0.596	1.01	0.109	0.096 .	0.000	0.000	

Ideational Dimensions

Variable											
Authoritarianism (Base = Low)									**0.002**	**0.000**	**0.002**
Medium Low	0.278	-0.026	0.41	0.054	0.003 **	-0.92	-0.178	0.031 *	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.323	0.016	0.15	0.021	0.270	-0.21	-0.034	0.614	0.000	0.000	
High	0.247	0.051 **	0.28	0.039	0.045 *	-0.05	-0.008	0.902	0.002	0.000	
Antifeminism (Base = Low)									**0.004**	**0.055**	**0.059**
Medium Low	0.401	0.040 *	-0.20	-0.031	0.130	0.75	0.088	0.027 *	0.000	0.037	
Medium High	0.197	-0.011	-0.42	-0.073	0.003 **	0.75	0.094	0.044 *	0.000	0.018	
High	0.203	-0.045 **	-0.58	-0.104	0.000 ***	0.81	0.017	0.764	0.004	0.000	
Social Conservatism (Base = Low)									**-0.007**	**0.000**	**-0.007**
Medium Low	0.258	-0.004	-0.14	-0.022	0.333	-0.55	-0.098	0.226	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.372	0.076 ***	-0.32	-0.054	0.021 *	-0.44	-0.077	0.316	-0.007	0.000	
High	0.191	-0.010	-0.61	-0.111	0.000 ***	-0.11	-0.017	0.830	0.000	0.000	
Market Efficiency (Base = Low)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Medium Low	0.337	-0.028 .	-0.49	-0.086	0.000 ***	0.25	0.034	0.485	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.244	0.004	-0.89	-0.171	0.000 ***	-0.71	-0.131	0.035 *	0.000	0.000	
High	0.132	-0.012	-1.38	-0.289	0.000 ***	0.16	0.023	0.686	0.000	0.000	
Economic Self-Determination (Base = Low)									**0.010**	**0.000**	**0.010**
Medium Low	0.257	0.004	-0.22	-0.035	0.255	0.08	0.012	0.875	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.373	-0.001	-0.96	-0.187	0.000 ***	-0.28	-0.046	0.560	0.000	0.000	
High	0.256	-0.032 *	-1.50	-0.319	0.000 ***	-0.09	-0.014	0.854	0.010	0.000	

Significance Indicators: *** < 0.001   0.001 < ** < 0.010   0.010 < * < 0.050   0.050 < . < 0.100

Source: The 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2008 iterations of the *Canadian Elections Study*.

Notes: Macro-level variables are designated with a [+]. Macro-level sample size is 50. Micro-level sample sizes is 7,091. The statistical siginificance of macro-level variables is determined using a one-tailed directional test of significance, while for micro-level variables two-tailed tests are employed.

Table 5.2.2: Estimated Effects on Support for Redistributon in Québec

	Base Log Odds	Base Predicted Probability	P-Value
Main Effect Intercept	1.49	0.814	0.083 .

