

Does Multiculturalism Isolate People? Diversity, social capital, and attitudes towards government in Canada

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Multiculturalism has become an increasingly important part of the way that states respond to diversity. As multiculturalism policies have become more common, they have been criticized for becoming barriers to ethnic-minority integration. Critics argue that by helping to maintain a diverse array of cultural and social identities multiculturalism limits the degree to which states can build a common political identity. Canada adopted one of the first and one of the strongest multiculturalism policies of any state, and multiculturalism has become an important part of Canadian identity. The strength of multiculturalism policies in Canada make critiques of multiculturalism particularly relevant to the country. If multiculturalism policies inhibit political integration, Canada should experience significant problems building a common identity across diverse communities. This paper investigates the mechanisms through which critics of multiculturalism suggest multiculturalism limits political integration, and the degree to which those mechanisms can be found in Canada. In doing so, it discusses whether the maintenance of diverse ethnic-identities is mutually exclusive to the building of strong support for state and government institutions. There is little evidence to suggest that Canada is experiencing the divisions that critics of multiculturalism suggest that it should. I find that Canadians who have strong ties to their ethnic and cultural communities are not more likely to have lower opinions of government and are not less likely to believe that most people can be trusted.

This paper will be divided into four sections. The first will examine the theoretical grounding of the isolation critique of multiculturalism, developing some hypotheses that can be tested within the Canadian context. The second will cover the data and methods used in testing these hypotheses. The third section will present results for hypothesis tests and the fourth will draw some overarching conclusions about the applicability of the critique to Canada.

Literature Review and Hypotheses

Diversity and Support for the State

A central critique of multiculturalism is that multiculturalism's support of diverse identities limits support for collective institutions and endeavours. This critique has roots in republican democratic theory that argues that common cultural values provide necessary grounding for political discourse. Michael Walzer and David Miller both make the argument that there are common understandings and values that guide political debate that are grounded in culture. Walzer connects membership in a community with the claims that individuals have to group resources and the right individuals have to participate in collective decisions (Walzer, 1983, 31-32). For Walzer communities within the state will cease to be insular only when there is a common notion of welfare, culture, or politics, that ties people in those communities to each other (38). Political communities are thus justified in requiring some degree of assimilation into the community as a requirement for membership in the state. This assimilation creates the moral commitments between members of the political community that allow collective institutions to function. Miller takes a similar view of membership in the state, arguing that common connection and identity are necessary for robust political deliberation. A strong sense of national identity provides the basis for a common community that leads people to be concerned for the well-being of others (Miller, 2000, 68-69). Central to both Walzer's and Miller's analysis is that individuals must feel a degree of connectedness to engage in politics. Both allow for some diversity within the state, but also that members of the state share common bonds that give them a stake in each other's interests. The weaker those bonds are, the more concerned both are that states will not be able to mobilize members to engage in activities oriented towards collective ends.

Brian Barry extends this analysis to multiculturalism programs specifically. He argues that

some level of cultural assimilation is necessary for states to avoid becoming culturally segregated. For Barry, programs such as bilingual education¹ can prevent individuals in ethnic-minority communities from building connections with people outside of their ethnic-community. This in turn limits their ability to pursue ways of life that take them outside of their ethnic and cultural communities (Barry, 2001, 213-214). Barry further argues that commitment to a liberal and redistributive state requires bonds that go beyond those that can be established by a legal concept of citizenship. He believes that these commitments require the development of common identities that lead individuals to see themselves as more than legal members of a state, but also as members of a common cultural community. Barry argues that multiculturalism policies undermine the creation of these commitments (77-78). Nee and Saunders provide some empirical support for Barry's segregation argument, noting that reliance on ethnic communities for housing and employment support often limits the ability of immigrants to build social networks that go beyond their own ethnic communities (Nee and Saunders, 2001, 387).

Joppke also claims that investing state resources in protecting and promoting minority cultural practices can isolate communities from the rest of society. In the United States, Joppke argues that the adoption of multicultural education has awoken ethno-racial consciousness that might not have otherwise developed amongst ethnic-minority individuals (Joppke, 1999, 174-175)². Joppke sees state efforts to strengthen the bonds that exist within ethnic-minority communities as mutually exclusive to efforts to build connections between ethnic-minority communities and the majority community. The more time people spend within their own ethnic and cultural communities, the less time they spend connection with those outside of those communities. For Barry and Joppke this has isolating impacts on both majority and minority communities. For majority communities, concern that minorities are not integrating into the state makes them less inclined to view the interests of minorities sympathetically. The concern that minorities might stake a claim to state resources without integrating into the community makes majority communities less supportive of state programs. Members of the majority community here become concerned that by putting resources into state programs they are effectively transferring them from their own communities to others. With respect to ethnic-minorities, some critics of multiculturalism believe that increased connections within one's minority community prevents minorities from building ties outside of their community. The lack of political, economic, and social ties with those outside their community in turn limits their participation in and support for a state's political institutions.

Multiculturalism policies have been criticized for their impact on the welfare state in particular. Barry's central claim that multiculturalism undermines the sense of common community is an important part of these critiques. This comes through in work by Wolfe and Klausen, who argue that the common bonds needed to sustain the welfare state can be undermined by policies that support the development of sub-state identities (Wolfe and Klausen, 1997, 240-241). They argue that people are less willing to pay into redistributive systems when they feel that the beneficiaries of those systems do not com from their own communities. Martin Gilens offers some evidence to support this claim. He

1 Bilingual education in this case refers to education in the language of the majority culture and in the language of a minority community. Spanish/English bilingual education programs in California serve as an example of what Barry is referring to here.

2 Joppke makes a similar argument that Turks in Germany end up isolated from the rest of German society because of what Joppke refers to as multicultural policies designed to preserve Turkish cultural practices (Joppke 1999, 212-214). Joppke, however, is stretching when he refers to German policies towards Turkish communities as multiculturalism. The inability of many Turkish guest workers to gain citizenship and claim the political rights associated with citizenship plays a large role in the isolation of those communities from the rest of German society. These policies seem to be less about the preservation of Turkish cultural practices within Turkish communities in Germany and more about the exclusion of Turkish communities from certain aspects of German citizenship and society.

finds that Americans who have negative attitudes towards African-Americans (and who are more likely to believe that African-Americans are majority recipients of welfare spending³) are less likely to support increases in welfare spending (Gilens, 1999, 68-69). Alesina and Glaeser find further support for this, noting that American states with a higher proportion of African-Americans spend less on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and that racial fractionalization is associated with a decrease in the proportion of GDP states spend on welfare (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, 140-141, 146-148).

The theoretical and empirical arguments put forward here should have implications for the attitudes that people have with respect to government institutions. Individuals who are opposed to welfare spending directed at members outside of the community should also have difficulty with collective institutions that serve individuals from outside of their community. The more diverse the society, the more members of it should feel that collective institutions fail to adequately represent their interests. If critics of multiculturalism are correct, this should come through in the manner in which individuals view the government. This relationship should hold for both majority and minority communities. Majority communities should feel that government programs that respond to the interests of the state as a whole are not in line with their own interests. As government of diverse states spend money on things such as welfare programs, members of the majority community should become concerned that governments are transferring resources away from their community. Minority communities should be less supportive of government institutions in diverse states because of a lack of connections between minority communities and government institutions. Isolation from political, social, and economic institutions should give minorities less ability to influence government policy development and thus leave them less supportive of government.