	Composition Baseline	Composition Difference	Main Effect			Interaction Effect			Overall Effect		
	Proportion in Base (ROC)	Δ from Base (ROC)	Δ in Log Odds	Δ in Predicted Probability	P-Value	Δ in Log Odds	Δ in Predicted Probability	P-Value	Composition Component	Effect Component	Net Effect
Economic Dimensions											
Income (Base = Low Income)									**0.011**	**0.000**	**0.011**
Medium Low	0.215	0.046 ***	-0.16	-0.026	0.353	0.12	0.017	0.700	0.000	0.000	
Medium	0.207	0.014	-0.50	-0.087	0.006 **	0.23	0.032	0.479	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.158	-0.013 .	-0.62	-0.112	0.001 **	0.56	0.071	0.122	0.000	0.000	
High	0.093	0.000	-0.70	-0.130	0.001 **	0.26	0.036	0.504	0.000	0.000	
Very High	0.144	-0.059 ***	-1.07	-0.213	0.000 ***	0.38	0.050	0.329	0.011	0.000	
Education (Base = Incomplete Highschool)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Highschool	0.221	0.006	-0.10	-0.015	0.484	0.12	0.017	0.648	0.000	0.000	
Some Post-Secondary	0.336	-0.010	-0.34	-0.057	0.012 *	0.19	0.027	0.459	0.000	0.000	
University	0.276	0.000	-0.21	-0.034	0.146	0.21	0.030	0.455	0.000	0.000	
Employment Status (Base = Unemployed)									**0.006**	**-0.007**	**-0.001**
Self-Employed	0.140	-0.026 **	-0.55	-0.097	0.030 *	-0.46	-0.081	0.307	0.004	0.000	
Employed	0.470	0.037 **	-0.31	-0.052	0.189	-0.35	-0.059	0.408	0.000	0.000	
Student	0.044	0.011 *	0.05	0.007	0.891	-0.49	-0.086	0.423	0.000	0.000	
Retired	-0.010	-0.035 **	-0.52	-0.092	0.045 *	0.26	0.036	0.587	0.003	0.000	
Homemaker	0.052	0.005	-0.06	-0.010	0.838	-0.40	-0.068	0.461	0.000	0.000	
Other	0.020	-0.010 **	1.05	0.112	0.051 .	-2.10	-0.465	0.017 *	0.000	-0.007	
Cross-Sectional Inequality+	---	---	-13.90	-0.114	0.045 *	---	---	---	---	---	0.033
Longitudinal Inequality+	---	---	7.44	0.076	0.041 *	---	---	---	---	---	0.000
Redistribution+	---	---	-1.23	-0.032	0.124	---	---	---	---	---	0.000
Economic Growth+	---	---	7.77	0.100	0.000 ***	---	---	---	---	---	-0.001
Institutional Dimensions											
Union Status (Base = Not)	0.363	0.015	0.12	0.018	0.207	0.08	0.011	0.701	**0.000**	**0.000**	0.000
Confidence in the Civil Service (Base = High)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Low	0.085	0.041 ***	-0.24	-0.039	0.325	0.05	0.008	0.914	0.000	0.000	
Medium Low	0.482	0.014	-0.09	-0.014	0.668	0.01	0.001	0.990	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.390	-0.038 **	0.11	0.017	0.595	0.02	0.003	0.969	0.000	0.000	
Left Government Domination[+]	---	---	0.33	0.059	0.006 **	---	---	---	---	---	0.010

Identities Dimensions

Gender (Base = Male)	0.497	0.004 ***	0.39	0.052	0.000 ***	-0.05	-0.008	0.766	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Couple (Base = Single)	0.651	-0.054 ***	-0.31	-0.052	0.002 **	-0.02	-0.004	0.902	**0.003**	**0.000**	**0.003**
Ethnic Heritage (Base = Western Europe / Canadian)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
East Asia	0.023	-0.017 ***	-0.36	-0.060	0.202	-0.73	-0.136	0.388	0.000	0.000	
Eastern Europe	0.076	-0.067 ***	0.03	0.005	0.843	-0.26	-0.042	0.732	0.000	0.000	
First Nations	0.014	-0.006 *	0.44	0.058	0.244	0.31	0.043	0.788	0.000	0.000	
Middle East	0.008	0.000	0.71	0.086	0.157	0.02	0.003	0.981	0.000	0.000	
Other Ethnicity	0.066	-0.006	0.36	0.053	0.217	0.02	0.003	0.980	0.000	0.000	
Ethnic Heterogeneity[+]	---	---	1.45	0.049	0.178	---	---	---	---	---	**0.000**
Immigrant (Base = Not)	0.167	-0.104 ***	-0.09	-0.014	0.458	0.22	0.031	0.535	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Racism (Base = Not)	0.084	0.032 ***	0.09	0.013	0.550	-0.01	-0.001	0.982	**0.000**	**0.084**	**0.000**
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment (Base = Not)	0.196	0.013	-0.10	-0.015	0.345	-0.18	-0.028	0.365	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Age (Base = Senior)									**0.002**	**0.044**	**0.046**
Low	0.132	0.033 ***	-0.11	-0.018	0.568	0.95	0.105	0.017 *	0.001	0.015	
Middle	0.310	0.036 **	-0.07	-0.011	0.672	0.73	0.087	0.026 *	0.001	0.028	
High	0.293	-0.008	-0.05	-0.008	0.721	0.50	0.064	0.100	0.000	0.000	
Religion (Base = Protestant)									**0.028**	**0.000**	**0.028**
Catholic	0.248	0.578 ***	0.37	0.050	0.000 ***	-0.02	-0.003	0.951	0.028	0.000	
Jewish	0.010	0.003	-0.35	-0.059	0.432	-0.19	-0.030	0.808	0.000	0.000	
Not Religious	0.214	-0.124 ***	0.14	0.020	0.269	-0.27	-0.045	0.501	0.000	0.000	
Other Religion	0.091	-0.054 ***	0.22	0.031	0.183	-0.61	-0.111	0.236	0.000	0.000	
Nationalism (Base = Low)									**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Medium Low	0.087	0.152 ***	-0.23	-0.038	0.358	0.27	0.038	0.401	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.382	-0.036 **	-0.10	-0.016	0.648	-0.05	-0.007	0.870	0.000	0.000	
High	0.493	-0.348 ***	-0.12	-0.019	0.596	-0.07	-0.010	0.837	0.000	0.000	