If the theory that multiculturalism isolates people living in diverse societies from each other is correct then there should be differences in attitudes towards governments across individuals. If connection to one's ethnic identity is the key mechanism through which diversity affects support for state institutions, then those individuals who feel more connected to their ethnic identity should express lower support for state institutions than those who have weaker ethnic identifications. This should hold for both those that identify with the majority ethnicity and those that identify with the minority one. Those that identify with the majority community should be more likely to see minorities as people outside of the state's community and should thus be less supportive of government programs that transfer resources to them. These individuals should exhibit the attitudes that Barry theorizes and that Gilens and Alesina and Glaeser find in the United States. If the theory that multiculturalism isolates people from the state is correct, minorities who feel their ethnicity is more important to them should also be less supportive of government than those that feel ethnicity is less important. It is these individuals who should have the most difficulty building ties outside their community and should thus feel more isolated from government. The following hypotheses can be developed from this theory.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals who are more involved in their ethnic-communities should be less supportive of government institutions.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who consider ethnicity to be more important should be less supportive of government institutions.

Diversity and Social Capital

The theory that multiculturalism decreases support for state institutions speaks well to research done on social capital and support for government institutions. For critics of multiculturalism and social capital theorists the links that people build with one another have an impact on the way that they view government institutions. For both, strong connections with people across different social groups should

³ African-Americans do not make up the majority of welfare recipients, but many Americans believe that they do (Gilens, 1999, 67-68).

lead individuals to be more supportive of government institutions. Putnam claims that increased levels of social capital are associated with stronger local government performance in Italy and with increased political participation in the United States (Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2000). He argues that community organizations serve as important training grounds for political activity (Putnam, 2000, 338-339). Furthermore, participation in community organizations builds trust bonds between members of a community (339-340).

Putnam draws a distinction between bonding and bridging capital. Bonding capital is social capital that is built amongst members of groups. It links people within communities to each other, but does not link people to those outside their community. For Putnam bonding capital is built within exclusive organizations. These organizations bring people together based on similar ethnic, cultural, religious, and other common identities (Putnam, 2000, 22-24). Bonding capital has a limited ability to increase political participation because it does not build trust ties across social groups. For Putnam bonding capital isolates people within their own communities. He identifies diversity as a threat to the development of strong social capital because of the degree to which diverse communities see the development of bonding and not bridging capital (Putnam, 2007). Bridging capital has an important role for Putnam in building trust within states. Bridging capital is built through the engagement of individuals from diverse backgrounds in organizations that span social, cultural, and ethnic divides. The degree to which it engages diverse groups of people gives bridging capital a valuable role for Putnam in building support for state institutions (Putnam, 2000, 22-24). The distinction that Putnam draws between bridging and bonding capital is important to the application of the theory that multiculturalism isolates individuals. Members of community organizations that build bonding capital should have lower levels of trust for other individuals and should have lower ratings of governments than others. Members of community organizations that build bridging capital should have higher levels of trust for others and should have higher ratings of government institutions. This yields the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals who are members of community organizations that build bonding capital should have lower ratings of government institutions than others.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals who are members of community organizations that build bridging capital should have higher ratings of government institutions than others.

Hypothesis 5: In both of these cases, social trust should act as an intervening variable.

I expect that the impacts of ethnic ties in support for government institutions may be different for majority and minority communities. The mechanisms through which diversity reduces support for government institutions are different for people from different ethnic backgrounds. For members of the majority community the concern that government in diverse communities may redistribute their resources to members of a different community is the mechanism through which they are expected to have lower approval ratings for government institutions. For minority communities, the degree to which they are isolated within the own communities is expected to impact the degree to which they build connection with the broader social, economic, and political community. It is possible to find evidence that one of these mechanisms is present in Canada while not finding evidence for the presence of the other mechanism. As a result, I ran a set of tests that separate those that identify as part of the majority ethnic community from those that identify as part of an ethnic-minority community.

Defences of Multiculturalism

In contrast to the concerns expressed by critics of multiculturalism, defenders of multiculturalism see it as important to connecting ethnic-minorities to the state. Kymlicka claims that multiculturalism policies make important accommodations that allow ethnic-minorities to engage in political, social, and economic activity to the same degree at the majority community. He argues that accommodations such as those that allow Sikhs to wear turbans with RCMP uniforms or grant work exemptions for

individuals to participate in religious holidays are necessary to allowing individuals to participate in public life while maintaining their cultural and religious practices (Kymlicka, 1995, 176-177). He makes the point that multiculturalism protections often have the goal of ensuring that ethnic-minorities can integrate into society while maintaining their own culture. Indeed, a large part of Canadian multiculturalism is geared towards facilitating cultural exchange, developing anti-racism programs, ensuring equal employment, and ensuring equal legal treatment for minorities (Ley, 2010, 197-198). Charles Taylor argues that the manner in which minorities are recognized affects the way that they see themselves within the state. Multiculturalism can play a valuable role in creating environments in which minorities feel comfortable integrating into society (Taylor, 1994, 25-26). Advocates of multiculturalism see it as not having an isolating effect on ethnic-minorities, but rather argue that it plays a valuable role integrating immigrants and ethnic-minorities.

There is some evidence to support the argument that multiculturalism plays a positive role in ethnic-minority and immigrant integration. Kymlicka argues that Canada and Australia, countries with strong multiculturalism policies, have more ethnic-minorities elected to parliament and higher levels of identification with Canada and Australia amongst immigrants (Kymlicka, 2010, 261-262). Comparing the United States and Canada, Bloemraad finds that multiculturalism leads to higher levels of citizenship acquisition and immigrant integration in Canada (Bloemraad, 2006, 43-45). With respect to multiculturalism and the welfare state, Banting et al. find that state that have introduced multiculturalism policies have not seen higher levels of retrenchment over the welfare state that those that do not have multiculturalism policies (Banting et al., 2006, 65-66). Markus Crepaz also finds that states with modest multiculturalism policies have higher levels of welfare spending than states without multiculturalism policies⁴ (Crepaz, 2008, 181-182). Kymlicka's and Bloemraad's work calls into question the arguments made by critics of multiculturalism that multiculturalism limits the ties between diverse communities in a state. Banting et al and Crepaz put forward evidence that suggests that the negative effects critics of multiculturalism expect to see with respect to the welfare state have not been realized empirically. This cross-national research contrasts with the evidence put forward by Alesina and Glaeser and Gilens focusing primarily on the United States.

The arguments defending multiculturalism tie well into research that argues that bridging and bonding capital may not be mutually exclusive to each other. Fennema and Tille claim that the bridging capital built between elites of ethnic-minority organizations and other elites can be transferred to members of the ethnic-community through within community bonding capital. They find in the Netherlands that those cultural communities that have high membership in ethnic organizations, and high levels of contact between elites organizations other political and social elites, also have community members that are more likely to seek Dutch advisors when making decisions regarding employment, housing, or children's education (Fennema and Tillie, 2008). Multiculturalism policies that create bonding capital within ethnic-minority communities can help to integrate such communities so long as multiculturalism policies also create points of contact between ethnic-minority communities and other communities. Building bridging capital between communities that have a high level of bonding capital can increase levels of integration and trust across groups.

This paper will make a couple of contributions to previous tests of multiculturalism policies. First, I will look at attitudes towards government instead of policy outcomes. This allows me to get at the mechanism through which critics of multiculturalism expect multiculturalism to affect policy. Critics of multiculturalism expect that diversity within societies will change the way that majorities view government and the degree to which minorities will feel part of the state. My test will look directly at these attitudes instead of at the policy outcomes that they may have. I expect that

⁴ Countries with strong multiculturalism policies have higher levels of welfare spending than those without, but less than countries with modest multiculturalism policies (Crepaz, 2008, 181-182).

individuals will identify governments as responsible for a number of collective projects, and as a result, individuals who oppose collective projects to have more negative attitudes towards government. Furthermore, my test of individual attitudes allows me to differentiate between individuals for whom mechanisms of multiculturalism's critics are present and those for whom they are not. I am able to distinguish between individuals who attach a strong importance to their ethnicity and those that do not. I am also able to distinguish between individuals who are highly involved in their communities and those that are not. By comparing these groups I can test for the impact of the mechanisms that critics of multiculturalism identify.