Ideational Dimensions

Authoritarianism (Base = Low)									**-0.003**	**0.000**	**-0.003**
Medium Low	0.278	0.053 ***	0.41	0.054	0.003 ***	-0.34	-0.057	0.150	0.001	0.000	
Medium High	0.323	-0.004	0.15	0.021	0.270	-0.14	-0.022	0.551	0.000	0.000	
High	0.247	-0.132 ***	0.28	0.039	0.045 *	-0.07	-0.011	0.814	-0.004	0.000	
Antifeminism (Base = Low)									**0.010**	**0.000**	**0.010**
Medium Low	0.401	0.095 ***	-0.20	-0.031	0.130	-0.23	-0.038	0.378	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.197	0.000	-0.42	-0.073	0.003 **	-0.32	-0.053	0.282	0.000	0.000	
High	0.203	-0.067 ***	-0.58	-0.104	0.000 ***	-0.48	-0.083	0.119	0.010	0.000	
Social Conservatism (Base = Low)									**0.006**	**0.013**	**0.019**
Medium Low	0.258	0.046 ***	-0.14	-0.022	0.333	0.14	0.021	0.591	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.372	0.006	-0.32	-0.054	0.021 *	0.15	0.022	0.562	0.000	0.000	
High	0.191	-0.092 ***	-0.61	-0.111	0.000 ***	0.76	0.089	0.025 *	0.006	0.013	
Market Efficiency (Base = Low)									**-0.025**	**0.000**	**-0.025**
Medium Low	0.337	-0.012	-0.49	-0.086	0.000 ***	0.31	0.042	0.260	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.244	0.067 ***	-0.89	-0.171	0.000 ***	0.23	0.033	0.381	-0.010	0.000	
High	0.132	0.055 ***	-1.38	-0.289	0.000 ***	0.13	0.019	0.644	-0.015	0.000	
Economic Self-Determination (Base = Low)									**0.004**	**0.000**	**0.004**
Medium Low	0.257	0.038 **	-0.22	-0.035	0.255	-0.15	-0.024	0.694	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.373	-0.040 **	-0.96	-0.187	0.000 ***	-0.18	-0.028	0.623	0.004	0.000	
High	0.256	-0.006	-1.50	-0.319	0.000 ***	0.06	0.008	0.876	0.000	0.000	

Significance Indicators:	*** < 0.001	0.001 < ** < 0.010	0.010 < * < 0.050	0.050 < . < 0.100

Source: The 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2008 iterations of the *Canadian Elections Study*.

Notes: Macro-level variables are designated with a [+]. Macro-level sample size is 50. Micro-level sample sizes is 7,091. The statistical siginificance of macro-level variables is determined using a one-tailed directional test of significance, while for micro-level variables two-tailed tests are employed.

Table 5.2.3: Estimated Effects on Support for Redistributon in Alberta

	Base Log Odds	Base Predicted Probability	P-Value
Main Effect Intercept	1.49	0.814	0.083 .

	Composition Baseline	Composition Difference	Main Effect			Interaction Effect			Overall Effect		
	Proportion in Base (ROC)	Δ from Base (ROC)	Δ in Log Odds	Δ in Predicted Probability	P-Value	Δ in Log Odds	Δ in Predicted Probability	P-Value	Composition Component	Effect Component	Net Effect
Economic Dimensions											
Income (Base = Low Income)									0.000	-0.018	-0.018
Medium Low	0.215	0.018	-0.16	-0.026	0.353	-0.43	-0.073	0.260	0.000	0.000	
Medium	0.207	0.008	-0.50	-0.087	0.006 **	-0.15	-0.024	0.705	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.158	-0.015	-0.62	-0.112	0.001 **	0.25	0.035	0.574	0.000	0.000	
High	0.093	0.001	-0.70	-0.130	0.001 **	-0.98	-0.191	0.043 *	0.000	-0.018	
Very High	0.144	-0.004	-1.07	-0.213	0.000 ***	0.12	0.018	0.786	0.000	0.000	
Education (Base = Incomplete Highschool)									0.000	0.000	0.000
Highschool	0.221	0.002	-0.10	-0.015	0.484	0.40	0.053	0.228	0.000	0.000	
Some Post-Secondary	0.336	0.028 .	-0.34	-0.057	0.012 *	0.07	0.010	0.833	0.000	0.000	
University	0.276	-0.020	-0.21	-0.034	0.146	-0.10	-0.015	0.780	0.000	0.000	
Employment Status (Base = Unemployed)									0.003	0.000	0.003
Self-Employed	0.140	0.033 **	-0.55	-0.097	0.030 *	0.25	0.035	0.641	-0.003	0.000	
Employed	0.470	0.013	-0.31	-0.052	0.189	0.26	0.036	0.610	0.000	0.000	
Student	0.044	-0.008	0.05	0.007	0.891	-0.43	-0.074	0.559	0.000	0.000	
Retired	-0.010	-0.047 **	-0.52	-0.092	0.045 *	-0.41	-0.070	0.472	0.006	0.000	
Homemaker	0.052	0.017 *	-0.06	-0.010	0.838	-0.95	-0.185	0.126	0.000	0.000	
Other	0.020	-0.007 .	1.05	0.112	0.051 .	-1.95	-0.430	0.063 .	0.000	0.000	
Cross-Sectional Inequality+	---	---	-13.90	-0.114	0.045 *	---	---	---	---	---	0.006
Longitudinal Inequality[+]	---	---	7.44	0.076	0.041 *	---	---	---	---	---	0.000
Redistribution[+]	---	---	-1.23	-0.032	0.124	---	---	---	---	---	0.000
Economic Growth[+]	---	---	7.77	0.100	0.000 ***	---	---	---	---	---	0.005
Institutional Dimensions											
Union Status (Base = Not)	0.363	-0.080 ***	0.12	0.018	0.207	0.29	0.040	0.226	0.000	0.000	0.000
Confidence in the Civil Service (Base = High)									0.000	0.000	0.000
Medium Low	0.482	0.030 .	-0.24	-0.039	0.325	-0.12	-0.019	0.851	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.390	-0.002	-0.09	-0.014	0.668	-0.21	-0.034	0.705	0.000	0.000	
High	0.043	-0.017	0.11	0.017	0.595	-0.08	-0.013	0.883	0.000	0.000	
Left Government Domination[+]	---	---	0.33	0.059	0.006 **	---	---	---	---	---	-0.034