Data and Methods

Canada as a Case

In this paper I look at the applicability of critiques of multiculturalism to Canada. Testing these theories in Canada is important for a couple of reasons. First, looking at this in the Canadian context provides a valuable test of the immigrant integration policies that Canada has adopted. Over four decades, multiculturalism has not just become a central aspect of Canada's immigration and integration policy, it has become an important part of Canadian identity. The repercussions that this has on the manner in which ethnic-minorities as well as other Canadians view themselves with relation to the state is important. It would be interesting to know if Canadians who are more attached to their ethnic-identity than others have difficulty connecting with state institutions in a multicultural state. The second reason that looking at these theories in the Canadian context is that Canada provides an easy test for these theories. As a state that has had strong, long-standing, and well-entrenched multiculturalism policies, Canada is a case that should see the extensive negative impacts of multiculturalism that critics predict. If multiculturalism isolates individuals who are strongly connected to their own ethnicities from the state, Canada is a state where this should happen to a great degree. If Canada does not see a lower level of support for government amongst individuals who feel closely tied to their ethnicity, there is reason to doubt the degree to which multiculturalism isolates individuals from the state.

Data Source

For this paper I use survey data from the first and second waves of the Equality, Security, and Community Survey (ESC) conducted in 2000-2001 (first wave) and 2002-2003 (second wave). The survey contains questions on the level of general trust respondents have for others, their membership in various types of organizations, and the importance that they assign to ethnicity. These variables allow me to test whether membership in ethnic or cultural organizations as well as attachment to ethnicity have an impact on support for government. The ESC also over-samples urban communities, something that is valuable because it ensures a significant representation of ethnic-minorities within the sample⁵. The first wave of the survey includes 4105 respondents from the national sample and an additional 1051 respondents from a sample of just metropolitan areas. The second wave includes 4202 respondents from a national sample, with an additional 1452 respondents coming from a sample of only urban areas (York University, 2013). In my data analysis I weigh each response equally.

Dependent Variables

In examining support for government institutions I use a couple of different variables. The first variable that I use is government rating. Here I use an ESC question that asks respondents to assign a rating out of 100 to different levels of government. The first wave includes ratings for federal, provincial, and municipal governments. I take an average of these scores to create an average government rating for each respondent. The second wave of the survey includes rating for only federal and provincial governments. For this wave of the survey I create an average government rating for

5 Urban areas tend to be more diverse than rural communities.

each respondent from their ratings of federal and provincial governments. The first wave of the ESC also includes ratings out of 100 for the courts and the police. I use these as additional dependent variables in order to get tests that look at government institutions that are further from partisan politics than governments.

I run another set of regressions that look at generalized trust as a dependent variable. This tests the degree to which people's membership in organizations and attachment to their ethnicity affect generalized trust. These tests get at the plausibility of social capital as an intervening variable that leads membership in particular types of organizations or attachment to ethnicity to reduce individuals' support for government institutions. To measure generalized trust I use a survey question that asks whether respondents believe that most people can be trusted. I turned this into a dummy variable, with people who believe that most people can be trusted coded as a 1, and people who believe that most people cannot be trusted coded as a 0. In order for trust to act as an intervening variable, the independent variables that impact government rating should impact social trust in a similar manner.

Independent Variables

The first set of independent variables that I test speak to organization membership. The ESC survey asks about the number of organizations that respondents either give time to or are a member of. It separates these organizations into a number of different types, which I test in this paper. These include membership in or time given to service, recreational, political, cultural, ethnic, religious, and organizations that help people. I test each of these categories of organizations as separate independent variables. I do not aggregate these variables because I expect different types of organizations to have different effects on my dependent variables. The relationship of different types of organizations to government rating and generalized trust also have different implications for the theories put forward by critics of multiculturalism. Organizations that are not tied to culture or ethnicity should have more diverse memberships, and therefore should build bridging capital between their members. Service, recreational, and help organizations should all build bridging capital and thus increase support for government institutions and generalized trust. Political clubs should build bonding capital between members of the same political group⁶ but should create bridging capital across ethnic and cultural groups⁷. In contrast to these organizations, ethnic and religious organizations should have memberships that are ethnically, religiously, and often culturally homogenous. These organizations should create bonding capital between members of ethnic and religious communities, but should be less effective when it comes to building bridging capital. Membership in these clubs should thus have a negative impact on support for government institutions and generalized trust if critics of multiculturalism are correct. It is unclear where cultural organizations fit in this dynamic. If cultural organizations are largely oriented towards members of the same culture, one might expect them to build bonding capital and as a result decrease support for government institutions and generalized trust. If cultural organizations include members from diverse cultural groups, one might expect them to build bridging capital and as a result have a positive impact on ratings of government and generalized trust.

I also include in this paper an independent variable for the importance that respondents attach to ethnicity. Here I use a survey question that asks respondents to rate the importance of ethnicity to them as very important, important, somewhat important, or not important. I create dummy variables for each response. In the regressions I present in the paper I will compare the respondents who say ethnicity is very important, important, or somewhat important against a base category of individuals who say that ethnicity is not important to them. I will include in the appendix regressions using different base

6 A political organization might be a political party, but also could be an organization that engages in political activity but is not explicitly affiliated with a particular party.

7 This should occur to the extent that political organizations have members from different ethnic and cultural groups. This is likely to be the case in Canada.

categories for comparison. I use the not important category as a base for comparison for two reasons. The first is that it provides a good comparison point against which I can compare all those other categories in which respondents attach at least some importance to ethnicity. The second is that it is this comparison that yields the most significant results. The limited difference in government rating and generalized trust between the different categories of individuals that see ethnicity as at least somewhat important suggest that the divide between individuals over ethnicity and government rating lies between individuals that attach at least some importance to ethnicity and those that do not attach any importance to ethnicity at all.

The theories generated by critics of multiculturalism policies may have different impacts on members of majority and minority ethnic communities. In order to account for this I run a separate set of regressions that separates out individuals who identify as Canadian and those do not. To get a measure of respondents' ethnicity I use an ESC survey question that asks respondents to list their primary ethnic identification. I am unable to compare each identity group against each other because of the low response totals within a large number of ethnic groups. In order to make comparisons I aggregate ethnic identifications in a couple of different ways. In this paper I use an aggregation that includes individuals within the majority community if they identify as Canadian, Quebecois, Aboriginal, English, British, Scottish, Irish, French, American, or from New Zealand. Individuals who do not identify in this group are included in the minority category. This is the broadest conception of the majority community that I tested. I also ran regressions with majority categories that include individuals that identify as Canadian, Quebecois, or Aboriginal and as Canadian, Quebecois, Aboriginal, English, French, or British. I also included regressions that include only those that identify as Canadian in the majority category. Changing the aggregation of the majority category did not have much of an impact on the results of my tests. I include regressions for the majority category that counts only those that identify as Canadian in the appendix.

Data Analysis

I use two types of regression analysis in this paper. I use OLS regression analysis for all test that have government rating as the dependent variable. The continuous nature of the government rating variable allows me to do this. I am not able to use OLS analysis for the regressions that use generalized trust as a dependent variable because generalized trust is a binary variable. In these cases I use LOGIT analysis. On each LOGIT regression I run a series of tests using CLARIFY software in order to determine the impact of various shifts in organization membership and attachment to ethnicity on the level of generalized trust within communities. In all regressions I include a set of control variables. These are income, education, gender, and age. In my analysis education and age tended to have statistically significant impacts on government rating and generalized trust while income and gender tended not to.