Identities Dimensions

Gender (Base = Male)	0.497	0.017		0.39	0.052	0.000	***	0.10	0.014	0.645	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Couple (Base = Single)	0.651	0.030	.	-0.31	-0.052	0.002	**	0.08	0.011	0.742	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Ethnic Heritage (Base = Western Europe / Canadian)											**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
East Asia	0.023	0.002		-0.36	-0.060	0.202		-0.33	-0.054	0.634	0.000	0.000	
Eastern Europe	0.076	0.053		0.03	0.005	0.843		-0.21	-0.034	0.496	0.000	0.000	
First Nations	0.014	0.005		0.44	0.058	0.244		0.71	0.085	0.542	0.000	0.000	
Middle East	---	---		0.71	0.086	0.157		---	---	---	---	---	
Other Ethnicity	0.066	-0.010		0.36	0.053	0.217		-0.44	-0.075	0.591	0.000	0.000	
Ethnic Heterogeneity[+]	---	---		1.45	0.049	0.178		---	---	---	---	---	**0.000**
Immigrant (Base = Not)	0.167	-0.040	**	-0.09	-0.014	0.458		0.21	0.030	0.498	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Racism (Base = Not)	0.084	0.017	.	0.09	0.013	0.550		0.02	0.003	0.946	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment (Base = Not)	0.196	0.018		-0.10	-0.015	0.345		-0.33	-0.055	0.189	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Age (Base = Senior)											**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Low	0.132	0.029	*	-0.11	-0.018	0.568		0.25	0.035	0.568	0.000	0.000	
Middle	0.310	0.043	**	-0.07	-0.011	0.672		0.16	0.023	0.668	0.000	0.000	
High	0.293	-0.038	*	-0.05	-0.008	0.721		-0.11	-0.017	0.761	0.000	0.000	
Religion (Base = Protestant)											**0.000**	**-0.023**	**-0.023**
Catholic	0.248	-0.021		0.37	0.050	0.000	***	-0.54	-0.096	0.032	*	0.000	-0.023
Jewish	0.010	-0.003		-0.35	-0.059	0.432		0.00	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	
Not Religious	0.214	-0.026	.	0.14	0.020	0.269		-0.38	-0.064	0.188	0.000	0.000	
Other Religion	0.091	0.015	.	0.22	0.031	0.183		0.11	0.016	0.773	0.000	0.000	
Nationalism (Base = Low)											**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Medium Low	0.087	0.022	*	-0.23	-0.038	0.358		0.02	0.051	0.474	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.382	0.008		-0.10	-0.016	0.648		-0.33	0.044	0.477	0.000	0.000	
High	0.493	-0.043	*	-0.12	-0.019	0.596		0.25	0.053	0.378	0.000	0.000	

Ideational Dimensions

Authoritarianism (Base = Low)											**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Medium Low	0.278	-0.002		0.41	0.054	0.003		0.04	0.007	0.888	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.323	0.038	*	0.15	0.021	0.270		0.05	0.008	0.871	0.000	0.000	
High	0.247	-0.024	.	0.28	0.039	0.045		0.20	0.028	0.563	0.000	0.000	
Antifeminism (Base = Low)											**-0.013**	**0.000**	**-0.013**
Medium Low	0.401	-0.026	.	-0.20	-0.031	0.130		-0.05	-0.008	0.880	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.197	0.009		-0.42	-0.073	0.003	**	-0.02	-0.003	0.957	0.000	0.000	
High	0.203	0.100	***	-0.58	-0.104	0.000		-0.37	-0.062	0.311	-0.013	0.000	
Social Conservatism (Base = Low)											**-0.009**	**0.000**	**-0.009**
Medium Low	0.258	-0.039	*	-0.14	-0.022	0.333		0.03	0.005	0.930	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.372	0.052	**	-0.32	-0.054	0.021	*	-0.03	-0.005	0.934	-0.003	0.000	
High	0.191	0.064	***	-0.61	-0.111	0.000	***	0.17	0.025	0.677	-0.006	0.000	
Market Efficiency (Base = Low)											**-0.023**	**0.000**	**-0.023**
Medium Low	0.337	-0.054	**	-0.49	-0.086	0.000	***	0.06	0.010	0.828	0.004	0.000	
Medium High	0.244	0.049	**	-0.89	-0.171	0.000	***	-0.07	-0.011	0.811	-0.009	0.000	
High	0.132	0.062	***	-1.38	-0.289	0.000		-0.04	-0.007	0.891	-0.018	0.000	
Economic Self-Determination (Base = Low)											**-0.010**	**0.000**	**-0.010**
Medium Low	0.257	-0.011		-0.22	-0.035	0.255		0.01	0.002	0.976	0.000	0.000	
Medium High	0.373	0.057	**	-0.96	-0.187	0.000	***	0.06	0.008	0.889	-0.010	0.000	
High	0.256	-0.026	.	-1.50	-0.319	0.000		0.44	0.058	0.287	0.000	0.000	

Significance Indicators: *** < 0.001   0.001 < ** < 0.010   0.010 < * < 0.050   0.050 < . < 0.100

Source: The 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2008 iterations of the *Canadian Elections Study.*

Notes: Macro-level variables are designated with a [+]. Macro-level sample size is 50. Micro-level sample sizes is 7,091. The statistical siginificance of macro-level variables is determined using a one-tailed directional test of significance, while for micro-level variables two-tailed tests are employed.

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