Results and Analysis

Ratings of Government Institutions

The first set of test that I ran look at the impact of club membership and importance of ethnicity on the attitudes that individuals have towards government. If critics of multiculturalism are correct, that multiculturalism policies isolate individuals from the state, those individuals who are members of ethnic and religious organizations,⁸ and who consider ethnicity to be more important, should have lower ratings of government institutions. The ESC data on club membership does not support this theory. The only statistically significant negative relationship between organization membership and government rating occurs in 1993 with respect to the way that members of political organizations view government. There is no statistically significant (at the 95% confidence interval) relationship between

⁸ As noted in the methods section, ethnic and religious organizations are the most likely organizations to build bonding capital instead of bridging capital.

membership in cultural organizations and ratings of government, courts, or the police. Further, in all cases, except in 2003, with respect to government institutions the signs of the coefficients are positive. This is the wrong direction if membership in cultural organizations is contributing to the isolation from society that critics of multiculturalism predict it to. In no case is there a statistically significant relationship between membership in ethnic or religious organizations and support for government, the courts, or police. In the case of ethnic organizations, two coefficients (2001 government rating and police rating) have negative signs, but the other two coefficients have positive signs. All of the tests of membership in religious organizations on government, police, and court rating produce coefficients with positive signs. These results are not expected by the theories advanced by critics of multiculturalism. With respect to membership in organizations, the theory advanced by critics of multiculturalism does appear to transfer well to Canada. The table below gives the full set of regression coefficients for this test.

Insert table 1 here

The tests run on ethnic importance provide further evidence that the theories developed by critics of multiculturalism cannot be extended to Canada. The tests that I run looking at the impact of attachment to ethnicity on the ratings individuals have for government produce statistically significant relationships, but ones that are positive. In 2001 and 2003 individuals who consider ethnicity to be very important or important are statistically significantly more likely to rate government more highly as compared to those that ethnicity is not important at all. Additionally, in 2001 those that think ethnicity is not very important rate government more highly than those who do not attach any importance to ethnicity at all. None of the results for court or police rating are significant, but all coefficients are positive. This test provides quite strong evidence against the theory that multiculturalism decreases individuals' support for the state in Canada. Not only a lack of statistically significant evidence to show that attachment to ethnicity reduces support for government institutions, there is statistically significant evidence that individuals with stronger connections to their community have higher ratings of government- the relationship opposite to the one expected by critics of multiculturalism. If attachment to ethnicity correlates with increased ratings of government, it is difficult to argue that multiculturalism reduces support for government by increasing individuals' attachments to their own ethnicities. The results of these tests are displayed in the table below.

Insert table 2

The impact of community organizations and importance ethnicity may not be the same across different communities. In order to test for this I run the same tests as above on categories that are separated by ethnic identification. The results of these tests are similar to my earlier tests. Membership in religious organizations has a negative but not statistically significant relationship with average government rating for ethnic-minorities in both 2001 and 2003. Membership in ethnic organizations has a negative relationship with government rating in 2001 for ethnic minorities, but a positive one in 2003. Neither of these relationships is statistically significant. There are no statistically significant (at the 95% confidence level) relationships between ethnic or religious organization membership and court or police rating for ethnic-minorities. The closest piece of evidence to what critics of multiculturalism would predict is a negative relationship between membership in ethnic organizations and police rating for ethnic-minorities. This relationship is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level, but not at the 95% confidence level. Given the lack of other relationships that critics of multiculturalism would predict, it is difficult to see this as evidence of a trend in Canada where ethnic-minorities who

are more active in their own communities are less supportive of government institutions. There is a statistically significant negative relationship between membership in religious organizations and support for government in 2003 for members of the majority community. The impact of this relationship is very small at 0.2 of a point out of 100 and is not mirrored by any other statistically negative relationship between membership in religious or ethnic organizations and government rating, court rating, or police rating in 2001. In 2001, the relationships that existed with the non-divided categories holds when the importance of ethnicity is looked at. This relationship is no longer statistically significant for either ethnic-minority or ethnic-majority groups in 2003, but the coefficients are still positive, indicating a lack of evidence that either ethnic-majorities or ethnic-minorities that feel more attached to their ethnicity are less supportive of government institutions. The tests that separate responses based on ethnicity are less supportive of government institutions. The tests that separate responses based on ethnicity demonstrate the same lack of evidence that multiculturalism isolates people from each other as the tests do not separate responses based on ethnicity. In this case again, it does appear that the theories advanced by critics of multiculturalism are holding in the Canadian case. The tables for these tests are included below.

Insert tables 3 and 4 here

General Social Trust

The second set of tests that I run look at the impact of club membership and ethnic importance on social trust. If social trust is an intervening variable in the theory that multiculturalism isolates people from each other, bonding organizations and those who feel that their ethnicity is more importance to them should have lower levels of general social trust. There is very limited evidence to suggest that this is the case in Canada. In the data from 2001, individuals who are members of more ethnic organizations are less likely to believe that most people can be trusted, but this relationship does not hold in the data from 2003. Further, religious organizations do not show a statistically significant negative relationship between membership and the belief that most people can be trusted. The coefficient for the effect of religious organizations on the belief that most people can be trusted is negative, but the size of the coefficient is very small. These results do not fit the theory that increased connection within one's own ethnic or cultural community isolates individuals from the rest of society. There is not a strong relationship between involved in organizations connected to one's ethnic or cultural community and lower likelihoods of belief that most people can be trusted in Canada. The results of this regression and CLARIFY tests are presented in the table below.

Insert table 5 here

The tests that I ran on the importance of ethnicity also show a lack of evidence for the theory advanced by critics of multiculturalism in Canada. If multiculturalism is isolating people from each other by leading people to be connected more closely to their own ethnic groups than others, those that place more importance on their ethnicity should be less likely to believe that most people can be trusted. In neither year of the ESC survey is this the case. In 2001 none of the categories of respondents that attach at least some importance to ethnicity are statistically significantly less likely to believe that most people can be trusted as compared to those who do not attach any importance to ethnicity at all. To the extent that there are differences between those categories they are in the wrong direction for the theory that multiculturalism isolates people from each other. The results from 2001 show slightly positive coefficients for categories that attach at least some importance to ethnicity. These results are duplicated in 2003 with the exception that the category of individuals that see ethnicity as very important has a

slightly negative coefficient when compared to those who do not believe that ethnicity is important. This relationship through is not statistically significant and the coefficient is indeed very small. This suggests that individuals who are linked more closely to their own ethnicity are not less likely to believe that most people can be trusted in Canada. The for these regressions along with tests done in CLARIFY are included below.

Insert table 6 here

Splitting the respondents into categories based on membership in majority and minority ethnic communities show results that are similar to the ones for tests that do not split respondents. Membership in ethnic or religious clubs does not statistically significantly decrease the likelihood that ethnic-minority respondents believe that most people can be trusted in either the 2001 survey or the 2003 survey. There is a statistically significant negative affect for members of the majority community in the 2001 with respect to membership in ethnic organizations. This mirrors the effect noted in the non-split sample. With respect to the importance one places on ethnicity, in both 2001 and 2003 ethnic minorities who place at least some value on their ethnicity are not statistically significantly less likely to believe that most people can be trusted. Individuals who identify with the majority community shows similar results. Ethnic-majority individuals who consider ethnicity to have at least some importance are not statistically less likely to believe that most people can be trusted. The only statistically significant relationship with respect to the majority community is a positive one in 2003, where those who consider ethnicity to be not very important are slightly more likely to believe that most people can be trusted than those that believe that ethnicity is not important. Splitting respondents by ethnicity does not seem to provide any further support for the theory that multiculturalism isolates people from each other. There is very limited support for the theory in the results that show membership in ethnic organizations decreases the likelihood that one believes that most people can be trusted. Otherwise the relationships that one would expect to see if connections to ethnicity are reducing individuals' connections to others do not appear to be present in Canada. Tables showing the tests that look at community membership and the importance of ethnicity on trust are included below.

Insert tables 7, 8 and 9 here

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall the hypotheses derived from the theories that multiculturalism divides society do not fare well in Canada. The first hypothesis, that individuals who are more involved in ethnic, religious, or cultural organizations should be less supportive of government institutions fails to see statistically significant evidence in support of it. This finding also creates difficulty for the third hypothesis that membership in organizations that build bonding capital should decrease support for government institutions. There is no evidence that this is occurring in so far as ethnic and religious bonding capital is concerned. The evidence in support of the fourth hypothesis, that bridging capital increases support for government institutions, is also very limited. Membership in few of the organizations tested, both bridging and bonding and bonding, show statistically significant evidence of an affect on the manner in which individuals view government institutions. The data in this case suggests a limited impact of both bridging and bonding capital on attitudes towards government in Canada.

The second hypothesis, that individuals who feel more attached to their ethnic identities will be less supportive of government institutions provides the strongest evidence against the applicability of the isolation theory to the Canadian case. Not only is there a lack of statistically significant evidence to show that those that feel closer to their ethnic communities have more negative attitudes towards

government, there is statistically significant evidence to suggest that the opposite relationship exists. This holds for ethnic-minority communities, as individuals who identify with a minority ethnicity and attach at least some importance to that ethnicity tend to have more positive assessments of government than individuals from a minority ethnicity who attach no importance to that ethnicity. It is difficult, given this evidence, to attach multiculturalism to a decrease in support for government. The theory critical of multiculturalism argues that multiculturalism reduces support for government by tying individuals to their own ethnic and cultural communities. This in turn should isolate them from the broader community and from government. If attachment to one's ethnic-community has a negligible or positive effect on attitudes toward government, it is difficult to argue that by increasing or supporting one's ethnic or cultural attachments one is reducing support for state institutions.

The fifth hypothesis, that speaks to social capital as an intervening variable, has limited support. Part of this comes from the fact that there is limited evidence to support the presence of a relationship between the independent variables (organization membership and connection to ethnicity) and the dependent variables (attitudes toward government) that trust is supposed to act as an intervening variable for. Further though, there is limited evidence to suggest that membership in bonding organizations reduces levels of social trust. There is some evidence to suggest that this is the case with membership in ethnic organizations in 2001, but this does not hold over both years that are tested. Further, this positive relationship does not hold across all ethnic groups. Using the broad definition of the majority community, the negative relationship does not hold for ethnic-minorities. Membership in religious organizations, another organization that should build bonding capital, shows no statistically significant negative impact on the belief that others can be trusted. The tests run on connection to ethnicity show no evidence that those that feel closer to their own ethnic communities are less likely to believe that others can be trusted. There is therefore limited evidence to suggest that trust can act as an intervening variable in this case.

The lack of support for the theory advanced by critics of multiculturalism in Canada suggests a number of possible ramifications for the broader application of the critique of multiculturalism discussed in this paper. It could be that Canada is an outlier when it comes to multiculturalism policies. The high level of acceptance of immigrants by Canadians may make Canadians more likely to divorce ethnic or cultural attachment from attachment to the state, in turn, they may be more willing to accept political institutions that have weak ties to cultural communities. Indeed, Johnston et al. find that Canadians who have a strong sense of national identity are less likely than others to hold anti-immigrant sentiments (Johnston et al., 2010, 367-368). This may apply to Canada but not to other countries that have a national identity tied more closely to their majority cultural or ethnic community. It may further be the case that the theory that attachment to ethnicity or culture isolates individuals from each other applies well to diversity but not to multiculturalism policies. Diversity might isolate individuals from each other, but multiculturalism policies might mitigate this affect by increasing the inclusion of minority groups within the broader community. Acceptance and recognition of the state as multicultural by both governments and individuals may make individuals more likely to interact with and trust citizens from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Government programs associated with multiculturalism that foster cultural exchange may also mitigate the negative effects that diversity might have on support for collective institutions. As a result of this, both ethnic-majorities and ethnic-minorities in states with strong multiculturalism policies may be more willing to accept collective endeavours that speak to the interests of ethnically diverse populations. In this vein, Bloemraad suggests that multiculturalism plays a role in the higher proportion of immigrants that seek and acquire citizenship in Canada as compared to the United States (Bloemraad, 2006). Finally, the findings from Canada may suggest a broader problem with the theory that diversity or multiculturalism decreases support for collective institutions. If the Canadian case is representative of other cases, there may

simply be a lack of empirical support for the theories advanced by Barry, Miller, and Walzer. An examination of the impact of community organization membership and connection to ethnicity in a cross-national context may be able to provide further testing of these theories.

Tables

Table 1

Variable	The Impact of Club Membership on Support for Government Institutions							
	Average Government Rating				Court Rating		Police Rating	
	2001		2003		2001		2001	
	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value
Service Clubs	-0.874 (0.831)	0.293	0.594 (0.599)	0.322	-0.707 (1.063)	0.506	0.367 (0.920)	0.690
Recreational Clubs	-0.151 (0.420)	0.720	-0.110 (0.294)	0.708	-0.346 (0.543)	0.523	-0.031 (0.460)	0.946
Political Organizations	-0.544 (1.008)	0.589	-1.292 (0.592)	0.029	2.099 (1.295)	0.105	-0.482 (1.103)	0.662
Cultural Organizations	0.971 (0.669)	0.147	-0.118 (0.457)	0.796	1.280 (0.853)	0.134	0.328 (0.737)	0.657
Help Organizations	0.499 (0.478)	0.297	0.574 (0.403)	0.154	0.419 (0.617)	0.498	1.038 (0.527)	0.049
Ethnic Organizations	-0.618 (0.588)	0.293	1.089 (0.561)	0.052	0.160 (0.805)	0.843	-1.006 (0.651)	0.123
Religious Organizations	0.818 (0.680)	0.229	-0.112 (0.0397)	0.005	0.440 (0.868)	0.612	1.282 (0.740)	0.083
Income	-1.49E-005 (0.0000101)	0.139	-4.53E-004 (0.00513)	0.930	-1.45E-005 (0.0000129)	0.264	1.46E-005 (0.0000111)	0.191
Education	1.357 (0.247)	0.000	1.377 (0.164)	0.000	2.012 (0.315)	0.000	0.402 (0.270)	0.136
Female	1.105 (0.931)	0.235	0.061 (0.653)	0.925	-2.435 (1.192)	0.041	2.031 (1.019)	0.047
Age	-0.112 (0.0394)	0.004	-0.141 (0.0230)	0.000	-0.092 (0.0500)	0.065	0.056 (0.0429)	0.195
Constant	52.983		51.136		49.544		62.628	
R2	0.039		0.046		0.045		0.018	

9

Table 2

Variable	The Impact of Ethnic Attachment on Support for Government Institutions							
	Average Government Rating				Court Rating		Police Rating	
	2001		2003		2001		2001	
	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value
Ethnicity is Very Important	3.527 (1.382)	0.011	4.416 (1.088)	0.000	2.006 (1.780)	0.260	1.468 (1.508)	0.331
Ethnicity is Important	3.463 (1.266)	0.006	3.661 (1.034)	0.000	1.563 (1.632)	0.338	0.629 (1.383)	0.650
Ethnicity is Not Very Important	3.127 (1.437)	0.030	1.901 (1.162)	0.102	1.196 (1.850)	0.518	0.011 (1.569)	0.994
Income	-1.54E-005 (0.000000795)	0.053	-2.53E-003 (0.005)	0.598	-1.38E-005 (0.0000102)	0.177	6.51E-006 (0.00000876)	0.458
Education	1.159 (0.210)	0.000	1.275 (0.153)	0.000	1.882 (0.270)	0.000	0.305 (0.229)	0.183
Female	0.611 (0.818)	0.456	-0.382 (0.617)	0.536	-1.603 (1.051)	0.127	1.881 (0.895)	0.036
Age	-0.093 (0.035)	0.007	-0.129 (0.022)	0.000	-0.053 (0.044)	0.225	0.087 (0.037)	0.021
Constant	50.253		48.472		47.197		62.180	
R2	0.030		0.039		0.031		0.008	

9 All tables use data from the Equality, Security, and Community Survey which can be found online at <http://www.isr.yorku.ca/download/ESC/esc.html>

Table 3

Variable	The Impact of Organization Membership on Government Rating							
	Average Government Rating				Court Rating		Police Rating	
	2001		2003		2001		2001	
	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value
Majority Club Membership	-1.507 (1.092)	0.168	1.359 (0.692)	0.050	-2.724 (1.403)	0.052	-0.959 (1.212)	0.429
Majority Recreation Club Membership	-0.083 (0.466)	0.859	-0.292 (0.352)	0.407	-0.209 (0.608)	0.731	-0.206 (0.512)	0.688
Majority Political Organization Membership	0.581 (1.165)	0.618	-1.632 (0.747)	0.029	2.333 (1.506)	0.122	0.068 (1.301)	0.958
Majority Cultural Organization Membership	0.685 (0.724)	0.344	-0.440 (0.560)	0.432	1.262 (0.930)	0.175	0.330 (0.804)	0.682
Majority Help Organization Membership	0.259 (0.546)	0.635	0.725 (0.477)	0.129	0.309 (0.712)	0.665	0.707 (0.606)	0.244
Majority Ethnic Organization Membership	0.084 (0.709)	0.906	1.123 (0.843)	0.183	-0.190 (1.008)	0.851	-0.669 (0.790)	0.397
Majority Religious Organization Membership	1.889 (0.866)	0.029	-0.210 (0.060)	0.000	1.200 (1.136)	0.291	1.449 (0.962)	0.132
Minority Service Club Membership	-0.080 (1.281)	0.950	-1.490 (1.200)	0.214	1.981 (1.648)	0.230	2.008 (1.421)	0.158
Minority Recreation Club Membership	-0.667 (0.806)	0.408	0.087 (0.465)	0.852	-0.661 (1.032)	0.522	0.455 (0.889)	0.608
Minority Political Organization Membership	-4.064 (2.016)	0.044	-0.912 (1.016)	0.369	1.654 (2.596)	0.524	-1.472 (2.112)	0.486
Minority Cultural Organization Membership	1.527 (1.851)	0.410	0.511 (0.791)	0.519	2.302 (2.335)	0.324	1.021 (2.007)	0.611
Minority Help Organization Membership	1.402 (0.982)	0.154	0.430 (0.734)	0.559	0.643 (1.246)	0.606	2.046 (1.075)	0.057
Minority Ethnic Organization Membership	-1.365 (1.098)	0.214	1.039 (0.772)	0.178	0.641 (1.416)	0.651	-2.136 (1.206)	0.077
Minority Religious Organization Membership	-0.621 (1.110)	0.576	-0.073 (0.054)	0.181	-1.051 (1.419)	0.459	1.014 (1.223)	0.407
Income	-1.13E-005 (0.0000102)	0.269	1.34E-005 (0.005)	0.998	-1.55E-005 (0.0000131)	0.239	1.37E-005 (0.0000113)	0.225
Education	1.377 (0.250)	0.000	1.419 (0.167)	0.000	2.012 (0.320)	0.000	0.382 (0.274)	0.163
Female	0.937 (0.941)	0.320	0.183 (0.658)	0.781	-2.395 (1.209)	0.048	2.032 (1.032)	0.049
Age	-0.115 (0.040)	0.004	-0.131 (0.023)	0.000	-0.093 (0.051)	0.065	0.060 (0.043)	0.163
Constant	52.925		50.402		49.708		62.715	
R2	0.049		0.049		0.050		0.023	

Table 4

Variable	The Impact of Ethnic Importance on Support for Government Institutions							
	Average Government Rating				Court Rating		Police Rating	
	2001		2003		2001		2001	
	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value
Majority Very Important	7.051 (2.865)	0.014	1.065 (2.112)	0.614	3.639 (3.645)	0.318	2.750 (3.059)	0.369
Majority Important	6.791 (2.751)	0.014	0.915 (2.036)	0.653	3.612 (3.499)	0.302	1.179 (2.931)	0.688
Majority Not Very Important	5.390 (2.851)	0.059	1.029 (2.120)	0.627	3.324 (3.632)	0.360	-0.184 (3.045)	0.952
Majority Not Important	3.753 (2.915)	0.198	-2.868 (2.219)	0.196	3.067 (3.721)	0.410	0.271 (3.118)	0.931
Minority Very Important	6.060 (2.959)	0.041	3.766 (2.128)	0.077	5.742 (3.776)	0.129	0.358 (3.157)	0.910
Minority Important	6.338 (2.902)	0.029	2.551 (2.119)	0.229	5.079 (3.701)	0.170	0.187 (3.096)	0.952
Minority Not Very Important	8.902 (3.302)	0.007	1.107 (2.387)	0.643	5.011 (4.197)	0.233	1.849 (3.511)	0.598
Income	-1.54E-005 (0.00000801)	0.055	-2.41E-003 (0.005)	0.616	-1.44E-005 (0.0000103)	0.162	6.99E-006 (0.00000884)	0.429
Education	1.177 (0.214)	0.000	1.237 (0.157)	0.000	1.854 (0.275)	0.000	0.325 (0.233)	0.164
Female	0.643 (0.827)	0.437	-0.130 (0.625)	0.835	-1.543 (1.065)	0.148	1.949 (0.906)	0.032
Age	-0.097 (0.035)	0.005	-0.108 (0.022)	0.000	-0.052 (0.045)	0.244	0.081 (0.038)	0.033
Constant	47.122		49.807		44.793		61.924	
R2	0.033		0.042		0.033		0.010	

Table 5

Trust and Club Membership 2001								
Variable	Coefficient	P-Value	1 to 3	Significant?	4 to 6	Significant? 7 to 9	Significant?	
Service Clubs	0.231 (0.269)	0.392	0.040	No	0.008 (0.045)	No	-0.001 (0.032)	No
Recreational Clubs	0.228 (0.108)	0.035	0.065	Yes	0.036 (0.011)	Yes	0.019 (0.007)	Yes
Political Organizations	0.218 (0.300)	0.466	0.036	No	0.003 (0.051)	No	-0.004 (0.037)	No
Cultural Organizations	-0.044 (0.130)	0.737	-0.023	No	-0.029 (0.049)	No	-0.031 (0.044)	No
Help Organizations	-0.044 (0.099)	0.657	-0.018	No	-0.023 (0.041)	No	-0.025 (0.039)	No
Ethnic Organizations	-0.413 (0.134)	0.002	-0.189	Yes	-0.166 (0.035)	Yes	-0.085 (0.028)	Yes
Religious Organizations	0.202 (0.169)	0.234	0.048	No	0.023 (0.027)	No	0.010 (0.021)	No
Income	2.34E-006 (0.00000592)	0.432						
Education	0.107 (0.059)	0.071						
Female	0.331 (0.220)	0.133						
Age	0.029 (0.009)	0.002						
Constant	-1.006							
Trust and Club Membership 2003								
Variable	Coefficient	P-Value	1 to 3	Significant?	4 to 6	Significant? 7 to 9	Significant?	
Service Clubs	0.230 (0.089)	0.010	0.086	Yes	0.052 (0.009)	Yes	0.030 (0.006)	Yes
Recreational Clubs	0.116 (0.038)	0.002	0.049	Yes	0.041 (0.010)	Yes	0.033 (0.006)	Yes
Political Organizations	0.029 (0.079)	0.710	0.011	No	0.007 (0.031)	No	0.004 (0.028)	No
Cultural Organizations	0.157 (0.064)	0.014	0.062	Yes	0.046 (0.013)	Yes	0.032 (0.007)	Yes
Help Organizations	0.161 (0.052)	0.002	0.065	Yes	0.049 (0.010)	Yes	0.034 (0.004)	Yes
Ethnic Organizations	-0.090 (0.068)	0.182	-0.044	No	-0.046 (0.033)	No	-0.043 (0.028)	No
Religious Organizations	-0.007 (0.005)	0.126	-0.003	No	-0.003 (0.002)	No	-0.003 (0.002)	No
Income	0.003 (0.001)	0.000						
Education	0.147 (0.020)	0.000						
Female	-0.011 (0.077)	0.891						
Age	0.019 (0.003)	0.000						
Constant	-1.470							

Table 6

Variable	The Impact of Attachment to Ethnicity on Trust				2003			
	2001		Significant?		2003		Significant?	
	Coefficient	P-Value	0 to 1		Coefficient	P-Value	0 to 1	
Ethnicity is Very Important	0.006 (0.305)	0.983	-0.002 (0.054)	No	-0.096 (0.124)	0.440	-0.022 (0.027)	No
Ethnicity is Important	0.341 (0.300)	0.255	0.056 (0.051)	No	0.193 (0.119)	0.105	0.044 (0.025)	No
Ethnicity is Not Very Important	0.424 (0.351)	0.227	0.065 (0.056)	No	0.271 (0.136)	0.046	0.058 (0.029)	Yes
Income	3.90E-006 (0.00000236)	0.098			3.34E-003 (0.001)	0.000		
Education	0.074 (0.048)	0.125			0.163 (0.019)	0.000		
Female	0.174 (0.182)	0.341			0.026 (0.072)	0.720		
Age	0.174 (0.008)	0.000			0.020 (0.003)	0.000		
Constant	-0.919				-1.487			

Table 7

Trust and Club Membership 2001								
Variable	Coefficient	P-Value	1 to 3	Significant? 4 to 6	Significant? 7 to 9	Significant?		
Majority Service Clubs	1.004 (0.610)	0.100	0.060	No	0.003 (0.028)	No (0.018)	-0.001 (0.018)	No
Majority Recreational Clubs	0.335 (0.147)	0.022	0.074	Yes	0.074 (0.026)	Yes (0.026)	0.013 (0.008)	Yes
Majority Political Organizations	0.115 (0.401)	0.774	-0.012	No	-0.027 (0.074)	No (0.074)	-0.019 (0.044)	No
Majority Cultural Organizations	0.020 (0.156)	0.898	-0.001	No	-0.010 (0.047)	No (0.047)	-0.013 (0.041)	No
Majority Help Organizations	-0.029 (0.123)	0.810	-0.012	No	-0.019 (0.045)	No (0.045)	-0.022 (0.042)	No
Majority Ethnic Organizations	-0.420 (0.181)	0.020	-0.194	Yes	-0.153 (0.045)	Yes (0.045)	-0.075 (0.034)	Yes
Majority Religious Organizations	0.328 (0.286)	0.252	0.051	No	0.013 (0.038)	No (0.038)	0.002 (0.027)	No
Minority Service Clubs	-0.205 (0.327)	0.530	-0.100	No	-0.080 (0.081)	No (0.081)	-0.046 (0.048)	No
Minority Recreational Clubs	0.072 (0.161)	0.654	0.012	No	0.001 (0.042)	No (0.042)	-0.005 (0.037)	No
Minority Political Organizations	0.785 (0.571)	0.169	0.056	No	0.003 (0.035)	No (0.035)	-0.002 (0.022)	No
Minority Cultural Organizations	-0.437 (0.309)	0.158	-0.192	No	-0.120 (0.065)	No (0.065)	-0.056 (0.042)	No
Minority Help Organizations	-0.093 (0.178)	0.602	-0.043	No	-0.052 (0.066)	No (0.066)	-0.047 (0.051)	No
Minority Ethnic Organizations	-0.318 (0.213)	0.135	-0.143	No	-0.125 (0.065)	No (0.065)	-0.073 (0.040)	No
Minority Religious Organizations	0.273 (0.274)	0.319	0.043	No	0.010 (0.039)	No (0.039)	0.000 (0.030)	No
Income	1.79E-006 (0.00000304)							
Education	0.120 (0.061)							
Female	0.307 (0.227)							
Age	0.028 (0.009)							
Constant	-1.009							

Table 8

Trust and Club Membership 2003								
Variable	Coefficient	P-Value	1 to 3	Significant? 4 to 6	Significant? 7 to 9	Significant?		
Majority Service Clubs	0.130 (0.102)	0.201	0.049	No	0.034 (0.025)	No	0.023 (0.019)	No
Majority Recreational Clubs	0.190 (0.048)	0.000	0.076	Yes	0.054 (0.007)	Yes	0.035 (0.003)	Yes
Majority Political Organizations	0.204 (0.124)	0.099	0.073	No	0.044 (0.019)	No	0.025 (0.013)	No
Majority Cultural Organizations	0.146 (0.086)	0.088	0.055	No	0.040 (0.018)	No	0.028 (0.012)	No
Majority Help Organizations	0.175 (0.065)	0.007	0.068	Yes	0.049 (0.012)	Yes	0.032 (0.006)	Yes
Majority Ethnic Organizations	0.105 (0.115)	0.362	0.038	No	0.025 (0.033)	No	0.016 (0.026)	No
Majority Religious Organizations	-0.003 (0.008)	0.708	-0.001	No	-0.001 (0.003)	No	-0.001 (0.003)	No
Minority Service Clubs	0.377 (0.173)	0.030	0.108	Yes	0.043 (0.015)	Yes	0.018 (0.012)	Yes
Minority Recreational Clubs	0.011 (0.056)	0.848	0.004	No	0.002 (0.024)	No	0.001 (0.022)	No
Minority Political Organizations	-0.178 (0.120)	0.137	-0.087	No	-0.079 (0.046)	No	-0.059 (0.030)	No
Minority Cultural Organizations	0.180 (0.099)	0.069	0.066	No	0.044 (0.017)	No	0.028 (0.011)	No
Minority Help Organizations	0.109 (0.089)	0.220	0.042	No	0.032 (0.025)	No	0.022 (0.019)	No
Minority Ethnic Organizations	-0.140 (0.089)	0.116	-0.064	No	-0.064 (0.039)	No	-0.055 (0.030)	No
Minority Religious Organizations	-0.007 (0.006)	0.235	-0.003	No	-0.003 (0.003)	No	-0.003 (0.003)	No
Income	0.004 (0.001)	0.000						
Education	0.146 (0.020)	0.000						
Female	-0.026 (0.078)	0.745						
Age	0.018 (0.003)	0.000						
Constant	-1.404							

Table 9

Variable	2001 The Impact of Ethnic Attachment on Support for Government Institutions				2003 The Impact of Ethnic Attachment on Support for Government Institutions			
	Coefficient	P-Value	0 to 1	Significant?	Coefficient	P-Value	0 to 1	Significant?
Majority Ethnicity is Very Important	1.351 (0.544)	0.013	0.166 (0.053)	Yes	0.377 (0.238)	0.113	0.083 (0.047)	No
Majority Ethnicity is Important	1.174 (0.510)	0.021	0.165 (0.063)	Yes	0.631 (0.230)	0.006	0.136 (0.047)	Yes
Majority Ethnicity is Not Very Important	1.802 (0.577)	0.002	0.202 (0.045)	Yes	0.775 (0.243)	0.001	0.155 (0.043)	Yes
Majority Ethnicity is Not Important	1.164 (0.579)	0.044	0.139 (0.056)	Yes	0.429 (0.252)	0.088	0.090 (0.049)	No
Minority Ethnicity is Very Important	0.572 (0.514)	0.266	0.082 (0.073)	No	0.118 (0.239)	0.623	0.028 (0.052)	No
Minority Ethnicity is Important	1.125 (0.525)	0.032	0.149 (0.058)	Yes	0.301 (0.240)	0.210	0.065 (0.050)	No
Minority Ethnicity is Not Very Important	0.252 (0.594)	0.672	0.027 (0.093)	No	0.170 (0.271)	0.530	0.037 (0.057)	No
Income	3.55E-006 (0.00000236)	0.133			3.39E-003 (0.001)	0.000		
Education	0.098 (0.050)	0.050			0.171 (0.019)	0.000		
Female	0.114 (0.187)	0.544			0.003 (0.074)	0.966		
Age	0.029 (0.008)	0.000			0.018 (0.003)	0.000		
Constant	-1.854				-1.796			

Appendix 1- Ethnic Attachment with Ethnicity as Not Very Important as a Base Category

Variable	The Impact of Ethnic Attachment on Support for Government Institutions							
	Average Government Rating				Court Rating		Police Rating	
	2001		2003		2001		2001	
Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	
Ethnicity is Very Important	0.400 (1.243)	0.748	2.515 (0.920)	0.006	0.810 (1.593)	0.611	1.457 (1.355)	0.282
Ethnicity is Important	0.336 (1.111)	0.762	1.760 (0.854)	0.039	0.367 (1.424)	0.796	0.617 (1.212)	0.610
Ethnicity is Not Important	-3.127 (1.437)	0.030	-1.901 (1.162)	0.102	-1.196 (1.850)	0.518	-0.011 (1.569)	0.994
Income	-1.54E-005 (0.00000795)	0.053	-2.53E-003 (0.005)	0.598	-1.38E-005 (0.0000102)	0.177	6.51E-006 (0.00000876)	0.458
Education	1.159 (0.210)	0.000	1.275 (0.153)	0.000	1.882 (0.270)	0.000	0.305 (0.229)	0.183
Female	0.611 (0.818)	0.456	-0.382 (0.617)	0.536	-1.603 (1.051)	0.127	1.881 (0.895)	0.036
Age	-0.093 (0.035)	0.007	-0.129 (0.022)	0.000	-0.053 (0.044)	0.225	0.087 (0.037)	0.021
Constant	53.380		50.373		48.393		62.191	
R2	0.030		0.039		0.031		0.008	

Appendix 2- Ethnic Divisions with Identification as Canadian as the Majority Category

Variable	The Impact of Organization Membership on Government Rating							
	Average Government Rating				Police Rating			
	2001		2003		2001		2001	
	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value
Can Service Club Membership	-0.012 (1.746)	0.994	1.457 (1.279)	0.255	-1.170 (2.248)	0.603	3.769 (1.944)	0.053
Can Recreation Club Membership	-0.493 (0.877)	0.575	-0.684 (0.633)	0.280	-0.823 (1.155)	0.476	0.223 (0.971)	0.819
Can Political Organization Membership	1.725 (1.833)	0.347	-2.620 (1.449)	0.071	1.436 (2.365)	0.544	-1.958 (2.042)	0.338
Can Cultural Organization Membership	1.777 (1.604)	0.268	-0.301 (0.893)	0.736	2.053 (2.071)	0.322	-0.536 (1.749)	0.759
Can Help Organization Membership	0.099 (1.127)	0.930	0.128 (0.803)	0.873	-1.839 (1.472)	0.212	-0.050 (1.254)	0.968
Can Ethnic Organization Membership	0.524 (1.221)	0.668	1.773 (1.496)	0.236	0.476 (2.290)	0.835	-0.654 (1.358)	0.630
Can Religious Organization Membership	0.717 (1.457)	0.623	-0.168 (0.088)	0.057	2.015 (1.885)	0.285	2.597 (1.617)	0.108
Ncan Service Club Membership	-1.253 (0.953)	0.189	0.357 (0.681)	0.600	-0.444 (1.220)	0.716	-0.577 (1.054)	0.584
Ncan Recreation Club Membership	-0.080 (0.461)	0.862	-0.037 (0.320)	0.909	-0.237 (0.594)	0.690	-0.136 (0.504)	0.787
Ncan Political Organization Membership	-1.685 (1.218)	0.167	-1.182 (0.662)	0.075	2.879 (1.567)	0.066	0.080 (1.326)	0.952
Ncan Cultural Organization Membership	0.775 (0.745)	0.298	-0.103 (0.533)	0.846	1.183 (0.953)	0.215	0.435 (0.824)	0.598
Ncan Help Organization Membership	0.707 (0.531)	0.183	0.816 (0.463)	0.078	0.913 (0.686)	0.183	1.375 (0.585)	0.019
Ncan Ethnic Organization Membership	-0.965 (0.676)	0.154	0.907 (0.610)	0.137	0.030 (0.870)	0.973	-1.070 (0.747)	0.152
Ncan Religious Organization Membership	0.942 (0.776)	0.225	-0.120 (0.046)	0.009	-0.309 (1.007)	0.759	0.984 (0.857)	0.251
Income	-1.38E-005 (0.0000102)	0.174	-2.05E-004 (0.005)	0.968	-1.57E-005 (0.0000131)	0.229	1.51E-005 (0.0000112)	0.179
Education	1.355 (0.250)	0.000	1.411 (0.166)	0.000	2.061 (0.320)	0.000	0.377 (0.273)	0.168
Female	1.085 (0.942)	0.250	0.200 (0.659)	0.762	-2.564 (1.211)	0.034	2.002 (1.032)	0.053
Age	-0.114 (0.040)	0.004	-0.131 (0.023)	0.000	-0.098 (0.051)	0.054	0.055 (0.043)	0.204
Constant	53.024		50.429		49.605		62.772	
R2	0.043		0.048		0.050		0.022	

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Variable	Average Government Rating				Court Rating		Police Rating	
	2001		2003		2001		2001	
	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value
Canadian Very Important	1.876 (2.680)	0.484	3.935 (1.911)	0.040	-0.929 (3.394)	0.784	-1.913 (2.899)	0.509
Canadian Important	5.744 (2.035)	0.005	1.431 (1.527)	0.349	0.056 (2.618)	0.983	1.897 (2.225)	0.394
Canadian Not Very Important	3.089 (2.431)	0.204	-0.707 (1.848)	0.702	0.193 (3.111)	0.950	1.403 (2.687)	0.602
Canadian Not Important	2.597 (2.554)	0.309	-6.157 (2.084)	0.003	-1.061 (3.349)	0.751	-0.787 (2.842)	0.782
Minority Very Important	4.566 (1.570)	0.004	2.649 (0.037)	0.037	2.114 (2.019)	0.295	1.846 (1.705)	0.279
Minority Important	3.953 (1.458)	0.007	2.073 (0.090)	0.090	1.466 (1.873)	0.434	0.233 (1.582)	0.883
Minority Not Very Important	3.896 (1.655)	0.019	0.217 (0.874)	0.874	1.128 (2.126)	0.596	-0.491 (1.794)	0.784
Income	-1.57E-005 (0.00000801)	0.050	-2.09E-003 (0.00480)	0.663	-1.40E-005 (0.0000103)	0.174	6.38E-006 (0.00000884)	0.471
Education	1.161 (0.213)	0.000	1.319 (0.155)	0.000	1.897 (0.275)	0.000	0.298 (0.232)	0.199
Female	0.637 (0.828)	0.442	-0.250 (0.623)	0.689	-1.573 (1.064)	0.140	1.956 (0.905)	0.031
Age	-0.092 (0.035)	0.008	-0.119 (0.0218)	0.000	-0.052 (0.0445)	0.240	0.089 (0.0378)	0.019
Constant	49.478		49.360		47.312		62.208	

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